State v. Rasheed

[Cite as State v. Rasheed, 2024-Ohio-3424.]




                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     MONTGOMERY COUNTY

 STATE OF OHIO                                      :
                                                    :
       Appellee                                     :   C.A. No. 29917
                                                    :
 v.                                                 :   Trial Court Case No. 2022 CR 03026
                                                    :
 MALIK TALEEB RASHEED                               :   (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
                                                    :   Court)
       Appellant                                    :
                                                    :

                                               ...........

                                               OPINION

                                    Rendered on September 6, 2024

                                               ...........

DAVID R. MILES, Attorney for Appellant

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by MICHAEL P. ALLEN, Attorney for Appellee

                                              .............

LEWIS, J.

        {¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Malik Taleeb Rasheed appeals from his conviction for

felonious assault in the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court following a jury trial.

For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
                                                                                           -2-


         I.   Facts and Course of Proceedings

       {¶ 2} On November 1, 2022, Rasheed was indicted by a Montgomery County

grand jury on one count of felonious assault (serious physical harm), in violation of R.C.

2903.11(A)(1), and one count of felonious assault (deadly weapon), in violation of R.C.

2903.11(A)(2), both felonies of the second degree.

       {¶ 3} Rasheed was originally scheduled for arraignment on November 3, 2022,

which the arraignment was continued by the court until November 7, 2022, at which point

counsel was appointed. Rasheed successfully moved for a continuance from November

23, 2022, until December 5, 2022. On December 5, 2022, a trial date was scheduled for

January 19, 2023.

       {¶ 4} On January 3, 2023, Rasheed filed a motion to dismiss count two of the

indictment because the indictment failed to specify the specific deadly weapon allegedly

used to commit the offense. The trial court denied Rasheed’s motion to dismiss on

January 31, 2023, and a new trial date was scheduled for the week of February 16, 2023.

       {¶ 5} A final pretrial was held on February 14, 2023. Rasheed declined to accept

a plea offer from the State, and the case proceeded to a jury trial the following day. After

jury selection began, Rasheed informed the court that he wished to proceed pro se. A

discussion was held on the record outside the hearing of the jury, and Rasheed was

eventually permitted to proceed pro se. Following jury selection and after the jury was

impaneled and sworn in, Rasheed requested a continuance in order to prepare for trial

and further requested to have new standby counsel appointed.              Following lengthy

discussions, the court declared a mistrial and continued the trial to the next available date.
                                                                                              -3-


         {¶ 6} Immediately after the mistrial was declared, Rasheed requested a

competency hearing. On March 16, 2023, the trial court ordered that Rasheed complete

a competency evaluation and ordered that he be evaluated as to his sanity at the time of

the alleged offenses. Rasheed was subsequently found competent to stand trial, and

trial was scheduled for June 12, 2023. New counsel was appointed to assist as standby

counsel, but Rasheed refused to cooperate with counsel and insisted that he proceed pro

se without standby counsel.

         {¶ 7} Between the time of the mistrial and the second jury trial, Rasheed filed

numerous pro se motions, including several motions to dismiss based on speedy trial

violations. The trial court granted one motion regarding discovery, but all of Rasheed’s

other motions were overruled.

         {¶ 8} A jury trial commenced on June 12, 2023. The following evidence was

presented at trial.

         {¶ 9} M.F. testified that she met Rasheed in early September 2022.1 At that time,

M.F. was living on Kenilworth Avenue with her children.                Because Rasheed was

homeless, she allowed him to stay at her house from time to time. On October 22, 2022,

Rasheed came to M.F.’s home around 3:30 p.m., and they ran errands together. Around

7 p.m. they returned to her home on Kenilworth. M.F. was in the process of moving, so

she continued packing things and cleaning the house while Rasheed went upstairs to lay

down on a bed. At some point, while only the two of them were in the home, M.F. went

upstairs to clean the bathroom, and Rasheed got up and started asking M.F. about some



1
    In accordance with this Court’s policies, we will refer to the victim by initials only.
                                                                                       -4-


missing money. Rasheed accused M.F. of stealing $200 from him, which she denied.

Rasheed grabbed a Bluetooth speaker that was in the bathroom, held it above his head,

and threatened to bash M.F.’s head with it if she did not give him his money. However,

instead of hitting her with the speaker, Rasheed grabbed M.F.’s hair and dragged her into

the bedroom across the hall. While M.F. was on the bed, Rasheed shouted at her, held

his arm to her neck, and then threw her onto the floor. Rasheed forced her legs back

into a fold and held her down while he grabbed an iron. Rasheed plugged in the iron

and, once it was hot, he pressed it down onto M.F.’s face. M.F. was able to use her feet

to unplug the cord of the iron and pushed it off her face. During this struggle, Rasheed

repeatedly asked for his money and told M.F. they were both going to die that day.

       {¶ 10} After M.F. got out from under the iron, Rasheed dragged her downstairs by

her hair. Rasheed struck M.F. a few times and then dragged her to the dining room

because she told him his money was stashed in some bags of tea. As she was trying to

buy time by looking through tea bags, Rasheed grabbed a ceramic jar and hit her with it

across her face, causing a laceration. He told her that he was going to hit her with

something every 10 seconds until she gave him his money. While she was pretending

to look for the money, Rasheed kicked her with steel toe boots in her chest, causing her

to smash into a television.

       {¶ 11} After M.F. struck the television, Rasheed went to the living room door. M.F.

tried to run through the kitchen to the back door, but Rasheed grabbed her by her hair

and dragged her back to the dining room; he then struck her several more times in the

face. Rasheed then went into the kitchen, where M.F. had a two-liter jug of aloe, and he
                                                                                            -5-


poured it all over her. He also grabbed a gallon of disinfectant and poured it on her.

       {¶ 12} Rasheed repeatedly told M.F., who was on the floor, to get up. While she

was on the floor, he kicked her in the back and neck several times. He then went to

M.F.’s bag, where she kept a handgun, and he took it out. Rasheed told her that neither

of them was going to get out of there alive. Rasheed tried to operate the gun, but it had

a problem with a screw, and Rasheed just jiggled the gun around without firing it. When

Rasheed went to the front door again, M.F. ran out the back door.              M.F. saw her

neighbors outside. At first, she told them she did not need help because Rasheed came

outside beside her, and he still had the gun. When the neighbors started to walk away,

Rasheed told M.F. that she needed medical attention and that they should get her to a

hospital. However, when Rasheed went back into the house, M.F. ran to her neighbor’s

house and asked for help. The neighbors called 911 for her.

       {¶ 13} M.F. testified that she was taken by medics to the hospital and was

hospitalized for a week. She had seven broken ribs, a broken spine, a broken sternum,

and missing patches of hair. She needed stitches behind her arm, behind her knee, and

on her face due to multiple lacerations. M.F. went to a burn clinic for treatment of her

face, but she still had scarring on the left side of her face and her lip at the time of trial;

she also had a tilt to her gait at trial as a result of all the injuries.

       {¶ 14} After M.F. was released from the hospital, she looked for the iron and the

gun.   She never found the gun Rasheed had taken but did locate the iron in her

belongings after she moved from the Kenilworth residence; she turned the iron over to

police. M.F. denied that she had taken any drugs or alcohol on the night of the assault,
                                                                                      -6-


but she was aware that Rasheed had had marijuana and mushrooms with him.

       {¶ 15} In response to the 911 calls, Dayton Police were dispatched to M.F.’s

residence on Kenilworth Avenue on a domestic violence complaint; the officers were told

that the victim was at her neighbor’s house on Kenilworth and the assailant (with a gun)

was inside M.F.’s residence. Dayton Police Officer Richard Thimmes and his partner,

Officer Joshua Gundaker, were the first officers to arrive at M.F.’s home.       Officer

Thimmes testified he made contact with Rasheed as Rasheed walked out the back side

door of the house. Rasheed claimed he did not have any weapons on him but his “baby

might”; he also told the officers that M.F. had taken mushrooms and freaked out on him.

The officers did not locate any weapons on Rasheed, but he did have a bag of marijuana

and a lighter.

       {¶ 16} After officers obtained consent from M.F.’s son to search her home, they

found an ironing board but no iron and a gun box with ammunition but no gun. The

officers also found a braid of hair from M.F. on the floor. No drugs or other weapons

were found inside the house.

       {¶ 17} Dayton Police Sergeant Salli Jones testified that she had responded to the

911 call and went to M.F.’s neighbor’s home on Kenilworth, where she observed M.F.

sitting on the floor with a towel over her face. M.F. was wrapped in a blanket and her

clothing and person appeared to be damp. Sergeant Jones observed burns on M.F.’s

face and a laceration on her cheekbone. When officers attempted to speak to M.F., she

could only respond with groans and moans. M.F. did not appear to be intoxicated or

under the influence; rather, she appeared to be in shock. M.F. was non-responsive to
                                                                                       -7-


the officers and was visibly shaking.

      {¶ 18} Sergeant Tim Turner of the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office testified to

his duties as administrative sergeant for the regional dispatch center, which handles 911

calls. Sergeant Turner testified as the keeper of records for the two 911 calls made on

October 22, 2022, by M.F.’s neighbors. The first 911 call was made at approximately

9:50 p.m., with the second call was made around 9:59 p.m. Officers did not arrive on the

scene until 10:09 p.m.

      {¶ 19} Detective Alaina Hammond of the Dayton Police Department was assigned

to the case the day after the assault occurred. Detective Hammond testified she spoke

to M.F.’s son and the neighbors on Kenilworth to obtain statements the day after the

incident. Hammond attempted to locate any additional witnesses or video cameras from

surrounding locations but was unsuccessful. She also obtained a search warrant for

Rasheed’s vehicle but did not find a gun or an iron there. Days later, Hammond had a

canine search the area outside of M.F.’s residence for firearms, without success.

      {¶ 20} Detective Hammond met with M.F. while she was still in the hospital.

Hammond testified that M.F. appeared to be in a lot of pain. M.F. wore a C-collar on her

neck and had a brace with handles on it in the front to help move her torso. Although

M.F. was in a hospital bed with bandages around her face and had some difficulty

speaking, she provided a statement to Hammond about what had happened.

      {¶ 21} Detective Hammond obtained a certified copy of M.F.’s hospital records

from Miami Valley Hospital; they showed that she had been admitted on October 22,

2022, and discharged on October 29, 2022. The records also reflected that M.F. had a
                                                                                         -8-


C3 cervical fracture, a closed fracture of the sternum, multiple rib fractures, a laceration

on her face, lacerations on her right side and right elbow, first-degree facial burns, and a

partial thickness burn on her face.

       {¶ 22} In late January or early February 2023, Detective Hammond again met with

M.F. in person for a statement. By then, M.F.’s appearance had improved and many of

her injuries had healed. M.F. provided Detective Hammond with a green bag containing

the iron M.F. claimed had been used in the incident. M.F. also provided a gun box for

the firearm M.F. said Rasheed had used on the night of the assault, but no firearm was

inside the box.   The firearm was never located.

       {¶ 23} Following the jury trial, Rasheed was found guilty as charged. On July 11,

2023, the parties appeared for sentencing. Although Rasheed had represented himself

at trial, he requested counsel for sentencing. Therefore, the trial court appointed counsel

and continued the sentencing hearing.

       {¶ 24} On August 1, 2023, the parties again appeared for sentencing, this time with

Rasheed represented by counsel. The trial court merged the two counts and the State

elected sentencing on felonious assault with a deadly weapon. The trial court imposed

a mandatory minimum prison term of 8 years with a maximum prison term of 12 years,

pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Act. The trial court advised Rasheed that he would be

subject to a mandatory term of post-release control upon his release from prison for not

less than 18 months but no more than 3 years. The court filed its judgment entry on

August 3.

       {¶ 25} Rasheed filed a notice of appeal on August 28, 2023. However, this Court
                                                                                            -9-


determined that the August 3, 2023 judgment entry was not a final appealable order

because it did not set forth the fact of conviction, citing Crim.R. 32(C) and State v. Lester,

2011-Ohio-5204. State v. Rasheed, Montgomery App. No. 29893 (Decision and Final

Judgment Entry, Sep. 11, 2023). We noted that the trial court had filed a nunc pro tunc

entry on September 3, 2023, in an attempt to correct its original judgment entry, but

because that occurred after the notice of appeal was filed, the trial court lacked jurisdiction

to correct the order. Accordingly, that appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

       {¶ 26} On September 19, 2023, the trial court issued an amended judgment entry

from which Rasheed filed a timely notice of appeal. He now raises seven assignments

of error.

            II.   Speedy Trial

       {¶ 27} Rasheed’s first assignment of error states:

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING APPELLANT’S MOTION

       TO DISMISS ON SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS.

       {¶ 28} Rasheed argues that the trial court erred in overruling his several motions

to dismiss on statutory speedy trial grounds. Rasheed contends that his speedy trial

time should not have been extended by the declaration of a mistrial or the court’s referral

for Rasheed’s competency and sanity evaluations. We do not agree.

       {¶ 29} “The right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Sixth

Amendment to the United States Constitution, made obligatory on the states by the

Fourteenth Amendment. Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantees an

accused this same right.” State v. Hughes, 86 Ohio St.3d 424, 425 (1999), citing State
                                                                                           -10-


v. MacDonald, 48 Ohio St.2d 66, 68 (1976). “This constitutional mandate was codified

in Ohio by the enactment of R.C. 2945.71, which designates specific time limits for

bringing a defendant to trial.” State v. Louis, 2020-Ohio-951, ¶ 28 (2d Dist.).

       {¶ 30} Pursuant to R.C. 2945.71(C)(2), a felony defendant must be brought to trial

within 270 days after the defendant’s arrest. “For purposes of calculating speedy-trial

time, ‘each day during which the accused is held in jail in lieu of bail on the pending charge

shall be counted as three days.’ Thus, subject to certain tolling events, a jailed defendant

must be tried within 90 days.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Ramey, 2012-Ohio-2904,

¶ 15, quoting R.C. 2945.71(E). The day of arrest is not included when calculating a

defendant’s speedy trial time. State v. Cimpaye, 2020-Ohio-2740, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.), citing

State v. Cline, 2003-Ohio-4712, ¶ 27 (2d Dist.).

       {¶ 31} “Speedy-trial provisions are mandatory, and, pursuant to R.C. 2945.73(B),

a person not brought to trial within the relevant time constraints ‘shall be discharged,’ and

further criminal proceedings based on the same conduct are barred.” State v. Sanchez,

2006-Ohio-4478, ¶ 7, quoting R.C. 2945.73(B) and citing R.C. 2945.72(D). However,

“the prescribed times for trial set forth in R.C. 2945.71 are not absolute in all

circumstances, but a certain measure of flexibility was intended by the General Assembly

by the enactment of R.C. 2945.72, wherein discretionary authority is granted to extend

the trial date beyond the R.C. 2945.71 time prescriptions.” State v. Wentworth, 54 Ohio

St.2d 171, 173 (1978), citing State v. Lee, 48 Ohio St.2d 208 (1976) and State v. Davis,

46 Ohio St.2d 444 (1976). “Accordingly, R.C. 2945.72 contains an exhaustive list of

events and circumstances that extend the time within which a defendant must be brought
                                                                                      -11-


to trial.” Ramey at ¶ 24. These include the following relevant circumstances:

      (B) Any period during which the accused is mentally incompetent to stand

      trial or during which the accused's mental competence to stand trial is being

      determined, or any period during which the accused is physically incapable

      of standing trial;

      (C) Any period of delay necessitated by the accused's lack of counsel,

      provided that such delay is not occasioned by any lack of diligence in

      providing counsel to an indigent accused upon the accused's request as

      required by law;

      (D) Any period of delay occasioned by the neglect or improper act of the

      accused;

      (E) Any period of delay necessitated by reason of a plea in bar or

      abatement, motion, proceeding, or action made or instituted by the accused;

      ...

      (H) The period of any continuance granted on the accused's own motion,

      and the period of any reasonable continuance granted other than upon the

      accused's own motion . . .

R.C. 2945.72.

      {¶ 32} “Upon review of a speedy-trial issue, a court is required to count the days

of delay chargeable to either side and determine whether the case was tried within

applicable time limits.” Sanchez at ¶ 8. “A defendant establishes a prima facie speedy

trial violation when his motion reveals that a trial did not occur within the time period
                                                                                            -12-


prescribed by R.C. 2945.71.” State v. Hill, 2020-Ohio-2958, ¶ 6 (2d Dist.), citing State v.

Butcher, 27 Ohio St.3d 28, 31 (1986). “If a defendant ‘establishes a prima facie case of

a violation of his right to a speedy trial, the burden then shifts to the State’ to demonstrate

either that the statutory limit was not exceeded, or that the State's time to bring the

defendant to trial was properly extended.” State v. Wagner, 2021-Ohio-1671, ¶ 12 (2d

Dist.), quoting State v. Nichols, 2005-Ohio-1771, ¶ 11 (5th Dist.), citing Butcher at 30-31.

“Review of a speedy-trial claim involves a mixed question of law and fact. Therefore, we

defer to the trial court's factual findings if they are supported by competent, credible

evidence, but we review the application of the law to those facts de novo.” State v. Long,

2020-Ohio-5363, ¶ 15.

       {¶ 33} First, Rasheed argues that his speedy trial rights were violated before his

first trial started on February 15, 2023. The record reflects that Rasheed was arrested

on October 22, 2022, so his statutory speedy trial time started to run on October 23, 2022.

He was held in custody solely on these charges for the duration of the case; therefore,

Rasheed was entitled to the triple-count provision enumerated under R.C. 2945.71(E).

Absent any tolling events, Rasheed’s speedy trial time of 90 days would have expired on

January 20, 2023.

       {¶ 34} On November 23, 2022, a scheduling conference was held at which

defense counsel requested a continuance. The request was granted, and the matter

was continued until December 5, 2022. Counsel’s request for a continuance constituted

a tolling event and extended Rasheed’s speedy trial time an additional 13 days. See

R.C. 2945.72(H) (speedy trial time is extended for “[t]he period of any continuance
                                                                                          -13-


granted on the accused's own motion.”).

       {¶ 35} On December 5, 2022, Rasheed orally requested that the case be

dismissed on speedy trial grounds, which the trial court orally overruled.         Because

Rasheed’s speedy trial rights had not been violated at that time, the trial court did not err

in denying Rasheed’s motion to dismiss. That same day, a jury trial was scheduled for

January 19, 2023, with a final pretrial on January 6, 2023.

       {¶ 36} On January 3, 2023, Rasheed filed a motion to dismiss one count of the

indictment. Two days later, counsel filed a motion to withdraw. At the January 6, 2023

final pretrial hearing, the trial court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, appointed new

counsel, and continued the case until January 10, 2023. On January 10, 2023, newly-

appointed counsel requested a continuance of one week, which the trial court granted.

Although, generally, lack of counsel for the accused and/or counsel’s request for a

continuance would constitute tolling events, time was already being tolled at that point

due to Rasheed’s January 3, 2023 motion to dismiss. The tolling ended when the trial

court overruled the motion to dismiss on January 31, 2023. State v. Bickerstaff, 10 Ohio

St.3d 62, 67 (1984) (“It is evident from a reading of the statute that a motion to dismiss

acts to toll the time in which a defendant must be brought to trial.”) Thus, time was tolled

an additional 29 days from January 3, 2023, until January 31, 2023.

       {¶ 37} On January 31, 2023, a jury trial was scheduled for the following month.

Defense moved to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, which the court orally overruled.

Once again, due to prior tolling events, the trial court did not err in overruling the motion

to dismiss because Rasheed’s speedy trial time had not yet expired. Rasheed’s first jury
                                                                                           -14-


trial began on February 15, 2023. Considering that 42 days were tolled, we conclude

that Rasheed’s first trial began prior to the expiration of his speedy trial time, which would

have been in early March 2023.

       {¶ 38} After jury selection, a mistrial was declared, and the jury was discharged.

Rasheed’s second jury trial did not begin until June 12, 2023. According to Rasheed,

his speedy trial time was not extended by the mistrial because it was not a tolling event.

We agree that a mistrial is not a tolling event pursuant to R.C. 2945.71, because following

a mistrial, R.C. 2945.71 does not apply, and the standard to be applied for speedy trial

purposes is “reasonableness under federal and state constitutions.” State v. Fanning, 1

Ohio St.3d 19, 21 (1982).

       {¶ 39} Consistent with constitutional speedy trial standards, the reasonableness

standard requires a four-factor analysis: “(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the

delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to

the defendant.” State v. Hull, 2006-Ohio-4252, ¶ 21-22, citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.

514, 530 (1972).         “[T]hese four factors are balanced considering the totality of the

circumstances, with no one factor controlling.” State v. Perkins, 2009-Ohio-3033, ¶ 8 (2d

Dist.), citing Barker.

       {¶ 40} The trial court found that the delay between Rasheed’s mistrial and the

commencement of his second trial was reasonable and therefore that Rasheed’s

constitutional speedy trial rights had not been violated. Under the facts of this case, we

agree that Rasheed’s constitutional speedy trial rights were not violated and, therefore,

the trial court did not err in overruling Rasheed’s multiple motions to dismiss on speedy
                                                                                           -15-


trial grounds. Here, the length of the delay between Rasheed’s mistrial and the second

trial was 116 days, which is not generally considered unreasonable for a felony case.

“The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some

delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other

factors that go into the balance.” Barker at 530.        “A delay becomes presumptively

prejudicial as it approaches one year in length.” State v. Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 90,

citing Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652, fn. 1 (1992).

       {¶ 41} Assuming (without deciding) that the approximately four-month delay

triggered a Barker analysis, the delay was not sufficiently prejudicial to merit the dismissal

of the charges against Rasheed. First, the State was not responsible for the delay.

“Only the portion of the delay which is attributed to the government's neglect is to be

weighed in a defendant's favor.” State v. Triplett, 78 Ohio St.3d 566, 569 (1997), citing

Doggett at 658. The reasons for the mistrial were Rasheed’s eleventh-hour request to

proceed pro se and his inability to do so without newly appointed standby counsel and an

opportunity to prepare. Accordingly, the initial delay was the result of Rasheed’s actions

and could not be attributed to the State. A new trial date was then scheduled at the

court’s earliest availability, approximately two months later on April 24, 2023. However,

that trial date was vacated and continued as a result of Rasheed’s request for a

competency evaluation, during which time the trial court could not have proceeded to trial.

State v. Berry, 72 Ohio St.3d 354, 359 (1995) (stating that a criminal defendant who is

legally incompetent may not be tried). Although Rasheed contends that the trial court

should have neither granted a mistrial nor ordered a competency evaluation, neither of
                                                                                          -16-


those decisions was an abuse of discretion, as we will address later in this opinion.

When Rasheed was found competent on May 9, 2023, the trial was scheduled for June

12, 2023, and the jury trial commenced on that date. Accordingly, the second Barker

factor weighed against finding a constitutional speedy-trial violation.

       {¶ 42} There is little doubt that Rasheed asserted his right to a speedy trial by

repeatedly filing motions to dismiss for speedy trial violations. The record reflects that,

following his mistrial, Rasheed filed more than 20 motions, the majority of which sought

dismissal of his charges; the State responded to those motions, and the trial court issued

decisions. Although the third Barker factor weighed in favor of Rasheed, this factor was

not dispositive.

       {¶ 43} Finally, we see no prejudice to Rasheed as a result of the delay. The initial

reason for the delay, i.e. granting the mistrial, was to prevent Rasheed from being

prejudiced by having to proceed pro se without standby counsel and without sufficient

preparation. The second delay, the competency evaluation, was also conducted for

Rasheed’s benefit, at his request, to make sure he was legally capable of proceeding to

trial. Nevertheless, Rasheed claims in his brief that he was prejudiced because, in his

first trial, the State questioned the prospective jurors about the possibility that the victim

would not testify at trial, but this did not occur at the second trial at which the victim did

testify. But Rasheed had the same opportunity to question the prospective jurors that

the State did. Rasheed has failed to explain how this fact prejudiced him. The fourth

Barker factor weighed against finding a constitutional violation.

       {¶ 44} In balancing the Barker factors, we conclude that the delay in this case was
                                                                                           -17-


not constitutionally unreasonable. The first assignment of error is overruled.

        III.   Mistrial

       {¶ 45} The second assignment of error states:

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING A MISTRIAL.

       {¶ 46} Rasheed claims that the trial court abused its discretion in declaring a

mistrial sua sponte, because he only requested a minimal continuance of the trial and a

fair trial was still able to be had. The State responds that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in declaring a mistrial because of Rasheed’s impromptu decision to represent

himself on the day of trial and his inability to do so without a continuance.

       {¶ 47} “Mistrials need be declared only when the ends of justice so require and a

fair trial is no longer possible.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Franklin, 62 Ohio St.3d 118,

127 (1991). Reviewing courts grant “great deference to the trial court's discretion in this

area, in recognition of the fact that the trial judge is in the best position to determine

whether the situation in his courtroom warrants the declaration of a mistrial.” State v.

Glover, 35 Ohio St.3d 18, 19 (1988). The Ohio Supreme Court, recognizing that there

are a variety of circumstances in which a mistrial may arise, “has been reluctant to

formulate precise, inflexible standards. Rather, the court has deferred to the trial court's

exercise of discretion in light of all the surrounding circumstances . . . .” State v. Widner,

68 Ohio St.2d 188, 190 (1981). “The granting or denial of a motion for mistrial rests in

the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse

of discretion.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 480 (2001). “A

trial court abuses its discretion when it makes a decision that is unreasonable,
                                                                                          -18-


unconscionable, or arbitrary.” State v. Darmond, 2013-Ohio-966, ¶ 34, citing State v.

Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 (1980). “Abuse-of-discretion review is deferential and

does not permit an appellate court to simply substitute its judgment for that of the trial

court.” Id., citing State v. Morris, 2012-Ohio-2407, ¶ 14.

       {¶ 48} “In examining the trial judge's exercise of discretion in declaring a mistrial,

a balancing test is utilized, in which the defendant's right to have the charges decided by

a particular tribunal is weighed against society's interest in the efficient dispatch of

justice.” Glover at 19, citing State v. Calhoun, 18 Ohio St.3d 373, 376 (1985); United

States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978). “[A] defendant's valued right to have his trial

completed by a particular tribunal must in some instances be subordinated to the public's

interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments.” Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684,

689 (1949). “Where the facts of the case do not reflect unfairness to the accused, the

public interest in insuring that justice is served may take precedence.” Glover at 19,

citing Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978).

       {¶ 49} After a lengthy discussion on the record, the trial court declared a mistrial

based on the following reasoning:

       I think that Mr. Rasheed has made the record that he doesn't want to be

       represented by [defense counsel]. He's also made the record that he is

       not prepared to go forward today. And in the judgment of the Court, he

       won't be ready to go for the balance of this week, as a result of which I'm

       going to declare a mistrial of this case, or of this trial, based on the conduct

       of Mr. Rasheed, who has said, number one, he doesn't want to be
                                                                                       -19-


       represented by [defense counsel]. Number two, he needs to be represented

       -- he needs additional time for preparation. . . . And number three, because

       at this point, I don't think that Mr. Rasheed is capable at this time of

       defending this case. So we'll declare a mistrial. We'll excuse the jury.

       We'll give you a date of the 24th of April. If we can move something in

       sooner than that, fine.

Mistrial Tr. 192.

       {¶ 50} The record supports the trial court’s decision to grant a mistrial. At the

beginning of the jury trial, Rasheed was represented by counsel. Then, shortly after

defense counsel began voir dire, Rasheed stated for the first time that he wished to

proceed pro se. Eventually, the trial court agreed to permit him to do so. However, by

the time Rasheed informed the court that he was unprepared to go forward with the jury

trial without a continuance, the jury had already been selected and sworn in. Although

Rasheed indicated he only needed a continuance for a few days, the trial court’s schedule

was unable to accommodate that. The following Monday was a federal holiday, and the

courtroom was unavailable for several weeks. (The trial court judge at that time was a

visiting judge who was using another judge’s courtroom, which was unavailable in the

ensuing weeks.) The trial began on a Wednesday morning, and the discussion of a

mistrial occurred that afternoon. The trial court informed Rasheed that he could have

the rest of the evening to prepare to go forward with trial the following day, but Rasheed

declined, indicating that he needed more time than that to prepare. Although Rasheed

was unequivocal that he wanted to represent himself, he also requested new standby
                                                                                        -20-


counsel and was adamant that he was not prepared to go forward with the trial without a

continuance.    The trial court informed Rasheed that, in order to timely appoint new

standby counsel and provide Rasheed additional time to prepare, the trial would not be

able to go forward with the jury that had already been seated.

       {¶ 51} Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

declaring a mistrial.   The trial court’s reasoning reflected significant justification for

declaring a mistrial and that the ends of justice would have otherwise been defeated.

Accordingly, Rasheed’s second assignment of error is overruled.

       IV.     Competency and Sanity Evaluations

       {¶ 52} Rasheed’s third assignment of error states:

       THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING A NOT

       GUILTY     BY    REASON       OF    INSANITY     EVALUATION        AND     A

       COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL EVALUATION.

       {¶ 53} Rasheed argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering

competency and insanity evaluations. According to Rasheed, the reason the trial court

ordered the evaluations was “to get around appellant’s speedy trial rights.” Appellant’s

Brief, p. 11. We do not agree.

       {¶ 54} “Fundamental principles of due process require that a criminal defendant

who is legally incompetent shall not be subjected to trial.” Berry, 72 Ohio St.3d at 359.

“If a defendant ‘lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings

against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense[,]’ he may not

stand trial.” State v. Voris, 2022-Ohio-152, ¶ 34 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Skatzes,
                                                                                        -21-


2004-Ohio-6391, ¶ 155.

      {¶ 55} “In a criminal action in a court of common pleas, . . . the court, prosecutor,

or defense may raise the issue of the defendant's competence to stand trial. If the issue

is raised before the trial has commenced, the court shall hold a hearing on the issue as

provided in this section. If the issue is raised after the trial has commenced, the court

shall hold a hearing on the issue only for good cause shown or on the court's own motion.”

R.C. 2945.37(B). If the issue of a defendant’s competence to stand trial is raised, the

court may order one or more evaluations of the defendant’s present mental condition.

R.C. 2945.371(A). “[W]e review the decision of the trial court regarding competency

evaluations for an abuse of discretion.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Matharu, 2017-

Ohio-8251, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.).

      {¶ 56} In this case, it was Rasheed who raised the issue of competency and

specifically requested a competency evaluation.        Immediately after the trial court

declared a mistrial on February 15, 2023, Rasheed stated that “I need a . . . competency

hearing.” Mistrial Tr. 193. Because the trial court had already declared a mistrial and

rescheduled a new trial date, Rasheed’s request occurred before trial.           Where a

defendant has raised the issue of competency before trial, courts have found that R.C.

2945.37(B) requires that a hearing be held. State v. Mills, 2023-Ohio-4716, ¶ 13.

      {¶ 57} The judge issued an order for both a competency and a sanity evaluation

on March 16, 2023. The entry ordering the competency evaluation noted that Rasheed’s

“behavior in court on February 15, 2023, has raised for the court the issue of his

competence to stand trial.” Entry Ordering Competency Evaluation. As noted above,
                                                                                         -22-


after the mistrial was declared, Rasheed specifically requested a competency hearing.

The record further reflects that during the court proceedings on February 15, 2023,

Rasheed repeatedly interrupted the trial court judge, argued with his appointed counsel,

and restated arguments indicating his refusal to listen to the court. Notably, the trial

court’s entry granting the mistrial described Rasheed’s actions in court as follows: “after

observing over a protracted period of time Rasheed’s apparent failure to comprehend the

trial process, despite attempts by the court and counsel to explain it to him, and his

constant disruptive interruptions of the proceedings, the court concluded the trial could

not proceed.”    Order, February 16, 2023.      We cannot conclude that the trial court

abused its discretion in ordering a competency evaluation under these circumstances.

       {¶ 58} Rasheed did not file a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity as is required

under R.C. 2943.04. Nevertheless, the trial court ordered a sanity evaluation at the

same time the competency evaluation was ordered. Even assuming the trial court erred

in ordering an insanity evaluation, we see no prejudice to Rasheed warranting a reversal.

       {¶ 59} “Crim.R. 52(A) defines harmless error in the context of criminal cases and

provides: ‘Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial

rights shall be disregarded.’ ” State v. Morris, 2014-Ohio-5052, ¶ 23. Generally, an

error is viewed as affecting a defendant’s substantial rights only if the error was

prejudicial. State v. Harris, 2015-Ohio-166, ¶ 36. “Accordingly, Crim.R. 52(A) asks

whether the rights affected are ‘substantial’ and, if so, whether a defendant has suffered

any prejudice as a result.” Id., citing Morris at ¶ 24-25.

       {¶ 60} Rasheed’s concern on appeal is that the orders for competency and sanity
                                                                                        -23-


evaluations were made in an attempt to circumvent Rasheed’s speedy trial rights. But

this argument lacks merit. Both the competency evaluation, which we concluded was

not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to order, and the insanity evaluation were

conducted by the same psychologist on the same day. Thus, conducting the sanity

evaluation in no way lengthened the time for which Rasheed was held in custody or

postponed his trial date further than was already accomplished by Rasheed’s having the

competency evaluation. Moreover, no information obtained in the sanity evaluation was

used against Rasheed at trial.       Because the sanity evaluation had no effect on

Rasheed’s speedy trial rights, as he suggests, or on the outcome of his trial, we conclude

any alleged error in ordering the sanity evaluation was harmless.

       {¶ 61} Rasheed’s third assignment of error is overruled.

        V.    Sufficiency of the Evidence

       {¶ 62} In his fourth assignment of error, Rasheed argues:

       APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS FOR FELONIOUS ASSAULT ARE BASED

       UPON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.

       {¶ 63} Rasheed contends there was insufficient evidence to identify him as the

perpetrator of the offense because the police did not find the iron or the gun on the night

of the assault and because Rasheed did not attempt to evade the police.           Further,

Rasheed argues that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the iron was a

deadly weapon for him to be convicted under R.C. 2903.11(A)(2).

       {¶ 64} “A sufficiency of the evidence argument disputes whether the State has

presented adequate evidence on each element of the offense to allow the case to go to
                                                                                          -24-


the jury or sustain the verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Wilson, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 10

(2d Dist.), citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 (1997). “[T]he relevant inquiry

is whether any rational factfinder viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the

state could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable

doubt.”   (Citations omitted.) State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 430 (1997).          “The

verdict will not be disturbed unless the appellate court finds that reasonable minds could

not reach the conclusion reached by the trier-of-fact.” Id., citing State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio

St.3d 259, 273 (1991).

                 a. Identity

       {¶ 65} “The State has the burden to prove every element of the crime charged

beyond a reasonable doubt, including the identity of the person who committed the crime.”

(Citations omitted.)   State v. Bailey, 2017-Ohio-2679, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.).       Proof of the

identity of the accused can be made by circumstantial or direct evidence. State v. Tate,

2014-Ohio-3667, 15, citing Jenks at 272-273. “Ohio courts have held that the testimony

of one witness, if believed by the jury, is enough to support a conviction.” State v. Strong,

2011-Ohio-1024, ¶ 42 (10th Dist.), citing State v. Dunn, 2009-Ohio-1688, ¶ 133 (5th Dist.).

       {¶ 66} Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find

that a reasonable jury could have found that the State had established Rasheed’s identity

beyond a reasonable doubt.       M.F.’s testimony alone provided sufficient evidence of

identity to support a conviction.    M.F. testified that she had met Rasheed in early

September 2022, and they had developed a relationship. Her testimony at trial identified

Rasheed as the perpetrator who assaulted her on October 22, 2022, and she provided
                                                                                          -25-


an in-court identification of Rasheed.      M.F. was unwavering in her identification of

Rasheed as the perpetrator of the assault.

       {¶ 67} In addition to M.F.’s testimony, multiple officers identified Rasheed as the

individual arrested at M.F.’s home on October 22, 2022, and testified that he was the

individual in the police body camera footage that was shown to the jury. Moreover,

although Rasheed did not testify, he made it obvious to the jury through his questioning

of the witnesses that he was present with M.F. at her residence on October 22, 2022.

The fact that the police did not find the iron or the gun on the night of the assault, or that

Rasheed did not attempt to evade the police that night, did not detract from the evidence

establishing his identity as the perpetrator of the offense. Accordingly, this argument is

without merit.

                  b. Deadly Weapon

       {¶ 68} Rasheed was convicted of felonious assault with a deadly weapon, in

violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2). "Deadly weapon" is defined as being “any instrument,

device, or thing capable of inflicting death, and designed or specially adapted for use as

a weapon, or possessed, carried, or used as a weapon.” R.C. 2923.11(A). While some

objects are frequently considered deadly weapons in and of themselves, such as

firearms, others, owing to the manner in which they are used, can become deadly

weapons. See, e.g., State v. Dean, 2019-Ohio-1391, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.) (holding that a

billiard ball thrown at a victim’s head constituted a deadly weapon); State v. Clark, 2018-

Ohio-4789, ¶ 58-59 (5th Dist.) (holding that a mop handle was a deadly weapon when

struck against victim’s face); In re Smith, 142 Ohio App.3d 16, 24 (8th Dist. 2001)
                                                                                         -26-


(concluding that a reasonable trier of fact could find the end of a ballpoint pen could

constitute a deadly weapon). Whether an object constitutes a deadly weapon “is a

determination highly dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case.”

(Citations omitted.) State v. Byrd, 1986 WL 13239, *3 (2d Dist. Nov. 20, 1986). “The

manner of use of the instrument, its threatened use, and its nature determine its capability

to inflict death.” State v. Deboe, 62 Ohio App.2d 192, 193 (6th Dist. 1977). “A jury is

permitted to infer the deadly nature of an instrument from the facts and circumstances of

its use.” State v. Vondenberg, 61 Ohio St.2d 285, 289 (1980).

       {¶ 69} The testimony at trial established that Rasheed plugged in an iron to heat it

up and then pressed the hot iron onto M.F.’s face, which caused significant burns. M.F.

testified that, as Rasheed was plugging in the iron and holding her down, he said that

they were both going to die that day. Although we acknowledge that an iron is not

typically thought of as a deadly weapon, the testimony at trial established that the iron

was used as a weapon and, further, that Rasheed was threating the victim not only with

harm but with death while he used the iron as a weapon. The fact that Rasheed’s use

of the iron did not result in death under these circumstances did not preclude it from being

deemed a deadly weapon. Considering the severity of the burns inflicted, the use of the

hot iron on the victim’s face, and that Rasheed had threatened her with death

contemporaneously with using the hot iron, we conclude that a jury could had reasonably

concluded that the iron, as used in this case, was a deadly weapon.

       {¶ 70} Rasheed’s conviction was supported by sufficient evidence, and his fourth

assignment of error is overruled.
                                                                                          -27-


        VI.      Admissibility of Evidence

       {¶ 71} In his fifth assignment of error, Rasheed alleges the following:

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE TWO 911

       PHONE CALLS.

       {¶ 72} Rasheed argues that the trial court erred in admitting two 911 phone calls

into evidence because the callers themselves did not testify at trial. Notably, Rasheed

did not object to the admissibility of the two 911 calls on the basis of hearsay or improper

authentication during trial.   During Sergeant Turner’s testimony, Rasheed made a

general objection to the first 911 call and argued about the credibility of the statements

made on the recording. When asked about any objection to admitting the first 911 call,

Rasheed indicated that he did not object to the first one and said to “keep the first call.”

Trial Tr. 678.

       {¶ 73} Regarding the second 911 call, during Sergeant Turner’s testimony,

Rasheed again objected based on arguments about the credibility of the statements made

on the recording. However, he then stated that he “wanted to let these jurors hear the

second [911 call].” Trial Tr. 562. He later objected to the admissibility of the second

911 call based on the credibility of the statements made on the call, but not due to hearsay

or its lack of authenticity. Trial Tr. 678. In each instance, Rasheed’s objections went to

the weight of the evidence, but not its admissibility.

       {¶ 74} “A first principle of appellate jurisdiction is that a party ordinarily may not

present an argument on appeal that it failed to raise below.” State v. Wintermeyer, 2019-

Ohio-5156, ¶ 10, citing Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121 (1997). Because
                                                                                         -28-


Rasheed did not object to the admissibility of the 911 calls with respect to their

authentication and admissibility at trial, he has waived all but plain error.       State v.

Drummond, 2006-Ohio-5084, ¶ 187. To show plain error, Rasheed must demonstrate

that “an error occurred, that the error was obvious, and that there is ‘a reasonable

probability that the error resulted in prejudice,’ meaning that the error affected the

outcome of the trial.” (Emphasis added in Rogers.) State v. McAlpin, 2022-Ohio-1567,

¶ 66, quoting State v. Rogers, 2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 22.

                 a. Proper Authentication

       {¶ 75} Evid.R. 901(A) provides: “The requirement of authentication or identification

as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a

finding that the material in question is what its proponent claims.”         “The threshold

standard for authenticating evidence pursuant to Evid. R. 901(A) is low, and ‘does not

require conclusive proof of authenticity, but only sufficient foundational evidence for the

trier of fact to conclude that * * * [the evidence] is what its proponent claims it to be.’ ”

State v. Arrone, 2006-Ohio-4144, ¶ 146 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Easter, 75 Ohio

App.3d 22, 25 (4th Dist. 1991).      We have held that 911 recordings are sufficiently

authenticated when the keeper of such records testifies about how such records are

recorded, stored, and retrieved from the system and identifies the recordings at issue as

true and accurate copies. State v. Eicholtz, 2013-Ohio-302, ¶ 30-31 (2d Dist.).

       {¶ 76} Sergeant Turner testified that his duties as the Administrative Sergeant for

the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office included being the keeper of records for the

regional dispatch center. He testified that the two CDs he had produced contained the
                                                                                           -29-


two 911 calls made from the residence of M.F.’s neighbors to the regional dispatch center

on October 22, 2022. He further explained how the 911 calls were recorded and stored

and how they were retrieved from the system and transferred to a CD. He testified that

neither of the CDs had been altered or manipulated and that were true and accurate

recordings of the 911 calls made on the date and time in question.              Accordingly,

Sergeant Turner’s testimony provided sufficient authentication for the admission of the

two 911 calls.

                  b. Hearsay

       {¶ 77} “Hearsay” is defined in Evid.R. 801(C) as “a statement, other than one made

by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the

truth of the matter asserted.”      Generally, hearsay is not admissible, Evid.R. 802;

however, there are several exceptions to the hearsay rule primarily found in Evid.R. 803.

The State asserts that the first 911 call fell within the hearsay exception of a present sense

impression under Evid.R. 803(1) and the second 911 call fell within the hearsay

exceptions of both a present sense impression and an excited utterance. Evid.R. 803(1)

and (2).

       {¶ 78} A “present sense impression” is defined in Evid.R. 803(1) as “[a] statement

describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving

the event or condition, or immediately thereafter unless circumstances indicate lack of

trustworthiness.” Evidence admitted as a present sense impression is an exception to

the hearsay rule.     Evid.R. 803(1).      “There is an assumption that statements or

perceptions that describe events uttered during or within a short time from the occurrence
                                                                                         -30-


of the event are more trustworthy than statements not uttered at or near the time of the

event.” State v. Travis, 2006-Ohio-787, ¶ 35 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Ellington, 2004-

Ohio-5036, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.). Furthermore, “[t]he key to the statement's trustworthiness is

the spontaneity of the statement, either contemporaneous with the event or immediately

thereafter. By making the statement at the time of the event or shortly thereafter, the

minimal lapse of time between the event and statement reflects an insufficient period to

reflect on the event perceived—a fact which obviously detracts from the statement's

trustworthiness.” Cox v. Oliver Machinery Co., 41 Ohio App.3d 28, 35-36 (12th Dist.

1987).

         {¶ 79} Evid.R. 803(2) likewise excludes excited utterances from the hearsay rule.

An excited utterance is defined as “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition

made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or

condition.” Evid.R. 803(2).

         {¶ 80} In this case, no plain error is demonstrated in admitting the recordings of

the two 911 calls; they were admissible as present sense impressions. “911 calls are

usually admissible under the excited utterance or the present sense impression exception

to the hearsay rule.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Norris, 2015-Ohio-624, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.).

Here, M.F. had just been severely beaten when she went next door to her neighbor’s

house. When the neighbors called 911 shortly thereafter, they relayed to dispatch M.F.’s

physical appearance and her need for medical attention. In the first 911 call, a male

neighbor described that M.F. was cold, wet, and barefoot. He also informed dispatch

that M.F. was injured and needed an ambulance, even though he did not observe any
                                                                                       -31-


injuries. The second 911 call, made less than 10 minutes after the first call, updated

dispatch that the neighbors had observed a burn injury to M.F.’s face that they previously

had not seen. A female neighbor insisted that an ambulance come and described to the

dispatcher the injuries she had observed on M.F. The female neighbor stated that the

burn on M.F.’s face was bleeding and swelling up and that she could see the “white meat”

on M.F.’s face. She also informed the dispatcher that M.F. was cold, had no shoes on,

and was complaining of chest pain. M.F. was soaking wet and they were trying to keep

her warm. Additionally, the neighbor informed dispatch that M.F. said the guy who had

injured M.F. used an iron to burn her face and he might have a gun.

      {¶ 81} In each of the two 911 calls, the neighbor’s statements were “ ‘describing or

explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or

condition, or immediately thereafter,’ and therefore admissible notwithstanding the

hearsay rule.” State v. Tibbetts, 92 Ohio St.3d 146, 158-159 (2001), quoting Evid.R.

803(1). Nothing in the record suggests any untrustworthiness of either of the 911 calls,

and the observations of the neighbors were corroborated by the testimony and

photographic evidence submitted at trial. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in admitting the two 911 calls into evidence as present sense impressions.

Because the calls were admissible under the present sense impression exception to the

hearsay rule, we need not consider if the second call also qualified as an excited

utterance.

      {¶ 82} Although the information about the iron and the gun could potentially be

considered hearsay, we discern no error warranting reversal because the admission of
                                                                                          -32-


the statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The State did not offer the

statement to prove the truth of the matter asserted or rely on the statement to prove that

Rasheed used the iron or had a gun on the night of the incident. By the time the jury

heard the 911 calls, M.F. had already testified to the cause of her injuries and that

Rasheed had taken her gun. Accordingly, we see no plain error in the admission of the

911 calls.

       {¶ 83} Rasheed’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.

       VII.   Cross-Examination

       {¶ 84} In his sixth assignment of error, Rasheed argues:

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING APPELLANT TO

       CROSS-EXAMINE         A   STATE’S      WITNESS      WITH     IMPEACHMENT

       PURSUANT TO OHIO EVIDENCE RULE 609.

       {¶ 85} In support of his sixth assignment of error, Rasheed points to his cross-

examination of M.F. in which he asked her, “Have you ever had any run-in with the police

or have you been arrested or any type of questionable things – fraud –." Trial Tr. 422-

423. The trial court sustained the State’s objection to this question, and Rasheed moved

on. Rasheed now claims that Evid.R. 609 permitted him to impeach M.F. and that the

trial court impermissibly restricted him from doing.     Rasheed further argues, without

support, that the trial court “should have inquired of appellant the basis for the question

and what proof he might have.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 15.

       {¶ 86} “Cross-examination of a witness is a matter of right, but the ‘extent of cross-

examination with respect to an appropriate subject of inquiry is within the sound discretion
                                                                                          -33-


of the trial court.’ ” State v. Green, 66 Ohio St.3d 141, 147 (1993), quoting Alford v.

United States, 282 U.S. 687, 691 (1931). For the purpose of attacking the credibility of

a witness, and subject to Evid.R. 403, evidence that a witness has been convicted of a

crime is admissible at trial if: 1) the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in

excess of one year; or 2) the crime involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of

the punishment. Evid.R. 609(A)(1), (3).

       {¶ 87} A trial court has broad discretion in determining the extent to which

testimony will be admitted under Evid.R. 609. State v. Wright, 48 Ohio St.3d 5 (1990),

syllabus. Accordingly, unless the trial court “has clearly abused its discretion and the

defendant has been materially prejudiced thereby, an appellate court should not disturb

the decision of the trial court.” State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 64 (2001), citing State v.

Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 265 (1984).

       {¶ 88} We cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting

Rasheed’s cross-examination of M.F., as the questioning was impermissible.                 In

accordance with Evid.R. 609, “[o]nly convictions are admissible—not arrests, indictments,

or charges.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Graves, 2016-Ohio-7303, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.).

“Arrest without more does not, in law any more than in reason, impeach the integrity or

impair the credibility of a witness. It happens to the innocent as well as the guilty. Only

a conviction, therefore, may be inquired about to undermine the trustworthiness of a

witness.” Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 482 (1948). Asking M.F. if she had

ever had any run-ins with the police, been arrested, “or any type of questionable things,”

were all objectionable and not admissible, as none of this history constituted a “conviction”
                                                                                         -34-


in accordance with Evid.R. 609.

       {¶ 89} If Rasheed intended to use Evid.R. 609 to impeach M.F. based on a prior

conviction, the record contains no evidence that M.F. had an admissible prior conviction.

“A party may not predicate error on the exclusion of evidence during the examination in

chief unless two conditions are met: (1) the exclusion of such evidence must affect a

substantial right of the party and (2) the substance of the excluded evidence was made

known to the court by proffer or was apparent from the context within which questions

were asked.”    (Emphasis in original.)    State v. Gilmore, 28 Ohio St.3d 190 (1986),

syllabus, applying Evid.R. 103(A)(2). “ ‘The purpose of a proffer is to assist the reviewing

court in determining, pursuant to Evid.R. 103, whether the trial court's exclusion of

evidence affected a substantial right of the appellant.’ ” State v. Mullins, 2007-Ohio-

1051, ¶ 36 (2d Dist.), quoting In re Walker, 2005-Ohio-3773, ¶ 37 (11th Dist.). “In the

absence of such a proffer or any such documentation in the record on appeal, we

presume that there was no proof of conviction.” In re Watkins, 1992 WL 104117, *3 (8th

Dist. May 14, 1992). Because Rasheed failed to proffer or provide any indication in the

record as to what criminal conviction would have been admissible that was excluded, we

cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.

       {¶ 90} To the extent Rasheed contends that the trial court should have asked him

the basis for the question and what proof he might have had, essentially asking Rasheed

to make a proffer, we decline to require a court to act as counsel for a pro se defendant.

“ ‘It is well established that pro se litigants are presumed to have knowledge of the law

and legal procedures and that they are held to the same standard as litigants who are
                                                                                         -35-


represented by counsel.’ ” State ex rel. Fuller v. Mengel, 2003-Ohio-6448, ¶ 10, quoting

Sabouri v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 145 Ohio App.3d 651, 654 (10th Dist. 2001).

“[A] pro se litigant ‘cannot expect or demand special treatment from the judge, who is to

sit as impartial arbiter.’ ” Yocum v. Means, 2002-Ohio-3803, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.), quoting

Kilroy v. B.H. Lakeshore Co., 111 Ohio App.3d 357, 363 (8th Dist. 1996).              It was

Rasheed’s burden to make the appropriate inquiry and to provide a proffer, if needed. It

was not the duty of the trial court to assist him in the practice of law.

       {¶ 91} Rasheed’s sixth assignment of error is overruled.

      VIII.   Sentencing Entry

       {¶ 92} In his final assignment of error, Rasheed raises the following error:

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT PLACING REAGAN TOKES LANGUAGE IN

       THE SENTENCING JUDGMENT ENTRY.

       {¶ 93} Rasheed does not dispute that the trial court properly informed him of the

required notifications under the Reagan Tokes Act at the time of sentencing. However,

Rasheed argues that the court erred by not including those notifications in its written

judgment entry. We do not agree.

       {¶ 94} “The ‘Reagan Tokes Law,’ which became effective in March 2019, requires

that for certain first- and second-degree felony offenses, a sentencing court impose on

the offender an indefinite sentence consisting of a minimum and a maximum prison term.”

State v. Hacker, 2023-Ohio-2535, ¶ 1. When sentencing an offender to an indefinite

prison term, the trial court must first select a stated minimum term from a range of

potential minimum prison terms.        R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a) and (2)(a).    The maximum
                                                                                      -36-


prison term is then calculated based on the amount of time equal to the minimum term

imposed on the offender plus fifty per cent of the length of that minimum term. R.C.

2929.144(B)(1). “Under R.C. 2967.271(B) through (D), there is a presumption that the

offender will be released on the expiration of his or her minimum prison term or earned

early-release date, but the statute enables [the Ohio Department of Corrections] to rebut

the presumption and keep the offender incarcerated up to the expiration of his or her

maximum prison term.” State v. Maddox, 2022-Ohio-764, ¶ 4.

      {¶ 95} A trial court is required to notify the offender of all the Reagan Tokes

advisements set forth in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) at the sentencing hearing.       State v.

Massie, 2021-Ohio-3376, ¶ 23 (2d Dist.). “Those notifications generally pertain to the

offender's minimum and maximum prison term and to the existence and operation of a

rebuttable presumption of release from service of the sentence upon expiration of the

minimum term.” State v. Clark, 2022-Ohio-2801, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.). In addition to orally

informing the defendant of the minimum prison term and the maximum prison term

imposed at the time of sentencing, the prison terms must also be included in the judgment

entry. R.C. 2929.144(C).

      {¶ 96} Rasheed filed a timely notice of appeal from the August 3, 2023 judgment

entry; the entry did not contain any Reagan Tokes advisements. However, when the

appeal of the August 3, 2023 judgment entry was dismissed for lack of a final appealable

order, the case was remanded, and a new entry was filed on September 19, 2023. In

addition to stating the minimum and maximum prison terms for the offense for which

Rasheed had been convicted, the new entry included the following Reagan Tokes
                                                                                          -37-


notification:

       The defendant was advised that there is a rebuttable presumption that

       he/she will be released from service of the sentence at the expiration of the

       minimum term or presumptive early release date, whichever is earlier, and

       that the Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections may rebut the

       presumption if it makes certain specified determinations.

       {¶ 97} According to Rasheed, each of the specific notifications identified in R.C.

2929.19(B)(2)(c)(i)-(v) must also be included in the sentencing entry, rather than the

abbreviated description provided in the trial court’s entry. He argues that the same

analysis that applies to post-release control notifications should also apply to Reagan

Tokes notifications. We disagree.

       {¶ 98} R.C. 2929.19(B)(2) states in relevant part that “if the sentencing court

determines at the sentencing hearing that a prison term is necessary or required, the

court shall do all of the following . . . .” (Emphasis added.)      The phrase “all of the

following” refers to multiple subsections concerning certain necessary sentencing

notifications, including, but not limited to, R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c). That section provides

that if a trial court imposes a non-life felony indefinite prison term, the trial court must

“notify the offender” of the advisements set forth in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c)(i)-(v). Unlike

R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(b) or 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i), which require the sentencing entry to

include certain information, nothing in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) requires that the notifications

be included in the sentencing entry. While R.C. 2929.144(C) provides that both the

minimum and maximum prison terms must be included in the sentencing entry, it does
                                                                                        -38-


not require that all the other notifications identified in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) also be

included in the sentencing entry. Certainly, had the legislature wanted to require the

Reagan Tokes notifications to be included in the sentencing entry, it could have chosen

to do so. We agree with the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, which recently concluded

that the plain language of “R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) only requires that a sentencing court

‘notify’ the offender of the Reagan Tokes advisements orally ‘at the sentencing hearing,’

and does not require that the court repeat those advisements in the written sentencing

entry.” (Emphasis in original.) State v. McIntosh, 2023-Ohio-4022, ¶ 58 (12th Dist.).

      {¶ 99} Even though the statute does not require the notifications be included in the

sentencing entry, Rasheed relies on State v. Bates, 2022-Ohio-475, to support his

argument that they should be included. In Bates, the Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed

that once the trial court orally provides all the required advisements for post-release

control at the sentencing hearing, it must also incorporate those advisements into the

sentencing entry. Id. at ¶ 12, citing State v. Grimes, 2017-Ohio-2927, ¶ 8. According

to Rasheed, the same analysis that requires post-release control notifications to be

included in the judgment entry should similarly apply to the Reagan Tokes notifications.

We do not agree.

      {¶ 100} " ‘Post-release control’ means a period of supervision by the adult parole

authority after a prisoner's release from imprisonment, other than under a term of life

imprisonment, that includes one or more post-release control sanctions imposed under

section 2967.28 of the Revised Code.”       R.C. 2967.01(N).     Every prison sentence

imposed upon an offender shall include a requirement that the offender either will or may
                                                                                            -39-


be subject to a period of post-release control imposed by the parole board after the

offender’s release from imprisonment. R.C. 2967.28(B) and (C). The Ohio Supreme

Court has explained that post-release control notifications must be made part of the

journal entry of sentencing “because it is the sentencing entry that ‘empowers the

executive branch of government to exercise its discretion . . . .’ ” Grimes at ¶ 15, quoting

State v. Jordan, 2004-Ohio-6085, ¶ 22, citing Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d 504, 512-513

(2000). In Jordan, the Court reaffirmed that the post-release control notifications must

be included in the sentencing entry “because the separation-of-powers doctrine precludes

the executive branch of government from impeding the judiciary's ability to impose a

sentence, the problem of having the Adult Parole Authority impose postrelease control at

its discretion is remedied by a trial court incorporating postrelease control into its original

sentence.” Jordan at ¶ 19, citing Woods at 512-513. “Consequently, unless a trial court

includes postrelease control in its sentence, the Adult Parole Authority is without authority

to impose it.” Id. Moreover, the “preeminent purpose” of the statutes involving post-

release control is notifying offenders “that their liberty could continue to be restrained after

serving their initial sentence.” Watkins v. Collins, 2006-Ohio-5082, ¶ 52. Thus, the

imposition of post-release control is considered part of the defendant’s sentence and

therefore must be included in the sentencing entry.

       {¶ 101} On the other hand, in State v. Hacker, 2023-Ohio-2535, the Ohio Supreme

Court held that because a judge sets the minimum and maximum prison terms under

Reagan Tokes, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“DRC”) does not

exercise judicial power in violation of the separation of powers when it prolongs an
                                                                                           -40-


offender's time in prison within the given sentencing range. Id. at ¶ 13-25. “Once the

trial court imposes the minimum and maximum prison terms under R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a)

or (2)(a), the sentence for the offender has been set.”          Id. at ¶ 16.    “If the DRC

determines that the presumption of release has been rebutted, it may maintain the

offender's incarceration—but only within the bounds set by the trial court. It does not

impede the court's exercise of its judicial powers.” Id. Nothing about the analysis in

Hacker suggests that the separation of powers would be violated if the Reagan Tokes

notifications were not included in a sentencing entry. McIntosh, 2023-Ohio-4022, at

¶ 65.

        {¶ 102} Furthermore, unlike post-release control, the Reagan Tokes notifications

do not apply to every prison sentence, and the statutory scheme does not allow the DRC

to restrain a defendant’s liberty after serving his or her sentence like a post-release control

violation could. Once a defendant is sentenced to prison and the trial court imposes the

minimum and maximum prison terms, as set forth by statute, the sentence for the offender

has been set. Unlike post-release control, the Reagan Tokes notifications are not part

of a defendant’s sentence but merely information a trial court must provide to a defendant

at the time of sentencing.          Neither including nor failing to include the R.C.

2929.19(B)(2)(c) notifications in the sentencing entry would have an effect on the DRC’s

ability to comply with Reagan Tokes sentencing. The DRC will still be required to comply

with both statutory and administrative regulations dealing with Reagan Tokes sentences.

Therefore, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in failing to include some, but not

all, of the Reagan Tokes notifications in the sentencing entry.
                                                                                      -41-


       {¶ 103} Rasheed’s seventh assignment of error is overruled.

        IX.    Conclusion

       {¶ 104} Having overruled all the assignments of error, we will affirm the judgment

of the trial court.

                                    .............



EPLEY, P.J. and TUCKER, J., concur.