Turner v. Graham

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                                              
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK                                             
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                                   :                                 
MYRRHELEKI TURNER,                      :                                 
                                   :                                 
               Petitioner,         :                                 
                                   :        18 Civ. 492 (JPC)        
     -v-                           :                                 
                                   :          OPINION                
HAROLD   GRAHAM,   Superintendent  of  Auburn  :  AND ORDER               
Correctional Facility,                  :                                 
                                   :                                 
               Respondent.         :                                 
                                   :                                 
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JOHN P. CRONAN, United States District Judge:                             

Following a 2015 jury trial in New York state court, Petitioner Myrrheleki Turner was 
convicted of attempted second degree murder and two counts of criminal possession of a weapon 
in the second degree and sentenced to an aggregate term of twenty years’ imprisonment.  Turner’s 
conviction arose from his near-fatal shooting of a man named Lucian Rogers at a park in Harlem 
on the night of March 11, 2014.  The proof against Turner relied heavily on the eyewitness 
testimony of Evilla Roebuck, a long-term resident of the neighborhood who was standing close to 
Turner and Rogers at the time of the shooting.  The trial court admitted Roebuck’s grand jury 
testimony to establish the truth of her identification of Turner as the shooter, upon finding that 
Turner had intimidated and threatened Roebuck in connection with her trial testimony, thereby 
forfeiting his Sixth Amendment right to confront her at trial.            
Turner seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the trial 
court’s admission of Roebuck’s grand jury testimony and raising several claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  For the below reasons, the Court denies Turner’s petition. 
                      I.  Background                                 
A.  Factual Background                                                    
The following facts are taken from the evidence presented at Turner’s trial, with all factual 
inferences drawn in Respondent’s favor in light of the jury’s guilty verdict.  See Quartararo v. 

Hanslmaier, 186 F.3d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 1999).  On the night of March 11, 2014, approximately forty 
to fifty people congregated at Donnellan Park in the Sugar Hill section of Harlem, many of whom 
were socializing, drinking alcohol, and smoking marijuana.  See Dkt. 1 (“Petition”), Ex. A (“Trial 
Tr.”) at 29-31, 165-66.  Among those at Donnellan Park that night were Turner and Rogers. 
After arriving at the park alone, Rogers eventually found himself conversing with Roebuck.  
Id. at 31, 39, 165-66.  Roebuck had arrived at the park around 10:00 p.m. to have some cocktails.  
Id. at 29-30, 32.  Known by many as “Auntie”, Roebuck was popular in the neighborhood around 
Donnellan Park, having lived there for four decades.  Id. at 24, 154.  She served as tenant president 
in her apartment building and operated several watermelon stands in Manhattan and the Bronx.  Id. 
at 24, 29, 155.  Rogers and Roebuck had known each other for several years, and they would see or 

speak with one another frequently.  Id. at 26-27, 154-55.                 
It appears Turner came to the Donnellan Park that night after Rogers and Roebuck were 
already there.  See id. at 165-66.  Turner and Rogers grew up in the same neighborhood in Harlem, 
were “friends,” and “to a certain extent” “h[ung] out with the same crew of people.”  Id. at 152, 
157-58.  At some point, Turner and Rogers began to argue, the argument escalated, and a fist fight 
broke out.  Id. at 31-32.  Rogers was “getting the best of” Turner and landed two punches on him.  
Id. at 32-33, 76.  Eventually, the fight subsided with Rogers victorious, and Rogers helped Turner 
off the ground.  Id. at 33.  Turner walked away, and Rogers remained next to Roebuck near the 
park’s gate.  Id.                                                         
About five minutes later, Turner returned with a gun.  Grand Jury Tr. at 7-8, 12-14; Trial 
Tr. at 45.1  He walked up to Rogers, while Rogers was near Roebuck, and fired a single shot at 
close range into Rogers’s chest.  Grand Jury Tr. at 8-9, 13; Trial Tr. at 45-46, 57-58; see also Trial 
Tr. at 179-80.  The bullet went through Rogers’s body and exited the back of his left arm, causing 

artery and nerve damage.  Trial Tr. at 181-82, 187.  Immediately after the shooting, Roebuck 
jumped over the gate with several other people and seriously injured her neck.  Id. at 33, 56.  Rogers 
meanwhile staggered out of the park and collapsed on the corner of 150th Street and St. Nicholas 
Place.  Id. at 102, 117, 182-83.  A passerby called 9-1-1, and an ambulance took Rogers to Harlem 
Hospital, where, after losing a considerable amount of blood, he had emergency surgery.  Id. at 103, 
109-10, 148, 185-87.  He ultimately required multiple surgeries on his arm, and went about six or 
seven months without feeling in his arm and hand.  Id. at 187, 190.       
New  York  City  Police  Department  (“NYPD”)  Officer  Carlos  Pagan  investigated  the 
shooting.    Id.  at  274-75.    Officer  Pagan  visited  Rogers  in  the  hospital,  but  Rogers  was 
“uncooperative” and “wouldn’t give [the police] details about the incident.”  Id. at 277.  The 

investigation ultimately led the police to Turner.  Id. at 276.  For nearly three months thereafter, 
authorities attempted to arrest Turner.  Id. at 280.  Between March 21, 2014 and June 12, 2014, 
Officer Pagan went to Turner’s address in Harlem approximately ten times, but never found him 
there.  Id. at 280-81.  NYPD Detective Joseph Condello of the Violent Felony Squad also visited 
Turner’s apartment three times during this period but failed to locate him despite speaking with 
others who lived in his apartment.  Id. 334-35.  On June 12, 2014, the Violent Felony Squad finally 
found Turner in Harlem.  Id. at 278.  The next day, Officer Pagan conducted a police line-up in 
which Turner appeared with five other individuals that resembled him.  Id. at 88, 294-95.  Roebuck 


1 The transcript of Roebuck’s grand jury testimony was filed with the Court under seal. 
viewed the line-up and identified Turner as the man who shot Rogers.  Id. at 88-89, 295-96.  Officer 
Pagan then arrested Turner.  Id. at 276.                                  
B.  Procedural History                                                    
1.  Relevant Trial Court Proceedings                                 
Trial began in New York State Supreme Court, New York County, on March 11, 2015 
before the Honorable Justice Ruth Pickholz.  Id. at 1.  The prosecution called several witnesses 

including (1) Roebuck, (2) an EMT who treated Rogers, (3) the NYPD Sergeant who first arrived 
at the scene of the crime, (4) the passerby who called 9-1-1, (5) Rogers, (6) an NYPD lab technician, 
(7) Officer Pagan, and (8) Detective Condello.  The combined testimony of these witnesses 
established that Rogers was shot, and nearly killed, after a physical altercation at Donnellan Park 
on the night of March 11, 2014.  But with the exception of Roebuck, whose testimony is discussed 
below, none of these witnesses identified Turner as the shooter.2  Turner did not call any witnesses 
and did not present any evidence.                                         
     a.  Roebuck’s Testimony                                         
Prior to trial, Roebuck testified before the grand jury that Turner shot Rogers.  Grand Jury 
Tr. at 8.  But at trial, she recanted this testimony.  Specifically, Roebuck testified at trial that she 

knew Turner by the nickname “Link” and Rogers by the nickname “Cy”, and that she saw the two 
men fight on March 11, 2014.  Id. at 25-27, 32, 72.  She also testified that after Rogers prevailed in 
the fight, Rogers helped Turner up and the two men shook hands.  Id. at 33, 74.  Then, shortly after 
the fight ended, Roebuck saw a “flash” and a gun.  Id. at 33-34.  However, she declared she was 


2 Rogers did not want to testify and only testified because he had been subpoenaed.  Trial 
Tr. at 159.  He did not identify his shooter on the witness stand.  Id. at 178.  Rogers claimed that 
he had a fight with someone he had never met before and was shot at the conclusion of that fight, 
but maintained that he did not get into an argument with Turner that night and that he was unable 
to see the person who shot him.  Id. at 167-69, 178-79, 181-82.           
“not going to say” who shot Rogers because she was “not 50 to 100 percent sure,” attributing her 
faulty memory to alcohol consumption on the night of the shooting.  Id. at 34-35.  This testimony 
appeared to come as a surprise to the prosecutor, as Roebuck previously had identified Turner as 
the shooter in a photo array, in a live line-up, and before the grand jury.  See id. at 61-62. 

The  prosecutor  then  asked  Roebuck  whether  anyone  approached  her  regarding  her 
testimony.  Id. at 35-36.  She confirmed that a man known as “Black,” whom she considered her 
nephew, id. at 40, spoke to her “[a] couple of weeks ago,” id. at 36.  Roebuck explained that Black 
was “like family” to her because her mother raised him.  Id. at 36-37.  She also recently had learned 
that Black and Turner are cousins.  Id. at 36.  Black asked Roebuck whether she had been 
subpoenaed in this case, and she confirmed that she was.  Id. at 38-39.  According to Roebuck, 
Black told her “to make sure that, you know, if you are not sure let the courts know you are not 
sure” and that “if you are not sure let them know that . . . you are not 50 or 100 percent sure.”  Id. 
at 39.  This “not 50 or 100 percent sure” was curiously identical to the very same language that 
Roebuck twice used moments earlier when she declined to say who shot Rogers.  See id. at 34-35.  

Roebuck also stated that a woman known as “Bird,” whom she had known for at least twenty years, 
also approached her approximately three weeks before the trial.  Id. at 43-44.  Bird informed her 
“that Black wanted [Bird] to tell [Roebuck] that [Black] had a few G’s to put in [Roebuck’s] 
pocket.”  Id. at 43-44.  Roebuck clarified that she understood this to mean that Black wanted to give 
her $5,000, but Roebuck refused the money.  Id. at 44.                    
In light of this testimony, the prosecutor asked Roebuck whether she recalled testifying 
before the grand jury that Turner shot Rogers.  Id. at 45-46.  Roebuck initially stated that she did 
not recall this.  Id. at 46.  The prosecutor then impeached Roebuck’s credibility by reading the 
following exchange from Roebuck’s grand jury testimony in which she referred to Turner and 
Rogers by their nicknames, Link and Cy, respectively:                     
[Q:]  [A]re you referring to Link?                                   
[A:]  Link came out of back, out of the building, he had, how I know what kind 
     of gun it was, it was a same gun the police officer had and I walked up to 
     Cy right beside me I could see the fire and hear the sound and he held it 
     sideways and shot him.  I jumped over the gate and ended up with a broken 
     neck.                                                           
[Q:]   [W]ho shot who?                                               
[A:]   Link shot Cy.”                                                

Id. at 45-46.  At this point, these excerpts from Roebuck’s grand jury testimony were read to 
impeach Roebuck, and were not offered as substantive evidence of the truth of her prior testimony.  
See id. at 137-38; see also Guide to N.Y. Evid. rule 8.33(2) (“If a witness testifies at a [criminal] 
proceeding and is subject to cross-examination concerning a statement made by the witness prior 
to the proceeding, the statement is admissible if the statement is inconsistent with the witness’s 
testimony but solely for impeachment purposes.”).  Roebuck testified that she did not recall this 
testimony and explained this was likely because she was “drinking every morning” at the time and 
had a “few cocktails” before testifying before the grand jury.  Trial Tr. at 47.3  Indeed, she stated 
that she had “been intoxicated for the last fifteen years” and “[t]he only day [she] was not 
intoxicated is right now,” referring to her presence in court at trial.  Id. at 91.   
The prosecution also challenged Roebuck’s failure to identify Turner at trial based on her 
pre-trial identification of Turner as the shooter.  Roebuck acknowledged on the witness stand that, 
a few days after the shooting, she told the police that she saw Turner shoot Rogers.  Id. at 57.  On 
March 21, 2014, and ten days after the shooting, police officers then questioned Roebuck and 
showed her a photo array.  Id. at 84-86.  At trial, however, Roebuck stated that she did not recall 

3 While Roebuck initially claimed at trial that she did not recall identifying Turner as the 
shooter in her testimony before the grand jury, Trial Tr. at 46, she later testified that, although in 
the grand jury she “said [she had] seen Link,” presumably referring to her identification of Turner 
as the shooter, she then had “to sit back and re-evaluate . . . to be sure,” id. at 52; see also id. at 90 
(admitting that she told the grand jury that Turner shot Rogers).         
this.  Id. at 84-85.  The prosecutor then showed Roebuck a document apparently containing the 
original photograph array in order to “refresh [her] recollection.” Id. at 85.  He asked Roebuck if 
the document indicated that she wrote “that’s who shot Cy and fighting Cy.”  Id. at 86.  She 
answered in the affirmative.  Id.  She also acknowledged that, on June 13, 2014, she viewed a police 

line-up of people, and identified Turner as the person who shot Rogers.  Id. at 88-89. 
     b.  The Sirois Hearing                                          
At the end of the trial day of Roebuck’s testimony, the prosecutor requested a Sirois hearing4 
because Roebuck “testified on the stand that she had been subjected to people coming to her home” 
and “people offering her money not to testify,” and this “very effectively made her unavailable to 
the prosecution.”  Trial Tr. at 133; see Guide to N.Y. Evid. rule 8.02 (prior grand jury testimony of 
an unavailable trial witness is admissible if “the defendant engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing 
that was intended to and did procure the unavailability of the witness”).  When making this request, 
the prosecution also informed the court that recordings of Turner’s jail phone calls revealed that he 
had directed certain individuals to influence Roebuck’s testimony.  Trial Tr. at 133-35.   

The trial court held the Sirois hearing on March 12, 2015, the day after Roebuck testified.  
Id. at 210-51.5  The hearing began with the prosecution playing tape recordings of some of Turner’s 

4 Under New York law, if a court suspects that a defendant “by violence, threats or 
chicanery, caused a witness’s unavailability,” People v. Cotto, 92 N.Y.2d 68, 76 (1998), it may 
hold a Sirois hearing at which it must determine “whether the defendant actually did procure the 
absence of the witness, in which case the admission of un-cross examined testimony of the absent 
witness will be permitted,” Perkins v. Herbert, 596 F.3d 161, 166-67 (2d Cir. 2010).  Such a 
finding requires “clear and convincing evidence” under New York law.  People v. Geraci, 85 
N.Y.2d 359, 367 (1995); see also Guide to N.Y. Evid. rule 8.19 (explaining that a defendant 
forfeits his confrontation right if by clear and convincing evidence, he engaged in misconduct 
“aimed at least in part at preventing the witness from testifying” and this wrongdoing caused the 
witness “not to testify or testify fully”).                               

5 The Sirois hearing occurred in the middle of trial and thus is found in the trial transcript. 
jail calls.  Id. at 211-16.  Because the transcripts of these calls are central to one of the main issues 
in this case, large excerpts are reproduced below.6                       
The first call took place on December 22, 2014.  Dkt. 28-1 (“Telephone Tr.”) at 1.  In this 
phone call, Turner asked a man referred to as “G” if he could speak with Black.  Id.  Turner then 

spoke with Black and said that he needed Black to talk to someone.  Id. at 2.  Black confirmed that 
he would.  Id.  Excerpts from this transcript are as follows:             
Turner:        You got black number?                                 
G:             Our cousin black?  Yea.                               
Turner:        Get him for me.                                       
G:             Hold on.                                              
Turner:        Tell him I need him to go talk to Bernard for me.     
G:             Alright hold on.                                      

                          . . .                                      

Turner:        You been seeing Bernard?                              
Black:         Yea I spoke to him.  He just came home about three weeks 
               ago.                                                  
Tuner:         Ah, he around right?                                  
Black:         Yea yea, uhh umm.  Your big brother told me that situation.  
               I told him I’m (unintelligible).                      
Turner:        Yea I need you, I need you, I need you to talk—I need to 
               talk, I need you to talk to this                      
Black:         Alright alright.  You know you ain’t gotta say that bro.  I 
               already know the situation (unintelligible) told me that.  
Turner:        Good lookin, I need you to do it ASAP though . . . like as 
               fast as possible.                                     
Black:         I’ll personally go do it.                             
Turner:        Alright.  Thank you.  Appreciate you . . . .          
Black:         I was already on the job once he told me.             
Turner:        Good lookin . . . .                                   
Black:         I talked to (unintelligible) I went and did that.     

Id. at 1-3.                                                               

6 The Court made three alterations to the transcripts.  First, the Court refers to Turner by 
name rather than “Defendant.”  Second, the Court altered capitalization and punctuation in non-
material ways.  Third, the Court omitted ellipses found in the original transcript, and thus any 
ellipses in the excerpts here represent omissions of words or phrases by the Court in quoting the 
transcript text.                                                          
The second call occurred on January 1, 2015.  Id. at 4.  During this call, an unidentified male 
told Turner about someone he referred to as “Watermelon.”  Id.  During the Sirois hearing, the 
prosecution argued that this was a reference to Roebuck, who sold that fruit around Donnellan Park.  
Trial Tr. at 243.  Excerpts from this transcript are below:               

Unknown Male:  . . . So they started the trial or nah?  (Unintelligible).  
Turner:        (Unintelligible).  I go back on the 20th I think.  But what’s 
               happening?                                            
Unknown Male:   Shit happening over here.  I saw uh [PAUSE] Watermelon.  
Turner:        Yea, what happened?                                   
Unknown Male:   He dipped off real fast before I could say something to her.  
               I saw come down the block, I saw ‘em, tried to walk past to 
               catch up to him, he dipped off, jumped in a cab.      
Turner:        A’right, it is what it is.                            

                          . . .                                      

Turner:        Black said he already talked to him                   
Unknown Male:   (Unintelligible).                                    
Turner:        So I don’t know how to, ya know what I mean?          
Unknown Male 2:   Yea.                                               
Turner:        It is what it is.  [PAUSE].  Trying to get out of this nasty box 
               though.  Know what I mean?                            

Telephone Tr. at 4-5.                                                     
The next day, Turner made another phone call.  Id. at 6.  In this conversation, Turner spoke 
with G and an unknown male, who appeared to be the same unknown male from the prior day’s 
call.  See id.  Turner referred to the conversation from the day prior and seemed to tell the man to 
attempt to talk to the husband of the person they referred to as “Watermelon.”  See id.  Turner also 
reiterated to G to “[m]ake sure Black is on his job with what we’re talking about.”  Id.  Below are 
excerpts:                                                                 
Turner:        You might need to talk to the dude instead of talking to 
               the talking to somebody else.  You remember what you told 
               me yesterday, right?                                  
Unknown Male:   Uh-huh.                                              
Turner:        Couldn’t catch nobody before they got in the cab?  You hear 
               what the fuck I’m saying to you.                      
Unknown Male:   Yea I’m listening yo, I’m listening.  You not saying it 
               clearly.  Say it again.                               
Turner:        You told me you tried to catch somebody before they got in 
               the cab and you said you couldn’t catch em.           
Unknown Male:   Catch who?                                           
Turner:        You said you was trying to catch somebody before they got 
               in the cab but you couldn’t catch em you was walking too 
               slow?                                                 
Unknown Male:   Oh yea yea yea.                                      
Turner:        Try hollerin at the motherfuckin um husband man.      
Unknown Male:   Start hollerin at who?                               
Turner:        The husband.                                          
                          . . .                                      

Turner:        Make sure Black is on his job with what we’re talking about.  
               You hear me . . . ?                                   
G:             Yea I hear you.                                       
Unknown Male:   Yea I hear you.                                      
Turner:        Alright.                                              

Id. at 6-7.                                                               
The fourth call took place on January 9, 2015.  Id. at 8.  Here, an unidentified man told 
Turner that Black “spoke to the person” on several occasions.  Id.  Excerpts are below: 
Turner:        When’s the last time you talked to . . . Black . . . ?  
Unknown Male:   I seen Black uhh [PAUSE] this week when I was at the 
               house.                                                
Turner:        What he was talking about?                            
Unknown Male:   . . . He hollers black and white personally, like no in between, 
               he spoke to the person.                               
Turner:        A’right.                                              
Unknown Male:   Personally.                                          
Turner:        Alright.                                              
Unknown Male:   More than once, you heard?                           
Turner:        Okay, you know you said it to me, ya know, it is what it is.  
               It’s regular shit man.  It is what it is.             

Id.                                                                       
On January 21, 2015, Turner made the final phone call relevant to this matter.  Id. at 9.  In 
this conversation, Turner told an another individual to tell Black that Turner received a trial date 
and to “[t]ell him to keep doing what he’s doing.”  Id.  Turner then used a basketball analogy to 
express urgency.  Id. at 9-10.                                            
Turner:        You been seeing Black?                                
Unknown Male:   Yea I, I been seeing him a lot of him in the car.    
Turner:        Alright.  Tell him I got a, I got a trial date for the seventeenth.  
Unknown Male:   Alright.                                             
Turner:        Ya know what I mean?  Tell him to keep doing what he’s 
               doing.  Ya dig?                                       
Unknown Male:   Yeah.                                                

                          . . .                                      

Turner:        Make sure you tell Black what I said too . . . .      
Unknown Male:   I gotchu . . . .                                     
Turner:        Ya  know,  I  really  need  need  the  motherfuckers.    Tell 
               them . . . there’s 30 seconds left in the ballgame shot clocks 
               at ten, ya heard?                                     
Unknown Male:   I gotchu.  (Unintelligible).                         
Turner:        . . . down two points.  We need this basket man.  For real for 
               real . . . .                                          

Id.                                                                       
Next, Officer Pagan testified.  Trial Tr. at 216-24.  Officer Pagan said that while he was 
with the prosecutor that morning, which was the day after Roebuck testified, Roebuck called the 
prosecutor’s cellphone.  Id. at 217.  The prosecutor’s cellphone was on speaker, allowing Officer 
Pagan to hear the conversation.  Id.  During the phone call, Roebuck stated that after she left court 
the day prior, she received a phone call from Black and Bird during which Bird told Roebuck “[t]o 
keep her name out of court.”  Id. at 218.  According to Officer Pagan, Roebuck also stated that later 
that day, “she was approached by a young guy” at a grocery store.  Id. at 219.  She recognized the 
man from the neighborhood and “said she kn[ew] him as OYG,” which Officer Pagan explained 
was an acronym for a Harlem-based gang called Original Young Gangsters.  Id.  This man “asked 
[Roebuck] if she was in court yesterday.”  Id.  Finally, Roebuck also informed the prosecutor that 
her brother in Baltimore “was receiving phone calls for a couple of months but that he didn’t know 
why until yesterday.”  Id. at 220.  Roebuck spoke with her brother on March 11, 2015 and “she told 
him that she was in court and then he stated, oh that is why I was getting phone calls for a couple 
months.”  Id.  Roebuck claimed that in those phone calls “they were telling her brother . . . for Miss 
Roebuck not to testify in court.”  Id.  Turner did not call any witnesses at the Sirois hearing.  See 

id. at 226.                                                               
After hearing arguments from the parties, id. at 226-51, Justice Pickholz ruled that the 
prosecution had shown “by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant did intimidate [and] 
threaten” Roebuck, id. at 266.  In support of her decision, Justice Pickholz explained that she had 
reviewed the phone calls that Turner made while in prison and relied on her observation of Roebuck 
from her testimony in court.  Id.  She found that Roebuck “was clearly not truthful on the witness 
stand, and she was doing everything she could to say that she was drunk.  She was intoxicated.  She 
needed a cocktail.  This was the only day she didn’t drink.”  Id.  Further, Justice Pickholz found “it 
very telling that the day after [Roebuck] testified[,] [Roebuck] called the [prosecutor] to tell him 
that she had been approached, and it was clear to [the court] that [Roebuck] did so because she 

wanted to let somebody know that she was still being threatened although she didn’t want to say in 
court her true testimony.”  Id. at 267.  As a result, Justice Pickholz allowed Roebuck’s grand jury 
testimony to be admitted as substantive evidence.  Id. at 266.            
     c.  The Jury Verdict                                            
On March 18, 2015, the jury returned a verdict finding Turner guilty of the two counts of 
criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.  Id. at 511-12.  The next day, after further 
deliberation, the jury found Turner guilty of the remaining count of attempted murder in the second 
degree.  Id. at 520.  Turner was later sentenced to an aggregate prison term of twenty years.  See 
Petition ¶ 25.                                                            
2.  Direct Appeal                                                    
Turner  appealed  his  conviction  to  the  Appellate  Division  for  the  First  Department, 
challenging the trial court’s admission of Roebuck’s grand jury testimony.  On October 20, 2016, 
the Appellate Division held that “[t]he court properly permitted the [prosecution] to introduce an 

eyewitness’s grand jury testimony as evidence-in-chief to establish defendant’s guilt.”  People v. 
Turner, 39 N.Y.S.3d 439, 439 (App. Div. 2016).  Specifically, the court found that “[t]here was 
ample  circumstantial  evidence,  including  defendant’s  recorded  phone  calls  and  reasonable 
interpretations thereof, to support the conclusion that defendant, acting through proxies, influenced 
the witness to give false trial testimony, thereby rendering her effectively unavailable, and that the 
change in her testimony could only be explained by this unlawful influence.”  Id. at 439-40 (internal 
citations omitted).  On January 17, 2017, the New York Court of Appeals denied Turner’s 
application to appeal the Appellate Division’s decision.  People v. Turner, 28 N.Y.3d 1151 (2017).  
3.  New York Criminal Procedure Law Section 440.10 Motion            
On January 15, 2018, Turner filed in state court a motion to vacate his judgment of 

conviction pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.10.  See Dkt. 16 (“Supplemental 
Petition”) ¶ 5; Dkt. 24 (“Opposition”) at 6.7  In this motion, Turner argued that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because his trial attorneys failed to call witnesses at the 
Sirois  hearing  and  did  not  object  to  Roebuck’s  impeachment  during  which  the  prosecutor 
introduced evidence of a pretrial photographic identification.  See Supplemental Petition ¶ 5; 
Opposition at 6.                                                          
On March 5, 2018, Turner filed a supplemental § 440.10 motion in which he argued that he 


7 Turner did not submit to the Court several relevant filings pertaining to his § 440.10 
motion.    For  this  procedural  history,  the  Court  therefore  largely  relies  on  undisputed 
representations in Turner’s and Respondent’s briefs to this Court.        
also received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorneys failed to investigate or 
present  an  alibi  defense  that  suggested  he  was  in  the  Bronx  at  the  time  of  the  shooting.  
Supplemental Petition ¶¶ 8, 15.  In late May 2018, Justice Pickholz summarily denied Turner’s 
claims raised in his initial § 440.10 motion, but ordered an evidentiary hearing regarding his alibi 

claims raised in his supplemental motion.  Supplemental Petition ¶ 9; Opposition at 6.  Following 
a hearing, Justice Pickholz denied Turner’s supplemental § 440.10 motion on November 14, 2018.  
Supplemental Petition, Exs. J, K.                                         
Turner sought leave to appeal this decision, Supplemental Petition, Ex. L, but the Appellate 
Division denied his application on March 28, 2019, Supplemental Petition, Ex. N.  He then applied 
for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, Supplemental Petition, Ex. O, and the Court 
of Appeals dismissed this application as “not appealable” on July 17, 2019, Supplemental Petition, 
Ex. P.                                                                    
4.  Federal Habeas                                                   
On January 19, 2018, and four days after filing his initial § 440.10 motion, Turner filed in 

this Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  In this petition, 
Turner raises two arguments.  First, he argues that the trial court’s admission of Roebuck’s grand 
jury testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him.  Petition at 
¶¶ 34-42.  Second, he argues that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel because 
his trial attorneys failed to call witnesses during the Sirois hearing and failed to object to the 
prosecution’s use of Roebuck’s pretrial photographic identification.  Id. ¶¶ 43-72.  In other words, 
he makes the same arguments that he raised in his direct appeal and initial § 440.10 motion in New 
York state court.                                                         
On March 12, 2018, and one week after he filed his supplemental § 440.10 motion, Turner 
sought permission to file a supplemental § 2254 petition and requested an order holding his initial 
petition in abeyance pending the resolution of his § 440.10 motion in New York state court.  Dkt. 
6.  The Honorable J. Paul Oetken granted this on March 15, 2018 and ordered that this action be 
held in abeyance pending the outcome of Turner’s state court proceedings.  Dkt. 7. 

On July 22, 2019, and five days after the New York Court of Appeals dismissed Turner’s 
application for leave to appeal the denial of his § 440.10 motion, Turner supplemented his § 2254 
petition in this Court.  Supplemental Petition ¶ 1.  In that filing, Turner raises the same argument 
he advanced in his supplemental § 440.10 motion, namely that he was denied effective assistance 
of counsel because his trial attorneys failed to investigate or advance his claimed alibi defense.  Id. 
¶¶ 37-110.                                                                
On March 24, 2020, Respondent Harold Graham, superintendent of Auburn Correctional 
Facility, filed an answer and a memorandum of law opposing all arguments Turner raised in his 
habeas petition.  Dkt. 24.  Turner filed a reply on April 6, 2020.  Dkt. 25.  This case was reassigned 
to the undersigned on September 29, 2020.                                 

                     II.  Legal Standard                             
Pursuant to § 2254, a federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus to a person held “in 
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).  Because 
Turner filed his habeas petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), it is “subject to review under the standards established in that 
Act.”  Murden v. Artuz, 497 F.3d 178, 191 (2d Cir. 2007).                 
Under AEDPA, a federal court may grant habeas corpus relief only if a claim that was 
adjudicated on the merits in state court “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court 
of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or “resulted in a decision that was based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 
proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2).  With regard to § 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” 

established Supreme Court precedent “if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law” set 
forth in a Supreme Court case or if it confronts facts that are “materially indistinguishable” from a 
Supreme Court decision but “reaches a different result.”  Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 
(2005).  A state court decision “involves an unreasonable application of” Supreme Court precedent 
if  the  state  court  applies  Supreme  Court  precedent  to  the  facts  at  issue  “in  an  objectively 
unreasonable manner.”  Id.  State court factual findings are “presumed to be correct” unless the 
petitioner rebuts the findings with “clear and convincing evidence.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).   
AEDPA thus “dictates a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,” 
which “demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”  Bell v. Cone, 543 
U.S. 447, 455 (2005) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  “As a condition 

for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s 
ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an 
error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 
disagreement.”  Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).           
                      III.  Discussion                               
Turner raises two arguments for why he is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.  First, he 
claims that the trial court violated the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause when it admitted 
into evidence Roebuck’s grand jury testimony.  Second, he contends that he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel guaranteed to him by the Sixth Amendment because his trial attorneys failed 
to: (1) call witnesses during the Sirois hearing; (2) object to the prosecution’s impeachment of 
Roebuck with her pretrial photographic identification of Turner; and (3) investigate or present his 
alleged alibi defense.  For the reasons stated below, each of these arguments fails under AEDPA’s 
deferential review standard, and thus the Court denies Turner’s petition in its entirety. 

A.  Confrontation Clause                                                  
Turner first argues that the state court violated the Sixth Amendment by allowing the 
prosecution to introduce Roebuck’s grand jury testimony as substantive evidence of the truth of 
that  prior  testimony.    Petition  at  ¶¶  34-42.    This  argument  fails  because  the  state  court’s 
determination that Turner forfeited his right to confront Roebuck by attempting to influence her 
testimony was not contrary to clearly established federal law, but rather was consistent with 
Supreme Court precedent.  See Trial Tr. at 266-67.                        
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”  U.S. Const. 
amend. VI.  “The Amendment contemplates that a witness who makes testimonial statements 

admitted against a defendant will ordinarily be present at trial for cross-examination, and that if the 
witness is unavailable, his prior testimony will be introduced only if the defendant had a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine him.”  Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358 (2008).   
The Confrontation Clause is “most naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation 
at common law, admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the founding.”  Crawford 
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004).  One of these founding-era exceptions is “forfeiture by 
wrongdoing.”  Id. at 62.  At common law, this exception “permitted the introduction of statements 
of a witness who was ‘detained’ or ‘kept away’ by the ‘means of procurement’ of the defendant.”  
Giles, 554 U.S. at 359 (citations omitted); see also Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006) 
(“[O]ne who obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to 
confrontation.”);  Reynolds  v.  United  States,  98  U.S.  145,  158  (1879)  (explaining  that  the 
Constitution grants a defendant “the privilege of being confronted with the witnesses against him; 
but if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses away, he cannot insist on his privilege”).  This is essentially 

an “equitable” remedy.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.  If a defendant intimidates a witness in order to 
prevent the witness from testifying against him, he forfeits his right to confront that witness, and 
the court may then admit prior testimonial statements from that witness even though the defendant 
lacked an opportunity to cross-examine.                                   
The Supreme Court most recently addressed the bounds of this exception in Giles.  In Giles, 
a man killed his ex-girlfriend, and prosecutors sought to introduce statements that the victim made 
to a police officer a few weeks before her murder regarding a domestic violence incident involving 
the defendant.  554 U.S. at 356-57.  The trial court admitted these statements, and California’s 
appellate courts concluded this did not violate the Confrontation Clause because the defendant 
forfeited his right to confront his ex-girlfriend by murdering her.  Id. at 357.  The Supreme Court 

reversed and held that such an exception to the Confrontation Clause was unknown at the time of 
the founding.  Id. at 377.  Instead, the Court emphasized that the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception 
applies only when the defendant caused the declarant’s absence “for the purpose of preventing 
testimony.”  Id. at 368; see also id. at 359-60.  Thus in Giles, the witness’s murder alone, absent an 
indication that the defendant committed the murder to prevent her from testifying, was insufficient 
to trigger the exception.                                                 
Here, the state court admitted Roebuck’s unconfronted grand jury testimony for its truth 
because it found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Turner “did intimidate” and “threaten” 
Roebuck.  Trial Tr. at 266.  The court made this finding after conducting a hearing at which the 
court listened to Turner’s jail calls and received testimony from Officer Pagan, id., and based on 
the court’s observations of Roebuck on the witness stand, see id. (“I find that the witness was clearly 
not truthful on the witness stand, and she was doing everything she could to say that she was 
drunk.”).  The court further noted that the day after her testimony, Roebuck called the prosecutor 

about being approached, and found it “clear” that Roebuck “did so because she wanted to let 
somebody know that she was still being threatened although she didn’t want to say in court her true 
testimony.”  Id. at 267.  The Appellate Division affirmed this decision and concluded that Turner’s 
“recorded phone calls” supported the finding that Turner, “acting through proxies, influenced the 
witness to give false trial testimony, thereby rendering her effectively unavailable.”  Turner, 39 
N.Y.S.3d at 439.                                                          
Because this claim was thus adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings, and Turner 
does not contend otherwise, the highly deferential standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) applies.  Turner 
relies on § 2254(d)(1) and seems to argue both that the state court’s decision here was “contrary to” 
and  an  “unreasonable  application  of”  Giles  and  other  Supreme  Court  jurisprudence  on  the 

Confrontation Clause.  See Petition at 9 (“[T]he New York state court’s decision was contrary to 
clearly established federal law[.]”) (capitalization omitted); id. ¶ 42 (“[T]he New York appellate 
courts unreasonably applied Giles and existing Supreme Court jurisprudence on the Confrontation 
Clause to the instant case.”).  Both arguments fail.8                     
With  regard  to  his  first  argument,  Turner  does  not  suggest  that  the  facts  here  were 
“materially indistinguishable” from a Supreme Court decision, so his claim that the state court’s 

8 Turner does not challenge the notion that a witness who testifies at trial, as Roebuck did 
here, still can be considered “unavailable” for Confrontation Clause purposes.  The Court therefore 
does not consider this issue and assumes that Roebuck was “unavailable” for purposes of applying 
Sixth Amendment precedents.  See Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217, 234 n.7 (2d Cir. 2003).  Turner 
also does not argue that Roebuck’s statements to the grand jury were not “testimonial,” and the 
Court similarly concludes that they were.  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.  
decision was “contrary to” federal law must rest on the idea that the state court applied a rule that 
“contradicts the governing law.”  Brown, 544 U.S. at 141.  However, the Supreme Court has made 
clear that “one who obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right 
to confrontation.”  Davis, 547 U.S. at 833.  And Giles clarified that the forfeiture by wrongdoing 

exception applies only “when the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness 
from testifying.”  Giles, 554 U.S. at 359 (emphasis omitted).  Here, the trial court conducted a Sirois 
hearing to determine whether Turner had intimidated Roebuck from inculpating him at trial before 
it held that Roebuck’s prior testimonial statements could be admitted.  Thus, the state court did not 
contradict governing law.  Instead, it applied the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception as it existed 
at common law and in line with Supreme Court precedent.  See Giles, 554 U.S. at 359, 368; Davis, 
547 U.S. at 833; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62; Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158-59.   
Turner’s second argument rests on the possibility that the state court unreasonably applied 
Giles and other Supreme Court Confrontation Clause jurisprudence because the evidence did not 
show that Turner intended to intimidate Roebuck to not testify.  Petition ¶¶ 41-42.  The Court 

reiterates that for relief under AEDPA, Turner must demonstrate that the state court applied the law 
“in an objectively unreasonable manner.”  Brown, 544 U.S. at 141.  And a state court’s decision “is 
not unreasonable if ‘fairminded jurists could disagree on [its] correctness.’”  Davis v. Ayala, 576 
U.S. 257, 269 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 101).  The Appellate 
Division’s conclusion that the trial court did not err because there was “ample circumstantial 
evidence,” such as Turner’s many recorded phone calls, showing that Turner “act[ed] through 
proxies” to influence Roebuck to give false trial testimony, Turner, 39 N.Y.S.3d at 439, is far from 
an unreasonable application of Giles or earlier Confrontation Clause cases.  Instead, there is plenty 
of evidence in the record to support this determination.                  
Turner’s jail calls, quoted in part above, show that he orchestrated Black’s attempt to 
influence Roebuck.  Less than three months before trial began, Turner told Black he needed him to 
talk to someone, and Black assured him that he would “personally go do it.”  Telephone Tr. at 3.  
In the weeks that followed, Turner consistently asked others about Black, and was told that Black 

“spoke to the person” “[m]ore than once.”  Id. at 8.  Another individual with whom Turner 
conversed referred to seeing someone he referred to as “Watermelon,”  id. at 4, and the prosecution 
argued before the state court that this was a coded reference to Roebuck, Trial Tr. at 243.  Turner 
never has attempted to explain what he and his associates were talking about during any of these 
phone calls or why the state court was wrong to conclude that they were plotting ways to intimidate 
Roebuck—not at the Sirois hearing and not before this Court.  Instead, Turner states that there 
simply was “no wrong doing on his behalf” during any of these phone calls.  Petition ¶ 39.  Such a 
conclusory statement does nothing to rebut the evidence on the record.    

Besides the phone calls, Roebuck herself then confirmed that Black came to speak with her 
about her testimony a few weeks before trial and encouraged her to say that she was “not 50 or 100 
percent sure” who shot Rogers.  Trial Tr. 38-39.  This was the very language Roebuck twice used 
on the witness stand when she declined to answer the question of who shot Rogers.  Id. at 34-35.  
And Roebuck also stated that Bird attempted to bribe her with several thousand dollars on Black’s 
behalf.  Id. at 44.                                                       
Under the deferential review demanded by AEDPA, the Court cannot say that “fairminded 
jurists” would disagree with the state court’s finding that Turner’s actions were intended to 
influence Roebuck and prevent her from testifying in a way that would inculpate him in the 
attempted murder.  Richter, 562 U.S. at 102.  In fact, the evidence more than supports the conclusion 
that Turner “engaged in conduct designed to prevent a witness from testifying.”  Giles, 554 U.S. at 
361.  Indeed, courts in this Circuit have concluded that state courts did not unreasonably apply the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine in similar circumstances.  See Jernigan v. Brown, No. 08 Civ. 
9289 (JGK) (DF), 2012 WL 2377082, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2012) (rejecting the petitioner’s 
Confrontation Clause argument because “there was an ample basis for the trial court to make its 

factual finding,” such as “telephone messages that [p]etitioner left for [the witness], both prior to 
his indictment and afterwards, from prison”), report and recommendation adopted 2012 WL 
2394405 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2012); Drummond v. Cunningham, No. 08 Civ. 4290 (KAM) (RLM), 
2010 WL 5583116, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2010) (“The Sirois hearing provided ample evidence 
of attempts to intimidate [the witness]; the timing of those threats, coupled with the role of 
petitioner’s family and friend in attempting to influence [the witness], is sufficient to justify the 
trial  and  appellate  courts’  inference  that  petitioner  likely  knew  of  and  acquiesced  in  those 
attempts.”), report and recommendation adopted 2011 WL 132379 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2011); 
Brown v. Smith, No. 06 Civ. 1429 (PKC), 2008 WL 4922014, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2008) 
(finding  the  admission  of  a  witness’s  grand  jury  testimony  did  not  violate  the  petitioner’s 

confrontation right because evidence presented at the Sirois hearing showed that the defendant’s 
mother and girlfriend approached the witness with hostility, the defendant’s private investigator 
repeatedly sought out the witness without leaving contact information, the witness received a 
threatening note and two bullets on her car windshield, and the defendant was aware of the witness 
from a police report); see also Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217, 234 (2d Cir. 2003) (pre-Crawford 
case noting that “witness intimidation is the paradigmatic example of the type of ‘misconduct’ that 
can lead to the forfeiture of confrontation rights”).  Similarly here, the state court’s application of 
Giles and other Supreme Court cases regarding the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine was not 
objectively unreasonable.9                                                
Turner’s primary argument to the contrary focuses on his mental state.  He argues that the 
evidence at the Sirois hearing “did not show that [he] intended to prevent [Ms.] Roebuck from 
testifying.”  Petition ¶ 39; see also id. ¶ 41.  True, the evidence presented was largely circumstantial 

and did not show Turner making direct threats toward Roebuck.  However, “[i]ntimidation is rarely 
carried out face to face, especially when the intimidator is in custody, and even the agents of the 
intimidator rarely expressly state that they are agent[s] acting on the intimidator’s behalf.”  Breazil 
v. Superintendent Artis, No. 15 Civ. 1912 (BMC), 2015 WL 9581816, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 
2015).  And Turner’s jail calls, taken together, demonstrate his efforts to have Black convince 
Roebuck not to testify against him.  Thus, for the reasons stated, the Court concludes that the state 
court did not unreasonably apply the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine here because evidence in 
the record clearly suggests that Turner intended “to prevent the witness from testifying” about his 
shooting of Rogers.  Giles, 554 U.S. at 359.10                            
In sum, the Court concludes that Turner is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus due to the 


9 In making its finding, the trial court also relied on the fact that Roebuck continued to 
receive threats after her testimony.  See Trial Tr. at 267.  These interactions carry less weight 
because they occurred after she took the stand and failed to identify Turner as the shooter.  But still, 
these additional encounters suggest that there was a pattern of intimidation that did not cease after 
Roebuck’s testimony in court concluded.  The Appellate Division did not cite these events in its 
decision, and the Court finds that it is unnecessary to consider them because, even without that 
conduct, the trial court correctly applied the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the facts here. 

10 Turner does not appear to argue that this Court should grant the writ pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) based on any “unreasonable determination of the facts” by the state court.  To 
the extent that he does, this too fails.  AEDPA commands that the Court presume that any factual 
determinations made by the state court are correct, and it is Turner’s burden to rebut this by “clear 
and convincing evidence.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).  He fails to do so and instead relies on 
conclusory statements, such as insisting that the evidence at the Sirois hearing showed that “there 
was no wrong doing on his behalf.”  Petition ¶ 39.  As recounted above, the mounds of evidence 
presented at trial and the Sirois hearing demonstrate the opposite is true, and thus Turner fails to 
show that the state court made any “unreasonable determination of the facts.”  28 U.S.C. § 
2254(d)(2).                                                               
state court’s determination that he forfeited his right to confront Roebuck and decision to admit her 
grand jury testimony.  The Court thus denies habeas relief on this ground. 
B.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel                                     
Turner also argues that this Court should grant him a writ of habeas corpus because the state 

court violated the Sixth Amendment by denying him effective assistance of trial counsel.  Petition 
at ¶¶ 43-72; Supplemental Petition at ¶¶ 37-110.  As outlined below, each of Turner’s arguments 
with regard to ineffective assistance of counsel fail to show he is entitled to this relief. 
The Sixth Amendment provides that a defendant shall have “the [a]ssistance of [c]ounsel 
for his defen[se].”  U.S. Const. amend. VI.  The Supreme Court has recognized that “the right to 
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”  McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 
771 n.14 (1970) (emphasis added).  In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984), the Supreme 
Court articulated the test for determining whether a habeas petitioner was denied this right.  “To 
prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a convicted defendant must demonstrate that: 
(1) counsel’s performance ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’; and (2) ‘there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.’”  Rosas v. Artus, No. 05 Civ. 8440 (RJS), 2013 WL 499610, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2013) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694).  When reviewing trial 
counsel’s performance, the Court must “be highly deferential,” make “every effort . . . to eliminate 
the distorting effects of hindsight,” and “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  Thus, 
“[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.”  Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (quoting 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010)).  Indeed, the Court here must employ a “‘doubly 
deferential’ standard of review that gives both the state court and the defense attorney the benefit 
of the doubt.”  Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 15 (2013) (quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 
190 (2011)).                                                              
Turner argues that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel in three ways.  First, 
he points to the fact that his trial counsel failed to call any witnesses, especially Roebuck, during 

the Sirois hearing.  Petition ¶¶ 47-61.  Second, he notes that his counsel did not object to the 
prosecution’s impeachment of Roebuck through the use of a pretrial photographic identification.  
Id. ¶¶ 62-72.  And third, in his supplemental submission, he focuses on his counsel’s failure to 
investigate or present an alibi defense.  Supplemental Petition ¶¶ 37-110.  Each of these arguments 
fails to meet Strickland’s high bar for establishing a violation of this right. 
1.  Sirois Hearing                                                   
Turner’s counsel did not call any witnesses at the Sirois hearing.  See Trial Tr. 211-51.  
Turner takes issue with this, arguing had his counsel called Roebuck to testify at the hearing, he 
“would  have  been  able  to  show  the  court  that  her  testimony  changed  not  because  of  any 
intimidation, violence, or threats; but rather because she was unsure if the defendant was in fact the 

shooter.”  Petition ¶ 59, see also id. ¶¶ 50-61.  Turner further contends that Roebuck’s testimony 
would have explained that she was intoxicated at all other times when she identified Turner as the 
shooter.  Id. ¶ 59.  Turner argues that he suffered prejudice because if Roebuck had testified at the 
Sirois hearing, the court would have concluded that she was not intimidated and thus could not have 
admitted her grand jury testimony, which was ultimately fatal to Turner’s case.  Id. ¶ 60. 
The first problem with Turner’s argument is that the court had already heard Roebuck’s 
testimony because Roebuck testified at trial prior to the Sirois hearing.  Indeed, the substance of 
Roebuck’s trial testimony was exactly what Turner argues she needed to give at the Sirois hearing.  
And Justice Pickholz relied on that trial testimony in ruling that Roebuck’s grand jury testimony 
would be admitted as substantive evidence.  Trial Tr. at 267.  Turner seems to argue that if only 
Roebuck had repeated everything again, the outcome of the Sirois hearing would have been 
different.  The Court struggles to understand this logic.                 
For example, Turner contends that if his counsel called Roebuck at the Sirois hearing, she 

“would have been able to testify that she was drunk during the [g]rand [j]ury [t]estimony and that 
she was drunk the night of the incident which is why she mistakenly identified the defendant.”  
Petition ¶ 52.  However, she gave testimony to this effect the day before the Sirois hearing.  See, 
e.g., Trial Tr. at 35 (Roebuck testifying that she could not say if the shooter “was [Turner] or anyone 
else” because she was “drinking” that night); id. at 47 (Roebuck explaining she “had a few 
cocktails” before testifying before the grand jury).  At trial, Turner’s counsel cross-examined 
Roebuck and elicited similar testimony:                                   
Q:   .  .  .  Now,  we  have  heard  countless  times  you  saying  that  you  were 
     intoxicated for the good majority of the time you spoke to the police and 
     spoke to the [prosecutor] and testified, correct?               
A:   Yes.                                                            
Q:   But you take it seriously so you are not intoxicated today, right?   
A:   No.                                                             
Q:   You are clear headed today?                                     
A:   I can assure you I could sure use a cocktail right now.         
Q:   But you haven’t had one today because you know how important this is?   
A:   Yes.                                                            
Q:    You came to court clear headed today?                          
A:   Yes.                                                            

Id. at 92.  Similarly, Turner argues that if Roebuck had testified at the Sirois hearing, she could 
have shown that she “was not intimidated.”  Petition ¶ 60.  But again, she already stated this on the 
witness stand.  See Trial Tr. at 52 (“I’m not afraid.  What I got to be afraid of?”).  It is difficult to 
see how the performance of Turner’s counsel fell “below an objective standard of reasonableness,” 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, by not calling Roebuck at the Sirois hearing to reiterate the exact same 
testimony she had given the day prior.                                    
Turner’s explanation for why he suffered prejudice is also hard to accept.  He contends that 
if Roebuck testified at the Sirois hearing, her grand jury transcript would not have been admitted as 
evidence.  See Petition ¶ 60.  He fails to explain why this is the case when all Roebuck would have 
done is restate everything she had already said under oath.  This is especially so when the court 

made clear that it considered Roebuck’s testimony in making its decision to admit the grand jury 
testimony.  See Trial Tr. at 266 (“I obviously observed the witness on the stand when she testified.”). 
However, even if Roebuck had not already testified, the Court would still reject Turner’s 
argument.  “The decision whether to call any witnesses on behalf of the defendant, and if so which 
witnesses to call, is a tactical decision of the sort engaged in by defense attorneys in almost every 
trial.”  United States v. Smith, 198 F.3d 377, 386 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Eisen, 
974 F.2d 246, 265 (2d Cir. 1992)).  Thus, “counsel’s decision as to ‘whether to call specific 
witnesses—even ones that might offer exculpatory evidence—is ordinarily not viewed as a lapse 
in professional representation.’”  United States v. Best, 219 F.3d 192, 201 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting 
United States v. Schmidt, 105 F.3d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 1997)).                

Counsel’s decision to not call Roebuck during the Sirois hearing was a strategic decision 
that is not exemplary of ineffective assistance.  Turner’s counsel made a conscious decision to not 
call witnesses—Roebuck or otherwise—at the Sirois hearing.  When the prosecutor stated, “I 
assume the defense is not planning on calling anyone,” defense counsel replied, “[t]hat’s a correct 
assumption.”  Trial Tr. 226.  In denying Turner’s initial § 440.10 motion, the state court saw no 
issue with counsel’s strategic choice, and the court will not second guess this decision under the 
“doubly deferential” framework applicable here.  Burt, 571 U.S. at 15.  Turner fails to show that 
his counsel’s decision was outside the “wide range of reasonable professional assistance” or that he 
suffered any prejudice from this choice.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  The Court thus declines to 
grant a writ of habeas corpus based on this argument.11                   
2.  Roebuck’s Impeachment                                            
Turner next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because his counsel failed “to object 
to the introduction of the pretrial identification by the Prosecution in order to impeach” Roebuck.  

Petition ¶ 63.  Turner claims that the prosecution’s use of the pretrial photographic array at trial was 
a violation of New York Criminal Procedure Law § 60.35 and that his trial counsel “should have 
objected to the introduction of the pre-trial identification.”  Id. ¶ 67. 
Respondent takes no position on whether this is correct.  Instead, Respondent claims that 
this  argument  is  “moot”  because  the  court  later  admitted  Roebuck’s  grand  jury  testimony.  
Opposition at 62.  The Court understands this argument to essentially mean that Turner could not 
have been prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to object to Roebuck’s impeachment because the jury 
ultimately  could  consider  Roebuck’s  testimony  to  the  grand  jury  as  substantive  evidence 
inculpating Turner.  Assuming, without deciding, that Turner’s trial counsel should have objected 
to Roebuck’s impeachment under New York law, the Court finds that Turner was not prejudiced 

by this because Roebuck’s grand jury testimony identifying him as the shooter was later admitted 
as evidence against him.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  Thus, because it is unlikely that the jury’s 
verdict would have changed had the trial court precluded this line of impeachment, this argument 


11 Turner seems to argue in passing that his trial counsel was also ineffective because he 
failed to call other witnesses at the Sirois hearing, such as Black, Bird, and Roebuck’s brother in 
Baltimore.  Petition ¶ 51.  Turner fails to develop this argument or explain why counsel should 
have called any of these witnesses.  And the Court is hard pressed to see why calling any of these 
witnesses would have been an objectively good idea.  Drawing the court’s attention to Black and 
Bird, the very people that spoke to Roebuck about her testimony and attempted to bribe her, see 
Trial Tr. at 36, 39, 44, seems like a perilous strategy to say the least.  The same would be true for 
calling Roebuck’s brother, who apparently for months had been on the receiving end of threatening 
phone calls regarding Roebuck’s testimony.  See id. at 220.  In all events, for the reasons stated 
above, the Court declines to second guess counsel’s tactical decision to not call these witnesses at 
the Sirois hearing.                                                       
fails.                                                                    
3.  Alibi Defense                                                    
 At some point after Turner filed his initial petition in this Court on January 19, 2018, and 
thus nearly three years after Turner’s trial, Turner’s habeas counsel “obtained new information that 

was previously unavailable” regarding “potential alibi witnesses who could have been called at 
[Turner’s] trial.”  Supplemental Petition ¶ 7.  Turner therefore supplemented his habeas petition to 
additionally argue that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate or advance an alibi 
defense centered on these witnesses.                                      
     a.  Alleged Facts                                               
This claim necessarily relies on alleged facts that were not presented at trial.  The trial court 
held a hearing for Turner’s supplemental § 440.10 motion, which was based on the same alibi 
theory.  See Supplemental Petition, Ex. F at 21-134 (“§ 440.10 Hearing Tr.”).  At this hearing, four 
witnesses, including Turner, testified on Turner’s behalf, and the prosecution called Turner’s two 
trial attorneys.  Turner also provided the state court with video surveillance footage from the night 

of the shooting.  See Supplemental Petition, Ex. G; see also Dkt. 29.  The below facts come from 
these sources.                                                            
The heart of Turner’s claimed alibi defense is that shortly after 10:00 p.m. on the night of 
the shooting, Turner accompanied his friend Rondell Days to the home of Turner’s cousin, William 
Smith, in the Bronx and remained there until approximately 2:00 a.m.  Supplemental Petition ¶ 15 
(citing § 440.10 Hearing Tr. at 9-10, 22).  In other words, he could not have shot Rogers in 
Donnellan Park around 11:00 p.m. that night since he was with friends and family in a different 
borough of the City.  Turner argues that he told his trial counsel this, but his counsel declined to 
pursue the theory, and that this amounted to ineffective assistance.  Id. ¶¶ 97-99. 
Specifically, the video surveillance showed Days enter Turner’s apartment complex at 10:12 
p.m. on March 11, 2014.  The two men left the apartment complex together at approximately 10:20 
p.m. and headed uptown and away from Donnellan Park.  According to Days, he and Turner went 
to a corner store to purchase cigars and then hailed a taxi and took it to Smith’s house in the Bronx.  

§ 440.10 Hearing Tr. at 20-21.  Days testified that he, Turner, Smith, and a woman known as 
“Moody” remained there until at least 2:00 a.m.  Id. at 21.  Smith confirmed this.  Id. at 9-10. 
Once Turner was arrested, Smith asked Rafael Muniz, Esq. to represent Turner.  Id. at 15.  
Muniz  was  relatively  inexperienced,  but  met  Turner  for  an  initial  interview.    Id.  at  62-64.  
According to Muniz, at this meeting Turner told him that he was in the Bronx when the shooting 
occurred, but did not mention whom he was with.  Id. at 64.  Turner also had told Muniz that he 
wanted to testify before the grand jury and explain this, but Muniz advised against it.  Id. at 77-78.  
Muniz eventually brought in another attorney, Conway Martindale, Esq., to assist on Turner’s case.  
Id. at 46.  Martindale met with Turner on October 14, 2014.  Id. at 90.  During this meeting, 
Martindale  stated  that  they  discussed  Turner’s  trip  to  the  Bronx  on  March  11,  2014,  but 

Martindale’s understanding was that this occurred before the time of the shooting.  Id. at 92.  At the 
§ 440.10 hearing, Turner disputed his attorneys’ story.  According to Turner, at his first meeting 
with Muniz, he told Muniz that he “was nowhere around that shooting” and that “[he] went to [his] 
cousin William’s house.”  Id. at 32.  Turner also testified that he told Muniz to speak with William 
to get the names and phone numbers of those that Turner was with when the shooting occurred.  Id.  
Days and Smith attended Turner’s trial.  See id. at 10.  Smith testified at the § 440.10 hearing 
that, during the trial, he approached Turner’s attorneys outside the courtroom and asked them why 
they were not calling him as a witness.  Id.  According to Smith, Turner’s attorneys told him that 
“they didn’t have to call any witnesses because [the prosecution] didn’t prove their case” and “not 
to worry.”  Id. at 10-11.                                                 
     b.  State Court Decision                                        
Following the § 440.10 hearing, Justice Pickholz rejected Turner’s claim and found that 
“[t]he attorneys did not learn of the alibi witnesses until well into the trial.”  Supplemental Petition, 

Ex. J at 5.  Justice Pickholz noted that if his attorneys had chosen to suddenly call an “unnoticed 
alibi defense in the middle of trial, there was always the possibility that the prosecution would . . . 
eviscerate any alibi witness on cross or that other evidence would contradict the alibi witness” and 
undermine Turner’s identification defense, i.e., that he was not the shooter.  Id. at 6.  Thus, “the 
defense did not learn about the existence of an alibi until it was too late or unwise to use it” and 
“[i]ndeed, it may always have been unwise to use it.”  Id. at 7.  The state court concluded that 
Turner’s “attorneys’ investigation of the case was appropriate and their choice of a defense 
strategically defensible.”  Id.  Therefore, the state court held that Turner’s attorneys were “not 
ineffective” and Turner was not prejudiced.  Id.  As noted above, the Appellate Division denied 
Turner’s application for leave to appeal this decision, and the New York Court of Appeals also 

rejected his attempt to appeal to that court.  Supplemental Petition, Exs. N, P. 
     c.  Discussion                                                  
In his supplemental petition to this Court, Turner argues that Justice Pickholz’s conclusion 
was based on four “unreasonable determinations[s] of the facts in light of the evidence presented” 
for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).  Supplemental Petition ¶¶ 51-74.  Turner argues that this 
Court must therefore analyze his ineffective assistance of counsel claim de novo and conclude that 
he has met the Strickland test.  Id. ¶¶ 84-85.  The Court disagrees.      
“Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and convincing 
evidence to the contrary, § 2254(e)(1), and a decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and 
based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively 
unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding, § 2254(d)(2).”  Miller-
El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).  Turner does not show that any of the state court’s 
determinations were “objectively unreasonable.”  Instead, he essentially attempts to relitigate these 

facts and asks this Court to accept his version of the facts instead.  This the Court cannot do under 
the deferential review standard that applies here.  See Burt, 571 U.S. at 15; Richter, 562 U.S. at 105.  
The evidence presented at the § 440.10 hearing was inconsistent in key respects.  Thus, the state 
court was tasked with wading through this evidence, assessing the credibility of the witnesses who 
testified before it, and reaching reasonable conclusions.  The court finds that none of Turner’s issues 
with the state court’s factual findings amount to an objectively unreasonable determination.   
First, Turner argues that the state court erred in determining that Turner never told his 
attorneys that he had an alibi witness.  Supplemental Petition ¶¶ 51-60.  Turner said he told Muniz 
at their first meeting that he went to Smith’s house, but Muniz denied this.  Compare § 440.10 
Hearing Tr. at 32 with id. at 64.  The state court credited Muniz on this point, Supplemental Petition, 

Ex. J at 2-3, and the Court cannot say that this was an “objectively unreasonable” determination.   
Second, Turner challenges the state court’s determination that trial counsel adequately 
investigated his case.  Supplemental Petition ¶¶ 61-64.  Turner’s argument can be readily dismissed.  
Turner quotes the state court’s finding that Muniz conducted an investigation because “[h]e spoke 
to the defendant, his girlfriend, family and other friends” and “[n]o one told him that the defendant 
Mr. Turner had been at Smith’s house.”  Supplemental Petition ¶ 61 (quoting Supplemental Petition, 
Ex. J at 3).  But Turner argues this was not supported by the record because when asked if he ever 
“personally as an attorney [did] an investigation for a case,” Muniz said “no.”  Supplemental 
Petition ¶ 62 (quoting § 440.10 Tr. at 70).  This stray comment does not change the fact that the 
record shows Muniz spoke to many individuals about this case, including Turner, his girlfriend, his 
mother, and his brother.  § 440 Hearing Tr. at 69-70, 73.  This argument fails. 
Third, Turner takes issue with the fact that the court concluded Turner returned to his 
apartment building to change clothes at some point on the night of March 11, 2014.  Supplemental 

Petition ¶¶ 65-70.  This is significant because it would put Turner in the vicinity of Donnellan Park 
around the time of the shooting, and thus help to explain why his counsel failed to investigate his 
Bronx-based alibi.  See id. ¶ 65.  In addition to Martindale’s testimony that Turner told him this, 
the court cited video footage and Turner’s own statement, both of which placed Turner near 
Donnellan Park shortly before the shooting.  Supplemental Petition, Ex. J at 5.  The court cannot 
say that relying on this evidence to draw this conclusion was unreasonable. 
Finally, Turner argues that the trial court erred in determining that he admitted to police that 
he was in the vicinity of Donnellan Park around the time of the shooting.  Supplemental Petition 
¶¶ 71-74.  Here, the state court relied on a written statement that Turner gave to the police on June 
13, 2014, the day he was arrested.  See Supplemental Petition, Ex. H.  In this statement, Turner said 

that on the night of the shooting he was at a nearby Harlem park and a liquor store and also stopped 
by Donnellan Park.  Id.  Turner did not say in this statement that he was in the Bronx.  See id.  The 
state court’s finding here was therefore also not objectively unreasonable.   
Further, and without deciding whether de novo review of Turner’s ineffective assistance of 
counsel  claim  would  be  appropriate  here,  even  if  the  Court  agreed  that  certain  factual 
determinations were objectively unreasonable, the Court concludes that Turner’s claim would fail 
Strickland’s high bar under any standard of review.  Turner seems to argue that his counsel was 
ineffective in two related ways: first, his counsel failed to investigate his alibi defense, and second, 
his  counsel  failed  to  present  this  defense  at  trial.    Little  evidence,  besides  Turner’s  own 
uncorroborated testimony at the § 440.10 hearing, suggests that Turner’s attorneys were aware of 
Turner’s supposed alibi before trial.  For example, Turner’s statement to police the day he was 
arrested does not mention that he was in the Bronx or at his cousin’s house.  See Supplemental 
Petition, Ex. H.  In his statement, Turner wrote in relevant part as follows: “I was not there when 

[Rogers] got jumped in the square.  I never made it back.  I was in the battleground having a drink.  
We went back to the liquor store, stopped by the square, then I left.  When I get back to the square 
everyone is gone.”  Id.  This presumably would have been devastating to any Bronx-based alibi 
defense presented at Turner’s trial.  Further, Turner’s primary alibi witness, Smith—the man who 
hired Muniz to represent Turner—confirmed that he did not approach Muniz about testifying on 
Turner’s behalf until trial was already underway.  § 440.10 Hearing Tr. at 15.  Nothing in the record 
indicates that Smith ever told Muniz he was with Turner prior to this conversation. 
Under the first prong of Strickland, the Court cannot conclude that Turner’s attorneys fell 
below an “objective standard of reasonableness” by failing to investigate an alibi when Turner’s 
own post-arrest statement was in direct conflict with this supposed alibi.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

688.  Nor was it objectively unreasonable to decline to investigate or advance an unvetted alibi 
defense brought to counsel’s attention during trial.  See Supplemental Petition, Ex. J at 6.   
Finally, even if arguendo Turner’s trial counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate or 
present an alibi defense, on the present record, the Court concludes that Turner did not suffer 
prejudice under the second prong of Strickland.  466 U.S. at 694.  Even if Turner had presented 
some evidence suggesting that he was at his cousin’s house in the Bronx at the time of the shooting, 
eyewitness Roebuck’s grand jury testimony identifying Turner as the shooter would have still been 
admitted.  Even Rogers—who denied knowing who fired the shot—acknowledged that Turner was 
at Donnellan Park the night he was shot.  Trial Tr. at 166.  And any alibi presented would have been 
severely undercut by Turner’s own post-arrest statement that he was in the vicinity of Donnellan 
Park at time of the shooting, not in the Bronx.  The Court is thus unpersuaded that there is a 
likelihood that the trial outcome would have been different if counsel had presented an alibi defense. 

 In sum, the Court finds that each of Turner’s claims for ineffective assistance of counsel fail 
to meet the “high bar” set by Strickland.  Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  The Court declines to grant a writ of habeas corpus on this basis. 
                           IV.  Conclusion 
 For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies Turner’s  petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  Furthermore, because Turner has not made “a substantial showing 
of the denial of a constitutional right,” the Court will not issue a certificate of appealability.  28 
USS.C. § 2253(c)(2). 
 The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate any pending motions and close this 
case. 
 SO ORDERED. 
Dated: March 17, 2021                          f     hed    2 
 New York, New York                         JOHN P. CRONAN 
                                         United States District Judge 

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