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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 50857
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: April 24, 2025
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
)
RYAN MATTHEW SAMFORD, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Steven J. Hippler, District Judge.
Judgment of conviction for attempted strangulation and felony domestic violence
or battery, affirmed.
Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Kiley A. Heffner, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Kiley A. Heffner argued.
Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
________________________________________________
LORELLO, Judge
Ryan Matthew Samford appeals from his judgment of conviction for attempted
strangulation and felony domestic violence or battery. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Deputies responded to a report of a domestic dispute at a home. The caller reported that
his female roommate, J.T., came into his bedroom and told him her boyfriend, Samford, tried to
choke and kill her. The roommate stated that J.T. was in the roommate’s truck outside and that
she had marks on her neck. When the deputies arrived, they spoke with J.T. and noted she was
extremely upset while recounting the events of the night. When asked what happened, J.T. broke
1
down and responded with something to the effect of “I’m still in love with that guy--the guy who
tried to kill me.”
J.T. told the deputies that she and Samford had been at a party earlier that night and returned
home to their shared residence where they had a verbal altercation. J.T. could not recall the subject
of the argument but stated that she remembered that Samford took her to the floor between the bed
and desk in their bedroom. She stated Samford then held her down on her back by the neck with
his hand or hands and she unsuccessfully tried to call out and have the Siri feature call 911. J.T.
stated she was eventually able to push Samford off, punched him in the face, and ran to her
roommate’s room.
One of the deputies observed a red, semi-circular mark on the left rear of J.T.’s neck. The
fire department also responded to evaluate J.T. and observed red marks on the front and back of
her neck. The primary emergency medical technician noted in his report that J.T. had “red and
inflamed marks on her neck,” as well as “subconjunctival hemorrhage in her eyes from being
choked for so long.”
When interviewed by deputies, Samford initially denied that any physical altercation took
place. When confronted with J.T.’s statements, Samford stated J.T. was “very excitable” and that
he had been forced to get her off of him. When asked to further describe the physical fight,
Samford stated, “it was more of a grapple.” When questioned about a visible scratch on his arm,
Samford stated that J.T. was kicking and flailing during the incident. Samford could not provide
an explanation when asked why J.T. would have been kicking and flailing. Samford was
subsequently arrested for attempted strangulation.
After being booked at the jail, Samford immediately began to make phone calls to J.T.
During the first call, J.T. asked Samford why he strangled her and told him that he almost killed
her. Samford apologized and told J.T. he loved her and did not want to hurt her. In a second phone
call, J.T. again asked Samford why he strangled her, and he replied, “I can’t remember why, I
overreacted.” Later in the call, Samford told J.T., “I don’t know what’s going to happen.
Apparently, I’m supposed to have court tomorrow. Honestly, if I could, I would spend the rest of
my life making up for it.” J.T. responded: “You’re not going to get that chance now [Samford]--I
literally thought I was going to die.” Toward the end of the call, Samford again told J.T. he loved
her and apologized.
2
After reviewing Samford’s calls with J.T., a deputy interviewed Samford. During the
interview, Samford agreed with the deputy that Samford’s comments could be perceived as him
trying to influence, deter, or impede J.T. from potentially testifying truthfully in the upcoming
criminal proceedings.
Relevant to this appeal, J.T. had a follow-up phone call with another detective the day
following the altercation. J.T. disclosed the following:
I have no idea how it started. All I know is that all of a sudden he was on top of
me, I was on my back, his hands were around my throat and I was screaming but
all that would come out was really hoarse little whisper of screaming “Hey Siri, call
911” as hard as I could because I didn’t know where my phone was. . . . I knew I
was going to die, I was terrified, just screaming. . . . I was super aware that it was
only like a hoarse whisper and it was even scarier when I screamed but then I tried
to breathe in again so I could scream again but I couldn’t breathe in again to scream
again. . . . Three times I got gasps of breath and I keep thinking he choked me three
times, but it was all at once. I was just kicking and kicking. . . . I know that the
only way I was able to get him off me, even a little bit, was if I kicked my legs up
behind over his shoulders a little bit towards the front because I was laying on my
back and he was straddling me. . . . I used all of my strength and . . . at some point,
somehow I was able to get away.
J.T. explained that she ran to her roommate’s bedroom naked and hysterical. The roommate gave
J.T. some clothes, and the two of them exited the residence and got into the roommate’s truck.
The roommate called the police while J.T. contacted her parents. During the interview, the
detective asked J.T. how she was feeling, and she responded:
My throat is still sore, I’m not having trouble swallowing anymore. For a while it
was hurting a lot to swallow. My muscles are so sore, it feels like I did a bunch of
bench presses. My chest muscles are really sore. . . . My core is sore like I did a
bunch of crunches. . . . I am covered in bruises. I can see where his fingers and
thumbs were on my arms because I know at some point he held my arms down.
Three days later, J.T. went to the hospital to be evaluated for continuing neck pain and
symptoms. Also relevant to this appeal, a nurse recorded the following in J.T.’s medical records:
Patient states alleged physical abuse on Saturday at her house with her and her
significant other. Patient states boyfriend tried to ‘strangle her’, no obvious
bruising noted today, patient c/o lateral neck pain and trouble swallowing. This
RN noticed bruising on left forearm and small abrasion on right forearm. Patient
denies abdominal or lower extremity trauma.
The treating physician diagnosed J.T. as suffering from strain of her neck muscle and odynophagia
(painful swallowing).
3
A no-contact order was issued that prohibited any contact between J.T. and Samford;
however, J.T. filed a motion to terminate the no-contact order shortly thereafter. The magistrate
court modified the no-contact order to allow written and electronic communication between J.T.
and Samford while he was in custody, with a specific provision prohibiting them from discussing
the case.
J.T. and Samford began communicating again, and J.T. began putting money on Samford’s
account and sending him care packages on a regular basis. Their communications immediately
returned to being romantic in nature, with Samford calling J.T., “beautiful,” “gorgeous,”
“wonderful,” and repeatedly saying, “I love you.”
During this same time period, Samford rekindled a romantic relationship with an
ex-girlfriend living in Texas. The ex-girlfriend also began to put money on Samford’s account.
Samford and his ex-girlfriend began communicating regularly through calls, chats, and video
visits. Samford told his ex-girlfriend that he did not intend to stay in Idaho after his release and
that he wanted to return to Texas and be with her.
After several weeks of being incarcerated, Samford decided to tell J.T. that he planned to
go back to Texas and be with his ex-girlfriend after he was released from custody. When he told
his ex-girlfriend he had done that, she questioned whether that was the best decision for his case.
During a phone call, Samford and his ex-girlfriend decided it would be more beneficial for his case
if he kept J.T. closer rather than push her away. After having that conversation with his
ex-girlfriend, Samford continued to cultivate his relationship with J.T., and she continued to put
money on Samford’s phone account and send him care packages. J.T. also sent pictures of
almost-naked models to Samford so that he could sell them to other inmates. During this time
period, Samford also continued to send messages to his ex-girlfriend stating he loved her and
would be coming home to her.
The preliminary hearing was held the following month. J.T. testified on cross-examination
to remembering “very, very little” about any altercation. She stated she had been drinking the
evening of the incident, was “really intoxicated,” and described the altercation as follows:
The only way I knew how to describe it is it’s like see [sic] shadows moving
behind a sheet, so it’s really hard to describe what my memory is. Little flashes.
So I guess what I remember at one point he was on top of me, and I remember
4
calling out like I don’t know how many times to my--I have a smart home, so to
Siri, and I briefly remember getting away. And that’s it, basically.
J.T. testified that she knew she spoke to officers the night of the incident but did not remember
what she said. On redirect, J.T. testified that she knew Samford was “straddling” her and she had
a “really hard time breathing.” When asked why she had a hard time breathing, she stated, “I don’t
know where his hands were so I’m not sure, but I know that I couldn’t get breath into my lungs.”
She testified she was lying on her back on the floor of her bedroom and Samford was on top of
her. She testified it was “just kind of a blur” but that “all the weight was situated . . . on [her]
torso.” J.T. recalled going to the hospital four days following the incident but claimed not to
remember what she said to the nurses. The State relied primarily on medical records to meet the
standard of probable cause, and the case was bound over on both counts to the district court.
After the case was set for trial, Samford continued his fake relationship with J.T. J.T’s
texts to Samford demonstrated her support for his defense in the case. For example, she wrote that
“the investigator for your attorney just called! I have to call them back still but wanted to let you
know :) :) I’m excited to have someone on your defense team who is allowed to talk to me. Love
you xoxo.” Samford replied, “yay!!!! just don’t tell me anything baby I’ll find out from my
attorney I’m sure. I love you! its [sic] great to know we’re gonna see some progress finally and
hopefully it should be good news!” The same day, J.T. told Samford she felt her conversation
with the investigator in the public defender’s office went well and Samford responded, “well yay!!!
hopefully that means something good as far me coming home then babe!!! :).”
The following day, J.T. questioned Samford about his intentions:
My biggest fear is that you’re only being sweet to me to get what you need and that
you don’t actually want to be with me when you get out. That you’ll just save up
enough to get back to Houston then get back together with her like I mean nothing
to you.
Samford responded:
yes baby [the ex-girlfriend] and I are done, and I am coming home to you! its [sic]
not that I didn’t want to type more I’m just trying to type fast enough to save money.
but yes babe I am sure and you myself and [your dog] will build a life together
including a personal puppy house for the munckin [sic].
The next day, Samford wrote to the ex-girlfriend:
I left you voicemail to clarify what I meant. you know I stumble over words
sometimes babe. I LOVE YOU so so much. pleeeease don’t let my fumble of
5
words get in your head. You are all I want and need. once the defense has what
we need I will stop all contact. hell if it means we can be together I’d tell her
everything regardless if it meant time or not just to prove I’m telling the truth and
I love you so much. message me when you can or leave short voicemail. I’m sorry
I made you sad but it wasn’t lie again as you thought. not in that sense. I had guys
who had her photos and tried to return them and I denied it. I love you beautiful.
Several days later, Samford sent a message to his ex-girlfriend, stating: “you know I can’t cut her
off completely just yet until its certain she can’t [f***] up my life. I thought we were on the same
page with that in order for me to be on a plane and get home?” In the next message, Samford
wrote: “you know the degree of crazy she is and the power she has on my life right now until were
[sic] told otherwise. . . . which is why the only lies i woukd [sic] tell are to her and not anyone
else.”
About a month later, J.T. learned what Samford had been doing and confronted him about
it during a video visit. Samford admitted he had been untruthful because he was “scared.” When
J.T. asked him why, he answered: “Scared that you weren’t being honest about the whole
anti-prosecution thing.” Samford apologized, stating, “I’m sorry I let it go on this long. I’m sorry
that I didn’t tell you sooner . . . I really am.” J.T. responded: “I hate that I still love you.”
Prior to trial, the State moved in limine to admit J.T.’s prior statements based on the
doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, under which a party forfeits hearsay and confrontation
objections to admissibility by wrongful conduct designed to deprive an opposing party of the live
testimony of a witness. The State argued that Samford’s “repeated and enduring manipulation
resulted in [J.T.] testifying at the preliminary hearing that she has very little memory of what
happened on the date of the incident,” and through “influence and misdirection” Samford
“persuaded [J.T.] from giving truthful testimony in an open courtroom.”
The district court conditionally granted the motion, reasoning I.R.E. 804(a)(3) specifically
requires that the declarant testify to his or her lack of memory. See Milburn v. State, 135 Idaho
701, 708, 23 P.3d 775, 782 (Ct. App. 2000). In ruling on the motion, the district court applied a
four-step forfeiture by wrongdoing analysis and concluded: (1) a determination of whether J.T.
was available as a witness would have to be made at trial; (2) the evidence demonstrated Samford
had been manipulating J.T. with his expressions of love and devotion to coerce her into thinking
that if she did not testify against him, he would return home to her, which is a sufficient showing
of wrongdoing; (3) the evidence established Samford’s intent to procure J.T.’s unavailability as a
6
witness; and (4) if J.T. was unavailable at trial, it was caused by Samford’s wrongdoing. The
district court cautioned that, “if [J.T.] testifies at trial consistent with her preliminary hearing
testimony, the Court will find her unavailable for purposes of offering testimony on the subject
matter of the incident.”
At trial, the State called J.T. as a witness. The State moved for an official ruling on the
motion regarding forfeiture by wrongdoing based on J.T.’s testimony that she was unable to
remember very much about the altercation, had no memory of how she got away from Samford or
her interactions with the paramedics, and could not remember any specific questions or answers
to or from the police. The district court granted the State’s motion and admitted the following
evidence based on that ruling: a redacted recording of J.T.’s interview with the detective the day
after the altercation, a redacted on-body video of J.T.’s statements to the responding officer the
night of the altercation, and J.T.’s statements made to medical personnel four days after the
altercation, as reflected in the medical records.
Samford testified in his own defense. On cross-examination the prosecutor asked Samford
if J.T. sent him naked pictures to sell while incarcerated. Samford objected on grounds of
relevance, unfair prejudice, and beyond the scope of direct. The district court overruled the
objection, and Samford testified J.T. sent him pictures of almost-naked models that he used to
barter for items with other inmates.
Samford was found guilty of attempted strangulation and felony domestic violence or
battery. Samford appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When evaluating the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, we review questions of relevance
de novo. State v. Jones, 167 Idaho 353, 358, 470 P.3d 1162, 1167 (2020); State v. Aguilar, 154
Idaho 201, 203, 296 P.3d 407, 409 (Ct. App. 2012). A trial court’s determination of prejudice
under I.R.E. 403 will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown to be an abuse of discretion.
State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 406, 807 P.2d 610, 624 (1991); State v. Clark, 115 Idaho 1056, 1059,
772 P.2d 263, 266 (Ct. App. 1989). When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on
appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the trial court:
(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such
7
discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before
it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429
P.3d 149, 158 (2018).
Where a defendant claims that his right to due process was violated, we defer to the trial
court’s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720,
23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001). However, we freely review the application of constitutional
principles to those facts found. Id.
III.
ANALYSIS
A. J.T.’s Statements to Detective
Samford asserts the district court abused its discretion when it admitted the statements J.T.
made to the detective when she was interviewed the day after the altercation. Samford contends
the statements were inadmissible hearsay.1 The State responds that Samford has failed to show
error in the district court’s determination that J.T.’s statements were admissible pursuant to the
exception in I.R.E. 804(b)(5). We hold that the district court correctly concluded that J.T.’s
statements to the detective were admissible because J.T. was unavailable as a witness as a result
of Samford’s wrongdoing, thereby qualifying for the exception in I.R.E. 804(b)(5).
Hearsay is defined as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. I.R.E. 801(c);
State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 704, 889 P.2d 729, 733 (Ct. App. 1994). Hearsay is inadmissible
unless otherwise provided by an exception in the Idaho Rules of Evidence or other rules of the
Idaho Supreme Court. I.R.E. 802.
The district court admitted J.T.’s statements to the detective pursuant to the doctrine of
forfeiture by wrongdoing; that doctrine is reflected in I.R.E. 804(b)(5). This rule provides that “a
statement offered against a party that wrongfully caused--or acquiesced in wrongfully causing--the
declarant’s unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result” is not subject to exclusion
by the rule against hearsay. Thus, the exception applies when a defendant (1) engages or
1
Samford also claimed, in the alternative, that admission of J.T.’s statements to the detective
violated the Confrontation Clause. Samford withdrew this claim at oral argument.
8
acquiesces in wrongdoing; (2) that was intended to render the declarant unavailable as a witness;
and (3) that did, in fact, render the declarant unavailable as a witness. See United States v. Gray,
405 F.3d 227, 241 (4th Cir. 2005); see also I.R.E. 804(b)(5) (defining statements that are not
hearsay). The district court found that each of these criteria were satisfied in this case.
1. Unavailability of J.T. as a witness
Samford contends that the district court failed to apply the correct legal standard or exercise
reason in its analysis when it determined that J.T. was unavailable as a witness. A declarant is
considered to be unavailable as a witness if the declarant “testifies to not remembering the subject
matter.” I.R.E. 804(a)(3). Samford argues that the district court erred in concluding J.T. was
unavailable because J.T. did not testify that she had no memory of the subject matter. In support,
Samford notes that J.T. remembered “the altercation and certain events that transpired, such as
calling out to Siri to call 911, where she was positioned on the floor, feeling Mr. Samford on top
of her, and that she was having trouble breathing.”
Samford made this argument below and the district court properly rejected it. When
reviewing the district court’s determination, the following is instructive on what it means to be
unavailable due to a lack of memory:
A typical witness testifies to a variety of matters. Rule 804(a)(3) should
plainly apply to such a witness who remembers three out of four matters, but has
forgotten the fourth. If there is a qualifying hearsay statement by the witness that
details the fourth matter, Rule 804(a)(3) paves the way for its admission. There is
no reason this analysis should not also apply when a witness testifies about an event,
but has forgotten a detail about that event that is captured in the witness’ hearsay
statement. In such circumstances, as long as the witness testified to having
forgotten the detail, she has satisfied the rule’s requirement that she testify to not
remembering the “subject matter” to which her statement pertains.
30B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & JEFFREY BELLIN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 6966
(2024 ed.). That J.T. testified she remembered certain events does not deem her available for all
purposes in conducting an analysis under I.R.E. 804(a)(3). The relevant subject matter for
purposes of determining the admissibility of J.T.’s statements to the detective with respect to
Samford’s criminal conduct was whether he battered or attempted to strangle J.T. This is
analogous to the example above where the witness is considered unavailable when she forgets the
details of a fourth matter, but the details are captured in the witness’s hearsay statement. Similarly,
here, J.T. was unavailable when she testified to remembering some events but did not remember
9
whether Samford attempted to strangle her. J.T’s statements on that subject were captured during
her interview with the detective the day following the altercation. The district court did not abuse
its discretion in concluding J.T. was unavailable as a witness as defined in I.R.E. 804(a)(3).
2. Whether Samford caused J.T.’s unavailability
Samford next argues the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal
standards and did not exercise reason when it determined Samford caused J.T.’s unavailability.
Samford specifically takes issue with the district court’s reliance on New York v. Byrd, 855
N.Y.S.2d 505 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008), in which the appellate court found no error in the trial court’s
admission of the declarant’s grand jury testimony after determining that she was unavailable as a
witness. In that case, the defendant was arrested and charged with one count of attempted murder,
three counts of first degree assault, and one count of second degree assault after attacking his wife.
Id. at 507. The wife was initially cooperative with the prosecution and testified before the grand
jury and gave the police physical evidence. However, she subsequently stopped cooperating and
stated she would refuse to testify at trial. Id. A hearing was held to determine whether to admit
the wife’s grand jury testimony in the event she refused to testify against the defendant at trial.
The wife testified she received many calls from the defendant during his incarceration, which the
trial court noted violated a protection order. The wife stated the defendant requested money for
the prison commissary, told her he loved her, expressed his regret, and stated he wanted their
family to stay together. An expert witness also testified regarding battered person syndrome, and
the court concluded the wife suffered from that syndrome. Id. The wife subsequently refused to
testify at trial and the court admitted her grand jury testimony under the doctrine of forfeiture by
wrongdoing. Id. at 510. No error was found on appeal.
The district court analogized this case to Byrd, noting the evidence demonstrated Samford
manipulated J.T. with expressions of love and his intention to return home to her. The district
court reasoned this conduct was a means of maintaining control over J.T. Similar to Byrd, the
district court also noted that Samford initially violated the no-contact order. Samford contends
Byrd is distinguishable because, unlike the wife in Byrd, J.T. does not suffer from battered person
syndrome; Samford did not engage in hostile or abusive behavior; there is no evidence of a history
of domestic abuse; and although he initially violated the no-contact order, he did not make
hundreds of phone calls to J.T. while incarcerated as did the defendant in Byrd. Samford further
10
asserts the messages between him and his ex-girlfriend do not support the district court’s
determination that he intended to prevent J.T. from testifying; rather, he argues the
communications “evidence a concern that [J.T.] will be vengeful and not testify truthfully.”
These arguments are unpersuasive. While the court in Byrd “acknowledged the long
history of abuse,” it “took pains to clarify that the decision was based only on defendant’s actions
subsequent to the attack.” Id. at 509. Further, the court’s decision was not based on the wife
suffering from battered person syndrome; the court noted that the evidence about battered person
syndrome “was relevant to place defendant’s actions in context to show that he had such a degree
of control over [his wife].” Id. at 510. When concluding the government had proven by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant’s misconduct induced his wife’s unavailability to testify,
the court reasoned the government “need not demonstrate that the defendant’s sole motivation is
to procure the witness’s unavailability” and that it is enough if a desire to silence the witness
motivated the defendant in part. Id. Moreover, the wrongful conduct need not consist of hostile
or abusive behavior:
Given the obligation of citizens to testify when called upon to do so, any action that
causes them to forsake this obligation typically qualifies as wrongdoing. Thus, the
rule’s breadth appears intended to capture conduct, such as pressuring or tricking
witnesses into not testifying, even when that pressure would not itself constitute a
crime.
30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, § 7033.
The district court’s finding that Samford caused J.T.’s unavailability is supported by
substantial and competent evidence. For example, the district court considered the following
exchange between Samford and his ex-girlfriend after Samford revealed he had told J.T. he
planned to go back to his ex-girlfriend after his release:
[Ex-girlfriend]: Maybe you should just send her a message and say, ‘you
know, the more I think about it, the more I’m just not sure.’
[Samford]: Yeah.
[Ex-girlfriend]: I mean do whatever you think, but yeah--I would try to keep
her closer than further [sic].
[Samford]: Okay.
....
[Samford]: I just, I’ve just been telling her the truth because don’t know
if she’s still talking to [a friend] or my mom or
whatever--I’m actually just trying to be truthful. But if
11
you’re okay with me, you know, doing that to keep things
favorable, then--
[Ex-girlfriend]: It’s not like, I’m not sitting here saying tell her lies, or
whatever, but like--
[Samford]: Yeah get it.
[Ex-girlfriend]: Okay good deal.
[Samford]: As long as you know, that, you know, whenever I’m out I’m
coming straight home to you though.
[Ex-girlfriend]: Yeah. I don’t know what you say, I don’t want to know, do
whatever you need to do, um, like, you just need to get
out--yeah.
[Samford]: Yeah.
Following this, Samford continued to cultivate his fake relationship with J.T. They maintained
regular contact and spent hours on the phone, texting, and video chatting. He continued to tell J.T.
he loved her and addressed her as “babe” and “beautiful.” J.T. continued to put money on
Samford’s phone account and send him care packages. After J.T. expressed to Samford that she
felt the conversation with an investigator in the public defender’s office went well, Samford replied
to that message with: “well yay!!! hopefully that means something good as far me coming home
then babe!!! :).”
The district court also considered Samford’s statements to his ex-girlfriend during this time
period, such as: “once the defense has what they need I will stop all contact [with J.T.]”; “I’m
doing only what I feel keeps the status quo till my attorney tells me it no longer matters”; “you
know I can’t cut her off completely just yet until its [sic] certain she can’t [f***] up my life”; and,
“the only lies i woukd [sic] tell are to her and not anyone else.”
The district court’s finding that Samford engaged in wrongdoing that procured J.T.’s
unavailability is supported by substantial and competent evidence. The evidence shows that
Samford engaged in conduct intended to manipulate J.T. into not testifying.2 While this Court
concludes Samford’s characterization of his communications with his ex-girlfriend as merely
evidencing “a concern that [J.T.] will be vengeful and not testify truthfully” as disingenuous, even
2
During oral argument, Samford’s counsel argued that J.T.’s awareness of Samford’s
conduct after she confronted him about it should be considered when determining whether
Samford caused J.T.’s unavailability. That J.T. discovered, prior to trial, that Samford had been
lying to her about the future of their relationship does not change that Samford’s motivation in
lying to J.T. in the first instance was for the purpose of procuring J.T.’s unavailability at trial.
12
if that motivation is taken into consideration, the State need not demonstrate that Samford’s sole
motivation was to procure J.T.’s unavailability. The above communications demonstrate
Samford’s desire to silence J.T. was part of his motivation. Samford fails to show error in the
district court’s admission of evidence under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing as provided
in I.R.E. 804(a)(3).
B. Medical Records
Samford asserts the district court abused its discretion in admitting the medical records that
contain statements J.T. made to the nurse regarding Samford’s identity. Specifically, one medical
record indicates that J.T. reported the “alleged physical abuse on Saturday at her house with her
and her significant other” and that her “boyfriend tried to ‘strangle her.’” Samford contends the
statements include two layers of hearsay and were improperly admitted. Samford argues that the
first layer is J.T.’s statements to the nurse, and the second layer is the nurse’s notations, which
Samford contends are inadmissible under the business-records exception. Because this Court
concludes J.T.’s statements are admissible pursuant to the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception in
I.R.E. 804(a)(3), Samford’s argument on the first layer of hearsay fails.
Turning to Samford’s argument on the second claimed layer of hearsay, we first address
the State’s argument that Samford failed to preserve his appellate argument on this point.
Appellate court review is limited to the evidence, theories, and arguments that were presented
below. State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017). A party’s
specific arguments may evolve over time without raising preservation concerns so long as the
substantive issue was properly raised before the trial court. State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, 224,
443 P.3d 231, 238 (2019); State v. Gonzales, 165 Idaho 95, 98, 439 P.3d 1267, 1270 (2019). A
party preserves an issue for appeal by properly presenting the issue with argument and authority
to the trial court and noticing it for hearing or if the trial court issues an adverse ruling. State v.
Miramontes, 170, Idaho 920, 924-25, 517 P.3d 849, 853-54 (2022). Both are not required. Id. at
925, 517 P.3d at 854.
When the State moved to admit the medical record, Samford objected, stating, “I am going
to make the same 403 objections, expert objections and, like I said, foundation.” The State argued
in response that “it’s all a part of the medical record. It’s admitted under business records, but also
it’s a certified medical record.” The district court overruled Samford’s objection, reasoning that
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“the State cares about the symptoms. That is like medical diagnosis and treating exception under
the hearsay rule, and then they can incorporate it into the next layer of hearsay as a business record,
as part of a business record.” The State argues that Samford’s general trial objection did not
preserve the issue for appeal. We conclude the district court’s ruling preserved the issue for appeal
and will, therefore, address the merits of Samford’s challenge to the second layer of hearsay he
claims.
The requirements for admission of evidence under the business records exception are
provided in I.R.E. 803(6). Those requirements are: (1) “the record was made at or near the time
by--or from information transmitted by--someone with knowledge”; (2) “the record was kept in
the course of a regularly conducted activity of a business, organization, occupation, or calling,
whether or not for profit”; and (3) “making the record was a regular practice of that
activity.” I.R.E. 803(6)(A)-(C). J.T.’s treating physician testified that the medical records contain
notes from the whole team in the emergency department and that he relies on the notes prior to
talking with the patient, noting the triage nurse usually writes down the chief complaint of the
patient. Samford fails to show the district court abused its discretion when admitting the entire
medical record under the business records exception.
Even assuming any error in the admission of J.T’s statements identifying Samford as her
assailant, the error is harmless. Error is not reversible unless it is prejudicial. State v. Stell, 162
Idaho 827, 830, 405 P.3d 612, 615 (Ct. App. 2017). Where a criminal defendant shows an error
based on a contemporaneously objected-to, nonconstitutional violation, the State then has the
burden of demonstrating to the appellate court beyond a reasonable doubt the error did not
contribute to the jury’s verdict. State v. Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 46, 408 P.3d 38, 44 (2017).
Thus, we examine whether the alleged error complained of in the present case was harmless. See
id. Harmless error is error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the
issue in question, as revealed in the record. State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661, 674, 462 P.3d 1125,
1138 (2020). This standard requires weighing the probative force of the record as a whole while
excluding the erroneous evidence and at the same time comparing it against the probative force of
the error. Id. If the error’s effect is minimal compared to the probative force of the record
establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt without the error, then the error did not contribute to
the verdict rendered and is harmless. Id. The reviewing court must take into account what effect
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the error had, or reasonably may have had, on the jury in the context of the total setting and in
relation to all else that happened, which necessarily includes the evidence presented. Kotteakos v.
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946).
The probative force of the alleged error regarding J.T.’s medical records was minimal given
Samford is identified as the man with whom the altercation occurred through other admissible
evidence, such as J.T.’s statements to the responding officers, during her interview the following
day, and during her testimony. Any alleged error is, therefore, harmless.
C. Admission of Pictures J.T. Sent to Samford
Samford contends the district court failed to apply the correct legal standards by permitting
the prosecutor to cross-examine him regarding J.T. sending him pictures of almost-naked models
to sell or use for barter. He asserts the evidence was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. Evidence
is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without
the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action. I.R.E. 401. Relevant
evidence is generally admissible. I.R.E. 402. While relevant evidence is generally admissible, it
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice.
I.R.E. 403. In other words, evidence should be excluded if it invites inordinate appeal to lines of
reasoning outside of the evidence or emotions which are irrelevant to the decision-making process.
State v. Reyes, 169 Idaho 781, 791, 503 P.3d 997, 1007 (2022).
The district court held a bench conference off the record to discuss Samford’s objections
to testimony about the pictures--specifically relevance, unfair prejudice, and beyond the scope of
direct. The district court made its ruling when it went back on the record. In allowing the State to
elicit testimony regarding the pictures, the district court stated, “I ultimately held that they would
be relevant to show the--to impeach [J.T.] in terms of the degree to which she was willing to help
[Samford] and to just show the level of their confederation, so to speak, here.” Samford asserts
the testimony is irrelevant for this purpose because J.T. had already testified as to her willingness
to help Samford. However, proof of bias is almost always relevant because the jury, which is
tasked with findings and weighing credibility, has historically been entitled to assess all evidence
which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a witness’s testimony. State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho
533, 540, 285 P.3d 348, 355 (Ct. App. 2012). That there was additional evidence to show bias
does not negate the relevance of the evidence that J.T. was willing to send pictures to Samford that
15
he could use for bartering purposes. The district court did not err in determining that the challenged
evidence was relevant as impeachment evidence for the purpose of showing J.T.’s bias.
Samford also argues the testimony was irrelevant because it “provided no insight as to the
actions on the dates the alleged battery and attempted strangulation occurred.” As revealed by the
district court’s comments, the testimony was not admitted on this basis. Rather, the district court
ruled the challenged evidence was relevant to show J.T.’s bias in favor of Samford. Samford fails
to show the district court erred in that ruling.
Samford next contends that, even if the evidence was relevant, the district court still abused
its discretion by admitting the evidence because, he claims, the district court did not act
consistently with the applicable legal standards. Specifically, Samford contends the district court
failed to conduct the balancing test required by I.R.E. 403 and did not exercise reason because it
failed to properly weigh the danger of unfair prejudice against the probative value of the evidence.
The State responds this argument is not preserved for appeal. Evidentiary objections must clearly
state the specific ground for the objection, unless the basis for the objection is apparent from
context. State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744, 772, 419 P.3d 1042, 1070 (2018). Objections to the
admissibility of evidence on one basis do not preserve separate and different bases for exclusion.
Id. Thus, a party can fail to preserve an evidentiary issue for appeal not only by failing to make a
specific objection, but also by making a different objection than the one raised on appeal. See
United States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 150, 158 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding objection that the best evidence
available is on the witness stand did not preserve a hearsay objection to introduction of the
witness’s prior statement).
Samford’s arguments on appeal are somewhat inconsistent. On the one hand, Samford first
argues the district court failed to conduct the balancing test required by I.R.E. 403 (“the district
court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards because the district court did not
conduct the balancing test”). On the other hand, in his second argument, Samford contends the
district court improperly conducted the balancing test (“the district court did not exercise reason
because, if properly weighted, the danger of unfair prejudice from this testimony substantially
outweighed any limited probative value”).
When the district court went back on the record to make its ruling on Samford’s objection,
it stated with respect to the bench conference that Samford “argued [testimony regarding the
16
pictures] was unduly prejudicial.” The district court subsequently overruled the objection. After
the district court’s ruling, defense counsel did not object on the basis that the district court failed
to conduct the balancing test required by I.R.E. 403. This objection could not conceivably be made
prior to the district court’s ruling on the motion. We conclude the first argument is not preserved
for appeal.
However, Samford’s initial objection on the basis that the testimony was “unduly
prejudicial” suffices to preserve his second argument that the district court did not exercise reason
because it failed to properly weigh the danger of unfair prejudice against the probative value of
the evidence. Samford was not required to renew this objection after the district court’s ruling.
“Once the court rules definitively on the record--either before or at trial--a party need not renew
an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.” I.R.E. 103(b). Implicit in
the district court’s consideration of and ruling on Samford’s objection is that the district court
found the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial.
Samford contends the probative value of the evidence was minimal because it had no
bearing on the credibility of J.T. He further argues the evidence was unfairly prejudicial because
it allowed the State to portray him in an unfavorable light based on J.T.’s conduct. These
arguments are unpersuasive. First, we agree with the district court’s decision regarding the
relevance of the evidence to show J.T.’s bias “in terms of the degree to which” J.T. was willing to
help Samford. Second, we disagree with Samford that it was J.T.’s conduct in sending him the
pictures that portrayed him in an unfavorable light. It was both Samford’s conduct in accepting
the photos and then using them to barter for items and selling the pictures that would result in any
such portrayal. The district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the danger of unfair
prejudice against the probative value of the evidence.
D. Cumulative Error
Samford also contends that the cumulative error doctrine applies here, necessitating a
reversal of his conviction. Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors (harmless in
and of themselves) may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. Adamcik, 152
Idaho 445, 483, 272 P.3d 417, 455 (2012). However, a necessary predicate to the application of
the doctrine is a finding of more than one error. Id. Samford has failed to demonstrate at least two
17
errors, a necessary predicate to the application of the cumulative error doctrine. As such, Samford
has failed to show he is entitled to application of the cumulative error doctrine.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Samford has failed to show the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence
pursuant to the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing set forth in I.R.E. 804(a)(3). Samford has
failed to show the district court abused its discretion in admitting the entire medical record under
the business records exception--even assuming error in the admission of the entire medical record,
any error was harmless. Samford has also failed to show the district court abused its discretion in
admitting testimony from Samford regarding J.T. sending him photos to use for bartering.
Additionally, Samford is not entitled to relief based on cumulative error. Therefore, Samford’s
judgment of conviction for attempted strangulation and felony domestic violence or battery is
affirmed.
Judge HUSKEY and Judge TRIBE, CONCUR.
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Case Information
- Court
- Idaho Ct. App.
- Decision Date
- April 24, 2025
- Status
- Precedential