Turley v. Laqunas

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 Case No.: 23CV0231-LL (BLM) 11 MACEY E. TURLEY, JR., 12 Plaintiff, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR AN ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 13 v. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 14 LAQUNAS, Correctional Officer, [ECF No. 22] 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Linda Lopez 19 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Civil Local Rules 72.1(c) and 72.3(f) of the United States 20 District Court for the Southern District of California. For the following reasons, the Court 21 RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment be GRANTED. 22 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 23 On February 3, 2023, Macey E. Turley, Jr. (“Plaintiff” or “Turley”), a state prisoner 24 currently incarcerated at California State Prison located in Sacramento, California, proceeding 25 pro se filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Laqunas, Huss, 26 Harrison, and King. ECF No. 1. (“Compl.”) 27 1 On April 10, 2023, District Judge Lopez screened Plaintiff’s Complaint before service as 2 required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) & § 1915A(b). ECF No. 3. The District Court dismissed all 3 of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Harrison, King, and Huss for failing to state a claim upon 4 which relief could be granted. Id. at 7-9.1 The District Court also dismissed the Plaintiff’s Eighth 5 Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim relating to his stomach issues 6 against Defendant Laqunas. Id. at 5-6. However, the District Court found that Plaintiff’s Eighth 7 Amendment deliberate indifference to a serious medical need arising from his alleged suicide 8 attempt as to Defendant Laqunas sufficient state a plausible claim. Id. at 6-7. 9 Plaintiff was given the option to proceed as to the remaining Eighth Amendment claim 10 against Defendant Laqunas only or file an amended complaint to correct the deficiencies of 11 pleading identified in the District Court’s Order. Id. at 10. Plaintiff was informed that if he chose 12 the first option, the District Court would issue an Order directing the U.S. Marshal to effect 13 service of his Complaint on Defendant Laqunas and dismiss the remaining First and Eighth 14 Amendment claims against Defendants Laqunas, Harrison, King, and Huss. Id. Plaintiff filed a 15 “Notice of Intent to Proceed with his Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Laqunas only.” 16 ECF No. 4. Based on Plaintiff’s choice, the Court dismissed Defendants Harrison, King, and Huss 17 from the action and directed the US Marshal to effect service of the remaining Eighth 18 Amendment claim against Defendant Laqunas. ECF No. 5. Defendant Laqunas filed his Answer 19 on August 4, 2023. ECF No. 8. 20 On July 12, 2024, Defendant Laqunas (“Defendant” or “Laqunas”) filed a Motion for 21 Summary Judgment (“MSJ”) pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56, along with the declarations of F. 22 Laqunas (“Laqunas Decl.”) and S. Gray Gilmore (“Gilmore Decl.”) in support of his motion. ECF 23 Nos. 22, 22-3, 22-4. On July 15, 2024, the Court notified Plaintiff of the requirements for 24 opposing summary judgment pursuant to Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988) 25 26 1 Throughout this Order and for ease of consistency and reference, the Court will cite to each 27 document in the record using both the number assigned to the document and the page number automatically generated by its Case Management/Electronic Case File system (“ECF”). 1 and Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and set a briefing schedule. ECF 2 No. 23. Plaintiff was directed to file either his Opposition or a “Notice of Non-Opposition” by 3 September 9, 2024. ECF No. 23 at 2. Plaintiff did not file any response, therefore Defendant’s 4 motion for summary judgment is unopposed. 5 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 6 A. Plaintiff’s Claims2 7 The events recounted in the Complaint are alleged to have occurred while Turley was 8 incarcerated at R.J. Donovan State Prison (“RJD”). ECF No. 1. On August 4, 2022, Turley alleges 9 he told Defendant Laqunas he needed medical help for stomach pain and Laqunas told him he 10 would contact the nurse after he finished the count. Id. at 1. A nurse arrived thirty minutes later 11 to dispense medication. Id. When Turley expressed frustration at the slowness of the nurse’s 12 response, telling the nurse it was an emergency and that he needed help, Turley claims the 13 nurse explained he had not been told about Turley’s request for medical help. Id. When Laqunas 14 later walked by Turley’s cell, Turley claims Laqunas called him a “f-ing liar” and “got a razor [he] 15 had in the cell and told him [he] was going to cut himself if he didn’t help me.” Id. at 1, 7. Turley 16 claims Laqunas turned his head and walked away. Id. Turley then started cutting himself with 17 the razor. Id. According to Turley, a different correctional officer walked by and saw Turley 18 cutting himself, called a code, and told Turley to give him the razor and he would help him. Id. 19 B. Defendant’s Claims and Evidence 20 Laqunas held the position of correctional officer at RJD and was assigned as a floor officer 21 two to three days a week in Building 6, Unit B in August of 2022. Laqunas Decl. at ¶¶ 1-2. 22 23 2 Plaintiff’s Complaint is not verified under penalty of perjury. See ECF No. 1. Therefore, Plaintiff’s 24 Complaint may not be used as an opposing affidavit to the Defendant’s Motion but the Court sets forth the factual allegations found in his Complaint relating to the claims that remain after 25 Judge Lopez’s screening order because they are relevant to the defenses raised in the Defendant’s motion. , 55 F.3d 454, 460 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that 26 a complaint or motion duly verified under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 may 27 be used as an opposing affidavit under FED. R. CIV. P. 56.); , 661 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1151 (S.D. Cal. 2009). 1 Turley was housed in the Administrative Segregation Unit (“ASU”) in Building 6, Unit B on August 2 4, 2022. Gilmore Decl., Ex. B., Plaintiff’s Deposition (“Pl.’s Depo.”), ECF No. 22-3 at 20:4-5. 3 Turley had been housed in the ASU for approximately eight weeks on August 4, 2022. Id. at 4 20:9-11. 5 On August 3, 2022, Turley reported “[suicidal ideation] to CO Fernandez.” Gilmore Decl., 6 Ex. A. Mental Health Consult Progress Note dated Aug. 3, 2022. Turley was evaluated by 7 Psychiatrist Intern D. Enfield who reported Turley “denied [suicidal ideation] and indicated he 8 only reported [suicidal ideation] due to having a headache, stomach pain, and finding out he 9 was COVID positive.” Id. He further noted that Turley reported he “wanted to discuss these 10 things with medical but was not receiving the medical [treatment] he wanted at the speed he 11 wanted.” Id. Enfield determined Turley “did not present in acute psychiatric distress, and during 12 the session was not deemed a current risk of harm to self or others, nor gravely disabled.” Id. 13 Turley “denied current suicidal or homicidal ideation.” Id. Enfield assessed Turley’s chronic risk 14 as “moderate” because he had “previously endorsed three lifetime suicide attempts but has 15 been inconsistent and vague in reports,” declined to provide details on past attempts, and had 16 no “verified suicide attempts on file.” Id. Enfield assessed Turley’s acute risk as low because 17 Turley “deni[ed] suicidal ideation/intent/plan” and reported that he only “stated [suicidal 18 ideation] to be able to speak with medical.” Id. 19 On August 4, 2022, approximately nine hours before the events that gave rise to this 20 action, Turley reported suicidal ideation “due to not being able to go to [recreational yard].” Id., 21 Mental Health Consult Progress Note dated Aug. 4, 2022. It was documented that Turley was 22 unable to go to the yard “due to being COVID positive and on isolation” until August 8, 2022. 23 Id. He was examined by Psychologist J. Roos who explained to him that staff was only refusing 24 to allow him to go to the yard because he was COVID positive and had to remain isolated for a 25 few more days. Id. Turley was “not receptive to this feedback, became agitated” but he “did 26 not endorse a plan or intent for [suicidal ideation].” Id. Dr. Roos opined that Turley appeared 27 to have “reported [suicidal ideation] to get other needs met.” Id. Turley made additional 1 also assessed Turley’s acute risk as low because Turley “did not express intent or plan to harm 2 himself.” Id. at 8. He further found that Turley “did not meet requirements for a [higher level 3 of care], nor did he present with any imminent risk factors of [suicidal ideation that would 4 warrant a [higher level of care].” Id. 5 Later that same day, sometime between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m., Turley’s “stomach 6 started hurting” and a “couple minutes” later Laqunas came by Turley’s cell on a “welfare check.” 7 Pl.’s Depo. at 22:4-8. Turley told Laqunas that his “stomach was killing [him].” Id. at 22:8-9. 8 Turley told Laqunas that he needed a “man down” which was a term used to summon someone 9 from the medical staff. Id. at 22:21-24, 23:2-3. Laqunas responded that he would call for 10 someone from medical after he was through finishing the count. Id. at 23:15-16. Turley did 11 not tell Laqunas that he was having “suicidal thoughts” nor that he was feeling suicidal at that 12 time. Id. at 23:20-25. 13 A nurse came by Turley’s cell approximately thirty minutes after his first encounter with 14 Laqunas. Id. at 24:15-18. The nurse was there to pass medication to other inmates and no 15 one had told this nurse about Turley’s need for medical attention. Id. at 24:19-20, 25:2-3. The 16 nurse told Turley that he would come back to his cell after he was done passing out medication. 17 Id. at 25:7-9. Approximately five minutes later, Laqunas walked by Turley’s cell and Turley 18 asked him “why did you lie to me” when Laqunas had previously told him that he would contact 19 medical for him. Id. at 26:6-7. Laqunas just “smiled at [Turley]” and “put up his thumb, like, 20 saying, okay, yeah, or whatever.” Id. at 26:8-11. 21 Laqunas came by Turley’s cell a third time and Turley “pressed” a razor to his window so 22 Laqunas “could see it.” Id. at 26:1. However, Laqunas “act[ed] like he didn’t see it, so he kept 23 on walking.” Id. at 26:2. Turley also stated to Laqunas before he walked away “so you think 24 I’m playing? You think this is a game?” but Laqunas “laughed at him and kept on walking.” Id. 25 at 27:3-5. After Laqunas “kept on walking,” Turley said “all right, watch,” and told Laqunas that 26 he was going to “cut on myself.” Id. at 27:5-7. 27 Approximately five minutes after Laqunas had walked away, Turley “started cutting” 1 the cuts which caused this officer to “call code” on Turley. Id. at 27:12-17. Turley cut himself 2 on the outside of his arm and above the wrist area. Id. at 28:1-4. Turley “broke the skin” but 3 he “wasn’t trying to, like, cut a vein.” Id. at 29:4-6. Turley testified he was trying to “harm 4 himself” but he “wasn’t trying to kill [himself].” Id. at 29:7-9. After Turley cut himself, he 5 flushed the razor down the toilet in his cell. Id. at 29:22-24. 6 Turley was examined by nurses who cleaned the blood off of his arm and they “wrapped 7 it up.” Id. at 31:11-14. Turley’s stomach pain returned and he was given Milk of Magnesia and 8 he did not experience any further stomach pain that night. Id. at 31:23-25; 34:3-9.. He had 9 no more thoughts of cutting himself. Id. 32:1-4. While Plaintiff was being provided medical 10 attention, a sergeant asked Turley why he cut himself and as Laqunas came by during that 11 questioning, Turley, instead of responding directly to the sergeant, turned and said to Laqunas 12 “[y]ou know why, I showed you the razor.” However, Laqunas responded “[n]o, you didn’t.” 13 Id. at 32:11-14. 14 Turley was then taken to the Correctional Treatment Center (“CTR”) for a mental health 15 evaluation. Id. at 33:1-2. Turley attests that he was a “little bit [suicidal], yeah a little bit, but 16 not really because I was kind of mad and frustrated that I – that they took so long to give me 17 medical treatment. But, you know, I got over it.” Id. at 33:17-21. 18 While at the CTR Turley was examined by Psychologist R. Jakobczuk who noted that 19 Turley made a “superficial scratch to his arm because he was wanting medical attention and felt 20 like no one was paying attention and he felt ignored.” Gilmore Decl., Ex. A, ECF No. 22-3 at 9. 21 Dr. Jakobzcuk also wrote that Turley “stated that he knew if he engaged in [suicidal ideation 22 behavior] and reported [suicidal ideation] he would be seen immediately.” Id. He also made 23 the assessment that Turley had “NO intent to die.” Id. (emphasis in original). He wrote “[b]ased 24 on the information stated above, this incident was deemed NOT a suicide attempt” and told 25 Turley “not to report [suicidal ideation] to get attention as this was a misuse of medical services 26 and may result in a [Rules Violation Report] for malingering.” Id. 27 Turley was asked if he had another cutting incident the following day but he denied that 1 34:21-25. Turley was examined by M. Lewis, an “unlicensed Psychologist,” who stated that 2 Turley “reported [suicidal ideation] and an intent to ‘swallow razors’ for secondary gain to obtain 3 a phone call and his property.” Gilmore Decl., Ex. A, Mental Health Consult Progress Note dated 4 Aug. 7, 2022, ECF No. 22-3 at 13. Turley was returned to his housing unit after it was noted 5 that he “recanted” his claims of suicidal ideation stating he “only engaged in [suicidal ideation 6 behavior] and reported [suicidal ideation] to get a phone call.” Id. at 14. 7 Laqunas attests that on the evening of August 4, 2022, he “did not believe Plaintiff was 8 suicidal or at risk of serious harm.” Laqunas Decl. at ¶ 3. Other staff members had informed 9 Laqunas that “Plaintiff regularly claimed suicidal ideation to extract concessions from custody 10 staff.” Id. He was further “aware that, despite Plaintiff’s previous claims of suicidal ideation, 11 Plaintiff was returned to his cell after the previous incidents were resolved.” Id. at ¶ 4. As a 12 result, Laqunas “believed Plaintiff was not at risk of suicide” because he believed that it was 13 “illogical for Plaintiff to threaten to kill himself in order to receive faster medical attention for 14 alleged stomach pain.” Id. at ¶ 5. 15 LEGAL STANDARDS 16 Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 17 as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 18 P. 56(a). A fact is material when it “might affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson v. Liberty 19 Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 20 The initial burden of establishing the absence of any genuine issues of material fact falls 21 on the moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant can 22 satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence that negates an essential element 23 of the non-moving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating that the non-moving party failed to 24 make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party’s case on which that 25 party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id at 322–23. In such cases, “there can be ‘no 26 genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential 27 element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id 1 on the mere allegations or denials of its pleading. The non-moving party must “go beyond the 2 pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 3 admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id 4 at 324. The non-moving party may meet this requirement by presenting evidence from which 5 a reasonable jury could find in its favor, viewing the record as a whole, in light of the evidentiary 6 burden the law places on that party. See Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 7 1221–22 (9th Cir. 1995). In determining whether there are any genuine issues of material fact, 8 the court must “view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 9 Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). 10 DISCUSSION 11 Laqunas seeks summary judgment with respect to Turley’s Eighth Amendment deliberate 12 indifference to serious mental health needs claim because evidence in the record demonstrates 13 that Turley did not suffer from a serious mental health need. Laguna further contends even if 14 Turley could show such a need, Laqunas was not deliberately indifferent to this need because 15 there is no evidence that Turley was actually suicidal or a danger to himself or others. MSJ at 16 15-20. 17 Alternatively, Laqunas claims he is entitled to qualified immunity because “it is not clearly 18 established that a reasonable correctional officer needed to summon medical care within 15 19 minutes for an inmate who was not at a heightened risk of suicide.” Id. at 27. 20 A. Eighth Amendment Inadequate Mental Health Care Claims 21 1. Standard of Review 22 The government has an “obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing 23 by incarceration,” and a failure to meet that obligation can violate the Eighth Amendment Estelle 24 v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–05 (1976). In order to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim for 25 inadequate medical care, however, a prisoner must show “deliberate indifference” to his “serious 26 medical needs.” Id. at 104. This includes “both an objective standard—that the deprivation was 27 serious enough to constitute cruel and unusual punishment—and a subjective standard— 1 on other grounds by Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). 2 To meet the Eighth Amendment’s objective requirements, the prisoner must demonstrate 3 the existence of a serious medical need. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. A sufficiently serious need 4 exists if failure to treat his injury or condition “could result in further significant injury” or cause 5 “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 6 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th 7 Cir. 1992), overruled in part on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th 8 Cir. 1997) (en banc)). “A heightened suicide risk or an attempted suicide risk is a serious medical 9 need.” Conn v. City of Reno, 591 F.3d 1081, 1095 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, 563 U.S. 915 (2011), 10 opinion reinstated in relevant part, 658 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2011). 11 To meet the Eighth Amendment’s subjective requirement of deliberate indifference, a 12 “high legal standard,” a prisoner must demonstrate the defendant “kn[e]w[] of and 13 disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [his] health and safety.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 14 1057, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This “requires more 15 than ordinary lack of due care.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835, (1994) (internal quotation 16 marks omitted) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). “[T]he official must both 17 be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 18 harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id at 837. Deliberate indifference “may 19 appear when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it 20 may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.” Hutchinson v. United 21 States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). 22 2. Analysis 23 First, the Court must consider whether Turley suffered from a serious mental health need, 24 the objective requirement that must be shown to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim. 25 Laqunas argues that there is no evidence in the record to demonstrate that Turley had a 26 heightened suicide risk or that he ever actually attempted suicide and therefore, he cannot show 27 that he suffered from a serious mental health need. MSJ at 17-21 (citing Conn, 591 F.3d at 1 Laqunas contends that the evidence in the record demonstrates that Turley’s threats of 2 suicidal ideation “were manipulative tactics to extract concessions from custody staff.” Id. at 3 17. Laqunas has submitted Turley’s medical records from the day prior to the alleged suicide 4 attempt to the day following that incident. Gilmore Decl., Ex. A. The records show that on 5 August 3, 2022, approximately twenty-six hours prior to the incident giving rise to this action, 6 Turley was given a mental health assessment after he told a correctional officer that he was 7 experiencing suicidal ideation. Id. at 4. The medical record reflects that Turley admitted that 8 he “only reported [suicidal ideation] because he was having physical ailments for which he 9 believed that if he reported suicidal ideation, he would get faster medical treatment.” Id. This 10 medical record also notes that Turley had no “verified suicide attempts on file.” Id. Turley was 11 found to not be a “current risk of harm to self or others.” Id. 12 The following day, approximately nine hours before the events giving rise to this action, 13 Turley again claimed he was suffering from suicidal ideation, although he subsequently admitted 14 what he really wanted was to “go to [recreational therapy] yard.” Id. at 7. Turley was given a 15 mental health assessment and it was found that he did “not endorse a plan or intent for [suicidal 16 ideation] and appears that he reported it to get other needs met.” Id. He was found to not 17 “present with any imminent risk factors of [suicidal ideation] that would warrant a [higher level 18 of care].” Id. 19 Turley testified that on the evening of August 4, 2022, during the event at issue in this 20 case, Turley was experiencing stomach pain and told Laqunas that he needed him to call medical 21 so that Turley could be examined. Pl.’s Depo at 22:1-24. Turley admitted that he was not 22 feeling suicidal during the first encounter with Laqunas. Id. at 23:24-25. Turley testified that 23 during the last encounter he had with Laqunas that evening, Turley showed Laqunas a razor 24 and said “I’m going to cut on myself” but Laqunas “laughed at him and kept on walking.” Id. 25 at 26:19-21; 27:4-7. It is undisputed that approximately five minutes later, Turley did cut his 26 outer right arm with the razor. Id. at 27:12-24. However, Turley testified that he “wasn’t trying 27 to, like, cut a vein, but I was cutting on myself to show them, I’m not playing.” Id. at 29:4-6. 1 Turley was given another medical and mental health assessment following this cutting 2 behavior. Gilmore Decl., Ex. A at 9. His injury was described as a “superficial scratch to his 3 arm” and he told the psychologist assessing him that he “was wanting medical attention and felt 4 like no one was paying attention and he was ignored.” Id. Turley stated that he “knew if he 5 engaged in [suicidal ideation behavior] and reported [suicidal ideation] he would be seen 6 immediately.” Id. When assessed for suicidal ideation behavior, Turley was found to have “no 7 intent to die” and the incident with regard to him cutting himself with a razor was deemed “NOT 8 a suicide attempt.” Id. (emphasis in original.) Turley offers no evidence to dispute this showing 9 that he alleged mental health issues, including stating suicidal ideations and related behaviors, 10 in order to receive faster medical attention for unrelated physical ailments and access to the 11 recreation yard. There is no evidence in the record that Turley ever intended to kill himself. 12 After reviewing the evidence in the record, the Court finds there is no evidence indicating 13 there was a heightened risk of Turley committing suicide or attempting to commit suicide and 14 therefore, there is no triable issue of material fact with regard to whether Turley had a serious 15 mental health need. Conn, 591 F.3d at 1095. Accordingly, Plaintiff has the objective requirement 16 of a serious medical need. 17 Even if the Court were to assume that there was an objectively serious risk of Turley 18 committing suicide or attempting to commit suicide, no triable issue of fact exists to show 19 Laqunas acted with deliberate indifference to Turley’s serious mental health needs. “To 20 demonstrate the second prong—deliberate indifference—[P]laintiff[ ] must show that [Laqunas] 21 w[as] (a) of the serious medical need and (b) failed to adequately respond.” 22 Id. at 1096 (emphasis in original). Laqunas attests that he “did not believe [Turley] was suicidal” 23 because he had been informed that Turley “regularly claimed suicidal ideation to extract 24 concessions from custody staff.” Laqunas Decl. ¶ 3. Laqunas also attests that he did not believe 25 Turley would attempt suicide because it was “illogical for [Turley] to threaten to kill himself in 26 order to receive faster medical attention for alleged stomach pain.” Id. at ¶ 5. The evidence in 27 the record supports the reasonableness of Laqunas’ belief as it shows that correctional staff was 1 does not offer any evidence to dispute Laqunas’ showing that he genuinely believed that Turley 2 was not a threat to himself or others. Laqunas has made a showing, that is not disputed by 3 Turley, that he could not have consciously disregarded an excessive risk to Turley’s mental 4 health because he did not believe that Turley was serious about attempting suicide. In fact, 5 Turley admits in his deposition that he never tried to kill himself nor was he suicidal when he 6 interacted with Laqunas. 7 In addition, to the extent that Turley suggests that Laqunas was deliberately indifferent 8 because he purportedly delayed, or interfered with, his mental health treatment, he must 9 provide evidence that the delay lead to “further significant injury.” Jett v. Penne, 439 F.3d 1091, 10 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Kamakeeaina v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 2014 WL 1691611, at 11 *9 (D. Haw. Apr. 29, 2014), aff’d sub nom. Kamakeeaina v. Maalo, 680 F.App’x 631 (9th Cir. 12 2017) (Finding no Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference where plaintiff said he was “ready 13 to commit suicide,” but did not attempt suicide while in defendants’ custody). Here, Turley 14 acknowledges that he made superficial cuts on his arm but there is no evidence of a suicide 15 attempt or that there was a significant delay in providing him mental health treatment. 16 “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 17 non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd v. Zenith 18 Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Therefore, the Court finds that the record fails to present 19 a triable issue of fact as to Turley’s Eighth Amendment claims against Laqunas for deliberate 20 indifference to Turley’s serious mental health needs. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS 21 GRANTING Defendant Laqunas’ motion for summary judgment. 22 B. Qualified Immunity 23 Alternatively, Laqunas moves for summary judgment on the ground that he is entitled to 24 qualified immunity as to Turley’s Eighth Amendment claims. On summary judgment, courts 25 generally resolve questions of qualified immunity through a two-pronged inquiry. Tolan v. 26 Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655 (2014). The first prong “asks whether the facts, ‘[t]aken in light most 27 favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . . show the officer’s conduct violated a [federal] 1 whether the right in question was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the violation.” at 656 2 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)); see also Sharp v. Cnty. of Orange, 871 F.3d 3 901, 909 (9th Cir. 2016). The court is not required to address the prongs in any particular order. 4 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (“[T]he judges of the district courts and the 5 courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the 6 two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the 7 circumstances in the particular case at hand.”). 8 In this matter, with respect to Turley’s Eighth Amendment claims, where “no 9 constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no 10 necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; County 11 of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) (“[The better approach to resolving cases 12 in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff 13 has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”). 14 Here, the Court does not need to decide the issue of qualified immunity because the 15 Court is recommending summary judgment in favor of Laqunas on the ground that there is no 16 genuine dispute with regard to Turley’s Eighth Amendment claims against Laqunas. 17 SUA SPONTE SCREENING 18 The Court also recommends that Turley’s Eighth Amendment allegations that Laqunas 19 was deliberately indifferent to his stomach pains be dismissed pursuant to pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 20 § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under this statute, the Court must sua sponte dismiss “at any time” a prisoner’s 21 IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks 22 damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th 23 Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). 24 In this matter, the District Court dismissed these claims in the original screening Order. 25 See ECF No. 3 at 6 (“Turley’s allegation that Laqunas did not alert the nurse to his stomach pain, 26 is, at most, “mere negligence” or a “delay[] in providing care,” which is not enough to plausibly 27 allege an Eighth Amendment violation.”) As set forth above, Turley was given the option to 1 attempt against Defendant Laqunas only.” Id. at 10. Turley chose the second option and did 2 not seek leave to amend this claim to correct the deficiencies identified in the District Court’s 3 Order. However, the District Court’s subsequent order dismissing the claims previously found 4 deficient and serving the remaining claim in the Complaint on Laqunas did not dismiss the Eighth 5 Amendment medical care claim. See ECF No. 5. 6 It is clear that the District Court intended to dismiss these claims and Turley made no 7 attempt to correct the deficiencies found in the District Court’s Order. Therefore, it is 8 recommended that the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to a serious medical need 9 related to Turley’s stomach pain against Laqunas be dismissed for failing to state a claim 10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for reasons set forth in the District Court’s April 28, 2023 11 Order. Moreover, it is recommended that the District Court find that granting further leave to 12 amend this claim would be futile in this matter. See Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood, 759, F.3d 13 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014) (“‘Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of . . . leave 14 to amend.’”) (quoting Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995)). 15 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 16 For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District Judge 17 issue an order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, (2) granting 18 Defendant’s motion for summary judgment; and (3) dismissing Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 19 deliberate indifference to serious medical need against Defendant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 20 § 1915(e)(2)(B) without leave to amend. 21 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report must be filed with 22 the Court and served on all parties no later than November 12, 2024. The document should 23 be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court 2 served on all parties no later than November 26, 2024. The parties are advised that 3 || failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise these objections 4 appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998). 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 - 7 ||Dated: 10/15/2024 Sy be He we 8 Hon. Barbara L. Major 9 United States Maqistrate Judde 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 15