Suta v. The Home Depot Inc

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 8 VAHID SUTA, CASE NO. 2:22-cv-00744-RSL 9 Plaintiff, v. 10 ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 11 THE HOME DEPOT, INC., SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING DAMAGES 12 Defendant. 13 14 This matter comes before the Court on “Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary 15 Judgment on Damages.” Dkt. # 39. Plaintiff alleges that he was injured on April 17, 2019, 16 when a 15-20 pound object fell on his head while shopping at the Aurora Avenue Home 17 18 Depot in Seattle, Washington. Defendant seeks a summary determination that plaintiff 19 cannot prove that his past and future medical expenses, his lost wages, or any diminution 20 in his future earning capacity are causally connected to the incident. 21 Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts in the light most 22 23 favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact that would 24 preclude the entry of judgment as a matter of law. The party seeking summary dismissal of 25 the case “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its 26 ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION 1 motion” (Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)) and “citing to particular parts 2 of materials in the record” that show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact (Fed. 3 R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Once the moving party has satisfied its burden, it is entitled to summary 4 5 judgment if the non-moving party fails to designate “specific facts showing that there is a 6 genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. The Court will “view the evidence 7 in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . and draw all reasonable inferences 8 in that party’s favor.” Colony Cove Props., LLC v. City of Carson, 888 F.3d 445, 450 (9th 9 10 Cir. 2018). Although the Court must reserve for the trier of fact genuine issues regarding 11 credibility, the weight of the evidence, and legitimate inferences, the “mere existence of a 12 scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position will be insufficient” to 13 avoid judgment. City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1049 (9th Cir. 14 15 2014); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). Factual disputes whose 16 resolution would not affect the outcome of the suit are irrelevant to the consideration of a 17 motion for summary judgment. S. Cal. Darts Ass’n v. Zaffina, 762 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 18 2014). In other words, summary judgment should be granted where the nonmoving party 19 fails to offer evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could return a verdict in its 20 21 favor. Singh v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp., 925 F.3d 1053, 1071 (9th Cir. 2019). 22 Having reviewed the memoranda, declarations, and exhibits submitted by the 23 parties and taking the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court finds as 24 follows: 25 26 ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION 1 A. Past Medical Expenses 2 Defendant argues that because plaintiff failed to offer expert testimony linking his 3 past medical expenses to the April 17, 2019, incident, he will not be able to establish 4 5 causation and damages. Expert opinion on an issue – including causation -- is not required 6 where a reasonable person can infer the necessary connection from the facts and 7 circumstances of the case. Douglas v. Freeman, 117 Wn.2d 242, 252 (1991); Hill v. Sacred 8 Heart Med. Ctr., 143 Wn. App. 438, 446 (2008). In the circumstances presented here, a 9 10 jury could reasonably find that some undefined quantum of plaintiff’s past medical 11 expenses, such as his trip to the emergency room immediately after the incident, can be 12 traced to defendant’s conduct without the need for expert testimony. It would, however, be 13 significantly more difficult to conclude that recent medical treatment, such as his May 14 15 2022 consultation with Washington Orthopedic Spine & Injury Center (“OSIC”), was 16 related to the April 2019 incident without the assistance of an expert, especially 17 considering the fact that plaintiff was treated for back, shoulder, and neck pain at the end 18 of 2016. But plaintiff has offered more than just evidence of various medical treatments 19 over the years. With regards to the May 2022 consultation, for example, the OSIC provider 20 21 specifically notes that the bilateral cervical radiculopathy with marked foraminal stenosis 22 at C4-C5 he observed is “more likely than not . . . directly and causally related to the index 23 accident on 4/17/2019.” Dkt. # 44 at 32. This opinion was generated by a provider during 24 the process of assessing plaintiff’s condition and developing a treatment plan. Similar 25 26 statements regarding a causal link between the April 2019 incident and plaintiff’s on-going ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION 1 medical issues were recorded by Drs. Debiparshad, Wilmovsky, and Nwosu. Dkt. # 44 at 2 26-27, 41, and 49 respectively. In addition, plaintiff has submitted a declaration from Dr. 3 Debiparshad that states, “[w]hile providing treatment to Suta, I was able to determine that 4 5 the cause of his injury was the result of an incident involving a falling box or item while he 6 was visiting The Home Depot.” Dkt. # 45 at ¶ 5. 7 When moving for summary judgment, defendant chose not to provide copies of 8 plaintiff’s medical records, much less acknowledge the existence of the causation-related 9 10 findings in those records. When plaintiff pointed out the relevant evidence in his 11 opposition, defendant then argued that the opinions contained in the medical records 12 should not be considered because they were not presented in a report or disclosure under 13 Rule 26(a)(2)(B) or (C). Arguments raised for the first time in reply are generally not 14 15 considered because the opposing party is deprived of its opportunity to address the 16 arguments and the Court is deprived of the benefits of the adversarial process. Defendant’s 17 motion to dismiss could be denied on that ground. Because the admissibility of the treating 18 physician’s opinions will undoubtedly arise in the future, however, the Court chooses to 19 address the issue now despite defendant’s procedural lapse. 20 21 To the extent defendant is arguing that plaintiff’s treating physicians failed to 22 submit an expert report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), providers who will testify as to opinions 23 developed as part of their evaluation and treatment of a patient need not submit a written 24 report. Treating physicians are experts, but because they generally are not “retained or 25 26 specially employed to provide expert testimony,” they are not subject to Rule 26(a)(2)(B). ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION 1 Goodman v. Staples The Off. Superstore, LLC, 644 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2) advisory committee’s note (1993)). As long as the expert’s 3 “opinions were formed during the course of treatment,” Id. at 826, a party is required to 4 5 disclose only “(i) the subject matter on which the witness is expected to present [expert] 6 evidence . . . ; and (ii) a summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is 7 expected to testify” at the time specified by the Court, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C) and (D). 8 As discussed above, at least four of plaintiff’s providers formed an opinion 9 10 regarding the cause of plaintiff’s condition as part of their assessment of plaintiff’s 11 injuries/deficits and identification of treatment options. The witnesses and the medical 12 records containing their findings and opinions were disclosed during discovery, well 13 before the July 12, 2023, disclosure deadline. This does not end the Court’s inquiry, 14 15 however. Rule 26(a)(2)(C) requires a statement of the “subject matter” on which the 16 treating physician is expected to testify, along with “a summary of the facts and opinions” 17 to be offered at trial. Plaintiff’s reliance on the prior disclosure of treatment records in lieu 18 of the required summary is misplaced. Such a procedure would risk imposing undue 19 burden or unfair surprise on a defendant if the medical records were extensive and the 20 21 defendant has to sift through months or years of entries in an attempt to figure out who 22 might testify and what opinions each expert might offer. See Carrillo v. B & J Andrews 23 Enterprises, LLC, No. 2:11-CV-01450-RCJ, 2013 WL 394207, at *5–7 (D. Nev. Jan. 29, 24 2013); Brown v. Providence Med. Ctr., No. 8:10-CV-230, 2011 WL 4498824 (D. Neb. 25 26 Sept. 27, 2011). A number of courts have rejected the argument that the production of ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION 1 medical records, standing alone, satisfies Rule 26(a)(2)(C). See, e.g., Lucero v. Ettare, No. 2 15-CV-02654-KAW, 2017 WL 11693747, at *10 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2017); Schultz v. 3 Ability Ins. Co., No. C11–1020, 2012 WL 5285777 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 25, 2012); Smith v. 4 5 Barrow Neurological Institute, No. CV 10–01632–PHX–FJM, 2012 WL 4359057 (D. 6 Ariz. Sept. 21, 2012). The Court agrees. While medical records undoubtedly relate to the 7 “subject matter” of a treating physician’s testimony, they do not necessarily reveal which 8 of the providers will be called to testify or which opinions will be offered. Plaintiff’s 9 10 production does not, therefore, serve the purposes for which Rule 26(a)(2)(C) was enacted. 11 Once it is determined that a party has failed to provide information required by Rule 12 26(a), “the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a 13 motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or harmless.” 14 15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). Rule 37(c) “gives teeth” to the requirements of Rule 26(a), and 16 courts have wide latitude to impose sanctions. Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor 17 Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001). Generally, the exclusion penalty is “self- 18 executing” and “automatic” in order to induce parties to disclose in a timely manner. 19 Hoffman v. Constr. Protective Servs., Inc., 541 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2008). The party 20 21 facing an exclusionary sanction has the burden of showing that its failure to disclose was 22 substantially justified or is harmless. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1); Yeti, 259 F.3d at 1107. 23 “Among the factors that may properly guide a district court in determining whether a 24 violation of a discovery deadline is justified or harmless are: (1) prejudice or surprise to 25 26 the party against whom the evidence is offered; (2) the ability of that party to cure the ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION 1 prejudice; (3) the likelihood of disruption of the trial; and (4) bad faith or willfulness 2 involved in not timely disclosing the evidence.” Lanard Toys Ltd. v. Novelty, Inc., 375 F. 3 App’x 705, 713 (9th Cir. 2010). 4 5 Consideration of those factors suggests that the failure to properly disclose under 6 Rule 26(a)(2)(C) is harmless in the circumstances of this case. Plaintiff’s treating 7 physicians were listed as witnesses in his initial disclosures, responses to discovery 8 requests, and subsequent supplements. There is no indication that the treatment records are 9 10 voluminous, defendant had ample opportunity to review the records, the causation 11 opinions are clearly stated, and defendant had sufficient time to depose the witnesses 12 and/or conduct follow-up discovery. There is also no indication that plaintiff acted in bad 13 faith: in fact, prior motions practice suggests that the failure to make formal Rule 26(a)(2) 14 15 disclosures was the result of neglect. That defendant chose to ignore the clear evidence in 16 the record and forego discovery regarding causation in favor of filing a dispositive motion 17 on the issue is not the type of harm with which the discovery rules (or the Court) are 18 concerned. Plaintiff’s treating physicians will be permitted to testify as to the subject 19 matter of their evaluation and treatment as disclosed in the medical records and to opinions 20 21 formed in the course of treatment.1 22 23 24 25 1 While Dr. Debiparshad’s declaration would not be admissible at trial, he will be permitted to testify regarding his October 2021 opinions that plaintiff’s neck pain, dizziness, and loss of balance and his “ongoing mechanical axial 26 neck symptoms” are “secondary to a box falling on his head.” Dkt. # 44 at 26-27. Defendant’s Daubert objection to Dr. Debiparshad’s declaration – which will not be admitted at trial – is denied as moot. ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION 1 Defendant also argues that plaintiff’s medical records should be stricken as 2 inadmissible hearsay. “[O]nly admissible evidence may be considered by the trial court in 3 ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Beyene v. Coleman Sec. Servs., Inc., 854 F.2d 4 5 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). However, “[a]t the summary judgment 6 stage, [the Court does] not focus on the admissibility of the evidence’s form. [It] instead 7 focus[es] on the admissibility of its contents.” Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 8 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted); see also Aholelei v. Haw. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 220 F. 9 10 App’x 670, 672 (9th Cir. 2007). Defendant’s objection is based on the failure to present the 11 medical records through their custodians’ affidavits. Where the authenticity of the 12 documents is not seriously in question, the Court can consider evidence submitted on 13 summary judgment if its contents could be presented in an admissible form at trial. Fraser, 14 15 342 F.3d at 1037; Lavery v. Dhillon, No. 2:13-cv-2083DADACP, 2023 WL 7024464, at 16 *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2023). Such is the case here. 17 B. Future Medical Expenses 18 In October 2021, plaintiff consulted Dr. Debiparshad at Synergy Spine & 19 Orthopedics because physical therapy and pain medications had failed to relieve his 20 21 symptoms. After taking his history, conducting a general examination, reviewing medical 22 records, and consulting with plaintiff’s son, Dr. Debiparshad concluded that plaintiff’s 23 symptoms were caused by a box falling on his head in 2019 and that surgery might offer a 24 more definitive remedy. Dkt. # 44 at 26-27. Dr. Debiparshad opined that the surgery would 25 26 be extensive and involve reconstruction between C4 and C7 through an anterior approach: ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION 1 In order to perform an adequate decompression, and to address foraminal 2 stenosis with the nerve root compression[,] a wide decompression would be required, including: removal of enough of the stabilizing structures – 3 requiring stabilization/fusion at the corresponding levels – which would 4 cause iatrogenic instability at these levels. In order to prevent further neurological deterioration and to address the spinal instability[,] an 5 instrumented stabilization and fusion would be required following the 6 decompression. 7 Dkt. # 44 at 27-28. The charges for the described surgery were estimated to be 8 $335,819.00. Dkt. # 44 at 24. For the reasons discussed above, the failure to disclose this 9 10 opinion was harmless, and Dr. Debiparshad will be permitted to testify regarding the 11 causal link between the recommended surgery and the April 17, 2019, incident. 12 C. Wage Loss 13 An award of lost earnings is appropriate where the injuries caused by defendant’s 14 15 actions rendered plaintiff temporarily unable to continue in a prior occupation. Plaintiff 16 claims that he lost $4,486.68 in income due to the April 17, 2019 incident. Dkt. # 40-1 at 17 12; Dkt. # 44 at 10. The only evidence of this loss is plaintiff’s income tax returns: he 18 provided neither a computation showing how this loss amount was calculated nor a 19 20 declaration regarding work lost because of doctor’s appointments or physical incapacity 21 arising from the incident. Because there is no evidence that the lost wages were the result 22 of plaintiff’s injuries, the jury would have to speculate regarding why his wages decreased 23 from one year to the next. The claim for past wage loss cannot proceed. 24 25 26 ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION 1 D. Future Earning Capacity 2 Plaintiff is not making a claim for impairment of his future earning capacity. Dkt. 3 # 40-1 at 12. 4 5 6 For all of the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary judgment 7 regarding damages is GRANTED in part. There being no evidence that plaintiff’s past 8 wage loss was causally connected to the April 17, 2019, incident, the claim for $4,486.68 9 10 in lost wages cannot proceed. Plaintiff is not seeking damages for diminution of his future 11 earning capacity. 12 13 Dated this 20th day of November, 2023. 14 15 16 Robert S. Lasnik United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION