Techtronic Industries Company Limited v. Bonilla

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                              
                MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA                              
                      TAMPA DIVISION                                    

TECHTRONIC INDUSTRIES                                                     
COMPANY LIMITED and                                                       
TECHTRONIC INDUSTRIES                                                     
FACTORY OUTLETS, INC.,                                                    

   Plaintiffs,                                                          

v.                                     Case No: 8:23-cv-1734-CEH-AEP      

VICTOR BONILLA,                                                           

   Defendant.                                                           
___________________________________/                                      
                          ORDER                                         
   This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike and Exclude 
the Opinions and Reports of Expert J. Christopher Westland (Doc. 95).1 Plaintiffs 
request the Court exclude the opinions and testimony of Defendant’s expert pursuant 
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 and under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
509 U.S. 
579
(1993). Defendant Victor Bonilla filed a response in opposition. Doc. 108.2 The 
Court, having considered the motion and being fully advised in the premises, will 
deny, as moot the motion directed to Dr. Westland’s opinions related to the First 
Report3 and grant the Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude the opinions of Dr. Westland 

1 The unredacted version of Plaintiffs’ motion is filed under seal at Doc. 94-27. 
2 The unredacted version of Bonilla’s response is filed under seal at Doc. 109-3. 
3 On September 19, 2025, this Court granted summary judgment in Defendant’s favor on 
Plaintiffs’ claims related to the First Report, and thus Plaintiffs’ claims related to the First 
Report are no longer at issue in the case. See Doc. 179.                  
related to the Second Report. The Court defers ruling on Dr. Westland’s opinions in 
the supplemental report to the extent they are directed to the opinions of Mr. Kopa 
and Mr. Rubel and are related to the Second Report.                       

I.   BACKGROUND4                                                          
   In this defamation action, Plaintiffs Techtronic Industries Company Limited 
and Techtronic Industries Factory Outlets, Inc. (“Plaintiffs” or “TTI”) sue Defendant 
Victor Bonilla (“Defendant” or “Bonilla”) for statements made about TTI and its 

business practices by Bonilla in two reports he authored and published on his website 
Jehoshaphat Research in February and June 2023. TTI, a Hong Kong company traded 
on  the  Hong  Kong  Stock  Exchange,  manufactures  well-known  brands  including 
Ryobi, Milwaukee, Hoover, Oreck, and Dirt Devil. TTI has a contract with Home 
Depot to have exclusive rights to sell certain merchandise in Home Depot stores. 

When TTI sells goods in its factory outlet stores (“DTFO stores”), the goods are 
labeled “blemished.” In sum, Bonilla’s “research” reports accuse TTI of corporate 
malfeasance in their accounting and of defrauding Home Depot, one of their biggest 
customers.                                                                
   In August 2023, TTI filed this action suing Bonilla for libel and libel per se. Doc. 

1. TTI’s complaint seeks damages from Bonilla for publishing the alleged false and 
defamatory reports so that he could profit from short-selling TTI’s stock.
Id.
The 
parties filed cross motions for summary judgment (Docs. 92, 101). In an order dated 

4 Additional background regarding the action can be found in the Court’s Order on cross 
motions for summary judgment. See Doc. 179 at 2–7.                        
September 19, 2025, the Court granted in part and denied in part the parties’ motions. 
Doc. 179. The Court granted Bonilla’s motion for summary judgment as to the claims 
of defamation arising out of the First Report published by Bonilla (in February 2023) 

and denied Bonilla’s motion as to the claims arising out of statements made in the 
Second Report (in June 2023). See
id.
The Court granted, in part, TTI’s motion for 
partial summary judgment as to the falsity of the statements in the Second Report and 
as to TTI’s status as a private figure.
Id.
Pending before the Court is the Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Defendant’s Expert 

Dr. J. Christopher Westland. Doc. 95. Dr. Westland provided an initial report dated 
July 26, 2024 (Doc. 94-23) and a supplemental report (in response to the expert reports 
of Mr. Rubel and Mr. Kopa, Plaintiffs’ experts) dated August 9, 2024 (Doc. 94-24). 
Dr.  Westland  was  deposed  August  22,  2024  (Doc.  94-22).  TTI  moves  to  strike 

Bonilla’s expert under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c) because Dr. Westland violated Rule 26(a) 
in failing to provide the data upon which he relied in conducting his analysis. Next, 
TTI contends that Dr. Westland’s opinions and testimony should be excluded under 
Daubert because Dr. Westland is unqualified and his opinions are unreliable. 
   Bonilla opposes the motion, arguing that TTI’s challenges to Dr. Westland go 

to the weight of his opinions and not his qualifications or his methodologies. Doc. 108. 
Given  the  Court’s  summary  judgment  ruling  in  favor  of  Bonilla  related  to  the 
statements made in the First Report, the Court will deny the motion as moot regarding 
Dr. Westland’s testimony and opinions directed to the First Report.5 Because the 
Court finds that Dr. Westland’s opinions related to the Second Report lack reliability 
and/or will be unhelpful to the jury, TTI’s motion to exclude the testimony and 

opinions of Dr. Westland is granted as to the expert’s testimony and opinions directed 
to the Second Report. The Court defers ruling as to the testimony and opinions of Dr. 
Westland from the supplemental report in response to the opinions of Mr. Rubel and 
Mr. Kopa related to the Second Report.6                                   
II.  LEGAL STANDARD                                                       

   The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 
702, which provides:                                                      
   A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
   training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise 
   if:                                                                  

   (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
   help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
   issue;                                                               
   (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;              
   (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and 
   (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts 
   of the case.                                                         


5 The denial of the motion will be without prejudice. To the extent that Plaintiffs and/or 
Defendant take the position that Dr. Westland’s opinions related to the First Report are 
relevant to issues pertaining to the Second Report, such as damages, for example, the parties 
shall confer and may file a renewed motion, as necessary, on or before October 31, 2025.  
6  By  separate  order,  the  Court  will  address  Dr.  Westland’s  opinions  contained  in  his 
supplemental report directed to Plaintiffs’ experts, Mr. Kopa and Mr. Rubel, when the Court 
addresses the Defendant’s Daubert Motion to Strike Jeffrey Kopa, CFA (Doc. 168). 
Fed. R. Evid. 702. Rule 702 is a codification of the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
509 U.S. 579
(1993). In Daubert, 
the Supreme Court described the gatekeeping function of the district court to “ensure 

that any and all scientific testimony or evidence is not only relevant, but reliable.”
Id. 
at 589
; see also United States v. Frazier,
387 F.3d 1244, 1260
(11th Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
The Supreme Court extended its reasoning in Daubert to non-scientist experts in Kumho 
Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137, 141
(1999).                         

   In performing its gatekeeping function, the Court must consider whether: 
   (1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he 
   intends to address, (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his 
   conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry 
   mandated  in  Daubert,  and  (3)  the  testimony  assists  the  trier  of  fact, 
   through the application of scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, 
   to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.          

Frazier,
387 F.3d at 1260
(quoting City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc.,
158 F.3d 
548,  562
(11th  Cir.  1998)).  Thus,  the  three  discrete  inquiries  to  determine  the 
admissibility of expert testimony are qualifications, relevance, and reliability.  Quiet 
Tech. DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd.,
326 F.3d 1341
(11th Cir. 2003). Although there 
is some overlap among these inquiries, they are distinct concepts that the Court and 
litigants must not conflate.
Id.
“The  burden  of  laying  the  proper  foundation  for  the  admission  of  expert 
testimony is on the party offering the expert, and the admissibility must be shown by 
a preponderance of the evidence.” Hall v. United Ins. Co. of Am.,
367 F.3d 1255, 1261
(11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). “Presenting a summary of a proffered expert’s 
testimony in the form of conclusory statements devoid of factual or analytical support 
is simply not enough.”  Cook ex rel. Est. of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cty.,
402 F.3d 1092, 
1113
(11th Cir. 2005). The admission of expert testimony is a matter within the 

discretion of the district court, which is afforded considerable leeway in making its 
determination.  Frazier,
387 F.3d at 1258
.                                
   “The gatekeeper role, however, is not intended to supplant the adversary system 
or  the  role  of  the  jury:  ‘[v]igorous  cross-examination,  presentation  of  contrary 
evidence,  and  careful  instruction  on  the  burden  of  proof  are  the  traditional  and 

appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.’ Daubert,
509 U.S. at 
596
,
113 S. Ct. 2786
. The judge’s role is to keep unreliable and irrelevant information 
from the jury because of its inability to assist in factual determinations, its potential to 
create confusion, and its lack of probative value.” Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp.,
184 

F.3d 1300
, 1311–12 (11th Cir. 1999).                                      
   Under  Rule  37(c)(1),  a  district  court  may  exclude  expert  testimony  if  the 
proponent does not provide information as required by Rule 26(a). Fed. R. Civ. P. 
37(c); Romero v. Drummond Co.,
552 F. 3d 1303, 1323
(11th Cir. 2008). If the proponent 
can show that its failure to abide by Rule 26(a) was substantially justified or harmless, 

the Court has broad discretion to decide whether it will admit the evidence. Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 37(c)(1). See also Chapman v. Procter & Gamble Distrib., LLC,
766 F.3d 1296, 1315
(11th Cir. 2014) (“District courts have broad discretion to exclude untimely disclosed 
expert-witness testimony.”).                                              
   And under Rule 26, a party must supplement an expert witness’s report and 
testimony. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(2). A party must supplement expert disclosures under 
Rule 26(e) “in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material respect the 

disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect ....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(A). A 
party  must  supplement  its  expert  disclosures  “by  the  time  the  party’s  pretrial 
disclosures under Rule 26(a)(3) are due.”
Id.
The noncomplying party must establish 
that a failure to disclose is substantially justified or harmless.        

III.  DISCUSSION                                                          
   In  his  report,  Dr.  Westland  offers  the  following  opinions  regarding  the 
statements made by Bonilla in the Second Report.7                         
•  Bonilla’s calculation of revenue for DTFO is very conservative and his methods 
   are appropriate. Doc. 94-23 at 27.                                   

•  TTI’s stock price movements around June 5, 2023, when conflating factors are 
   discounted,8 appear to be random. (Doc. 94-23 at 26). Traders discounted as 
   implausible the Second Report’s claim of fraud on Home Depot, and as such, 
   the report had seemingly no significant impact on stock price. Id. at 26. In his 
   deposition Dr. Westland explained that mentioning the share price in his report 
   was for purposes of context and was not an opinion. He clarified that his 
   opinion is about market value impact and investor return impact. He opined 

7 Dr. Westland’s initial report contained lengthy narratives/summaries of Bonilla’s reports 
making it difficult to discern from Dr. Westland’s initial report whether some of this narrative 
intended to be merely observations or an offered opinion. For that reason and because the 
Court granted summary judgment in Bonilla’s favor on the issues related to the First Report, 
this order focuses on the opinions set forth in the section of the Westland initial report that 
specifically addresses Bonilla’s Second Report. See Doc. 94-23 at 24–27.  
8 Dr. Westland explains in greater detail related to his opinions directed to the First Report 
that conflating macroeconomic factors include changes in the Federal Reserve Rate, the M2 
money  supply,  Personal  Consumption  Expenditures  Index,  and  average  sales  prices  of 
houses. These factors, Dr. Westland opines, depressed the demand for home workshop and 
home building tools such as manufactured by TTI. Doc. 94-23 at 6.         
   that whether using the date June 5 or June 6, there is no change in either investor 
   wealth or TTI’s wealth due to the Second Report. Doc. 94-22 at 34–35. 

   1.   Qualifications                                                  
   The first question under Daubert is whether the proposed expert witness is 
qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he or she intends to address. City 
of Tuscaloosa  v. Harcros Chems., Inc.,
158  F.3d  548
,  562–63  (11th  Cir.  1998).  Dr. 
Westland holds a Ph.D. in Computers and Information Systems from the University 
of Michigan and an MBA in accounting from Indiana University. Doc. 94-23 at 3. 
Over the past thirty years, Dr. Westland’s primary scholarly research has focused on 
data analytics and machine learning in accounting and finance. According to Bonilla’s 

response,  Dr.  Westland  has  taught  at  several  domestic  and  overseas  academic 
institutions,  including  the  Hong  Kong  University  of  Science  and  Technology, 
Tsinghua University, University of Science and Technology of China, Harbin Institute 
of Technology and others. In 2012 he received High-Level Foreign Expert status in 
China under the 1000-Talents Plan and is currently Overseas Chair Professor at 

Beihang University.                                                       
   Plaintiffs do not specifically challenge Dr. Westland’s professional credentials. 
Rather,  they  attack  his  qualifications  to  the  extent  that  Dr.  Westland  himself 
acknowledged a lack of experience with employer incentive plans and Hong Kong 
accounting standards.9 Doc. 95 at 3. Given Dr. Westland’s education, credentials, and 


9 These challenges appear more relevant to Dr. Westland’s opinions directed to the First 
Report, which the Court finds, in this order, to be moot given the Court’s ruling on summary 
judgment. See Doc. 179.                                                   
experience, Dr. Westland appears at least nominally qualified to offer opinions in data 
analysis. That said, because the Court concludes that the opinions he offers regarding 
the Second Report are not reliable and/or are unhelpful to the jury, the motion to 

exclude Dr. Westland will be granted, in part.                            
   2.   Methodology                                                     
   The second prong of the Daubert analysis considers whether Dr. Westland’s 
methodology is reliable. “Exactly how reliability is evaluated may vary from case to 
case, but what remains constant is the requirement that the trial judge evaluate the 

reliability of the testimony before allowing its admission at trial.” Frazier,
387 F.3d at 
1262
(citing Fed. R. Evid. 702, Advisory Committee Notes (2000)). There are four 
non-exhaustive factors district courts consider in evaluating reliability: 
        (1) whether the expert’s methodology has been tested or is      
        capable of being tested; (2) whether the technique has been     
        subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known and     
        potential error rate of the methodology; and (4) whether the    
        technique  has  been  generally  accepted  in  the  proper      
        scientific community.                                           

Seamon v. Remington Arms Co.,
813 F.3d 983, 988
(11th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). 
A district court can take other relevant factors into account as well.
Id.
(citations 
omitted).                                                                 
   “If the [expert] witness is relying solely or primarily on experience, then,” in 
establishing reliability, “the witness must explain how that experience leads to the 
conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how 
that experience is reliably applied to the facts.” Frazier,
387 F.3d at 1261
(citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). The Court’s analysis as to reliability “focus[es] 
‘solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.’” 
Seamon,
813 F.3d at 988
(citation omitted).                               

   Regarding Dr. Westland’s opinion that Bonilla’s calculation of revenue for 
DTFO is very conservative and his methods appropriate, the opinion is not well-
supported or reliable. Discussing Bonilla’s Second Report, Dr. Westland finds the 
online  retailer  comparisons  used  by  Bonilla  to  be  “appropriate”  comparison 
companies based upon the monthly visitor traffic. He concludes the methods utilized 

by Bonilla in his calculations are appropriate. However, as Bonilla concedes in his 
response to TTI’s motion for partial summary judgment, he got the numbers (very) 
wrong about DTFO’s sales and profit. Doc. 107 at 17. Bonilla argues that it would be 
error for the Court to strike Dr. Westland’s opinion for relying on facts that were 
wrong. In support, he submits that Fed. R. Evid. 702 is “not intended to authorize a 

trial court to exclude an expert’s testimony on the ground that the court believes one 
version of the facts and not the other.” Here, however, there are not two versions of 
the facts. It is undisputed that Bonilla admittedly used the wrong numbers in the 
Second Report—Bonilla reported that DTFO had annual sales of $1-2 billion when 
evidence shows that DTFO had only $100 million in annual sales. See Doc. 107 at 17; 

Doc. 1-2 at 2. Dr. Westland’s reliance on Bonilla’s incorrect numbers from the Second 
Report wholly undermines his opinion that Bonilla’s calculation of DTFO revenues 
was appropriate and conservative, making the opinion unreliable.          
   Regarding Dr. Westland’s opinion about the market value and investor return 
impact, Plaintiffs contend Dr. Westland’s opinions are unreliable because he analyzed 
the wrong date when considering the effect that the Second Report had on TTI’s stock 

price. That is, although the Second Report is dated June 5th, it was not published in 
Hong  Kong  until  June  6th  because  of  the  time  change.  Thus,  TTI  argues  Dr. 
Westland’s analysis of TTI’s stock price on June 5 (the day before the report was 
published in Hong Kong) was in error. In his deposition, Dr. Westland acknowledges 
this error, conceding the event date should have been June 6, 2023 (Doc. 94-22 at 32, 

40),10 but Dr. Westland testified that he recalculated his event study based on a June 
6th event date and opined that it made no difference. Id. at 40. However, at his August 
2024 deposition he acknowledged he did not provide any data related to that event 
study to counsel.11 Id.  The ability to test an expert’s methodology is one of the factors 

courts consider in determining the reliability of the opinion. The expert’s failure to 
provide the supporting data he relies upon to demonstrate there would be no difference 
in using a June 6 date versus a June 5 date precludes any meaningful testing of his 
opinion and undercuts the reliability of the opinion.                     
   Dr. Westland also opined that traders apparently discounted as implausible the 

Second Report’s claim of fraud on Home Depot, and as such the report had seemingly 

10 The Court refers to the CM/ECF page number when citing to depositions and other exhibits 
filed in the court record.                                                
11 Bonilla’s response indicates that supplemental spreadsheets containing additional backup 
data  were  provided  on  July  31,  2024  (Doc.  108  at  5–6),  but  according  to  Westland’s 
testimony, that would not have included information related to his recalculated event study 
based on a June 6th event date.                                           
no significant impact on stock price. According to Dr. Westland, “[t]he financial 
markets appeared to completely disregard the allegations” and “ignored the second 
report.” Doc. 94-23 at 26. He states that the reasons for this dismissal are “unclear.” 

Id. The trial court’s gatekeeping function requires more than simply ‘taking the expert’s 
word  for  it.’”  Frazier,
387  F.3d  at  1261
(quoting  Fed.  R.  Evid.  702  advisory 
committee’s note (2000 amends.)). How a court evaluates reliability will vary from 
case to case, but in all cases of proffered expert testimony, the court must find that it 
is “properly grounded, well-reasoned, and not speculative before it can be admitted.”
Id.
at 1262 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note (2000 amends.)). Dr. 
Westland’s opinion that traders simply ignored or discounted the Second Report, for 
reasons he cannot explain, appears speculative at best.                   
   3.   Helpfulness to the Jury                                         

   The Court next considers whether an expert’s opinions would be helpful to the 
jury. To satisfy the helpfulness requirement, expert testimony must be relevant to an 
issue in the case and offer insights “beyond the understanding and experience of the 
average citizen.” United States v. Rouco,
765 F.2d 983, 995
(11th Cir. 1985). Relevant 
expert testimony “logically advances a material aspect of the proposing party’s case” 

and “fits” the disputed facts. McDowell v. Brown,
392 F.3d 1283
, 1298–99 (11th Cir. 
2004). Expert testimony does not “fit” when there is “too great an analytical gap” 
between the facts and the proffered opinion. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner,
522 U.S. 136, 147
(1997).                                                                   
   The opinions discussed above related to the Second Report would be unhelpful 
to the jury. First, Dr. Westland’s opinion predicated on data that is off by over a billion 
dollars is irrelevant and will not logically advance any of the issues in this case. 

Similarly,  Dr.  Westland’s  opinion  based on  an  analysis  using  the  wrong  date  is 
unhelpful. Finally, Dr. Westland’s speculative opinion that the market simply ignored 
the  Second  Report for  unknown  reasons  does  not offer  insight  beyond  a  juror’s 
common understanding. Accordingly, it is                                  
   ORDERED:                                                             

   1.   Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike and Exclude the Opinions and Reports of 
Expert J. Christopher Westland (Doc. 95) is granted-in-part and denied-in-part. The 
motion is granted as to Dr. Westland’s opinions and testimony directed to the Second 
Report as discussed herein. The motion is denied as moot as to Dr. Westland’s 

opinions and testimony directed to the First Report. The denial is without prejudice to 
being raised again to the extent that Dr. Westland’s opinions related to the First Report 
are  relevant to  any  issues  pertaining  to  the  second  report,  such  as  damages, for 
example. The parties shall confer and may file a renewed motion, as necessary, on or 
before October 31, 2025.                                                  

   2.   The Court defers ruling as to the motion to strike the opinions and 
testimony of Dr. Westland contained in his supplemental report that are directed to 
the opinions of Kopa and Rubel concerning Bonilla’s Second Report.        
    DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on September 26, 2025. 

                              Chakene Charts Mo TL ol yell    
                               Charlene Edwards Honeywell 
                               United States District Judge 

Copies to: 
Counsel of Record 
Unrepresented Parties, if any 

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