State v. Silver

[[COURTLISTENER_SUBOPINION {"id":"11116228","type":"010combined","part":"opinion","author":null,"source_field":"html_with_citations"}]]
[Cite as State v. Silver,
2025-Ohio-2771
.]


                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                               EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                  COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                     :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,               :
                                                            No. 114499
                 v.                                :

TERRELL SILVER,                                    :

                 Defendant-Appellant.              :


                                 JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 7, 2025


         Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                            Case No. CR-23-680442-A


                                             Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Kevin R. Filiatraut, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Joseph V. Pagano, for appellant.


SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:

                   Terrell Silver appeals his convictions stemming from the execution-

style murders of Dejuan Willis, Aiyanna Quitman, Christopher Monroe, and

Jazmyne Lawson and her unborn child, and the unrelated attempted murder and

felonious assault of another victim (“James”) that occurred a month after the
slayings. In addition to five consecutive life terms with no possibility of parole,

Silver was sentenced to serve 30.5 years on the definite terms imposed for the

firearm specifications and underlying non-life counts. For the following reasons, we

affirm those convictions.

               The trial involved circumstantial evidence tying Silver to the

weapons used in both crimes. But by and large, the State based its case on Silver’s

braggadocious confession to a prison cellmate and James’s certitude in identifying

Silver as his shooter.

               The investigation into the murders began in September 2019 when

a concerned citizen reported his belief that there were four dead bodies in an

abandoned house in the East 144th Street neighborhood of Cleveland. That person

knew Monroe to stay at the abandoned house there and that he often dealt drugs

at a nearby bus stop. Officers investigated the tip and found the bodies of Willis,

Quitman, Monroe, and Lawson in the house. An autopsy revealed Lawson was in

her second trimester of pregnancy.

               By the time officers found the bodies, they were decomposed beyond

facial recognition. The victims were later identified by other means. Investigators

recovered a .25-caliber pistol, a .40-caliber shell casing, and eleven 9 mm shell

casings in the room where the bodies lay. Several 9 mm bullets were also recovered.

Willis and Monroe were shot at least five times each. Quitman was shot at least 11

times and Lawson at least six.
               Another witness, once Silver’s roommate, testified that Monroe had

altercations with Silver in the days leading up to the shooting. Silver came home

one night looking for his handgun because, as he told the witness, he had just been

ambushed by Monroe at the same bus stop where reportedly he sold drugs. The

witness stated that Silver fired shots at Monroe and Willis as they fled the scene.

Approximately 10-15 minutes later, Monroe, Willis, Quitman, and Lawson walked

by the witness’s home, heading toward the abandoned house where their bodies

were eventually found.

               A few weeks after police discovered the bodies, James filed a police

report stating his belief that Silver was involved in the slayings. Not long after filing

that report, James called 9-1-1 to say that he spotted Silver as he was entering a

vehicle with someone else. As James explained the unfolding situation to the

dispatcher, he was shot by Silver, whom James identified at trial. The weapon

involved in that shooting was an unrecovered .40-caliber firearm, which was the

same .40-caliber weapon tied to the shell casing discovered in the room where the

murder victims’ bodies were found. During trial, James blurted out that he had been

told that Silver murdered the four people based on the information he heard from

his deceased friend.     That unsolicited statement was the subject of extended

discussions and objections.

               In July 2020, police officers responded to an unrelated shooting event

on East 158th Street. A 9 mm Taurus handgun was confiscated and an unrelated

individual was arrested. That individual told officers he obtained the Taurus from
his nephew, who recently died of a drug overdose. Investigators were unable to find

any connection between either of them and the murders or the bus-stop shooting.

The Taurus firearm was sent for ballistic testing. It was determined that all the

9 mm shell casings and bullets from the murder scene were fired from it, including

the bullets recovered from the murdered victims. Forensic testing revealed that

Silver’s blood was on the magazine chamber of the Taurus handgun, which is the

inside part of the handgrip where the ammunition magazine is inserted.

               In addition to the circumstantial evidence linking Silver to the

murders, the State also presented Silver’s admissions to a cellmate. The cellmate

began serving a sentence for aggravated rioting in December 2019. He was assigned

to share a cell with Silver. According to the cellmate, Silver bragged about his

ranking in the Heartless Felons gang and disclosed his criminal activity, including

details about the murders. Silver relayed to the cellmate that he shot Monroe and

Willis in retaliation for their shooting at him at the bus stop while Silver was

unarmed. Silver explained to the cellmate that Monroe and Willis heard that he was

looking for retribution, so they asked around for ammunition because they had

none. Silver took that opportunity to find the two men. As he told his cellmate, after

entering the room in the abandoned building, Silver saw the four people and just

began shooting because “he had to do what he had to do.”

               In this appeal, Silver advances six assignments of error, many of

which are related. Each will be addressed but reordered and consolidated where

appropriate.
               In the first, second, and fifth assignments of error, Silver challenges

the admissibility of various aspects of James’s and one of the investigating officer’s

trial testimonies.

               During trial, the prosecutor asked James whether he called 9-1-1

because he “thought [these two people] were involved in the murder of those four

people . . . ?” James responded that it was not just a “thought,” because “the dude

that’s dead, his cousin’s dead, too, and she the one that told me. She’s dead too. Her

name was Isha.” Tr. 1425:10-21. That statement does not directly incriminate Silver

but demonstrates that James lacked firsthand information regarding the murders.

               James’s 9-1-1 recording was also admitted into evidence beginning

with the dispatcher. The trial court concluded that the call was made in response to

an ongoing emergency and James was simply telling the dispatcher why he believed

he was in danger — being shot by someone James believed to be involved in a

depraved murder. With respect to James’s 9-1-1 statements and trial testimony, the

trial court instructed the jury as follows:

      James testified yesterday. You will not consider that Mr. James
      thought Terrell Silver was the person who shot DeJuan Willis, Aiyanna
      Quitman, Christopher Monroe, or Jazmyne Lawson as evidence of his
      guilt to counts related to those victims as he testified that he did not
      have firsthand knowledge of it.

      You may only consider his testimony for the limited purpose of his
      actions in conjunction with all the events that occurred on October 1,
      2019, and the associated testimony and exhibits together with all of the
      other testimony and exhibits in this case.

Tr. 1470:23-1471:10.
               In addition, one of the police officers testified to the various

nicknames of the victims and Silver that he learned during the course of the

investigation. The trial court admitted the testimony not for the truth of the matter

asserted, but to explain the course of the officer’s investigation.

               Silver claims that those statements violated the Confrontation Clause

of the Sixth Amendment of the federal constitution and were inadmissible because

the statements were not based on personal knowledge or were otherwise hearsay.

               All of the challenged evidence and testimony was admitted in a

limited capacity. We must start with the presumption that the limiting instructions

provided by the trial court mitigated the danger of any unfair prejudice in focusing

the jury’s attention on the admissible aspects of the testimony. See Samia v. United

States,
599 U.S. 635, 646
(2023) (“[O]ur legal system presumes that jurors will

‘attend closely the particular language of [such] instructions in a criminal case and

strive to understand, make sense of, and follow’ them.”), quoting United States v.

Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 740
(1993). “Generally, this type of instruction ensures that

the jury will consider evidence of limited admissibility for its admissible purpose

rather than its inadmissible purpose.” State v. Ricks,
2013-Ohio-3712, ¶ 49
, citing

Evid.R. 105 (French, J., concurring in judgment only). Silver has not addressed the

impact of the limiting instructions on anything but his Confrontation Clause

argument.

               Silver’s state-evidentiary-rule arguments, lack of personal knowledge

or hearsay, do not address the purposes of the evidence as admitted. For example,
Silver claims the statements of James and the officer violated the rule against

hearsay, despite the fact the evidence was not admitted for the truth of the matter

asserted. He instead focuses on the inadmissible aspects of the testimony while

ignoring the fact that the testimony was limited through the trial court’s instruction

to only consider it for the limited, admissible purposes.

              James’s statements regarding his belief of Silver’s culpability were

limited to his reason for calling 9-1-1 before being shot and were not being offered

for the truth of who committed the murders. See Evid.R. 801(C). The officer’s

testimony regarding the nicknames was solely for the purposes of the course of his

investigation. State v. Gray,
2023-Ohio-215, ¶ 21
(8th Dist.) (string citing cases

establishing that an officer’s testimony explaining the reasons for investigating

certain suspects is not hearsay). Although limiting instructions will not always cure

the admission of prejudicial evidence, we have not been provided any discussion or

analysis as to why the presumption that the limiting instruction was appropriate and

followed by the jury would not apply in this particular case.

              With respect to the Confrontation Clause issue, Silver claims that

James’s testimony regarding the source of his knowledge infected his statements in

the 9-1-1 recording and therefore violated the Confrontation Clause, under the

standard established in Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36
(2004). According to

Silver, James’s statements directly identified Silver as the murderer based on

secondhand information from a nontestifying witness.
               Silver, however, makes no attempt to demonstrate that any of the

statements in the 9-1-1 recording are testimonial in nature — he simply presumes

that legal conclusion. In general, not all statements made to a 9-1-1 dispatcher are

testimonial in nature. See Michigan v. Bryant,
562 U.S. 344
, 355 (2011); Davis v.

Washington,
547 U.S. 813, 827
(2006). Further, statements between two third-

party individuals implicating a defendant are generally not considered to be

testimonial under the Crawford analysis. United States v. Gibson,
409 F.3d 325
,

338 (6th Cir. 2006). Silver has not demonstrated that the Confrontation Clause was

implicated by James’s trial testimony or statements to the 9-1-1 dispatcher

regarding his belief as to Silver’s involvement in the murders.

               Nevertheless, Silver believes that because James admitted to

obtaining secondhand information regarding Silver’s involvement in the murders,

the trial court’s limiting instruction — telling the jury that James’s statements in the

9-1-1 recording were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted — did not cure

the purported Confrontation Clause violation. In support of that belief, Silver cites

State v. Beckwith,
2012-Ohio-3076
(8th Dist.) (concluding that a limiting

instruction was insufficient to cure the improper admission of a codefendant’s

inculpatory testimony). Silver’s singular reliance on Beckwith is misplaced.

               In Beckwith, the defendant committed robbery and murder with

several codefendants. One of the codefendants testified at Beckwith’s trial, stating

that another witness said that the defendant committed the crimes.
Beckwith at
¶ 21
. The Beckwith panel primarily relied on State v. Moritz,
63 Ohio St.2d 150
(1980), paragraphs one and two of the syllabus, which held that

      [a]n accused’s right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation
      Clause of the Sixth Amendment is violated in a joint trial with a non-
      testifying codefendant by the admission of extrajudicial statements
      made by the codefendant inculpating the accused. (Bruton v. United
      States,
391 U.S. 123
,
88 S.Ct. 1620
,
20 L.E.2d 476
[(1968)], followed.)

      A violation of an accused’s right to confrontation and cross-
      examination is not prejudicial where there is sufficient independent
      evidence of an accused’s guilt to render improperly admitted
      statements harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id.
After noting the circumstantial nature of the conviction at issue, the Beckwith

panel reversed the conviction based on the prejudice caused by the inadmissible

testimony presented to the jury.
Id.
Beckwith has yet to be extended beyond the

limited situation of a codefendant’s incriminating testimony. State v. Miller, 2021-

Ohio-2924, ¶ 53-56 (8th Dist.) (distinguishing and not applying Beckwith); State

v. A.M.,
2018-Ohio-4209, ¶ 82
(8th Dist.) (Kilbane, J., dissenting) (citing Beckwith

in disagreement with the majority); State v. Miller,
2014-Ohio-3907, ¶ 40
(8th

Dist.) (distinguishing and not applying Beckwith).

              This is for good reason. Moritz expressly applied Bruton, which over

the last five decades has never been expanded beyond the limited circumstance of

“where a defendant is directly incriminated by the extrajudicial statements of a non-

testifying codefendant.” Smith v. Arizona,
602 U.S. 779, 817-818
(2024) (Thomas,

J., concurring), citing Samia,
599 U.S. at 654
. Beckwith’s conclusion arguably
extends Bruton to include in-court testimony of codefendants but only in that

limited context. Beckwith is inapplicable to the posture of this case.

              Silver’s requested proposition — that a limiting instruction with

respect to unrelated, eyewitness testimony can never cure a purported violation of

the Confrontation Clause — is not based on any controlling authority. To the

contrary, the Supreme Court has held that a limiting instruction may be used in

admitting evidence of nontestifying witnesses, even if those statements indirectly

incriminate the defendant.      See generally
Samia at 655
(holding that the

Confrontation Clause “was not violated by the admission of a nontestifying

codefendant’s confession that did not directly inculpate the defendant and was

subject to a proper limiting instruction”). Thus, limiting instructions may be used

to avoid Confrontation Clause issues through case-specific analysis. Because Silver

relies on a general proposition that is not supported by any authority, the first,

second, and fifth assignments of error are overruled.

              In the sixth assignment of error, Silver claims that he was deprived of

a fair trial because the trial court admitted crime-scene and autopsy photos that

Silver deems to be gruesome and that offered little probative value as contrasted to

the inflammatory and undue prejudicial effects. According to Silver, “[c]ertainly, it

was not necessary to depict every wound and every spent shell casing in a

prosecution where the cause and manner of death was uncontested as well as the

fact of the pregnancy.” Although that sentiment is understandable, it provides no

framework to resolve the question presented.
               In general, “gruesome” photographs are admissible if that evidence

is relevant and of probative value to assist the trier of fact in determining the issues,

“or are illustrative of testimony and other evidence, as long as the danger of

material prejudice to a defendant is outweighed by their probative value and the

photographs are not repetitive or cumulative in number.” State v. Franklin,
62

Ohio St.3d 118, 125
(1991), citing State v. Maurer,
15 Ohio St.3d 239, 264-266
(1984), and Evid.R. 403. “‘[T]he admission of photographs is left to the sound

discretion of the trial court.’”
Maurer at 264
, citing State v. Wilson,
30 Ohio St.3d

199
, 203-204 (1972).

               There are 86 photographs in this record. There is no doubt that some

photos are necessary to provide the jury with background information. The sole

question is which of the photographs are considered “gruesome.”

               Not all postmortem photographs constitute “gruesome” images.

State v. Motley,
2023-Ohio-1811, ¶ 45
(8th Dist.). A picture of a corpse, in and of

itself, does not necessarily rise to that level. See State v. Froman,
2020-Ohio-4523,

¶ 105
; State v. Kirkland,
2020-Ohio-4079, ¶ 105
. This is because some individuals

may be more desensitized to morbid scenes than others, and as a result, the

determination of whether a photograph pushes the limits is fact-dependent.

Generally speaking, the photos must have “shock value.” State v. Depew,
38 Ohio

St.3d 275, 281
(1988).

               Beyond that, there is the question of how many photographs are

necessary to the State’s burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. There
is no arbitrary limit; it is also entirely case-dependent. See State v. Garrett, 2022-

Ohio-4218, ¶ 114 (the introduction of 17 crime-scene photographs depicting close-

up photographs of the victims’ heads and faces was deemed not an abuse of

discretion despite the fact that both victims had been the victims of sharp-forced

injuries to the head and face); State v. Watson,
61 Ohio St.3d 1
(1991) (five

photographs depicting the victim whose “brain was literally blown out of his skull”

was too many, although the error was harmless); State v. Graham,
2021-Ohio-3199
(8th Dist.) (affirming the introduction of over 100 photographs described as

“gruesome”).

               The standard of review for the introduction of evidence is abuse of

discretion. On this point, Silver has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its

discretion as to any specific photograph.       And further, even if we took the

extraordinary step of assuming that any of the photographs were gruesome, Silver

has not demonstrated, let alone argued, the existence of prejudice from their

introduction into evidence. His sole argument on this point is that the “gruesome”

nature of the photographs prejudiced him at trial solely based on the nature of the

photographs themselves.       Prejudice is not merely assumed.           It must be

demonstrated based on the totality of the evidence presented at trial.
Motley at ¶ 50
,

citing State v. Lundgren,
73 Ohio St.3d 474, 486
(1995) (concluding that the

defendant was not prejudiced solely from the introduction of the photographs

deemed inadmissible), citing Evid.R. 103 and Crim.R. 52(A).
               In light of the limited argument presented, the sixth assignment of

error is overruled.

               In the third assignment of error, Silver claims his convictions are

based on insufficient evidence.

               When determining whether a verdict is supported by sufficient

evidence, “‘[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Wilks,
2018-Ohio-1562, ¶ 156
, quoting State v. Jenks,
61 Ohio St.3d 259
(1991), paragraph

two of the syllabus. Credibility is not an issue. See State v. Pountney, 2018-Ohio-

22, ¶ 19, citing Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus.

               For the purposes of the murder convictions, Silver focuses on the

circumstantial evidence to the almost near exclusion of his confession to the

cellmate. That confession, along with James’s testimony regarding the shooting, are

sufficient in and of themselves and solely depend on credibility determinations that

are outside the scope of a sufficiency analysis. All arguments pertaining to the

counts arising from the murders can only be addressed under the weight-of-the-

evidence standard.

               The sole exception is Silver’s argument pertaining to the aggravated

burglary conviction, resulting in a 10-year and 54-month prison term for the

underlying offense and firearm specification. On that single conviction, Silver

claims the State failed to present any evidence of a trespass being committed by
force, stealth, or deception, an element of the aggravated burglary crime. According

to Silver, entering the room of a sleeping occupant is insufficient to prove entry by

stealth. But see State v. Stone,
2024-Ohio-177, ¶ 27
(2d Dist.) (concluding that

occupants being asleep satisfies the definition of a stealthy trespass); State v. Steen,
2020-Ohio-4598, ¶ 29
(2d Dist.) (string citing cases concluding that “entering an

open door at night while under the cover of darkness,” especially if the occupants

are likely to be asleep, is sufficient to establish the element of stealth).

               Silver relies on two inapplicable cases in support of his argument:

State v. Adams,
2015-Ohio-3954
, and State v. Bertram,
2023-Ohio-1456
.                In

Adams, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the State failed to demonstrate a

forcible entry into the apartment, and “although it is possible that [the defendant]

entered through stealth or deception, there was no probative evidence of either”

offered by the State. Adams at ¶ 23. In short, the State never addressed the manner

in which the entry occurred in Adams. That conclusion cannot be made in this case.

The State’s evidence demonstrated that Silver sneaked into the murdered victims’

room — catching them all by surprise to the extent that their bodies were found

where they were sleeping or lying. There is ample evidence that Silver entered the

room by actively avoiding discovery, enough so that no one was aware of his

presence until it was too late.
Stone at ¶ 27
;
Steen at ¶ 30
. Because Silver has not

discussed the stealth component on his sneaking up on sleeping or distracted

occupants, his argument is without merit. Stealth, or avoiding discovery, is one

method to prove the crime of aggravated burglary. See Bertram at ¶ 21 (without
evidence of force, “the state must prove that the defendant actively avoided

discovery or used deceptive conduct to gain entry”).

              With respect to the other case relied on by Silver, the rationale

supporting the reversal of the conviction in Bertram is likewise inapplicable. In that

case, the defendant simply walked into the victim’s garage in full view of the victim

and without any force or attempt to deceive the victim. Id. at ¶ 17. That brazen entry

into the structure has no bearing on Silver’s entrance into the room of the victims.

              Silver failed to demonstrate that any of his convictions were based on

insufficient evidence. The third assignment of error is overruled.

              In the fourth assignment of error, the final one for the purposes of

this appeal, Silver claims his convictions are against the weight of the evidence.

              When evaluating a claim that a verdict is against the manifest weight

of the evidence, “we review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable

inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether in resolving

conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a

manifest miscarriage of justice that we must reverse the conviction and order a new

trial.” Wilks,
2018-Ohio-1562, at ¶ 168
, citing State v. Thompkins,
78 Ohio St.3d

380, 387
(1997). Reversing a conviction based upon the weight of the evidence

should occur “‘only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily

against the conviction.’” Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin,
20 Ohio

App.3d 172
(1st Dist. 1983).
               Silver focuses on the credibility of James and the cellmate, and the

circumstantial connection between him and the firearm used in the murders. The

inconsistencies and the credibility issues of the testifying witnesses were presented

to the jury along with the shortcomings of the State’s case tying Silver to the murder

weapon. The simple fact that the jury believed the State’s evidence and found

James’s and the cellmate’s testimony credible despite the limitations and

impeachment of the witnesses, is not in and of itself a basis to declare the convictions

to be against the weight of the evidence. It has long been held that the trier of fact

is free to believe all, some, or none of the evidence presented by the State or defense

at trial. State v. Smith,
2010-Ohio-4006
, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). Simply identifying the

inconsistencies or avenues of impeachment is not sufficient to meet the high burden

to prove the conviction is against the weight of the evidence.

               Silver’s admission to his cellmate largely doomed him. Nothing about

the cellmate’s testimony clearly demonstrated an inherent credibility issue infecting

the prosecution, and the same rationale applies to James’s testimony identifying

Silver as the person who shot him. As a result, Silver has not demonstrated that the

trier of fact clearly lost its way. The fourth assignment of error is overruled.

               Having overruled the arguments as presented, Silver’s convictions are

affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.


______________________
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J., and
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR