State v. Reno R. Blakely (2)

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
   CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
        EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

               THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
                   In The Court of Appeals

        The State, Respondent,

        v.

        Reno Rodreigus Blakely, Appellant.

        Appellate Case No. 2023-000218


                    Appeal From Lancaster County
               R. Lawton McIntosh, Circuit Court Judge


                Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-360
         Submitted September 1, 2025 – Filed October 29, 2025


         AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND
                   REMANDED IN PART


        Senior Appellate Defender Lara Mary Caudy, of
        Columbia, for Appellant.

        Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
        Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant
        Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, and
        Assistant Attorney General Tommy Evans, Jr., all of
        Columbia; and Solicitor Randy E. Newman, Jr., of
        Lancaster, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Reno Rodreigus Blakely appeals his convictions for murder,
possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, and possession
of a weapon by a person convicted of a crime of violence and his aggregate
sentence of forty-five years' imprisonment. On appeal, Blakely argues the trial
court abused its discretion by excluding a co-defendant's statement against penal
interest and by ordering his sentence for possession of a weapon during the
commission of a violent crime be served consecutively to his sentence for murder.
We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand in part, pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR.

1. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting Antonio
Mickle's statement that "[Blakely] did not have the gun" because the statement was
inadmissible hearsay and did not fall under an exception. See State v. Pagan, 369
S.C. 201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006) ("The admission of evidence is within
the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of
discretion."); id. ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial
court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law."); Rule
804(b)(3), SCRE ("A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability
and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement."); Williamson
v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600-01 (1994) ("In our view, the most faithful
reading of Rule 804(b)(3) [of the Federal Rules of Evidence] is that it does not
allow admission of non-self-inculpatory statements, even if they are made within a
broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory."); id. (finding the trial court
"may not just assume for purposes of Rule 804(b)(3) that a statement is
self-inculpatory because it is part of a fuller confession").

2. Although Blakely failed to preserve whether the trial court abused its discretion
when it imposed consecutive sentences, we review this issue for the sake of
judicial economy. See State v. Bonner, 400 S.C. 561, 566-67, 735 S.E.2d 525,
527-28 (Ct. App. 2012) (excusing a failure to preserve a sentencing error in the
interest of judicial economy); State v. Plumer, 439 S.C. 346, 351, 887 S.E.2d 134,
137 (2023) ("[T]he appellate court may correct [a] sentence on direct appeal or
remand the issue to the trial court even if the defendant did not object to the
sentence at trial and even if there is no real threat of incarceration beyond the limits
of a legal sentence."). We vacate Blakely's consecutive sentence for possession of
a weapon during the commission of a violent crime because the trial court did not
use its discretion; rather, it relied on the State's erroneous interpretation of the
statute. See In re Christopher H., 432 S.C. 600, 605, 854 S.E.2d 853, 855 (2021)
("The sentence imposed will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion."); id. ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the sentence imposed was
based on either an error of law or a factual conclusion not supported by evidence in
the record."); State v. Smith, 276 S.C. 494, 498, 280 S.E.2d 200, 202 (1981) ("It is
an equal abuse of discretion to refuse to exercise discretionary authority when it is
warranted as it is to exercise the discretion improperly."); S.C. Code
Ann. § 16-23-490(A) (2015) ("If a person is in possession of a firearm or visibly
displays what appears to be a firearm or visibly displays a knife during the
commission of a violent crime and is convicted of committing or attempting to
commit a violent crime as defined in [s]ection 16-1-60 [of the South Carolina
Code], he must be imprisoned five years, in addition to the punishment provided
for the principal crime."); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-23-490(B) (2015) ("Service of the
five-year sentence is mandatory unless a longer mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment is provided by law for the violent crime. The court may impose this
mandatory five-year sentence to run consecutively or concurrently." (emphasis
added)). We remand to the trial court for sentencing on the possession of a
weapon during the commission of a violent crime conviction.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, and REMANDED IN PART. 1

MCDONALD, HEWITT, and TURNER, JJ., concur.




1
    We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.