State v. Shannon

[[COURTLISTENER_SUBOPINION {"id":"10840347","type":"010combined","part":"opinion","author":null,"source_field":"html_with_citations"}]]
[Cite as State v. Shannon,
2025-Ohio-1224
.]


                                       COURT OF APPEALS
                                      KNOX COUNTY, OHIO
                                   FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                      JUDGES:
STATE OF OHIO                                 :       Hon. Robert G. Montgomery, P. J.
                                              :       Hon. Kevin W. Popham, J.
                         Plaintiff-Appellee   :       Hon. David M. Gormley, J.
                                              :
-vs-                                          :
                                              :       Case No. 24CA000020
CHARLES SHANNON                               :
                                              :
                    Defendant-Appellant       :       OPINION




CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                          Appeal from the Knox County Court of
                                                  Common Pleas, Case No. 23CR12-0299


JUDGMENT:                                         Affirmed



DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                           April 7, 2025



APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee                            For Defendant-Appellant

CHARLES T. MCCONVILLE                             TODD W. BARSTOW
Prosecuting Attorney                              15 N. Park Place
BY: NICOLE E. DERR                                Newark, OH 43055
117 East High Street, Ste. 234
Mount Vernon, OH 43050
Popham, J.,

       {¶1}   Defendant-appellant Charles M. Shannon [“Shannon”] appeals from the

April 29, 2024, Decision and Entry of the Knox County Court of Common Pleas overruling

his motion to suppress.

                                  Facts and Procedural History

       {¶2}   On December 18, 2023, Shannon was indicted for two counts of having

weapons while under disability, felonies of the third degree in violation of R.C.

2923.13(A)(3), one count of aggravated possession of drugs, a felony of the fifth degree

in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), and one count of possessing criminal tools, a felony of the

fifth degree in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A). The having weapons while under disability

charges each carried a forfeiture specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.1417.

       {¶3}   On February 9, 2024, Shannon filed a motion to suppress. On April 25,

2024, an evidentiary hearing was held on the motion. Prior to the start of the hearing,

Shannon agreed that the scope of the evidentiary hearing was limited to “contesting the

search warrant and the PC for the search warrant.” Supp. T. at 5.

       {¶4}   Knox County Sheriff’s Detective Terry Wolfe testified that he began an

investigation of Shannon around the end of July or beginning of August 2023. During that

time, Detective Wolfe received information from a confidential source that Shannon was

transporting drugs from his residence in Columbus to a residence on Howard Street in

Mount Vernon, Ohio. Detective Wolfe described the source as one that he “used on

multiple occasions [and] that was reliable.” Supp. T. at 9. Detective Wolfe testified that he

was aware that Shannon was originally from Mount Vernon, Ohio, and he had family,

including a child, living in the Mount Vernon area. Supp. T. at 29; 31. Detective Wolfe
testified that during his investigation of Shannon, the detective utilized five confidential

informants. Supp. T. at 40 - 41.

       {¶5}   Based upon those conversations, Detective Wolfe began watching the

residence. Detective Wolfe testified that he did “see signs of drug sells from the

residence.”
Id.
at 9 - 10. Detective Wolfe subsequently made a traffic stop on a car leaving

the residence and found drugs inside that car. Id. at 10. Detective Wolfe obtained a

description of the vehicle Shannon was driving; however, during two traffic stops of

Shannon’s vehicle “no narcotics were located.” Supp. T. at 10.

       {¶6}   Detective Wolfe obtained Shannon's phone number and applied for a

search warrant for the phone. The warrant was granted, and Detective Wolfe began to

“ping” Shannon’s phone to track his movements. Id. at 10-11. He also obtained a GPS

warrant for Shannon's vehicle, which he executed while Shannon was attending his

weekly visitation with his child in Knox County.

       {¶7}   From the GPS tracker, Detective Wolfe learned Shannon, while coming to

Knox County from Columbus, would stop at one or two storage unit facilities. Supp. T. at

13. On November 27, 2023, Detective Wolfe observed Shannon inside the business part

of a storage unit facility talking to a female employee. Id. That employee gave Detective

Wolfe “Unit A-020,” as the number of Shannon’s storage unit, which Shannon had rented

that day. Id. at 14; 16; Affidavit for Warrant to Search, ¶ 21.

       {¶8}   Detective Wolfe testified that the storage facility where Shannon’s unit was

located is a private facility, surrounded by an 8 to 10-foot-high fence. Supp. T. at 32.

Further, the facility is gated, requiring a code or a pass key to enter the property to access
the storage units. Id. Detective Wolfe was given the pass code and permission to enter

the facility by an employee. Id. at 33.

       {¶9}   Detective Wolfe further testified that he “had gotten some information from

a source who stated that “Chuck was carrying a gun, I believe it was a Smith & Wesson,

was what I was told.” Supp. T. at 14.

       {¶10} Detective Wolfe testified that he placed a camera in a tree looking down

onto Shannon’s storage unit. Id. However, through a series of technical missteps, no

video footage of Shannon entering or leaving the storage unit was obtained or preserved.

Id. at 15; 17; 34 - 35. However, Detective Wolfe testified that while watching the live video

feed of Shannon's storage unit on November 28, 2023, he observed Shannon place two

large duffle bags and “a large case that looked like a gun case” in Unit A-020. Id. at 16.

       {¶11} On December 4, 2023, Detective Wolfe asked Knox County Sheriff Deputy

Luke Guthrie to run his canine partner “Feyd” around the storage facility. Affidavit for

Warrant to Search, ¶ 25. Detective Wolfe did not provide the canine handler Shannon's

unit number. Supp. T. at 17. The dog alerted to the presence of the odor of narcotics

outside the closed door of Shannon's unit.

       {¶12} Detective Wolfe obtained a search warrant for Shannon's unit. Inside, he

located two firearms, “a Smith & Wesson” and what “appeared to be a long gun,” baggies

containing narcotics residue, and drug paraphernalia. Supp. T. at 18 - 19.

       {¶13} At the conclusion of the hearing Shannon again told the judge that he was

only contesting the “basis for the issuance of the warrant[.]” Supp. T. at 43.

       {¶14} The trial judge denied Shannon’s motion to suppress through a Decision

and Entry filed April 29, 2024.
       {¶15} Shannon entered a no contest plea to one count of having weapons while

under disability, as well as the forfeiture specifications to count one and count two of the

indictment. Plea T. at 3; 14-15. The remaining counts of the indictment were dismissed

upon motion of the state. Amended Journal Entry, filed July 17, 2025. Sentencing was

deferred and the preparation of a Presentence Investigation Report was ordered. On July

18, 2024, the judge sentenced Shannon to thirty months in prison on count one of the

Indictment and ordered forfeiture of the weapons to the Knox County Sheriff.

                                       Assignment of Error

       {¶16} Shannon raises one Assignment of Error,

       {¶17} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT

DENYING HIS MOTION TO SUPPRESS.”

                                        Law and analysis

       {¶18} Shannon contends that the trial judge erred in not granting his motion to

suppress because the affidavit in support of the search warrant, while based upon

reasonable suspicion, is not based upon probable cause.

                                       Standard of Review

       {¶19} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law

and fact. State v. Burnside,
2003-Ohio-5372
, ¶ 8. When ruling on a motion to suppress,

the trial judge assumes the role of trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve

questions of fact and to evaluate witness credibility. See State v. Dunlap,
73 Ohio St.3d

308
, 314 (1995); State v. Fanning,
1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20
(1982). Accordingly, a reviewing

court must defer to the trial court’s factual findings if competent, credible evidence exists

to support those findings. See, Burnside; Dunlap; State v. Long,
127 Ohio App.3d 328,
332
(4th Dist. 1998); State v. Medcalf,
111 Ohio App.3d 142
(4th Dist. 1996); State v. Hill,
2024-Ohio-522, ¶ 16
(5th Dist.). However, once this Court has accepted those facts as

true, it must independently determine as a matter of law whether the trial court met the

applicable legal standard. See, Burnside, citing State v. McNamara,
124 Ohio App.3d 706
(4th Dist. 1997); See, generally, United States v. Arvizu,
534 U.S. 266
(2002), overruled

in part on separate grounds by Davis v. Washington,
547 U.S. 813
(2006) as stated in

United States v. Idleman,
2018 WL 4677859
(N.D.W.Va. July 16, 2018) and State v.

Strong,
2019-Ohio-2888, ¶ 19
(4th Dist.); Ornelas v. United States,
517 U.S. 690
(1996).

That is, the application of the law to the trial court’s findings of fact is subject to a de novo

standard of review.
Ornelas, supra.
Moreover, due weight should be given “to inferences

drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.” Ornelas,
517 U.S. at 698
.

                                         The search warrant

       {¶20} In addressing the substance of Shannon’s assignment of error, we begin

with Criminal Rule 41, which governs the issuance and execution of search warrants in

Ohio. Subsection (C) of the rule reads, in pertinent part:

              (1) A warrant shall issue on either an affidavit or affidavits sworn to

       before a judge of a court of record or an affidavit or affidavits communicated

       to the judge by reliable electronic means establishing the grounds for

       issuing the warrant. In the case of a search warrant, the affidavit shall name

       or describe the person to be searched or particularly describe the place to

       be searched, name or describe the property to be searched for and seized,
      state substantially the offense in relation thereto, and state the factual basis

      for the affiant’s belief that such property is there located….

             (2) If the judge is satisfied that probable cause exists, the judge shall

      issue a warrant identifying the property to be seized and naming or

      describing the person or place to be searched or the person or property to

      be tracked…The finding of probable cause may be based upon hearsay in

      whole or in part, provided there is a substantial basis for believing the

      source of the hearsay to be credible and for believing that there is a factual

      basis for the information furnished…. (Empasis added).

      {¶21} In reviewing the affidavit in this case, we are guided by the following

instruction from the Ohio Supreme Court,

             In reviewing the sufficiency of probable cause in an affidavit

      submitted in support of a search warrant issued by a magistrate, neither a

      trial court nor an appellate court should substitute its judgment for that of

      the magistrate by conducting a de novo determination as to whether the

      affidavit contains sufficient probable cause upon which that court would

      issue the search warrant. Rather, the duty of a reviewing court is simply to

      ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that

      probable cause existed.

State v. George,
45 Ohio St.3d 325, 330
(1989), paragraph two of the syllabus, citing

Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 238-239
(1983). Trial and appellate courts should accord

great deference to the magistrate's determination of probable cause, and doubtful or

marginal cases in this area should be resolved in favor of upholding the warrant. George,
45 Ohio St.3d at 329
, citing Gates,
462 U.S. at 238-239
. See also, State v. Norman,
2011-Ohio-568, ¶ 33
(5th Dist.).

       {¶22} “In determining the sufficiency of probable cause in an affidavit submitted in

support of a search warrant, ‘[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a

practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the

affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying

hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will

be found in a particular place.'” (Emphasis added). George,
45 Ohio St.3d 325
at

paragraph one of the syllabus, quoting Gates,
462 U.S. at 238
- 239.

       {¶23} Shannon contends that Detective Wolfe’s affidavit was lacking in facts

necessary to support a finding of a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime

would be found in the storage locker. He argues that the reliability of Detective Wolfe’s

confidential sources “must be seriously questioned” because, based upon those sources,

law enforcement in Knox County conducted two traffic stops of Shannon’s vehicle and

found neither drugs or weapons in Shannon’s possession. See Appellant’s brief at 2.

Shannon further contends that Detective Wolfe never actually saw Shannon in

possession of drugs or weapons, only what “looked like” a gun case. Further, no

corroborating evidence such as photographs, documents or statements were alluded to

in the affidavit, nor did the affidavit state that any confidential source purchased drugs

from Shannon.
Id.
Issue for Appellate Review: Whether the record contains a substantial

  basis for finding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the judge had sufficient
  probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in

                                Shannon’s storage locker

                                         Probable cause

      {¶24} In State v. Perez, the Ohio Supreme Court defined probable cause,

             “Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the

      officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been

      committed.” Henry v. United States (1959),
361 U.S. 98, 102
,
80 S.Ct. 168
,
4 L.Ed.2d 134
. “Probable cause does not require the same type of specific

      evidence of each element of the offense as would be needed to support a

      conviction.” Adams v. Williams (1972),
407 U.S. 143, 149
,
92 S.Ct. 1921
,
32 L.Ed.2d 612
. Rather, probable cause is a “practical, nontechnical

      conception,” Brinegar v. United States (1949),
338 U.S. 160, 176
,
69 S.Ct.

      1302
,
93 L.Ed. 1879
, that “turn[s] on the assessment of probabilities in

      particular factual contexts.” Illinois v. Gates (1983),
462 U.S. 213, 232
,
103

      S.Ct. 2317
,
76 L.Ed.2d 527
.
2009-Ohio-6179, ¶ 73
. The Gates decision provides considerable elaboration on the “fair

probability” standard applicable to the magistrate’s probable cause determination,

             Finely tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or

      by a preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place

      in the magistrate’s decision. * * * [I]t is clear that “only the probability, and

      not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable

      cause.” Spinelli, 393 U.S., at 419, 89 S.Ct. at 590–591. See Model Code
       of Pre–Arraignment Procedure § 210.1(7) (Prop. Off. Draft 1972); 1 W.

       LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.2(e) (1978). (Emphasis added.)

       Illinois v. Gates at
462 U.S. at 235
.

                             Hearsay and Informant Reliability

       {¶25} Criminal Rule 41 (C)(2) specifically provides, “The finding of probable cause

may be based upon hearsay in whole or in part, provided there is a substantial basis for

believing the source of the hearsay to be credible and for believing that there is a factual

basis for the information furnished.” Therefore, hearsay may serve as the basis for the

issuance of a warrant if there is a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. United

States v. Ventresca,
380 U.S. 102, 108
(1965). In Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108
(1964),

and Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410
(1969), the United States Supreme Court set

forth a two-pronged test to determine whether an informant’s tip establishes probable

cause to issue a warrant. Under that test, a magistrate must be informed of: (1) the basis

of the informant’s knowledge; and (2) sufficient facts to establish either the informant’s

veracity or the reliability of the informant’s information. Aguilar at 114; Spinelli at 413. See

also State v. Stubbs,
2020-Ohio-3464, ¶ 22
(5th Dist.). However, in determining whether

there is probable cause for the issuance of a warrant, courts employ a “totality-of-the-

circumstances” test. State v. George,
45 Ohio St.3d 325, 329
(1989), quoting, Illinois v.

Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 238
(1983). It would certainly appear as though Criminal Rule

41(C)(2) is a holdover of the Aguilar-Spinelli test. See George,
45 Ohio St.3d at 329
- 330

(discussing the “totality of the circumstances” test).

       {¶26} In Gates, the United States Supreme Court abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli

test in favor of a traditional “totality of the circumstances” test for probable cause. Gates,
462 U.S. at 238
. Thus, an affidavit must be “[considered] in its entirety, giving significance

to each relevant piece of information and balancing the relative weights of all the various

indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending the tip.” Massachusetts v. Upton,
466 U.S.

727, 732
(1984). No single piece of evidence in the affidavit is conclusive. But if the pieces

fit neatly together and, so viewed, support the judge’s determination that there was “a fair

probability that contraband or evidence of a crime” would be found, then the affidavit

provides a substantial basis for the issuance of the warrant.
466 U.S. at 733
. Further,

independent corroboration by the police of a confidential source’s information will lend

some degree of reliability to the other allegations made by the source. Alabama v. White,
496 U.S. 325, 332
(1990); State v. Evans,
67 Ohio St.3d 405, 411
(1993).

       {¶27} In the case at bar, the affidavit contained no statements providing indicia of

either the veracity of the confidential sources or the basis of their knowledge. We have

no idea from the affidavit whether the sources have been proven reliable. Nevertheless,

the information contained in paragraph 5 (confidential source #1), paragraphs 8, 10, and

11 (confidential source #2), and paragraph 16 (confidential source #3) of his affidavit

provide sufficient grounds for Detective Wolfe to continue to investigate the claims made

that Shannon is bringing drugs from Columbus to Knox County. Further, in paragraph 20

(confidential source #4) states that “Shannon was carrying a Smith and Wesson 500

handgun on his right hip.” The confidential source personally told Detective Wolfe this

information. The level of detail, i.e., the make of the handgun and how Shannon carries

it, implies personal observation or knowledge on the part of the confidential source.
       {¶28} Detective Wolfe in reliance, at least in part, on these statements, obtained

two search warrants, the “ping” warrant and a GPS warrant. Shannon does not contest

the legality of these two warrants.

       {¶29} Detective Wolfe was able to independently verify parts of the information he

had been given by his sources. Detective Wolfe was able to track Shannon to a residence

where confidential source #2 informed him Shannon had “dropped off a large amount of

meth.” Affidavit for Warrant to Search, ¶¶ 11; 19. Further, Detective Wolfe was able to

confirm by GPS tracking that Shannon had been at a residence where confidential source

#5 is said to have seen Shannon deliver “large amounts of methamphetamine.” Id. at ¶

22.

       {¶30} As a result of the information obtained from his sources, the “ping” warrant,

and the GPS warrant, Detective Wolfe learned that Shannon had rented the storage unit

A-020. He then set-up video surveillance and observed Shannon arrive at the unit on

November 28, 2023 and “put two large duffle bags and a large case that looked like a gun

case inside the unit.” Id. at ¶ 24. Detective Wolfe arranged for Deputy Guthrie and his

canine partner to conduct a free air sniff around the storage unit. Detective Wolfe

indicated, “K9 Feyd gave a change of behavior to indicate the presence of narcotics at

the door to Unit A-020.” Id. at ¶ 25.

          Canine alert outside of a closed door of a commercial storage unit, with the

   canine legally positioned in the area accessible to the unit facility’s employees and

 anyone renting one of the units in the facility, is not a “search,” for Fourth Amendment

                                        purposes
       {¶31} In United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696
(1983), the United States Supreme

Court suggested that the question of whether a dog sniff is a search depends in part on

the level of the person’s expectation of privacy in the place where the dog sniff occurs,

and in part on the level of intrusiveness of the dog sniff. The Court held that because a

traveler’s expectation of privacy in a public airport is limited, and a trained drug-detection

dog sniff is only minimally intrusive, a dog sniff of a traveler’s luggage in a public place

was not a search under the Fourth Amendment. 462 U.S. at 707. The Court

acknowledged that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in luggage contents

but held that there is no such expectation in scents that may be detected at the luggage’s

exterior. Id.

       {¶32} As for the intrusiveness of a dog sniff, the Supreme Court observed that a

dog sniff “discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item.” Place,
462 U.S. at 707
. A dog sniff was described as “sui generis” because there is “no other

investigative procedure that is so limited both in the manner in which the information is

obtained and in the content of the information revealed by the procedure.”
Id.
This reliance

on the limited intrusiveness of a drug-detection dog sniff was reaffirmed in City of

Indianapolis v. Edmond, where the Court held that a dog sniff of a vehicle at a traffic

checkpoint was not a search because it “does not require entry into the car and is not

designed to disclose any information other than the presence or absence of narcotics.”
531 U.S. 32, 40
(2000). See also United States v. McKenzie,
13 F.4th 223
, 233 - 236 (2d

Cir. 2021).

       {¶33} In the case at bar, Shannon did not challenge “Feyd’s” free air sniff as an

illegal search in either his written motion to suppress or during the suppression hearing.
See Motion to Suppress and Request for Oral Hearing, filed Feb. 9, 2024 (Docket Entry

Number 24); Supp. T. at 5; 43. Shannon’s motion to suppress raised no specific issues

and was only a general motion containing boilerplate language. At the hearing on the

motion to suppress, neither party raised the issue of the canine’s alert outside of the

closed door of the commercial storage unit as a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes

in its questioning of Detective Wolfe, or in opening or closing arguments.

                            Canine free air sniffs and probable cause

       {¶34} We recognize that an alert in the context of a canine narcotics sniff indicates

that narcotics are present in the item being sniffed, or have been present in such a way

as to leave a detectable odor. United States v. Buchanon,
72 F.3d 1217
, 1219 at n. 1 (6th

Cir. 1995); United States v. Boxley,
373 F.3d 759
(6th Cir. 2004).

       {¶35} In Florida v. Harris, the United States Supreme Court, stated, “a dog’s

satisfactory performance in a certification or training program can itself provide sufficient

reason to trust his alert. If a bona fide organization has certified a dog after testing his

reliability in a controlled setting, a court can presume (subject to any conflicting evidence

offered) that the dog’s alert provides probable cause to search.”
568 U.S. 237, 246-247
(2015). The United States Supreme Court held that if the state provides proof that the

dog was certified in a controlled setting, and the defendant has not contested that

showing, then the court should determine probable cause existed. On the other hand, if

the defendant disputes the reliability of the alert, then the court should weigh the

competing evidence.
Id.
{¶36} In the case at bar, Shannon did not challenge “Feyd’s” qualifications or

training to accurately detect the odor of narcotics, in either his written motion to suppress
or during the suppression hearing. See Motion to Suppress and Request for Oral Hearing,

filed Feb. 9, 2024 (Docket Entry Number 24); Supp. T. at 5; 43. Shannon’s motion to

suppress raised no specific issues and was only a general motion containing boilerplate

language. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, neither party raised the canine’s

certification or training in its questioning of Detective Wolfe, or in opening or closing

arguments.

                                 Waiver and motions to suppress

       {¶37} Criminal Rule 47, which governs motions in criminal proceedings, provides,

in relevant part:

              An application to the court for an order shall be by motion. A motion,

       other than one made during trial or hearing, shall be in writing unless the

       court permits it to be made orally. It shall state with particularity the grounds

       upon which it is made and shall set forth the relief or order sought. It shall

       be supported by a memorandum containing citations of authority and may

       also be supported by an affidavit. (Emphasis added).

       {¶38} Criminal Rule 12(C)(3) requires a defendant to file a motion to suppress

evidence with the trial court within thirty-five days after arraignment or seven days before

trial, whichever is earlier. Criminal Rule 12 further provides that the failure to do so “shall

constitute waiver of the defenses or objections, but the court for good cause shown may

grant relief from the waiver.” (Emphasis added.) Criminal Rule 12(H).

       {¶39} In City of Xenia v. Wallace,
37 Ohio St.3d 216
(1988), the Ohio Supreme

Court explained that “[Crim.R. 47], when applied to a motion to suppress evidence

obtained by search and seizure, requires that the prosecution be given notice of the
specific legal and factual grounds upon which the validity of the search and seizure is

challenged.”
Id. at 219
. “The prosecutor must know the grounds of the challenge in order

to prepare his case, and the court must know the grounds of the challenge in order to rule

on evidentiary issues at the hearing and properly dispose of the merits.”
Id. at 218
.

“Failure on the part of the defendant to adequately raise the basis of his challenge

constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.”
Id.
Accord State v. Shindler,
70 Ohio St.3d

54, 58
(1994) (“[b]y requiring the defendant to state with particularity the legal and factual

issues to be resolved, the prosecutor and court are placed on notice of those issues to

be heard and decided by the court and, by omission, those issues which are otherwise

being waived.”). See also State v. Toran,
2023-Ohio-3564, ¶ 36
(Gallagher, J.,

concurring) (“Toran failed to raise the issue in the trial court with the specificity and

citations to authority required by Crim.R. 12(H) and 47. Under Crim.R. 12(H), Toran

waived any challenges to the legality of the detective’s decision to impound the vehicle

he had been driving, and he is not permitted to cite any deficiencies in the state’s

presentation of evidence, which depended on that waiver, for the first time on appeal.”);

State v. Wintermeyer,
2019-Ohio-5156, ¶ 24
(“If there truly is a Fourth-Amendment-

standing concern, it is far better for the issue to be developed in the trial court, where

each side has the opportunity to put on evidence, than for a court of appeals to decide

the matter in the first instance after the opportunity to develop evidence has passed.”).

See also State v. Johnson,
2014-Ohio-671, ¶ 14
(10th Dist.) (canine search); State v.

Neal,
2016-Ohio-1406, ¶ 29
(10th Dist.) (canine search).

       {¶40} In the case at bar, Shannon failed to challenge in his motion to suppress

whether the canine’s search violated the Fourth Amendment, and whether the canine was
certified to accurately detect the odor of narcotics. He has therefore waived any argument

that Detective Wolfe’s affidavit did not support a finding of probable cause because it

failed to disclose the qualifications or training of the canine that performed the sniff and,

further, that the canine’s sniff itself violated any Fourth Amendment concerns.

                                           Conclusion

       {¶41} Given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, and

considering the affidavit in its entirety, Detective Wolfe’s independent corroboration of the

information obtained from his sources, and the canine’s positive alert, our review of the

record confirms that the judge had a substantial basis for concluding that there was a fair

probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in Shannon’s storage

locker. Therefore, probable cause supported the issuance of the search warrant.

       {¶42} Shannon’s sole Assignment of Error is overruled.

       {¶43} The judgment of the Knox County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

By Popham, J.,

Montgomery, P.J., and

Gormley, J., concur