Taylor v. Director TDCJ-CID

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UNITED  STATES  DISTRICT  COURT 
      EASTERN  DISTRICT  OF TEXAS 
                 No. 6:23-cv-00488 
              Ricardo Latrelle Taylor, 
                     Petitioner, 
                        V. 
               Director, TDCJ-CID, 
                    Respondent. 

                    ORDER 
 Petitioner Ricardo Latrelle Taylor filed this habeas action un- 
der
28 U.S.C. § 2254
, arguing that his state criminal conviction 
“was the product of grave federal constitutional errors.” Docs. 1 
at 1, 5 at 1. The case was referred to a magistrate judge. The mag- 
istrate judge issued a report recommending that the petition be 
dismissed on the merits. Doc. 12 at 18. Petitioner timely objected. 
Doc. 13. The court reviews the objected-to portions of a magis- 
trate judge’s report and recommendation de novo. Fed. R. Civ. P. 
72(b)(3). 
 Petitioner’s habeas action stems from the alleged ineffective 
assistance of counsel during petitioner’s criminal trial and subse- 
quent appeal. Specifically, petitioner argues that his trial counsel 
was ineffective by failing to submit a jury instruction on self-de- 
fense. Doc. 5 at 14. Appellate counsel was similarly ineffective by 
failing to properly argue this error on appeal. Jd. at 30. 
 For  an  ineffective  assistance  of counsel  claim,  counsel  is 
“strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance.”  Cul- 
len v. Pinholster,
563 U.S. 170
, 189 (2011) (citation omitted). In the 
habeas context, the standard of review is “doubly deferential” and 
must give “both the state court and the defense attorney the ben- 
efit of the doubt.” Burt v. Titlow,
571 U.S. 12, 15
(2013). 
 The dispositive issue in petitioner’s claims for ineffective as- 
sistance of counsel is whether petitioner was entitled to an in- 
struction on self-defense under Texas’s so-called confession and 

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avoidance rule. The confession and avoidance rule is a “judicially 
imposed prerequisite” that essentially requires a Texas defendant 
to admit that they committed the underlying offense in order to 
be entitled to a justification defense. See Ebikam v. State, No. 18-
01199,
2020 WL 3067581
, at *1–*2 (Tex. Crim. App. June 10,      
2020). If a self-defense instruction was not available under Texas 
law, petitioner could not have been prejudiced by his counsel’s 
failure to pursue it. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated 
as much in denying petitioner’s state habeas petition. Ex parte 
Taylor, No. WR-94,578-01,
2023 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS     
423
, at *2 (Tex. Crim. App. Sep. 27, 2023) (Richardson, J., con-
curring).1                                                      
Here, the trial court, the Texas Twelfth District Court of Ap-
peals, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals all found that pe-
titioner was not entitled to a self-defense instruction under Texas 
law. Even assuming arguendo that these courts misconstrued their 
own law, this court is not able to correct errors of state law in a 
federal  habeas  action.  Estelle  v.  McGuire,
502  U.S.  62
,  67–68 
(1991) (“[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of 
state law.”); Wood v. Quarterman,
503 F.3d 408, 414
(5th Cir.   
2007) (“[W]e do not sit as a super state supreme court on a habeas 
corpus proceeding to review error under state law.” (quoting Por-
ter v. Estelle,
709 F.2d 944, 957
(5th Cir. 1983))). Thus, to the ex-
tent that petitioner objected to the magistrate’s findings on the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, that objection is over-
ruled.                                                          
Petitioner also asserts that even if the state court rulings on 
the confession and avoidance rule are correct, the application of 
the rule to his case constitutes a denial of due process. Doc. 13 at 

1 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, without written order, affirmed 
the lower court’s denial of petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus, finding that 
there was no error in the judgment. Judge Richardson wrote separately to re-
mark on counsel for petitioner’s misconduct. In doing so, he confirmed that 
the court found that there was no harm in counsel’s failure to submit a jury 
instruction on self-defense.
Id.
(“But we reiterate here, there was no harm. 
Because at the end of the day, the facts did not give rise to a self-defense 
charge.”).                                                      
8. In making this argument, petitioner relies primarily on Holmes 
v. South Carolina,
547 U.S. 319
(2006).
Id.
at 9–10. There, the 
Court stated:                                                   
While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of de-    
fense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate pur-      
pose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are   
asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence       
permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative      
value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair   
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead   
the jury.
Id. at 326
.                                                     
Petitioner’s  due  process  objection  lacks  merits.  Unlike 
Holmes, petitioner does not allege that he was prohibited from  
presenting any particular evidence. Rather, petitioner was prohib-
ited from raising a justification defense. Even if this prohibition 
was construed as a prohibition against evidence, Holmes did not 
involve the confession and avoidance rule. Furthermore, the sin-
gle application of Holmes to the confession and avoidance rule  
cited by petitioner was in a case where the Texas Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals found that the defendant was entitled to a self-defense 
instruction because the defendant had testified at trial and admit-
ted to the underlying elements. Rogers v. State,
677 S.W.3d 705
, 
715 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). In contrast, petitioner did not testify 
or admit to the underlying conduct at trial. More broadly, peti-
tioner has not cited any law holding that the confession and avoid-
ance rule violates due process pursuant to Holmes. Thus, this ob-
jection is overruled.                                           
Having reviewed the magistrate judge’s report de novo , the   
court overrules petitioner’s objections and accepts the report’s 
findings  and  recommendations.  Petitioner’s  case  is  dismissed 
with prejudice. A certificate of appealability is denied sua sponte. 
Any pending motions are denied as moot.                         
So ordered by the court on September 29, 2025. 

          jf  CAMPBELL BARKER 
         United States District Judge 

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