State v. Damion Shantell Mayers

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   CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
        EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

                  THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
                      In The Court of Appeals

        The State, Respondent,

        v.

        Damion Shantell Mayers, Appellant.

        Appellate Case No. 2021-000927


                     Appeal From Orangeburg County
                   Edgar W. Dickson, Circuit Court Judge


                   Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-357
             Submitted October 1, 2023 – Filed November 8, 2023


                               AFFIRMED


        Appellate Defender Joanna K. Delany, of Columbia, for
        Appellant.

        Attorney General Alan Wilson, Deputy Attorney General
        Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney
        General Melody J. Brown, Assistant Attorney General
        Tommy Evans, Jr., all of Columbia; and Solicitor David
        M. Pascoe, Jr., of Orangeburg, all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Damion Shantell Mayers appeals his convictions and sentences
of life imprisonment for murder and five years' imprisonment for possession of a
firearm by a person convicted of a violent felony. On appeal, Mayers argues the
trial court erred in admitting testimony from Abraham Williams regarding whether
Williams received phone calls from Mayers's friends and family regarding his
participation in Mayers's trial. Mayers contends the danger of unfair prejudice
from Williams's testimony substantially outweighed its probative value under Rule
403, SCRE. We affirm.

We hold the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the portion of Williams's
testimony that focused on whether he received phone calls from Mayers's family
and friends in the two years before trial because the testimony was not probative of
the offenses for which Mayers was on trial. The testimony was also not probative
of whether Mayers had engaged in witness intimidation because the State did not
connect Mayers to the calls Williams received. Additionally, the danger of unfair
prejudice was high because the suggestion that Mayers was someone who would
threaten Williams in a manner that made Williams afraid to appear in court has a
tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis. See State v. Byers,
392 S.C.
438, 444
,
710 S.E.2d 55, 57-58
(2011) ("The admission or exclusion of evidence is
left to the sound discretion of the trial [court], whose decision will not be reversed
on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." (quoting State v. Williams,
386 S.C. 503,
509
,
690 S.E.2d 62, 65
(2010))); Rule 403, SCRE ("Although relevant, evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice . . . ."); State v. Gray,
408 S.C. 601, 610
,
759 S.E.2d 160, 165
(Ct.
App. 2014) ("'Probative value' is the measure of the importance of that tendency to
the outcome of a case. It is the weight that a piece of relevant evidence will carry
in helping the trier of fact decide the issues.");
id. at 616
,
759 S.E.2d at 168
("Unfair prejudice does not mean the damage to a defendant's case that results
from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather it refers to evidence
which tends to suggest decision on an improper basis." (quoting State v. Gilchrist,
329 S.C. 621, 630
,
496 S.E.2d 424, 429
(Ct. App. 1998))); Johnson v. State,
433
S.C. 550
, 558-59,
860 S.E.2d 696
, 701 (Ct. App. 2021) ("In criminal cases, the
term 'unfair prejudice' 'speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant
evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof
specific to the offense charged.'"(quoting Old Chief v. United States,
519 U.S. 172,
180
(1997))); State v. Edwards,
383 S.C. 66, 68
,
678 S.E.2d 405, 406
(2009) ("[A]
trial court may admit evidence of witness intimidation when the defendant is
established as the source of the intimidation.");
id. at 70
,
678 S.E.2d at 407
("Without establishing that connection, the evidence concerning witness
intimidation is unreliable and therefore inadmissible.").
However, we find the error was harmless because this portion of Williams's
testimony could not reasonably have affected the jury's verdict when looking at the
case as a whole. See State v. Collins,
409 S.C. 524, 537
,
763 S.E.2d 22, 29
(2014)
("The harmless error rule generally provides that an error is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt if it did not contribute to the verdict obtained."); State v. Brown,
344 S.C. 70, 75
,
543 S.E.2d 552, 554-55
(2001) ("Whether an error in the
admission of evidence is harmless generally depends upon its materiality in
relation to the case as a whole."). Two witnesses testified Mayers had lost money
to the victim in a dice game the two men were playing immediately before the
shooting. Additionally, a witness testified only Mayers, the victim, and Williams
were in the room where the shooting occurred just moments before the witness
heard gunshots. Finally, Williams's testimony that Mayers shot the victim with a
Draco was corroborated by another witness, who saw Mayers retrieve a Draco out
of a gray or white Cadillac, a color similar to the "silver or gray" Cadillac Mayers
stipulated he drove, and re-enter the apartment where the shooting occurred.

AFFIRMED. 1

WILLIAMS, C.J., and HEWITT and VERDIN, JJ., concur.




1
    We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.