Sulander v. Syneos Health, LLC

[[COURTLISTENER_SUBOPINION {"id":"10814677","type":"100trialcourt","part":"other","author":null,"source_field":"html_with_citations"}]]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                         
         FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA                      
                       WESTERN DIVISION                                  
                        No. 5:23-CV-539-FL                               


SHANNON SULANDER, JANNA       )                                          
STEWART, JOEY LEWIS, KORRI    )                                          
CULBERTSON, BRUCE             )                                          
McCONNELL & ANTHONY           )                                          
SULLIVAN,                     )                                          
                              )              ORDER                       
     Plaintiffs,              )                                          
                              )                                          
     v.                       )                                          
                              )                                          
SYNEOS HEALTH, LLC,           )                                          
                              )                                          
     Defendant.               )                                          

    This matter is before the court on Defendant’s motion to compel discovery 
[DE #82] pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26, 33, 34, and 37. Plaintiffs 
have responded in opposition [DE #88]. For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s 
motion to compel is granted in part and denied in part.                   
                         BACKGROUND                                      
    This action was initiated on October 24, 2022, by the filing of a complaint 
[DE #1] against Syneos Health, LLC (“Defendant”). The complaint has been amended 
three times [DE ##2,31,72], with the operative amended complaint [DE #72] filed on 
November  22,  2023.  Shannon  Sulander,  Janna  Stewart,  Joey  Lewis,  Korri 
Culbertson, Bruce McConnell, and Anthony Sullivan (“Plaintiffs”) assert religious 
discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment claims under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e  . (3d Am. Compl. [DE #72] 
¶¶ 155–72.) Plaintiffs are former employees of Defendant, and their allegations stem 
from Defendant’s September 2, 2021, mandate that all employees receive the COVID-

19 vaccine. (3d Am. Compl. ¶ 3.)                                          
    Plaintiffs first allege they were discriminated against on the basis of religion 
because Defendant failed to make reasonable accommodations for their sincerely held 
religious beliefs prohibiting them from taking the COVID-19 vaccine. (3d Am. Compl. 
¶ 157.) Plaintiffs also allege they were terminated and denied bonuses because of 
their religious objection to the vaccine mandate. (3d Am. Compl. ¶ 166.) Plaintiffs 
lastly allege they were subject to a hostile work environment because of Defendant’s 

“falsehoods regarding FDA approval made to employees” about the vaccines. (3d Am. 
Compl. ¶¶ 170–72.)                                                        
    Defendant served discovery requests on Plaintiffs on August 30, 2023, and 
January 2, 2024. (Mem. Supp. Mot. Compel [DE #83] at 3.) On February 16, 2024, 
Defendant wrote to Plaintiffs concerning deficiencies in Plaintiffs’ responses. (Mem. 
Supp. Mot. Compel, Ex. 1 [DE #83-1].) The parties met and conferred on March 12, 

2024,  and  Plaintiffs  supplemented  their  responses;  however,  Defendant  alleges 
continued deficiencies in those responses. (Mem. Supp. Mot. Compel at 3; Mem. Supp. 
Mot. Compel, Ex. 2 [DE #83-2].) Defendant provided notice of the dispute to the court 
in accordance with the case management order, and on October 2, 2024, the court 
entered an order dispensing with a discovery conference and authorizing Defendant 
to file a motion to compel. (10/2/2024 Text Order.)                       
    Defendant moves to compel answers to Interrogatories 9, 19, and 20, and 
Requests for Production of Documents (“RPD”) 4, 5, 13, 17, 18, 20, 23, 25, 26, 28, and 
29. (Mem. Supp. Mot. Compel at 5–10.) Plaintiffs oppose Defendant’s motion. (Resp. 

Opp’n Mot. Compel [DE #88]).                                              
                          DISCUSSION                                     
    Rule 26 provides for a broad scope of discovery:                     
    Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that 
    is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs 
    of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the 
    action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant 
    information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in 
    resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed 
    discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of 
    discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.     

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Relevance “has been broadly construed to encompass ‘any 
possibility’ that the information sought may be relevant to the claim or defense of any 
party.”                     , No. 1:06-CV-00889,
2007 WL 1726560
, at *3   
(M.D.N.C. June 13, 2007) (quoting               ,
227 F.R.D. 467, 473
(N.D. Tex. 2005));                           ,
313 F.R.D. 1, 5
(E.D.N.C.  
2016) (quoting        ,
2007 WL 1726560
, at *3);                          
  , No. 5:18-CV-66,
2020 WL 2311668
, at *2 (W.D. Va. May 8, 2020) (acknowledging 
the 2000 and 2015 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) and concluding that the discovery 
rules are to be interpreted broadly); 8 Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 2008 (3d 
ed.) (summarizing history of Rule 26 and noting that the 2015 amendment “did not 
affect a dramatic change in the scope of discovery”).                     
    Rule 26 requires the court to limit the frequency or extent of discovery if “the 
discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from 
some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive”; “the 

party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by 
discovery in the action”; or the discovery sought is outside the scope of Rule 26(b)(1). 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).                                              
    “The party resisting discovery bears the burden of showing why [the motion to 
compel] should not be granted.”                              ,
270        
F.R.D. 238, 241
(E.D.N.C. 2010). “To meet this burden, the non-moving party ‘must 
make a particularized showing of why discovery should be denied, and conclusory or 

generalized statements fail to satisfy this burden as a matter of law.’”  
           , No. 5:16-CV-679-FL,
2018 WL 5831997
, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 7, 2018) 
(quoting                ,
270 F.R.D. at 241
). “[T]he court has ‘substantial 
discretion’ to grant or deny motions to compel discovery.”   , No. 5:11-  
CT-3206-D,
2014 WL 555661
, at *4  (E.D.N.C. Feb. 11, 2014) (quoting       
                                      ,
43  F.3d 922, 929
(4th Cir. 1995)). 

    A.   Interrogatory 9                                                 
    Interrogatory  9  asks  Plaintiffs  to  “[i]dentify  all  employees  or  agents  of 
Defendant whom you claim engaged in any wrongful, improper and/or illegal act or 
otherwise caused harm to you in relation to this action and describe the nature of 
that harm.” (    , Mem. Supp. Mot. Compel, Ex. 3 [DE #83-3] (“Pl. Culbertson 
Disc. Reqs. & Resps.”) at 12.) Plaintiffs do not object to the interrogatory, and each 
respond along the lines of “[a]ny and all Syneos management and Officers involved 
in decision making” or “[a]ny and all Syneos employees who discriminated against 
me for not being vaccinated.” ( ; Mem. Supp. Mot. Compel, Ex. 4 [DE #83-4] (“Pl. 

Lewis Disc. Reqs. & Resps.”) at 12; Mem. Supp. Mot. Compel, Ex. 5 [DE #83-5] (“Pl. 
McConnell Disc. Reqs. & Resps.”) at 8; Mem. Supp. Mot. Compel, Ex. 6 [DE #83-6] 
(“Pl. Stewart Disc. Reqs. & Resps.”) at 12; Mem. Supp. Mot. Compel, Ex. 7 [DE #83-
7] (“Pl. Sulander Disc. Reqs. & Resps.”) at 12; Mem. Supp. Mot. Compel, Ex. 8 
[DE #83-8] (“Pl. Sullivan Disc. Reqs. & Resps.”) at 6–7.) Defendant argues these 
answers are incomplete as they do not identify any individuals. (Mem. Supp. Mot. 
Compel at 10.) Plaintiffs do not respond to this argument in their opposition to the 

motion to compel but previously asserted they would “pursue” the question posed by 
Interrogatory 9 through the discovery process. (Resp. Opp’n Mot. Compel; Mem. 
Supp. Mot. Compel, Ex. 2 at 2.)                                           
    When responding to interrogatories, a party “is obligated to make a reasonable 
inquiry, question [individuals] who may have relevant information, and answer the 
discovery requests to the best of its ability.”                 ,         

 ., No. 5:20-CV-536-FL,
2021 WL 3864476
, at *9 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 30, 2021); 
             , No. 5:21-CT-3270-D,
2022 WL 17367183
, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 28, 
2022) (finding interrogatory responses insufficient as it was “not apparent that [the 
party]  conducted  a  reasonable  investigation  in  order  to  fully  answer  the 
interrogatory”) Plaintiffs’ responses, dated November 3, 2023 (Pls. Culbertson and 
McConnell), November 6, 2023 (Pls. Lewis, Stewart, and Sulander), and February 8, 
2024 (Pl. Sullivan),  do not identify with any clarity the employees or agents involved.! 
Nor do they indicate whether they have conducted a reasonable investigation into the 
matter. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ responses are incomplete, and the motion to compel 
as to Interrogatory 9 is allowed. Plaintiffs shall provide a supplemental response or 
certify that, after reasonable investigation, they have no further response. 
     B.     Interrogatory 19 
     Defendant  moves  to  compel  responses  to  Interrogatory  19  from  Plaintiffs 
Culbertson and McConnell. (Mem. Supp. Mot. Compel at 7-8.) Interrogatory 19 asks 
Plaintiffs to “liJdentify your religion and the name and address of every church, or 
other house of worship that you have been a member of or attended in the last ten 
(10) years.” (Pl. Culbertson Disc. Reqs. & Resps. at 17; Pl. McConnell Disc. Reqs. & 
Resps.  at  12.)  Both Plaintiffs object on the grounds that the request is irrelevant, 
harassing,  vague  and  overbroad,  unduly  burdensome,  and  violates  the  clergy- 
parishioner privilege. (Pl. Culbertson Disc. Reqs. & Resps. at 17-18; Pl. McConnell 
Reqs. & Resps. at 12.) Plaintiffs also argue that Defendant is judicially estopped from 
seeking discovery about their religious beliefs. (Resp. Opp’n Mot. Compel  at 6.) 
           1.     Analysis of Objections 
     Interrogatory 19 is relevant. A religious discrimination claim pursuant to Title 
VII requires a plaintiff to show that her belief is “(1) sincerely held and (2) religious 

     1 Plaintiffs stated that they could not identify any individuals in response to 
Interrogatory  9 because  “they were informed their  accommodations would end on 
generic  Syneos letterhead which was not signed by any particular person.”  (Mem. 
Supp. Mot. Compel, Ex. 2.) Plaintiffs then noted they would “continue to pursue this 
question through the discovery process.” Ud.)

in nature.”                          ,
125 F.4th 465
, 470 (4th Cir. 2025). 
“The  first  prong,  sincerity,  ‘seeks  to  determine  an  adherent's  good  faith  in  the 
expression  of  [her  or  his]  religious  belief’  and  ‘provides  a  rational  means  of 

differentiating between those beliefs that are held as a matter of conscience and those 
that  are  animated  by  motives  of  deception  and  fraud.’”    (quoting 
     ,
745  F.2d  153
,  157  (2d  Cir.  1984)).  Plaintiffs’  religious  participation  is 
relevant to understanding if Plaintiffs have beliefs that are religious in nature, as 
well as the sincerity of those beliefs.  , 125 F.4th at 470–71 (using evidence 
of  plaintiff’s  purported  religion  and  religious  participation  such  as  baptism  to 
determine sincerity of beliefs);                 , No. 2:22-CV-4254-      

DCN-MHC,
2024 WL 4485908
, at *8–9 (D.S.C. July 19, 2024) (evidence of religious 
beliefs  and  vaccination  history  as  a  child  and  adult  discussed  in  religious 
discrimination analysis),      ,
2024 WL 4343708
(Sept. 30, 2024).        
    Plaintiffs’ other objections to Interrogatory 19 are boilerplate. “The grounds for 
objecting to an interrogatory must be stated with specificity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4). 
“[T]he use of boilerplate objections stating that an interrogatory is overbroad, unduly 

burdensome, irrelevant, or the like does not satisfy the specificity requirement” of 
Rule 33.                                        , No. 5:15-CV-37-FL,
2016 WL 4287929
, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 15, 2016);          No. 5:23-       
CV-87-D,
2024 WL 2703015
, at *5 (E.D.N.C. May 24, 2024) (collecting cases rejecting 
use of boilerplate objections). An objection may be boilerplate if it lacks any statement 
about why the request is irrelevant, overbroad, vague, or burdensome, or if it fails to 
cite court decisions discussing similar discovery limitations. See Mills v. East Gulf,
259  F.R.D.  118,  132
(S.D.W.  Va.  2009);  Wagner,
2024  WL 2703015
,  at  *6;  Hy-Ko 
Prods.  Co.  v. Hillman Grp., Inc., No. 5:09-MC-32,
2009 WL 3258603
, at *2 (E.D.N.C. 
Oct.  8,  2009).  Plaintiffs’ objections  do not include any supporting statement about 
why  the  interrogatory  is  harassing,  vague,  or  burdensome,  nor  do  they  cite  any 
supporting  case  law  related  to  their  objections.  Moreover,  Plaintiffs  Sulander, 
Stewart,  Lewis,  and  Sullivan  have  each  responded  to  this  interrogatory,  which 
undermines   Plaintiff   Culbertson’s   and   Plaintiff  McConnell’s   objections   to 
Interrogatory 19.  Thus, these objections are overruled. 
     Turning  to  Plaintiffs’  privilege  argument,  federal  privilege  law  applies  to 
federal question claims such as this one. See Fed. R. Evid. 501;  United States v. Zolin,
491  U.S.  554,  562
(1989);  Hall v.  Helms,
118  F.R.D.  51,  53
(W.D.N.C.  1987).  The 
clergy-penitent privilege is not consistently recognized in federal courts.? See In Re 
Grand Jury Investigation,
918 F.2d 374, 379-84
(8d. Cir. 1990) (discussing history of 
privilege  and  collecting  cases  recognizing  such  a  privilege);  but  see  Seidman  v. 
Fishburne-Hudgins Educ. Found, Inc.,
724 F.2d 4138
, 415 (4th Cir. 1984) (“The priest- 
penitent  or  clergyman-communicant  privilege  has  no  firm  foundation  in  common 
law.”).  When  recognized,  the  privilege  applies  to  confidential  communications 
between an individual and clergy. See In Re Grand Jury Investigation,
918 F.2d at 

     2
Plaintiffs  assert  the  clergy-penitent  privilege  in  their  objections  to  this 
interrogatory but do not expand on the argument in their response in opposition to 
the motion to compel.  (See Resp.  Opp’n Mot.  Compel.) Nor do they cite to any case 
law supporting the invocation of this privilege or its recognition in the Fourth Circuit. 
(See, e.g., Pl. Culbertson Disc. Reqs. & Resps. at 18.)

384;                 ,
418 U.S. 683, 709
(1974) (“[A]n attorney or a priest may 
not be required to disclose what has been revealed in professional confidence.”). 
Plaintiffs  have  not  objected  on  the  ground  that  Interrogatory  19  applies  to 

confidential  communications  with  clergy,  nor  does  the  text  of  the  interrogatory 
appear to require disclosure of such communication. Moreover, the privilege protects 
against compelled disclosure by clergy, not by communicants.  ,
418 U.S. at 
709
.                                                                      
    Plaintiffs also have not provided a description of the privileged information as 
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(A). (Pl. Culbertson Disc. Reqs. & 
Resps. at 17–18; Pl. McConnell Reqs. & Resps. at 12);                     

      , 250 F.R.D 251, 264 (D. Md. 2008) (the most common way to meet the 
requirement of Rule 26(b)(5)(A) is by providing a privilege log).  “Failure to timely 
serve a duly signed privilege log meeting the requirements of Rule 26(b)(5)(A) shall 
be deemed a waiver of the privilege otherwise claimed.”                   
     , No. 5:16-CV-278-BO,
2017 WL 2671078
, at *4 (E.D.N.C. June 20, 2017); 
                                            ,
270 F.R.D. 223, 228
(D.    

Md. 2010) (finding generalized claims of privilege to be insufficient without privilege 
log). As such, Plaintiffs’ invocation of the clergy-penitent privilege is meritless.   
         2.    Judicial Estoppel                                         
     “Judicial  estoppel  precludes  a  party  from  adopting  a  position  that  is 
inconsistent with a stance taken in prior litigation.”
867 F.3d 449, 457
(4th Cir.    
2017) (quoting John S.  Clark Co.  v. Faggert & Frieden, P.C.,
65 F.3d 26, 28
(4th Cir. 
1995)). Four elements must be met before a court may apply judicial estoppel: “(1) the 
party sought to be estopped must be seeking to adopt a position that is inconsistent 
with a stance taken in prior litigation; (2) the position sought to be estopped must be 
one of fact rather than law or legal theory;  (3) the prior inconsistent position must 
have been accepted by the court; and (4) the party sought to be estopped must have 
intentionally misled the court to gain an unfair advantage.” Minnieland Priv. Day 
Sch.,
867 F.3d at 458
(quoting Lowery v. Stovall,
92 F.3d 219, 224
(4th Cir. 1996)). 
     Plaintiffs  Culbertson and McConnell argue Defendant is judicially estopped 
from seeking discovery related to the  sincerity of their religious beliefs in light of 
Defendant’s prior admissions related to those beliefs. (Resp. Opp’n Mot. Compel at 6— 
9.)  Plaintiffs  claim  that  Defendant  admitted  to  granting  Plaintiffs’  requests  for 
religious  exemptions,  “thereby  indicating  that  [Defendant]  did  not  contest  the 
sincerity” of Plaintiffs’ beliefs. Ud. at 9.) According to Plaintiffs, this admission bars 
Defendant from now seeking discovery on the issue of sincerely held religious beliefs. 
(Id) 
     Plaintiffs’ argument fails to meet several elements of judicial estoppel.?  See 
Minnieland Priv. Day Sch.,
867 F.3d at 458
. First, Plaintiffs invoke judicial estoppel 

     3 Despite Fourth Circuit precedent regarding judicial estoppel, see Minnieland 
Priv.  Day Sch.,
867 F.3d at 457
; John S. Clark Co.,
65 F.3d at 28
, Plaintiffs cite to the 
Ninth Circuit’s articulation of the elements of judicial estoppel, which differ slightly 
from  the  Fourth  Circuit’s  test,  (Resp.  Opp’n  Mot.  Compel  at  8  (quoting  Perez  v. 
Discover Bank,
74 F.4th 10038
,  1008 (9th Cir. 2023))). Plaintiffs do not explain why 
this court should apply Ninth Circuit precedent. 
                                     10 

for a position taken by Defendant prior to the current litigation and before initiation 
of any lawsuit. There is no prior litigation in which Defendant argued—and the court 
accepted—any position related to Plaintiffs’ sincerely held religious beliefs. Moreover, 

Plaintiffs  have  not  asserted  any  facts  suggesting  Defendant  is  intentionally 
misleading the court to gain an unfair advantage.            ,
867        
F.3d at 458
(the element of intentionally misleading the court is “determinative”). 
Thus, Plaintiffs’ judicial estoppel objection is overruled.               
         3.    Scope                                                     
    Plaintiffs request that the court limit the scope of the inquiry into the sincerity 
of their religious beliefs to a one-year period. (Resp. Opp’n Mot. Compel at 9 (citing 

                       ,
256 F.R.D. 114
(W.D.N.Y. 2009).) They do not clarify 
why such a limitation is necessary, only stating that other cases have limited medical 
record disclosures to two years. (Resp. Opp’n Mot. Compel at 9 (“By analogy to the 
holding in                         , supra, limiting the scope of medical 
records to two years, the Court should limit the scope of inquiry [into] the sincerity of 
Culbertson’s and McConnell’s religious beliefs to a one-year period.”).) The court is 

not  persuaded  by  this  argument.  Plaintiffs’  religious  participation  over  time  is 
relevant to the sincerity of their religious beliefs.  , 125 F.4th at 470 
(history of plaintiff’s faith going back to 2011 relevant to sincerity of beliefs);  ,
2024 WL 4485908
, at *8–9. Thus, the motion to compel is allowed with respect to 
Interrogatory  19,  and  Plaintiffs  Culbertson  and  McConnell  shall  produce  such 
information for a ten-year period.                                        
    C.   Interrogatory 20                                                
    Each Plaintiff objects to Interrogatory 20, which asks them to       
    [i]dentify  every  vaccine  you  have  received,  any  medications  and/or 
    pharmaceuticals you have taken, or any cosmetic/toiletry products that 
    you  have  used,  that  contain,  were  developed  or  validated  with,  or 
    otherwise used in any way any fetal tissue, fetal cells, and/or fetal cell 
    lines,  including  the  date  you  received  that  vaccine,  took  the 
    pharmaceutical or medication, or used the cosmetic/toiletry product, 
    whether you continue to use it/them, and your reasoning for no longer 
    using it/them if you stopped using it/them. This Interrogatory includes, 
    but  is  not  limited  to,  Adenovirus,  Varicella  (shingles),  COVID-19, 
    Hepatitis, Varicella (chickenpox), Measles, Mumps, Rubella (MMR), and 
    rabies  vaccines,  amoxicillin,  penicillin,  tetracycline,  cephalosporin, 
    acetaminophen, albuterol, aspirin, ibuprofen, Tylenol, Advil, Aspirin, 
    Aleve, Pseudoephedrine, Pepto Bismol, Tums, Lipitor, Senokot, Motrin, 
    Maalox, Ex-Lax, Benadryl, Sudafed, Robitussin, Mucinex, Preparation  
    H,  Lidocaine/Lidoderm,  Claritin,  Prilosec,  Zoloft,  Trulicity    
    (Dulaglutide).                                                       

(      , Pl. Culbertson Disc. Reqs. & Resps. at 18.) Plaintiffs object on the ground 
that the interrogatory is irrelevant, overbroad, harassing, unduly burdensome, and 
violates the physician-patient privilege. ( at 18–19; Pl. Lewis Disc. Reqs. & Resps. 
at 23; Pl. McConnell Disc. Reqs. & Resps. at 13; Pl. Stewart Disc. Reqs. & Resps. at 
23; Pl. Sulander Reqs. & Resps. at 23; Pl. Sullivan Disc. Reqs. & Resps. at 10–11.) 
    Interrogatory 20 is relevant. Each Plaintiff contends they objected to receiving 
the COVID-19 vaccine, in part, because of its use of “abortion-derived fetal cells.” (3d 
Am. Compl. ¶ 32.) The use of these cells is alleged to be “contrary to [Plaintiffs’] 
religious teachings and beliefs.” ( ) Thus, history of use of products derived from 
fetal cells is relevant to the sincerity of Plaintiffs’ beliefs.  ,       
No.  5:22-CV-2220-JGB,
2024  WL  1634095
,  at  *3  (E.D.  Cal.  Mar.  22,  2024) 
(vaccination history is relevant to plaintiff’s religious discrimination claim based on 
refusal to obtain the COVID-19 vaccine);                     , No.        
22-CV-1760-DKC,
2025 WL 266664
, at *6 (D. Md. Jan. 22, 2025) (refusal to use 
“medical products” produced using “human cell lines derived from direct abortions” 

relevant to both sincerity of beliefs and their religious nature).        
    Plaintiffs’  boilerplate  objections  that  this  interrogatory  is  overbroad, 
harassing,  and  unduly  burdensome  are  without  merit.  ,
2024  WL    
2703015
, at *5. The objections do not point to any specific language being objected to, 
nor do they offer any argument about what is harassing, vague, or burdensome about 
the discovery request. (Pl. Culbertson Disc. Reqs. & Resps. at 18–19; Pl. Lewis Disc. 
Reqs. & Resps. at 23; Pl. McConnell Disc. Reqs. & Resps. at 13; Pl. Stewart Disc. 

Reqs. & Resps. at 23; Pl. Sulander Reqs. & Resps. at 23; Pl. Sullivan Disc. Reqs. & 
Resps.  at  10–11.)  Furthermore,  Plaintiffs  say  nothing  about  these  objections  to 
Interrogatory 20 in their opposition brief. (Resp. Opp’n Mot. Compel.)    
    Turning to the privilege objection, “[t]he Federal Rules of Evidence do not 
recognize a physician-patient privilege where, as here, subject matter jurisdiction is 
based on federal law.”             ,
173 F. App’x 251, 257
(4th Cir. 2006) 

(per curiam);        ,
429 U.S. 589
, 602 n.28 (1977);           ,
266 F.R.D. 121, 126
(E.D. Va. 2009);                     , No. 7:00-      
CV-114-F,
2000 WL 33177232
, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 13, 2000);              
     , No. 5:20-CV-396-FL,
2021 WL 8824945
, at *5 (E.D.N.C. June 8, 2021). As 
such,  Plaintiffs  cannot  validly  invoke  physician-patient  privilege.  Moreover, 
Plaintiffs have waived any privilege as to these medical records both by filing this 
action placing their medical history at issue, see Villareal v. Rocky Knoll Health Care 
Ctr.,  No.  2:21-CV-729-WED,
2022  WL  875287
,  at  *2  (E.D.  Wis.  Mar.  24,  2022) 
(religious discrimination claim based on refusal of COVID-19 testing placed plaintiffs 
medical history  at issue),  and by failing to  provide  a  privilege  log related to  this 
interrogatory,  see Avent,
2017  WL  2671078
,  at  *4.  The  motion  to  compel  as  to 
Interrogatory 20 is therefore allowed. 
     D.     RPDs 4, 5, 13, 17, 18, and 20 — Incomplete Responses 
     RPDs 4, 5, 13, 17, 18, and 20 are analyzed together because Defendant makes 
a similar argument about each RPD. 
     RPD  4  requests  “lalll  documents  concerning  any  statement  you  contend 
constitutes an admission made by Defendant, or anyone acting on its behalf, relating 
in any way to allegations in the Complaint.” (See, e.g., Pl. Culbertson Disc. Reqs. & 
Resps. at 24.) 
     RPD 5  requests “lal1l written or recorded oral statement(s) made by Defendant 
or its agents concerning the factual and legal allegations made by you in the lawsuit.” 
(See, e.g., Pl. Culbertson Disc. Reqs. & Resps. at 25.) 
     RPD  13 requests “lalll documents relating to each item of damage that you 
seek to recover from Defendant.” (See, e.g, Pl. Culbertson Disc. Reqs. & Resps. at 26.) 

     4 Plaintiffs do not argue that the scope of this interrogatory should be limited 
in time (see Pl.  Culbertson Disc. Reqs.  & Resps. at  18-19;  Pl.  Lewis Disc. Reqs.  & 
Resps.  at 23;  Pl.  McConnell Disc. Reqs.  & Resps.  at  13;  Pl.  Stewart Disc.  Reqs.  & 
Resps. at 23; Pl. Sulander Reqs. & Resps. at 23; Pl. Sullivan Disc. Reqs. & Resps. at 
10-11; Resp.  Opp’n Mot.  Compel), and the court therefore renders no opinion as to 
whether the scope of this interrogatory should be limited in duration. 
                                     14 

    RPD 17 requests “[y]our federal and state income tax returns for the last five 
years and any tax return from any year through the date of the trial.” ( , Pl. 
Lewis Disc. Reqs. & Resps. at 30.) As to this request, Defendant is satisfied with the 

responses of Plaintiffs Culbertson and Sullivan. (Mem. Supp. Mot. Compel at 6.)  
    RPD  18  requests  documents  related  to  employment  and  other  sources  of 
income aside from Syneos wages obtained from Plaintiffs’ start date with Syneos 
through present, including applications, resumes, or other documents relating to 
efforts to seek employment or income. ( , Pl. Culbertson Disc. Reqs. & Resps. 
at 27.)                                                                   
    RPD  20  requests  “[a]ll  employment  contracts,  salary/compensation 

information, and benefit information (  summary plan descriptions and brochures) 
relating to any employment positions you have held since the separation of your 
employment with Defendant.” ( , Pl. Culbertson Disc. Reqs. & Resps. at 27.) 
    Plaintiffs do not object to any of these RPDs. Plaintiffs respond to the RPDs, 
occasionally citing to attachments, but more often noting that an investigation is 
ongoing and documents will be produced. (Pl. Culbertson Disc. Reqs. & Resps. at 24–

28; Pl. Lewis Disc. Reqs. & Resps. at 28–31; Pl. McConnell Disc. Reqs. & Resps. at 
18–22; Pl. Stewart Disc. Reqs. & Resps. at 28–31; Pl. Sulander Disc. Reqs. & Resps. 
at 28–31; Pl. Sullivan Disc. Reqs. & Resps. at 15–19.) Defendant contends that each 
of these responses is incomplete with regard to some or all Plaintiffs. (Mem. Supp. 
Mot. Compel at 4–10.)                                                     
    Plaintiffs further report that a call took place between counsel for both parties 
on October 28, 2024, after the present motion was filed. (Resp. Opp’n Mot. Compel at 
3.) Plaintiffs state that the parties agreed Plaintiffs would (i) confirm whether any 

additional documents would be produced in response to RPDs 4 and 5 and (ii) provide 
more information regarding damages and back pay in response to RPD 13. (Resp. 
Opp’n Mot. Compel at 3.) Plaintiffs also state the parties agreed to limit the request 
for tax returns (RPD 17) to returns between 2021 and 2023. ( ) Additionally, 
Plaintiffs state that Defendant has returns related to Plaintiffs Lewis and Sullivan, 
and that the returns related to Plaintiffs Stewart and McConnell are forthcoming. 
(  )                                                                      

    “[A]n evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response must be treated as 
a  failure  to  disclose,  answer,  or  respond.”  Fed.  R.  Civ.  P.  37(a)(4).  Given  the 
incomplete nature of RPDs 18 and 20, the motion to compel with respect to those 
requests  is  allowed.  Plaintiffs  shall  make  a  reasonable  search  and  provide 
supplemental production or certify that no responsive documents exist as to RPDs 18 
and 20.          ,
2022 WL 17367183
, at *9 (party contending they are “still 

searching for records” subject to order allowing motion to compel).       
    Because the parties have apparently reached an agreement with respect to 
RPDs 4, 5, 13, and 17, Defendant’s motion to compel responses to those requests is 
dismissed without prejudice.                                              
    E.   RPDs 23, 25, 26, 28, and 29 – Medical History                   
    Each of these requests are related to Plaintiffs’ medical history. They are 
addressed together because Plaintiffs raise similar objections to each.   

    RPD 23 requests “[a]ll documents relating to any claim or allegation that you 
incurred medical costs and/or sustained mental, emotional, psychological, or physical 
harm or other injuries as a result of any alleged unlawful conduct by Defendant 
and/or its employees, agents, and/or representatives.” ( , Pl. Culbertson Disc. 
Reqs. & Resps. at 28.)                                                    
    RPD 25 requests                                                      
    [a]ll  medical  records  within  your  possession,  custody,  or  control, 
    including  but  not  limited  to,  all  information  related  to  treatments, 
    prognosis,  diagnosis,  vaccinations,  and  physical  or  mental  histories 
    made or maintained by your healthcare providers in the past ten (10) 
    years. Responses to this request should include, but may not be limited 
    to, your vaccination card.                                           

(      , Pl. Culbertson Disc. Reqs. & Resps. at 29.)                      
    RPD  26  asks  Plaintiffs  to  “complete,  sign,  and  return  the  enclosed 
Authorization  for  Disclosure  of  Protected  Health  Information  (Not  Including 
Psychotherapy Notes) and the enclosed Authorization for Disclosure of Protected 
Health Information (Psychotherapy Notes Only).” ( , Pl. Culbertson Disc.  
Reqs. & Resps. at 29.)                                                    
    RPD 28 requests “[a]ll documents relating to, influencing, or informing your 
decision-making regarding taking the COVID-19 vaccine prior to January 31, 2022. 
Responses should include, but may not be limited to, correspondence relating to your 
receiving the COVID-19 vaccine, scientific studies and/or reports, medical journals, 
social media posts, and news articles.” ( , Pl. Culbertson Disc. Reqs. & Resps. 
at 30.)                                                                   
    RPD 29 requests                                                      

    [a]ll medical records, physician’s notes and/or nurse’s notes, medical 
    bills,  appointment  notices,  and  correspondence  with  physicians, 
    counselors, ministers, psychologists, psychiatrists, religious leaders, or 
    caseworkers in your possession, custody, or control which document or 
    otherwise relate to vaccines, treatment, assistance, or consultation you 
    have  sought  in  the  past  five  (5)  years  for  any  ailments,  infections, 
    viruses, conditions, or injuries, including (but not limited to) any you 
    allege were incurred as a result of any act or omission by Defendant. 

(      , Pl. Culbertson Disc. Reqs. & Resps. at 30.)                      
    Plaintiffs object to each of the foregoing RPDs on the grounds that they are 
irrelevant, harassing, vague or overbroad, and unduly burdensome; they object to 
RPDs 23, 25, 26, and 29 on the ground of physician-patient privilege. (Pl. Culbertson 
Disc. Reqs. & Resps. at 28–30; Pl. Lewis Disc. Reqs. & Resps. at 31–33; Pl. McConnell 
Disc. Reqs. & Resps. at 22–24; Pl. Stewart Disc. Reqs. & Resps. at 31–34; Pl. Sulander 
Disc. Reqs. & Resps. at 32–34; Pl. Sullivan Disc. Reqs. & Resps. at 19–22.) Plaintiffs 
also object “to any production of medical history at this point” because Plaintiffs have 
only alleged “garden variety emotional distress” which does not “open the door to 
medical records.” (Resp. Opp’n Mot. Compel at 3–6.) If compelled to produce records, 
Plaintiffs seek to limit the time period to one year before termination and one year 
following termination. ( at 6.)                                           
         1.    Analysis of Objections                                    
    Any medical information related to vaccine history and motivations related to 
vaccination are relevant as they may shed light on Plaintiffs’ reasons for refusing the 
COVID-19 vaccine.  (3d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32–34);
2024 WL 1634095
, at *3      
(vaccination history is relevant to plaintiff’s religious discrimination claim based on 
refusal  to  obtain  the  COVID-19  vaccine).  Additionally,  any  remaining  medical 

information included in the RPDs is relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims of injury. Plaintiffs 
seek  actual,  compensatory,  and/or  punitive  damages  for  “emotional  suffering, 
humiliation,  embarrassment  and  mental  anguish”  as  well  as  “severe  emotional 
distress.” (3d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 162, 168, 172.) As such, their medical records are 
relevant.                                                                 
    If  Plaintiff  seeks  damages  on  the  basis  of  emotional  distress, 
    humiliation, anxiety, and other psychological factors, Defendant must 
    be able to determine how much of [Plaintiff’s] emotional distress, etc. 
    was  caused  by  his  termination.  Allowing  Defendant  to  review  
    [Plaintiff’s] medical records will shed light on any other contributing 
    factors or events . . . that might have caused . . . emotional distress. 

         ,
2007 WL 1726560
, at *4.                                       
    Plaintiffs’  boilerplate  objections  to  these  requests  are  without  merit.  The 
objections do not point to any specific language being objected to, nor do they offer 
any argument about what is harassing, vague, or burdensome about the requests. 
        ,
2024 WL 2703015
, at *6. Additionally, the physician-patient privilege is 
not embraced in federal courts when subject-matter jurisdiction is based on federal 
law.           ,
173 F. App'x at 257
;  ,
429 U.S. at 602
n.28;  ,
266     
F.R.D. at 126
;  ,
2000 WL 33177232
, at *1;   ,
2021 WL 8824945
, at *5.    
Moreover, were the physician-patient privilege applicable to this federal-question 
case, Plaintiffs have waived the privilege by putting their medical history at issue 
and failing to provide a privilege log.
2022 WL 875287
, at *2;  ,
2017 WL 2671078
, at *4.                                                   
         2.    Garden-Variety Emotional Distress                         

    Plaintiffs argue garden-variety emotional distress damages do not warrant 
production  of  medical  records  because  they  are  not  seeking  “medical-related 
damages.” (Resp. Opp’n Mot. Compel at 4.) Plaintiffs do not specify which RPDs this 
argument applies to but object to “any production of medical history.” (Resp. Opp’n 
Mot. Compel at 6.) The court construes Plaintiffs’ objection as applying to RPDs 23, 
25, 26, and 29.                                                           
    “The fact that . . . damages claims may be the ‘garden variety’ of damage claims 

for emotional distress does not automatically exempt them from discovery.” 
  ,
2007 WL 1726560
, at *5 (quoting                   .,
221 F.R.D.      
657
, 659–60 (D. Kan. 2004)). When such garden-variety emotional distress is alleged, 
“courts  have  found  that  ‘medical  and  psychological  information  sought  by  [] 
interrogatories and requests for production are relevant as to both causation and the 
extent of plaintiff’s alleged injuries and damages.’”           ,         

No. 1:22-CV-1377-JMC,
2023 WL 1970476
, at *2 (D. Md. Feb. 13, 2023) (omission in 
original) (quoting                             No. 3:12-CV-8047,
2013     
WL 1750464
, at *2 (S.D.W. Va. Apr. 23, 2013)). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ assertion of 
“garden-variety emotional distress” does not preclude production of discovery. The 
fact that Plaintiffs do not claim to have incurred medical or mental health treatment 
does not change the requirement of production.  ,
2013 WL 1750464
, at     
*2 (finding medical records relevant in retaliatory discharge case despite the fact that 
plaintiff did not claim to have incurred medical or mental health treatment because 
of the termination). Thus, Plaintiffs’ argument is without merit. 
     Plaintiffs’ request to limit the time frame for information requested, however, 
is reasonable. The court finds that limiting RPD 25 and RPD 29 to two years before 
Plaintiffs’  termination  and  two  years  after  Plaintiffs’  termination  strikes  an 
appropriate balance  and is proportional to the  needs  of the case considering  such 
matters as the issues involved, the sensitive nature of the information sought, and 
the burden and expense of production. Therefore, Defendant’s motion to compel RPDs 
23, 25, 26, 28, and 29 is granted in part, with RPDs 25 and 29 limited to the time 
period of two years before termination until two years after termination. 
                              CONCLUSION 
     For  the  foregoing  reasons,  Defendant’s  motion  to  compel  [DE  #82]  is 
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART on the terms more fully set forth above. 
     This 27th day of February 2025. 
                                        Dern  teal     Aravvde 
                                         KIMBERIY    A. SWANK 
                                         United States Magistrate Judge 

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