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[[COURTLISTENER_SUBOPINION {"id":"11207680","type":"100trialcourt","part":"other","author":null,"source_field":"html_with_citations"}]]
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
TOMMIE HENDRICK JR., )
) No. 24 C 867
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Chief Judge Virginia M. Kendall
)
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Plaintiff Tommie Hendrick, Jr. filed this
42 U.S.C. § 1983
action alleging multiple
constitutional rights and state law violations by Chicago Police Officers (“CPD”) Michael
Donnelly, Richard Rodriguez, and Joseph Vecchio (the “Defendant Officers”) and the City of
Chicago (the “City”). The City now moves to bifurcate and stay discovery on Hendrick’s Monell1
claims. (Dkt. 58 at 1). The City also asks the Court to enter its proposed “Limited Consent to Entry
of Judgment Against Defendant City of Chicago.” (Id.); (Ex. E, Dkt. 58-5). For the reasons set
forth below, the City’s Motion to Bifurcate and Stay Discovery and Trial on Plaintiff’s Monell
Claims [58] is granted.
BACKGROUND
The following factual overview is taken from Hendrick’s Amended Complaint, (Dkt. 26),
and is presumed true only for purposes of resolving the current motion. See, e.g., Veal v.
Kachiroubas,
2014 WL 321708
, at *1 n.2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2014). Hendrick alleges that, in August
2019, he was stopped, threatened, attacked, and verbally accosted by CPD officers. (Dkt. 26 at ¶¶
8-10). After bringing and settling a case against those officers, Hendrick began documenting police
1 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y.,
436 U.S. 658
(1978).
conduct in his neighborhood. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-12). Because of this, he asserts, Defendants Donnelly
and Rodriguez harassed and abused him. (Id. at ¶ 13). Hendrick alleges that Defendants Donnelly
and Rodriguez spread rumors that he is a police informant and have twice called him a “snitch.”
(Id. at ¶¶ 14-15). Hendrick filed complaints against Defendants Donnelly and Rodriguez. (Id. at ¶
16). On December 21, 2023, Hendrick spoke to the CPD Bureau of Internal Affairs about
scheduling an interview regarding his allegations. (Id. at ¶ 17).
On December 26, 2023, Defendant Officers arrested Hendrick for failing to disclose a
firearm. (Id. at ¶ 47). Hendrick and his girlfriend were in his girlfriend’s parked car when
Defendant Officers drove past it. (Id. at ¶¶ 18-19). Hendrick alleges that Defendant Officers then
seized his girlfriend’s vehicle and initiated a traffic stop without reasonable and articulable
suspicion. (Id. at ¶ 20). As the Defendant Officers approached the vehicle, Defendant Rodriguez
warned Defendant Vecchio that Hendrick would record their interaction and that they “got a beef
last time because of him.” (Id. at ¶ 22). Hendrick recorded a video on his cellphone as Defendant
Rodriguez knocked on the front passenger window and Defendant Vecchio shined a flashlight
through the back window. (Id. at ¶¶ 23-26). Defendant Vecchio stated that he saw a gun holster;
Hendrick asserts that there was no gun visible or in the gun holster. (Id. at ¶¶ 26-27). Defendant
Donnelly then told Hendrick’s girlfriend, who was in the driver’s seat, to get out of the car while
he and Defendant Vecchio pointed their weapons at the car. (Id. at ¶¶ 28-29). When he was unable
to open the locked front doors, Defendant Vecchio tried to break the front driver’s side door with
a flashlight. (Id. at ¶¶ 30-31). Defendant Officers then ordered Hendrick and his girlfriend to exit
the car while pointing their guns at them. (Id. at ¶¶ 32-33).
Hendrick exited the car with his hands raised, holding his cellphone in his left hand. (Id. at
¶ 35). Defendant Rodriguez knocked Hendrick’s phone out of his hand, and Defendant Vecchio
handcuffed him. (Id. at ¶ 36). After Hendrick called Defendant Donnelly a “bitch,” Defendant
Donnelly hit him in his stomach. (Id. at ¶¶ 38-39). Hendrick told Defendant Vecchio he had a gun
and that he was a Firearm Owners Identification (“FOID”) card holder. (Id. at ¶ 40). Defendant
Vecchio retrieved Hendrick’s gun, and Defendant Officers then took Hendrick to the police station.
(Id. at ¶¶ 41-42). Hendrick alleges that he was charged with failing to disclose his firearm even
though he offered to show Defendant Officers his FOID card. (Id. at ¶¶ 42-43). Defendant Officers
also had Hendrick’s girlfriend’s car towed. (Id. at ¶ 45). Hendrick asserts that, while he was in a
holding cell, Defendant Officers told him that they “finally got him.” (Id. at ¶ 46).
On January 16, 2024, all charges against Henrick were dismissed. (Id. at ¶ 47). Hendrick
asserts that because of Defendant Officers’ misconduct, he suffered physical injuries, pain and
suffering, humiliation, embarrassment, fear, emotional trauma, mental anguish, the deprivation of
his constitutional rights and dignity, interference with a normal life, lost time, and attorney’s fees.
(Id. at ¶ 49). Hendrick now brings this six-count lawsuit alleging: (1) a Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment claim under § 1983 against Defendant Officers for their unreasonable search, seizure,
use of force against, and detainment of Hendrick and his property; (2) a First Amendment
retaliation claim under § 1983 against Defendant Officers; (3) a Monell claim against the City for
its policies or practices that caused the Defendant Officers’ constitutional violations; (4)
indemnification by the City for Defendant Officers’ conduct; (5) an intentional infliction of
emotional distress against Defendant Officers; and (6) a malicious prosecution claim against
Defendant Officers. (Dkt. 26 at ¶¶ 50-83). The City now moves to bifurcate Hendrick’s Monell
claims from his claims against the Defendant Officers; stay discovery and postpone trial as to the
Monell claims until the claims as to the Defendant Officers are resolved; and enter the City’s
proposed “Limited Consent to Entry of Judgment Against Defendant City of Chicago” (Limited
Consent Agreement). (Dkt. 58 at 1).
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b), the Court has discretion to separate claims
or issues for trial if the separation would prevent prejudice to a party or promote judicial economy.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b); Chlopek v. Fed. Ins. Co.,
499 F.3d 692, 700
(7th Cir. 2007) (citing Houseman
v. U.S. Aviation Underwriters,
171 F.3d 1117
, 1121 (7th Cir. 1999)). “If one of these criteria is
met, the district court may order bifurcation as long as doing so will not prejudice the non-moving
party or violate the Seventh Amendment,” which guarantees a jury trial for civil cases in federal
court. Chlopek,
499 F.3d at 700
(citing Krocka v. City of Chicago,
203 F.3d 507, 516
(7th Cir.
2000)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d) also permits a court to stay discovery on Monell
claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d); see also, e.g., Horton v. City of Chicago,
2016 WL 316878
, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 2016); Saunders v. City of Chicago,
146 F. Supp. 3d 957, 968
(N.D. Ill. 2015).
Motions for bifurcation are “now commonplace,” and “there is a growing body of
precedent in this district for both granting and denying bifurcation in § 1983 cases.” See, e.g.,
Allison v. Gallagher,
2012 WL 4760863
, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2012) (quoting Elrod v. City of
Chicago,
2007 WL 3241352
, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 2007)); see also, e.g., Rodriguez v. City of
Chicago,
2018 WL 3474538
, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 2018). “Such motions and the inclination of
many judges to grant them stems in large part from the recognition that, often, ‘claims of municipal
liability require an extensive amount of work on the part of plaintiff’s attorneys and experts, and
an extraordinary amount of money must be spent in order to prepare and prove them.’” See Horton,
2016 WL 316878
, at *2 (quoting Moore v. City of Chicago,
2007 WL 3037121
, at *9 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 15, 2007)); see also, e.g., Peterson v. City of Chicago,
2015 WL 13882813
, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 19, 2015); Allison,
2012 WL 4760863
, at *1. Deciding whether to bifurcate a plaintiff’s
Monell claim is left to the Court’s sound discretion and “must be done on case-by-case basis,
looking at the specific facts and claims presented.” See, e.g., Rodriguez,
2018 WL 3474538
, at *2;
see also Estate of Loury by Hudson v. City of Chicago,
2017 WL 1425594
, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr.
20, 2017).
DISCUSSION
The City argues bifurcation and staying of Hendrick’s Monell claims are appropriate
because bifurcation best serves the interests of efficient litigation and judicial economy, will assist
in eliminating the risk of unfair prejudice to the Defendants, and will not prejudice Hendrick’s
ability to recover compensatory damages. (See generally Dkt. 58). In support of its Motion, the
City argues that the viability of Hendrick’s Monell claims depends on the success of his claims
against the Defendant Officers. (Id. at 9-11). The City has offered to consent to limited entry of
judgment against it should the jury determine the Defendant Officers committed a violation of
Hendrick’s constitutional rights, even if the Officers are protected from civil liability due to
qualified or absolute immunity. (Dkt. 58 at 11-12); (Ex. E, Dkt. 58-5). According to the City, the
Limited Consent Agreement would render discovery and trial on the Monell claims unnecessary
and benefit Hendrick because he would not be required to prove the elements of § 1983 municipal
liability. (Id.).
I. Split or Inconsistent Verdicts
The City argues that bifurcation is appropriate because Hendrick must succeed in his action
against the Defendant Officers before he can obtain a judgment against the City on his Monell
claims. (Dkt. 58 at 10). Where a plaintiff’s alleged harm “was not caused by any de facto policies
independent of any officer’s actions,” a constitutional violation by an individual officer must be
found before a municipality may be held liable under Monell. See, e.g., Harris v. City of Chicago,
2016 WL 3261522
, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 14, 2016); Williams v. City of Chicago,
315 F. Supp. 3d
1060
, 1080–81 (N.D. Ill. 2018). Under certain circumstances, “a municipality can be held liable
under Monell even when its agents are not,” although this is only possible where such a finding
would not create an “inconsistent verdict.” Thomas v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t,
604 F.3d 293,
305
(7th Cir. 2010)). To determine whether the City’s liability is dependent on that of the
Defendant Officers’, the Court “must look to the nature of the constitutional violations, the theory
of municipal liability and the defenses set forth.” Thomas,
604 F.3d at 305
.
Applying those factors here, Hendrick asserts constitutional violations under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments based on the Defendant Officers’ search, seizure, use of force
against, and detainment of Hendrick and his property. (Dkt. 26 at ¶¶ 51-52). He also asserts a First
Amendment violation based on Defendant Officers’ alleged retaliation against him for recording
the police and filing complaints against them. (Id. at ¶¶ 53-58). Liberally construing Hendrick’s
Monell claims against the City, he asserts that the City has a custom, policy, or practice of failing
to adequately investigate or discipline police officers for their misconduct. (Dkt. 58 at ¶¶ 59-68).
He argues that Defendant Officers “regularly harass citizens by engaging in pretextual stops,
writing false tickets, and illegally towing vehicles,” but have not been investigated or disciplined
despite Hendrick and others filing complaints against them. (Id. at ¶¶ 60-62). He further asserts
that investigations into two of his complaints against Defendant Officers were completed without
him being interviewed and that Defendant Officers were cleared of wrongdoing by “the
accountability sergeant.” (Id. at ¶¶ 64-65). Additionally, he claims that, after the events at issue
here, Defendant Donnelly was recorded pointing his weapon at someone’s head and threatening
to kill them. (Id. at ¶ 67). Hendrick argues that the City’s customs, policies, and practices relating
to investigations and discipline caused the constitutional violations committed by the Defendant
Officers. (Id. at ¶ 68).
Even accepting Hendrick’s claims as true, any harm caused by a policy or practice not to
investigate or discipline officer misconduct could only manifest itself through the Defendant
Officers actually engaging in misconduct. See, e.g., Treadwell v. Salgado,
2022 WL 267988
, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 2022) (“[T]he City’s purported failure to supervise police force does not
proximately cause harm to the public in and of itself.”); Ezell v. City of Chicago,
2019 WL
3776616
, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2019) (harm caused by City’s alleged failure to properly train,
discipline, or supervise officers could only manifest itself through officer’s actions); Claxton v.
City of Chicago,
2015 WL 5304630
, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2015) (same regarding City’s alleged
policies of failing to adequately train, supervise, and discipline officers). Therefore, the City cannot
be found liable under Monell unless Hendrick proves that one or more of the Defendant Officers
committed a constitutional violation under § 1983 as alleged in Counts I and II. See, e.g., Williams
214 F. Supp. 3d at 1080–81; Treadwell, WL 267988, at *4.
Hendrick asserts that his Monell claim against the City can survive without finding the
Defendant Officers’ individually liable. (Dkt. 62 at 6-8). The cases Hendrick cites in support of
his position are not persuasive. The court in Awalt v. Marketti declined to bifurcate Monell claims
after finding a split verdict may result, but the case presented significantly different facts than what
are present here. Awalt v. Marketti,
2012 WL 1161500
, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 2012) (plaintiff
alleged individual defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical condition and municipal
defendants promulgated policies or customs that created unconstitutional prison conditions).
Additionally, courts in three cases cited by Hendrick found that Monell claims were not dependent
on proving individual liability because the individual defendants were asserting qualified
immunity defenses.
Id. at *12
; Trexler v. City of Belvidere,
2021 WL 493039
, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
10, 2021); Est. of McIntosh v. City of Chicago,
2015 WL 5164080
, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 2015).
The Court, however, agrees with the widely held opposing view that the possibility of a successful
qualified immunity defense does not preclude bifurcation. See, e.g., Williams,
315 F. Supp. 3d at
1081
(In deciding whether bifurcation is appropriate, “whether the Officers can be found liable is
beside the point; rather, the issue is ‘whether the individual defendants committed a constitutional
violation that is a prerequisite for’ the City's liability.”); Ezell,
2019 WL 3776616
, at *4 (the fact
that Defendant Officers asserted immunity defenses was not relevant to bifurcation analysis
because “the question is whether the Officers committed the constitutional violation(s) underlying
Plaintiffs’ Monell claims, not whether they can be held liable for them.”); Tate v. City of Chicago,
2021 WL 4400982
, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2021) (bifurcating Monell claims after holding that
“even if the individual officers can avoid liability through qualified immunity. . . their actions still
must be constitutionally excessive for the City to face liability.”).
The City cannot be found liable under Monell unless the Defendant Officers are found to
have committed a constitutional violation, regardless of whether they are shielded from liability.
Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of bifurcation.
II. Efficient Litigation and Judicial Economy
The parties also dispute whether bifurcation will promote judicial economy. The City
argues that allowing the Monell claim to proceed will lead to, among other things, costly fact
discovery, judicial intervention in discovery disputes arising from the Monell claim-discovery,
briefing and ruling on a summary judgment motion, and a trial that “will be longer and more
factually and legally complex than a trial that would focus solely on the Defendant Officers’
liability.” (Dkt. 58 at 6-8). The City provides a detailed estimate of the type and amount of
discovery that litigating the Monell claims will require: (1) extensive written discovery requests
regarding various broad topics including training, discipline, complaint histories of non-defendant
officers, investigatory files, CPD customs and procedures; (2) depositions of current and former
CPD personnel and witnesses from other agencies, such as the Mayor’s Office and the Civilian
Office of Police Accountability; and (3) expert reports and depositions. (Dkt. 58 at 7-8). The City
points out that Hendrick has already issued Monell discovery, including extensive requests for
production2 and a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice for ten broad topics. (Id. at 2-3); (Ex. A, Dkt.
58-1); (Ex. B, Dkt. 58-2); (Ex. C, Dkt. 58-3). As such, the City maintains that bifurcating and
staying the Monell claims allows the parties to avoid extensive, complex, time-consuming, and
costly discovery, motion practice, and trial that may be ultimately prove unnecessary. (Dkt. 58 at
6-8).
Hendrick counters that bifurcation would “multiply the proceedings, impose huge costs on
the Court and the parties, and inconvenience the witnesses.” (Dkt. 62 at 6). To support this, he
claims that bifurcation would require two rounds of discovery, two separate stages of dispositive
motions briefing, two periods of pre-trial preparation, and ultimately two jury trials. (Id. at 7). This
argument fails for the reasons discussed above. Hendrick’s Monell claims are dependent on his
establishing the liability of the Officers, and the City has offered a Limited Consent Agreement3
2 Hendrick has requested the following: all traffic and investigatory stops for CPD’s 18th District from 2019 to
2015; all training materials for instructing BIA investigators; all training materials for instructing COPA
investigators; a copy of all investigations into misconduct allegations into 18th District officers from 2019 to 2025;
all records identifying any 18th District police officer who has been sent or recommended for additional training due
to work-related issues from 2019 to 2025; and records indicating the allegations, officers involved, and outcome of
all investigations into all allegations of misconduct against a police officer from 2019 to 2025. (Dkt. 58 at 2-3); Ex.
A, Dkt. 58-1); (Ex. B, Dkt. 58-2).
3 Hendrick contends that the City’s proffered Limited Consent Agreement should be disregarded because it is not
authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Dkt. 62 at 12). The case he relies on in support found that the
District Court incorrectly threated the agreement in that case as though it were a Rule 68 offer of judgment. Swanigan
v. City of Chicago,
775 F.3d 953, 960
(7th Cir. 2015). The Court recognizes that the Limited Consent Agreement is
not a Rule 68 offer of judgment; rather, as the City points out in its briefing, the Consent is an agreement to accept
judgment if the jury finds any individual defendant liable. (See Dkt. No. 58 at 2 n. 2). Such agreements have been
considered and accepted by other courts. See e.g., Saunders,
146 F. Supp. 3d at 970
.
that awards damages to Hendrick in the event that the Officers are found to have violated his
constitutional rights, regardless of any immunity arguments. Other courts, including this one, have
found bifurcation warranted on efficiency grounds under the same circumstances. See, e.g., Treece
v. Hochstetler,
213 F.3d 360, 361, 365
(7th Cir. 2000); Williams,
315 F. Supp. 3d at 1083
; Ezell,
2019 WL 3776616
at *4; Treadwell,
2022 WL 267988
at *6. Accordingly, first addressing the
individual claims may eliminate the need to proceed to the Monell claims at all, which promotes
judicial economy by avoiding significant discovery and proceeding with a shorter trial. See,
e.g., Ezell,
2019 WL 3776616
, at *5–6; Medina v. City of Chicago,
100 F. Supp. 2d 893, 895
(N.D.
Ill. 2000). Bifurcation may also significantly expedite litigation of the individual claims
themselves. Instead of litigating broad questions about the City’s disciplinary policies, for
example, the parties can focus on establishing what happened to Hendrick during his interaction
with Defendant Officers and whether it violated his constitutional rights. “By limiting the scope
of this stage of litigation, it is possible to resolve requisite threshold issues more quickly.”
Ackerman v. Allen, No. 16-cv-6199,
2017 WL 1536447
, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 2017).
Hendrick also argues that there is overlap of discovery essential to the individual claims
and the municipal claim, which makes bifurcation unnecessary and will create discovery disputes
and require duplicative efforts. (Dkt. 62 at 6-7). For these arguments to succeed, Hendrick must
sufficiently explain how discovery related to whether the Defendant Officers unlawfully detained
and arrested him, used excessive force, or retaliated against him overlaps significantly with
discovery into the much broader issue of whether the City has a practice of inadequately
investigating and disciplining officers. See Andersen v. City of Chicago,
2016 WL 7240765
, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2016); Williams,
315 F. Supp. 3d at 1082-83
. Hendrick merely makes the broad
assertion that evidence of a municipal policy or practice is probative of whether an individual
defendant engaged in a particular course of conduct consistent with those policies on a particular
occasion. (Dkt. 82 at 8). He does not, however, explain how any specific evidence in this case may
overlap. Accordingly, the Court rejects these arguments. For these reasons, efficiency and
economy counsel in favor of bifurcation.
III. Prejudice
Having found that the bifurcation promotes judicial economy, it is appropriate as long as
it will not prejudice the non-moving party or violate the Seventh Amendment. Anderson,
2016 WL
7240765
, at *5 (citing Treece,
213 F.3d at 365
). The City argues that bifurcation of the Monell
claims prevents unfair prejudice at trial to the Defendant Officers and the City. This is likely true
for the reasons stated in Bradford v. City of Chicago,
2019 WL 5208852
, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
16, 2019). The Court does not need to address this issue in detail, however, because the Court finds
that the efficiencies produced by staying Monell discovery and trial are sufficient alone to justify
bifurcation. See Tate,
2021 WL 4400892
, at *3; see also Lyons v. City of Chicago,
2023 WL
2390364
, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2023) (“Because one of Rule 42(b)’s criteria for bifurcation—
avoidance of prejudice—is satisfied, the Court is not obligated to address judicial economy and
efficiency.”); Chlopek,
499 F.3d at 700
(If “one of [Rule 42(b)’s] criteria is met, the district court
may order bifurcation....”).
The Court must consider, however, whether bifurcation prejudices Hendrick. Chlopek,
499
F.3d at 700
. Hendrick argues that, because his claims are “interwoven,” he would face
unreasonable hardship in having to prove the same facts at two trials. (Dkt. 62 at 11). He also
claims that bifurcation would cause delays in the final resolution of his claims, drive up the costs
of litigation, and lead to discovery disputes about what constitutes “Monell-only” discovery. (Id.).
The Court rejected these arguments when it determined that bifurcation would promote judicial
economy. Based upon those findings and the fact that numerous courts have found that bifurcation
allows parties to bypass burdensome and potentially unnecessary litigation and related costs, the
Court finds that bifurcation would not prejudice Hendrick. See, e.g., Andersen,
2016 WL 7240765
,
at *5; Medina,
100 F. Supp. 2d at 895
; Moore,
2007 WL 3037121
, at *9.
Finally, Hendrick argues that he has strong, non-economic interests in bringing his claims
that would be frustrated by bifurcation. (Dkt. 62 at 5). He wants to prevent “continued and future
constitutional violations” and “change the nature of police interactions with its citizens.” (Id. at 5-
6). He further asserts that the Limited Consent Agreement operates as a dismissal of his Monell
claims and does not address his non-economic concerns because it asserts that the City denies any
unconstitutional practices. (Id. at 12). First, the Limited Consent Agreement is not “a roundabout
way of seeking dismissal.” (Dkt. 62 at 12). As the Seventh Circuit has held, even after plaintiffs
have obtained their damages, they are permitted to pursue injunctive relief regarding policies or
practices identified in Monell claims. See Swanigan,
775 F.3d at 962
. Hendrick does not disagree
with the City’s claim that bifurcation would not prevent him from pursuing any claims against the
City that may remain after resolution of the individual claims and application of the Limited
Consent Agreement. (Dkt. 58 at 14).
Second, while Hendrick assuredly has strong reasons for wanting to pursue his Monell
claims, he seeks only monetary damages from the City in this action. (Dkt. 26 at 7-12). Pursuant
to the Limited Consent Agreement, the City will pay any compensatory damages awarded to
Hendrick, along with attorneys’ fees. (Ex. E, Dkt. 58-5). The Court acknowledges that Section
1983 claims are intended not only to compensate victims for past wrongs but also to deter future
constitutional deprivations. Owen v. City of Independence,
445 U.S. 622, 651
(1980). Hendrick,
however, fails to show that a judgment entered in this case against the City via the Limited Consent
Agreement would not adequately deter against future misconduct. See, e.g., Williams,
315 F. Supp.
3d at 1084
(“[Plaintiff’s] complaint does not limit any extraordinarily large judgment to his Monell
claim; instead, it is entirely possible that [he] could be awarded a large judgment against the
Officers, which presumably send the same message to the City and police department.”); Carr v.
City of N. Chicago,
908 F. Supp. 2d 926, 935
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2012) (explaining that
compensatory damages may lead the City “to feel an incentive to change”); Parker v. Banner,
479
F. Supp. 2d 827, 829
(N.D. Ill. 2007) (“If a constitutional violation occurred, then the City pays. .
.. [T]hat is all Owen requires. The idea that the Supreme Court requires some extra incentive to
deter cities from allowing their employees to violate rights is inconsistent with its policy of
immunizing cities from punitive damages.”). This is not to minimize Hendrick’s desired non-
economic benefit from bringing suit against the City. But, approaching the City’s motion with a
“pragmatic mindset,” as the Court must at this stage of the litigation, bifurcation is appropriate in
this case. See, e.g., Allison,
2012 WL 4760863
, at *1.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the City’s motion to bifurcate Hendrick’s Monell claims, stay
discovery and trial on those claims, and enter the City’s proposed Limited Consent [58] is granted.
cD la”
Lobe lcs M. Kefidall
UniteY States District Judge
Date: November 19, 2025
13Case Information
- Court
- N.D. Ill.
- Decision Date
- November 19, 2025
- Status
- Precedential