Townsend v. Rockwell Automation Inc.

              IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                        
              FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO                          


Faith Townsend,                  Case No. 1:24cv528                      

                    Plaintiff,                                           
          -vs-                   JUDGE PAMELA A. BARKER                  


                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND                  
Rockwell Automation, Inc., et al.,      ORDER                            


                    Defendants.                                          


    Pro se plaintiff Faith Townsend filed this action against her former employer, Rockwell 
Automation,  Inc.  (“Rockwell”),  her  former  supervisor,  Robert  Rodgriguez,  and  Rockwell’s 
Human Resources representative, Stephen Ostrom. (Doc. No. 1). Defendants filed a motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 6). Plaintiff opposes the 
motion. (Doc. No. 7). For the reasons that follow, the Court dismisses this action. 
                          I. Background                                  
    On November 28, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Rockwell and Rodgriguez, 
asserting discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. See Townsend v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., et al., No. 1:18CV2742 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 28, 
2018) (“Townsend I”). Plaintiff alleged the defendants created a racially hostile work environment, 
retaliated against her, and constructively discharged her. The Court ultimately dismissed Plaintiff’s 
claims, granting summary judgment against Plaintiff after the parties engaged in discovery. (Id.; 
Doc. Nos. 10, 66). Plaintiff appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed this 
Court’s decision. (Id.; Doc. No. 72). Plaintiff then filed a motion to vacate the Court’s judgment 
on the basis of fraud under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3), and she requested a new 

trial under Rule 59(a)(2). The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion. (Id.; Doc. No. 75).  
    On November 22, 2021, Plaintiff filed a second lawsuit against Rockwell, alleging that 
Rockwell discriminated against her based on her sex and race in violation of Title VII. See 
Townsend v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., No. 1:21CV2226 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 22, 2021) (“Townsend 
II”).  The Court determined that Plaintiff’s new claims were sufficiently related to the claims 
asserted in Townsend I and were therefore barred by res judicata. (Id.; Doc. No. 18). Plaintiff filed 
a motion for reconsideration, which the Court denied. (Id.; Doc. No. 20). And the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed the Court’s decision in Townsend II, agreeing that the Court properly concluded that 
claim preclusion barred Plaintiff’s claims alleged in Townsend II. (Id.; Doc. No. 22). More than 
one year later, Plaintiff moved to vacate the judgment on the basis of fraud under Rule 60(b)(3) 

and Rule “59(2).” The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion, finding her motion untimely and without 
merit. (Id.; Doc. No. 30). Plaintiff then filed a “motion for reconsideration of motion to vacate on 
the basis of fraud [under Rule] 60(d)(1).” (Id.; Doc. No. 31). The Court again denied Plaintiff’s 
motion. (Id.; Doc. No. 32).                                               
    On December 29, 2021, Plaintiff filed an action against the United States of America 
“seeking a remedy for harm” caused by United States District Judge James S. Gwin when he 
granted Rockwell’s motion for summary judgment in Townsend I. See Townsend v. USA, No. 
1:21CV2425 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 29, 2021) (Doc. No. 1) (“Townsend III”). The Court dismissed the 
action, concluding that Plaintiff’s claims concerning her employment dispute with Rockwell were 
barred by res judicata and the Court “has no authority to conduct additional appellate review over 
[Townsend I].” (Id.; Doc. No. 4).                                         
    On March 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States 
Supreme Court, which was denied. See Townsend v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., No. 23-303, 2023 

U.S. LEXIS 4457 (2023). And the Supreme Court denied Plaintiff’s petition for rehearing. See 
Townsend v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., No. 23-303, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 466 (2024). 
    Plaintiff now files this action, alleging “Fraud on the Court FRCP 60(d)(3),” and “Perjury 
18  U.S.C.  §  1623.”  (Doc.  No.  1).  Plaintiff’s  complaint,  once  again,  concerns  Plaintiff’s 
employment dispute with Rockwell. And once again, Plaintiff alleges fraud in connection with the 
discovery process initiated in Townsend I. Plaintiff requests the Court vacate the judgment entered 
in Townsend I.                                                            
                       II. Standard of Review                            
    Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move for the dismissal of 
claims when the claimant has failed to “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When deciding a motion to dismiss under this rule, the function of the Court is to 
test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993).  
And in reviewing the complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable 
to the plaintiff, accept all factual allegations as true, and determine whether the complaint contains 
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
679, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). Legal conclusions and unwarranted factual 
inferences, however, are not entitled to a presumption of truth. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also 
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986) (The Court is “not 
bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”).   
    Additionally, courts must read Rule 12(b)(6) in conjunction with Federal Civil Procedure 
Rule 8(a)(2)’s requirement that a plaintiff need offer “only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S. Ct. 
2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 596). Although specific facts are not 
required to meet the basic minimum notice pleading requirements of Rule 8, Plaintiff’s complaint 
must give the defendants fair notice of what the plaintiff’s legal claims are and the factual grounds 
upon which they rest. Bassett v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir. 
2008). The plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds for relief “requires more than labels and 
conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 
at 555. Factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 
Id.                                                                       
    Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365, 102 S. 

Ct. 700, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 
30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972). And the Court holds a pro se complaint to a less stringent standard than 
one drafted by an attorney. Spotts v. United States, 429 F.3d 248, 250 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing 
Haines, 404 U.S. at 520). The Court is not required, however, to conjure unpleaded facts or 
construct claims on a plaintiff’s behalf. See Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 577 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(citation omitted); Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277-78 (4th Cir. 1985). 
                        III. Law and Analysis                            
    Although Plaintiff adds a defendant to this complaint and alleges fraud under a different 
federal rule—Rule 60(d)(3), Plaintiff’s new complaint is barred by res judicata. 
    “Res judicata,” or claim preclusion, is the doctrine by which a final judgment on the merits 
in an action precludes a party from bringing a subsequent lawsuit on the same claim or cause of 
action or raising a new defense to defeat a prior judgment. Gargallo v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 918 F.2d 658, 660 (6th Cir. 1990). This doctrine precludes relitigating a 

claim or cause of action previously adjudicated as well as litigating a claim or defense that should 
have been raised, but was not, in a claim or cause of action previously adjudicated. Id. “If a later 
suit advances the same claim as an earlier suit between the same parties, the earlier suit’s judgment 
‘prevents litigation of all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery that were previously available to 
the parties, regardless of whether they were asserted in the prior proceeding.’”  Lucky Brand 
Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1589, 1954 (2020) (quoting Brown v. 
Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979)). The purpose of res judicata is to “promote the finality of 
judgments and thereby increase certainty, discourage multiple litigation, and conserve judicial 
resources.” Stolmayer v. McCarthy, 171 F. Supp. 3d 690, 694 (N.D. Ohio 2016). 
    Here, undeterred by the numerous judgments against her, Plaintiff continues to raise claims 

associated with her employment dispute with Rockwell nearly three years after the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed the Court’s decision in Townsend I, including alleging fraud in connection with the 
discovery process. She raised many of these same claims in her previous complaints, appeals, and 
motions to vacate. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges in this complaint fraud concerning her December 
2009 paycheck, claiming that this document was not in her possession “despite repeated attempts 
to collect all pertinent documents.” (Doc. No. 1 at 7). In her motion to vacate filed in Townsend 
II, Plaintiff claims “the fraud is perpetrated by the omission of data concerning her 2009 wages.” 
(Townsend II; Doc. No. 28 at 7). The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to vacate and her motion to 
reconsider purportedly filed under Rule 60(d)(1). (Townsend II; Doc. Nos. 30, 32). And even if 
she did not raise these claims previously, res judicata bars Plaintiff from litigating matters in this 
action because they could have been brought in her prior actions. Gargallo, 918 F.2d at 660.  
    Additionally, Plaintiff’s attempt to file this complaint under Rule 60(d)(3) fails. Rule 60(b) 
is “generally a party’s exclusive avenue when seeking relief from a final judgment or order.” 

Marcelli v. Walker, 313 F. App’x 839, 842 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Beggerly, 524 
U.S. 38, 46, 118 S. Ct. 1862, 141 L. Ed. 2d 32 (1998)). However, Rule 60(d), the “savings clause,” 
provides a litigant “an escape from the one-year bar for fraud-based motions for relief from 
judgment” and allows litigants to bring an independent action challenging the validity of the 
judgment at any time. Duncan v. Lourdes Univ., No. 3:24-cv-152, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94825, 
*7 (N.D. Ohio May 29, 2024). An independent action under Rule 60(d), however, is rare and only 
available  “to  prevent  a  grave  miscarriage  of  justice.”  Beggerly,  524  U.S.  at  47.  A  “grave 
miscarriage of justice” is a “stringent” and “demanding” standard that is “available only in cases 
‘of unusual and exceptional circumstances.’” Mitchell v. Rees, 651 F.3d 593, 595 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(citations and quotations marks omitted). Independent actions under Rule 60(d) are therefore 

“reserved for those cases of ‘injustice which . . . are sufficiently gross to demand a departure’ from 
rigid adherence to the doctrine of res judicata.” Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 46 (quoting Hazel-Atlas 
Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244, 64 S. Ct. 997, 88 L. Ed. 1250, 1944 Dec. 
Comm'r Pat. 675 (1944)); Duncan, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94825, at 8-9. Plaintiff has failed to 
demonstrate such grave injustice to warrant a departure from adherence to the principles of res 
judicata.                                                                 
    To the extent Plaintiff alleges the defendants committed perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§  1623,  Plaintiff’s  claim  fails.  Section  1623  provides  protections  against  perjury  in  civil 
proceedings ancillary to a criminal case, but it does not provide a private cause of action where the 
civil testimony does not have a nexus to an underlying criminal case. Nicole Energy Servs. v. 
McClatchey, No. 2:08-CV-0463, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6025, *18 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 4, 2010) (citing 
United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753 (2nd Cir. 1994)); see also Kafele v. Frank & Wooldridge 
Co., No. 03-4205, 108 Fed. App’x. 307, 308 (6th Cir. Aug. 17, 2004) (holding that petitioner did 

not possess a private right of action against the defendants for alleged violation of Section 1623, a 
criminal statute); Williams v. Finnegan, No. 5:13 CV 2214, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73192, *5 
(N.D. Ohio May 29, 2014). And “there is no authority to allow a private citizen to institute a 
criminal action in a federal court; that power is vested exclusively in the executive branch.” United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039 (1974).  
    Finally, the Court notes that this is the fourth cause of action Plaintiff has filed concerning 
her employment dispute with Rockwell. The Court dismissed the three prior actions. And Plaintiff 
has repeatedly moved to vacate the Court’s judgment. In Townsend I, she filed a Rule 60(b)(3) 
motion to vacate the judgment based on fraud, which the Court denied. In Townsend II, she filed 
a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s judgment before her appeal to the Sixth Circuit and a 

Rule 60(b)(3) motion to vacate based on fraud and a “motion for reconsideration of motion to 
vacate on the basis of fraud [under Rule] 60(d)(1)” following her appeal, all of which were denied. 
Plaintiff has also filed three appeals, including a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States 
Supreme Court, which was denied. At least three times, the courts have determined that Plaintiff’s 
claims were barred by res judicata.                                       
    The Court is very tolerant of legal filings from pro se litigants.  However, the Court will 
not permit any litigant to use the Court’s resources to address filings which are clearly designed to 
harass the Court or opposing counsel/parties.  Federal courts have both the inherent power and 
constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct that impairs the ability to carry 
out Article III functions.  Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1073 (11th Cir. 1986).  The filing 
of frivolous lawsuits and motions strains an already burdened federal judiciary. “Every paper filed 
with the Clerk of ... Court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the 
[Court’s] limited resources. A part of the Court’s responsibility is to see that these resources are 

allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice.” In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184, 109 
S. Ct. 993, 103 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1989). The Court’s ability to perform its duties is compromised 
when the Court is forced to devote limited resources to the processing of repetitious and frivolous 
filings. In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 179-80, 111 S. Ct. 596, 112 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1991). 
    This court has the responsibility to prevent litigants from unnecessarily encroaching on 
judicial machinery needed by others. Procup, 792 F.2d at 1073. To achieve that end, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has approved enjoining vexatious and harassing 
litigants by requiring them to obtain leave of court before submitting additional filings.  Filipas v. 
Lemons, 835 F.2d 1145 (6th Cir. 1987); Wrenn v. Vanderbilt Univ. Hosp., Nos. 94-5453, 94-5593, 
1995 WL 111480 (6th Cir. Mar. 15, 1995) (authorizing a court to enjoin harassing litigation under 

its inherent authority and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (citations omitted)).   
    Plaintiff’s new complaint appears to be filed for the sole purpose of obstructing the legal 
process.  Plaintiff is therefore cautioned that continued efforts to file patently repetitive and 
frivolous documents or motions may result in sanctions being issued against her, including 
declaring her to be a vexatious litigant and enjoining her from filing new actions without first 
seeking and obtaining leave of court.                                     
                          IV. Conclusion                                 
    For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ motion (Doc. No. 6) and dismisses 
this action.                                                              
    IT IS SO ORDERED.                                                    

                                   s/Pamela A. Barker                                         
                                  PAMELA A. BARKER                       
Date:   July 18, 2024              U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE