Steven Mayle v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________

No. 02-24-00310-CR
___________________________

STEVEN MAYLE, Appellant

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 3
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1693326

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Birdwell and Wallach, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Steven Mayle appeals his conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a

child. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.02(b). On appeal, Mayle contends that the trial

court abused its discretion by (1) refusing to grant a mistrial or to exclude the

testimony of two witnesses after the State failed to disclose as soon as practicable its

notes from a pretrial interview of these witnesses and (2) admitting certain out-of-

court statements made by the victim and her mother over his Confrontation Clause

and hearsay objections. We will affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Mother,1 who was then living in Louisiana, met Mayle through mutual

Facebook friends in early 2020, and they began an online relationship. In June 2020,

she and her four children—including the victim, M.T., who was then nine years old—

moved into Mayle’s home in Fort Worth. The children soon came to view Mayle as a

father figure and called him “dad” or “daddy.”

According to M.T., Mayle appeared to be “a kind, nice person” at first, but

then his behavior changed. In October 2020, he began sexually abusing her.

Mayle’s sexual abuse of M.T. came to light after an incident that occurred on

July 10, 2021. After coming home from work around midnight, Mayle settled into his

den. After her siblings and Mother went to sleep, M.T. went to the den to play a

1
Because the victim was a minor at the time of the offenses, we use aliases to
refer to her and her family members. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.10(a)(3), (b).

2
videogame. Alone in the den with M.T., Mayle began to sexually abuse her. At some

point, Mother woke up and learned from another of her daughters that M.T. and

Mayle were in the den with the door locked. She burst into the den and found M.T.

standing and facing Mayle, who was seated in a chair. M.T. was clad only in her

underwear and a shirt and was cowering as if she had been assaulted. As soon as

Mother entered the room, M.T. stated, “[H]e’s sorry, he’s drunk, and it hurts down

there.”

Mother told M.T. to cover herself with a blanket and run across the street to a

neighbor’s house for help. According to Mother, Mayle had an “I got caught” look on

his face. Enraged, Mother grabbed a knife and stabbed Mayle nearly fifty times. When

Mother went to the door to look for the police, Mayle retrieved a gun from the gun

safe and asked Mother to kill him. Mother grabbed the gun away from him and waited

for the police to arrive.

When the police arrived, they found Mother sitting on the front steps and

temporarily placed her in a patrol car. Officers found Mayle lying on the den floor

with slash wounds all over his body and holding a pair of juvenile female underwear.

The responding officers called dispatch to have an ambulance and additional

investigators sent to the scene.

M.T. was examined by a sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE), Nurse Maggie

Higgins. During the examination, M.T. told Nurse Higgins about Mayle’s sexual

behavior towards her. Specifically, she stated that Mayle had touched her vagina and

3
her anus with his penis and his finger, had made oral contact with her genitals, and

had engaged in acts of masturbation with her. M.T. said that the sexual abuse had

occurred multiple times since the previous October and explained that she had not

previously disclosed it because Mayle had threatened that he would no longer be her

dad if she told anyone.

Ultimately, Mayle was indicted for nine offenses, including continuous sexual

abuse of a child. He pled not guilty, and a jury trial was held. M.T. testified at trial

regarding Mayle’s various acts of sexual abuse. Mother and Nurse Higgins also

testified.

After hearing all the evidence, the jury convicted Mayle of continuous sexual

abuse of a child.2 Following the trial’s punishment phase, the jury assessed Mayle’s

punishment at ninety-nine years in prison. The trial court sentenced him accordingly.

This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Mayle raises seven points, many of which are interrelated. We

address each of these points in turn below.

Per the jury charge’s instructions, the jury rendered no verdict regarding the
2

remaining alleged offenses. See Allen v. State, 620 S.W.3d 915, 919–22 (Tex. Crim. App.
2021) (holding that the continuous-sexual-abuse statute prohibits a defendant’s
additional conviction of a predicate offense that “occurred [in]side the period in
which the [continuous-sexual-abuse offense] was committed”); see also Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 21.02(e).

4
A. Points One and Two: The State’s Failure to Disclose Interview Notes

In his first two points, Mayle contends that the trial court abused its discretion

by declining either (1) to grant a mistrial or (2) to exclude Mother’s and M.T.’s

testimony after the State failed to disclose as soon as practicable its notes from a

pretrial interview of these witnesses. We disagree.

1. Relevant Background

The week before trial, prosecutors met with Mother and M.T. in Louisiana for

final trial preparation. During this meeting, Mother and M.T. changed certain details

of their accounts regarding the sexual abuse that occurred and Mother’s July 10, 2021

altercation with Mayle. The prosecutors did not discover until on the second day of

trial—shortly before Mother was supposed to testify—that their interview notes

reflecting these changed details had not been disclosed to Mayle’s trial counsel. 3 Upon

realizing their mistake,4 the prosecutors promptly provided defense counsel with a

three-page bullet-form set of notes. At Mayle’s request, the trial court granted him a

The record reflects—and the State does not dispute—that Mayle made
3

numerous requests for discovery pursuant to Article 39.14(a) of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 39.14(a).
4
The trial court shared its view that the interview notes appeared to be work
product, which the State would not be required to produce. See id.; In re State ex rel.
Skurka, 512 S.W.3d 444, 453–54 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2016, no
pet.); cf. Marshall v. Hall, 943 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997,
no writ) (concluding that attorney’s agent’s notes and summaries from witness
interview were protected by the work-product privilege). The parties did not address
this issue in their briefing, and we will assume for purposes of this appeal that the
State was required to produce the interview notes.

5
twenty-two hour continuance to allow his attorneys time to review the newly provided

interview notes before Mother and M.T. testified.5 The trial court denied Mayle’s oral

request for a mistrial.

The following morning, Mayle filed a written motion requesting a mistrial or,

alternatively, the exclusion of Mother’s and M.T.’s testimony. After reviewing the

motion and considering Mayle’s oral argument in support thereof, the trial court

denied all of the requested relief.

2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

Article 39.14(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure (the Michael Morton

Act) requires the State, “as soon as practicable after receiving a timely request,” to

produce and permit the inspection and electronic duplication of “material” evidence

by the defense. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 39.14(a); State v. Heath, 696 S.W.3d

677, 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024); see Watkins v. State, 619 S.W.3d 265, 290 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2021) (defining “material” under Article 39.14 as “having a logical connection to

a consequential fact” and “synonymous with ‘relevant’”). The State has an additional,

affirmative duty to disclose “exculpatory, impeachment, or mitigating” materials that

“tend[] to negate the guilt of the defendant or would tend to reduce the punishment

for the offense charged.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 39.14(h).

Mayle asked for a half-day continuance; thus, the trial court actually granted
5

him more time than he requested.

6
When the State willfully violates Article 39.14, the trial court may exclude the

evidence at issue as “a court-fashioned sanction for prosecutorial misconduct.” See In

re State, 605 S.W.3d 721, 726 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, orig. proceeding);

see also Francis v. State, 428 S.W.3d 850, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). But as this court

has recognized, such exclusionary discovery sanctions should be reserved for

exceptional cases, and when presented with an Article 39.14 violation, a trial court

should consider “less drastic” remedies that do not inhibit the presentation of the

case. See State v. Johnson, No. 02-24-00062-CR, 2024 WL 5162689, at *20 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Dec. 19, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see

also Heath, 696 S.W.3d at 707–08 (acknowledging that although the trial court had the

authority to exclude undisclosed evidence, “a continuance would [have been] a much

more restrained solution”).

Similarly, a mistrial is an appropriate remedy only in extreme cases involving a

narrow class of highly prejudicial and incurable errors. Turner v. State, 570 S.W.3d 250,

268 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). “Because it is an extreme remedy, a mistrial should be

granted ‘only when residual prejudice remains’ after less drastic alternatives are

explored.” Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 884–85 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting

Barnett v. State, 161 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005), aff’d, 189 S.W.3d

272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).

We review a trial court’s denial of a particular remedy for an Article 39.14

violation and a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion.

7
Hance v. State, 714 S.W.3d 775, 809 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2025, no pet.) (op. on

reh’g). Under that standard, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

trial court’s ruling and uphold the ruling if it falls within the zone of reasonable

disagreement. Ocon, 284 S.W.3d at 884.

3. Analysis

Having reviewed the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its

discretion by refusing to declare a mistrial or to exclude Mother’s and M.T.’s

testimony based on the State’s failure to disclose the interview notes. As Mayle

acknowledges in his briefing, “[a] finding of willful misconduct . . . is required to

justify the exclusion of evidence based on a discovery violation (including the State’s

violation of Article 39.14(a)).” State v. Alvarez, No. 12-24-00175-CR, 2024 WL

4779117, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler Nov. 13, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated

for publication) (citing Heath, 696 S.W.3d at 704, 708). But he does not assert—nor

does anything in the record suggest—that the State’s failure to disclose the notes was

willful. Further, the trial court adequately remedied the State’s late disclosure by giving

Mayle’s counsel time to review the interview notes before Mother and M.T. testified.

See Heath, 696 S.W.3d at 707–08; see also Bailey v. State, No. 01-15-00215-CR, 2016 WL

921747, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 10, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (“When the State has not wrongfully withheld evidence

but the defendant is unfairly surprised because of the State’s failure to comply [with a

discovery order], the appropriate remedy is a continuance, to provide the defendant

8
an opportunity to review the evidence.”). Because this less drastic measure was

sufficient to remedy any prejudice resulting from the late disclosure,6 the trial court

did not abuse its discretion by declining to declare a mistrial or to exclude Mother’s

and M.T.’s testimony. See Ocon, 284 S.W.3d at 884–85; Johnson, 2024 WL 5162689, at

*20.

We overrule Mayle’s first and second points.

B. Points Three Through Seven: Admission of Out-of-Court Statements

In his third through seventh points, Mayle contends that the trial court abused

its discretion by allowing Nurse Higgins, the SANE who examined M.T., to testify

regarding certain out-of-court statements that M.T. and Mother had made in

connection with the sexual-assault examination and by admitting Nurse Higgins’s

records from the SANE exam.

Nurse Higgins testified that during the SANE exam, M.T. told her that:

6
Mayle asserts that the continuance was insufficient to remedy the harm caused
by the late disclosure because if he had been able to review the interview notes in
advance, he would have emphasized the inconsistencies in Mother’s and M.T.’s
statements more in his opening statement and “could have geared his voir dire to
emphasize the significance of inconsistent statements.” But as Mayle acknowledges,
he already emphasized the inconsistencies in M.T.’s story in his opening statement
even without the benefit of the interview notes. And because the presence of
inconsistencies in M.T.’s testimony was already a point of emphasis in Mayle’s
defense, it is unclear how the interview notes would have changed his approach to
voir dire. Further, as the State points out, all of the changes in M.T.’s and Mother’s
accounts as reflected in the interview notes relate to peripheral details; none of them
undercut the charged sexual-abuse allegations. Thus, we reject Mayle’s contention that
granting him a continuance was an insufficient remedy.

9
• Mayle had touched her vagina and her anus with his penis and his finger;

• Mayle had engaged in oral contact with her genitals;

• Mayle had engaged in acts of masturbation with her;

• Mayle had shown her pictures of naked adults;

• Mayle had used his phone to take photographs of her except for her face;

• The sexual abuse had begun in October 2020 and had continued over the
ensuing months; and

• She had not previously disclosed the abuse because Mayle had told her that
he would no longer be her dad if she told anyone.
Nurse Higgins also read for the jury the portion of her records reflecting Mother’s

recollection that M.T. had said, “[H]e’s drunk and he’s sorry, and it hurts down

there,” when Mother discovered Mayle and M.T. in the den on July 10, 2021.

Mayle asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting these

statements because they are hearsay and because their admission violated his rights

under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. We disagree.

1. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse-

of-discretion standard. Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003);

Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 379 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). We will not reverse a

trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence unless the record shows a clear

abuse of discretion. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 595. An abuse of discretion occurs only

10
when the trial court’s decision was so clearly wrong as to lie outside that zone within

which reasonable persons might disagree. Id.

Even if a trial court improperly admits evidence, such an error generally does

not warrant reversal unless it affects an appellant’s substantial rights. See Tex. R. App.

P. 44.2(b). “A substantial right is affected when the error had a substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Coble v. State,

330 S.W.3d 253, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Improperly admitted evidence that did

not influence the jury or had but a slight effect on the verdict is harmless. Id. Further,

a trial court’s error in improperly admitting evidence may be rendered harmless if

other evidence that proves the same facts as the inadmissible evidence is admitted

without objection. See Valle v. State, 109 S.W.3d 500, 509–10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

2. Hearsay Analysis

“Hearsay” is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying

at trial, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Tex. R. Evid.

801(d). Hearsay is not admissible unless a statute, a rule of evidence, or another rule

prescribed under statutory authority provides otherwise. Tex. R. Evid. 802.

Under Rule 803(4), a hearsay statement is admissible if it is made for—and is

reasonably pertinent to—medical diagnosis or treatment and describes medical

history, past or present symptoms or sensations, their inception, or their general

cause. Tex. R. Evid. 803(4); Lumsden v. State, 564 S.W.3d 858, 883 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2018, pet. ref’d). Rule 803(4) is premised on the patient’s strong and selfish

11
motive to tell the truth to receive proper medical diagnosis or treatment. Taylor v. State,

268 S.W.3d 571, 580 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Thus, to establish this exception, the

proponent of the evidence generally must show that the out-of-court declarant was

aware that the statements were made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment

and that proper diagnosis or treatment depended upon the veracity of the statements.

Id. at 588–89. The proponent must also show that the statements were pertinent to

diagnosis or treatment, i.e., that it was reasonable for the care provider to rely on the

statements in diagnosing or treating the patient. Id. at 591.

This court has recognized that “[t]he object of a sexual assault exam is to

ascertain whether the child has been sexually abused and to determine whether further

medical attention is needed. Thus, statements describing acts of sexual abuse are

pertinent to the victim’s medical diagnosis and treatment.” Beheler v. State, 3 S.W.3d

182, 189 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref’d). Texas courts have acknowledged

that a patient’s statements made to a medical professional during a SANE

examination fall within the Rule 803(4) exception to hearsay. See Gutierrez v. State,

630 S.W.3d 270, 279–80 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2020, pet. ref’d); Sharp v. State,

210 S.W.3d 835, 839 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2006, no pet.); see also Lumsden,

564 S.W.3d at 888 (“[W]e held that [the SANE’s] testimony was admissible under the

medical-diagnosis-or-treatment exception to the hearsay rule. Her handwritten report

is similarly admissible under the medical-diagnosis-or-treatment exception to the

hearsay rule.”). A parent’s statements to a medical professional in connection with a

12
SANE examination may also fall within the Rule 803(4) hearsay exception if they are

pertinent to the victim’s diagnosis and treatment. See Castillo v. State, No. 07-23-00193-

CR, 2024 WL 3958428, at *10 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 27, 2024, no pet.) (mem.

op., not designated for publication); Delavega v. State, No. 05-21-00229-CR, 2022 WL

1564548, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 17, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated

for publication).

Because Mother’s and M.T.’s statements to Nurse Higgins describing Mayle’s

acts of sexual abuse were pertinent to M.T.’s medical diagnosis and treatment, they

fall within the Rule 803(4) exception. See Gutierrez, 630 S.W.3d at 279–80; Sharp,

210 S.W.3d at 839; Beheler, 3 S.W.3d at 188; see also Castillo, 2024 WL 3958428, at *10;

Delavega, 2022 WL 1564548, at *4. Similarly, Mother’s statement regarding what M.T.

had said when she opened the door to the den on July 10, 2021—particularly M.T.’s

indication that “it hurts down there”—conveyed information that was pertinent to

M.T.’s diagnosis and treatment; thus, it was also admissible under the Rule 803(4)

exception.7 See Castillo, 2024 WL 3958428, at *10; Delavega, 2022 WL 1564548, at *4.

7
M.T.’s out-of-court statement that “he’s sorry, he’s drunk, and it hurts down
there” came into evidence not only through Nurse Higgins’s medical records and
testimony but also through Mother’s testimony. At trial, Mayle objected to Mother’s
testimony about this out-of-court statement on hearsay grounds and argued that it
should be characterized as an outcry statement, and he raises these arguments again
on appeal. However, because the statement in question did not provide the specific
details necessary to charge Mayle with the offense of which he was ultimately
convicted—continuous sexual abuse of a child—the trial court could have reasonably
concluded that it was just a general allusion of sexual abuse, not a true outcry
statement. See Venancio v. State, Nos. 02-21-00147-CR, 02-21-00148-CR, 2022 WL

13
Finally, M.T.’s statement that Mayle had exposed her to pornography as part of the

grooming process conveyed pertinent medical information and is therefore also

covered by the Rule 803(4) exception. See Martinez v. State, No. 10-16-00397-CR, 2018

WL 2142742, at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco May 9, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (holding that Rule 803(4) exception covered complainant’s

statement that defendant had “showed her pornography”).

We overrule Mayle’s fourth, fifth, and seventh points.

3. Confrontation Clause Analysis

The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, applicable to the states through

the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused

shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” Crawford v.

Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1359 (2004); Langham v. State, 305 S.W.3d

568, 575 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing U.S. Const. amend. VI). “[T]he most

17687436, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 15, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication); see also Brown v. State, 381 S.W.3d 565, 571–72 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2012, no pet.) (holding victim’s statements to 911 dispatcher that
“her mom made her put her hands up in her” and that “her dad put his middle part
up in her” and to responding officer that “her parents ‘touched her in her private
areas’ and that her ‘dad puts his male parts inside of her’” did not provide sufficient
detail to describe the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child). Further, because
evidence of M.T.’s out-of-court statement was properly admitted during Nurse
Higgins’s testimony under the Rule 803(4) exception, any error in the admission of
Mother’s testimony regarding this statement was harmless. Lamerand v. State,
540 S.W.3d 252, 256–57 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d) (“The
erroneous admission of hearsay does not constitute reversible error ‘if other evidence
proving the same fact is properly admitted elsewhere.’” (quoting Infante v. State,
404 S.W.3d 656, 663 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.))).

14
important instances in which the [Confrontation] Clause restricts the introduction of

out-of-court statements are those in which state actors are involved in a formal, out-

of-court interrogation of a witness to obtain evidence for trial.” Michigan v. Bryant,

562 U.S. 344, 358, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011). Once a defendant raises a

Confrontation Clause objection, the burden shifts to the State to prove either (1) that

the proposed statement does not contain testimonial hearsay and thus does not

implicate the Confrontation Clause or (2) that the statement does contain testimonial

hearsay but is nevertheless admissible. See De la Paz v. State, 273 S.W.3d 671, 680–81

(Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S. Ct. at 1374).

“[T]estimonial statements are those ‘that were made under circumstances which

would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be

available for use at a later trial.’” Adkins v. State, 418 S.W.3d 856, 861–62 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d) (quoting Burch v. State, 401 S.W.3d 634, 636

(Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). A court considers the totality of the circumstances in

determining whether a statement is testimonial. Clark v. State, 282 S.W.3d 924, 931

(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009, pet. ref’d).

As noted, we generally review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence under

an abuse-of-discretion standard. Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 743 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006). But when, as here, the admission of evidence involves a constitutional legal

ruling—in this case, whether a statement is testimonial or nontestimonial for

Confrontation Clause purposes—we give almost total deference to the trial court’s

15
determination of historical facts, but we review de novo the trial court’s application of

the law to those facts. See Langham, 305 S.W.3d at 576; Wall, 184 S.W.3d at 742

(applying hybrid standard of review to issue of whether statement was testimonial).

Because M.T.’s and Mother’s complained-of statements to Nurse Higgins—a

medical professional—were made for the primary purpose of medical diagnosis and

treatment, not developing facts for later litigation, they do not constitute testimonial

hearsay. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 312 n.2, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2533

n.2 (2009) (stating that “medical reports created for treatment purposes” are not

testimonial); Malone v. State, No. 02-10-00436-CR, 2011 WL 5118820, at *3 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth Oct. 27, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(holding that a victim’s statement to an on-scene EMT that the defendant had kicked

her was not testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes); Martinez v. State, No. 08-

09-00065-CR, 2010 WL 2619647, at *4 (Tex. App.—El Paso June 30, 2010, no pet.)

(not designated for publication) (holding similarly and collecting similar cases); see also

Lollis v. State, 232 S.W.3d 803, 807 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, pet. ref’d) (“[W]hen

a forensic or investigatory motive predominates, the resulting statements are

testimonial; when therapeutic or healing motive predominates, statements are not

testimonial.”).

Further, both M.T. and Mother testified at trial and were available for cross-

examination. Thus, even if their out-of-court statements to Nurse Higgins had been

testimonial, the statements’ admission would still not have violated Mayle’s

16
confrontation rights. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9, 124 S. Ct. at 1369 n.9; see also

Wells v. State, 558 S.W.3d 661, 667 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, pet. ref’d) (holding

that defendant’s confrontation rights were not violated by medical professional’s

testimony detailing complainant’s out-of-court statements made during sexual-assault

examination because the complainant testified at trial and was subjected to cross-

examination); Oliva v. State, No. 13-15-00609-CR, 2017 WL 2608280, at *7 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 15, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated

for publication) (holding testimony by nurse examiner’s supervisor about patient’s

“verbatim” medical history reflected in nurse’s sexual-assault report did not violate

Confrontation Clause because patient was declarant and because patient was subject

to cross-examination).

We overrule Mayle’s third and sixth points.

III. CONCLUSION

Having overruled all of Mayle’s points, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Mike Wallach

Mike Wallach
Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: September 11, 2025

Steven Mayle v. the State of Texas

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