United States v. Daniel Lockridge

                                RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                                Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
                                       File Name: 25a0159p.06

                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT



                                                             ┐
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                             │
                                    Plaintiff-Appellee,      │
                                                              >        No. 24-5784
                                                             │
        v.                                                   │
                                                             │
 DANIEL LOCKRIDGE,                                           │
                                Defendant-Appellant.         │
                                                             ┘

                           Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Chattanooga.
                     No. 1:23-cr-00082-1—Curtis L. Collier, District Judge.

                                     Argued: June 11, 2025

                               Decided and Filed: June 18, 2025

             Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; CLAY and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.
                                 _________________

                                            COUNSEL

ARGUED: Howard W. Anderson, III, TRULUCK THOMASON LLC, Greenville, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Brian Samuelson, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,
Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Howard W. Anderson, III, TRULUCK
THOMASON LLC, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Brian Samuelson, UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee.
                                      _________________

                                             OPINION
                                      _________________

       SUTTON, Chief Judge. Daniel Lockridge, who stands convicted of a methamphetamine-
distribution charge, challenges two conditions of his supervised release, one requiring him to
obtain mental-health treatment, the other requiring him to obtain substance-abuse treatment.
 No. 24-5784                        United States v. Lockridge                              Page 2


He claims that both conditions flout the district court’s responsibilities under Article III of the
U.S. Constitution because a probation officer oversees them.             Seeing no constitutional
infirmities, we affirm.

                                                 I.

       Daniel Lockridge is a decorated combat Marine and a methamphetamine trafficker. After
he returned to this country in 2009, he turned to methamphetamine—first to manage his post-
traumatic stress disorder, then to make money. He soon became his supplier’s supplier, sourcing
methamphetamine from Atlanta, Georgia, and reselling it to his supplier-turned-customer, among
others, for distribution in Chattanooga, Tennessee. By the time law enforcement caught him,
Lockridge had sold over seven kilograms of methamphetamine in the Volunteer State.

       In 2024, Lockridge pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting possession with the intent to
distribute methamphetamine. The district court sentenced Lockridge to 210 months in prison
and three years of supervised release.

       Two conditions of Lockridge’s supervised release require treatment for his mental-health
and substance-abuse challenges. The first is a special condition that requires him to “participate
in a program of mental health treatment, as directed by the probation officer, until such time as
[he] is released from the program by the probation officer.” R.95 at 5. The second is a special
condition that requires Lockridge to “participate in a program of testing and/or treatment for drug
and/or alcohol abuse, as directed by the probation officer, until such time as [he] is released from
the program by the probation officer.” R.95 at 5.

       At sentencing, Lockridge objected that the district court must “preauthorize any inpatient
treatment,” as opposed to outpatient treatment, under both conditions and “set a frequency for
drug testing” under the second condition. R.104 at 6. The district court, Lockridge maintained,
may not constitutionally delegate these decisions to the probation officer. The court overruled
Lockridge’s objection. Lockridge appeals, contesting these features of his sentence.
 No. 24-5784                        United States v. Lockridge                             Page 3


                                                II.

       Article III of the U.S. Constitution vests the judicial power in the federal courts,
including the “[i]ndisputably” judicial power “to impose the punishment provided by law.” Ex
parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 41–42 (1916). The courts may not delegate the judicial power
to the executive or legislative branches. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974).

       Article III requires courts, consistent with congressional criminal statutes, to exercise any
discretion in the imposition of a punishment. But it does not require courts alone to propose the
initial conditions of a sentence. The district court may use the assistance of nonjudicial officers,
as it does for other exercises of the judicial power, such as calculating damages, Thornton v.
Carson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 596, 600 (1813) (referee), analyzing common-law claims tied up in
bankruptcy, Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 573 U.S. 25, 38 (2014) (bankruptcy judge), or
proposing a report and recommendation for the disposition of a motion for summary judgment,
Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528 (2006) (magistrate). What makes this assistance permissible
is that the Article III court remains in charge. It reviews, then accepts, modifies, or rejects, the
nonjudicial officers’ recommendations. See Kansas v. Nebraska, 574 U.S. 445, 453 (2015).

       This type of collaboration between Article III courts and non–Article III officers is
common in criminal sentencing. District courts regularly look to probation officers, who lack an
Article III commission, to report on each defendant’s background, to propose a Guidelines
sentencing range, and to make other recommendations about the conditions of a sentence. While
the probation officers’ proposals benefit the court, they do not bind it. The judicial power to
impose the punishment remains with, and remains a final decision by, the court. See generally
United States v. Yopp, 453 F.3d 770, 772, 774 (6th Cir. 2006).

       So it is with supervised release. District courts may work with probation officers to
“craft[] and manage[]” the conditions of each defendant’s release, just as they do for other
aspects of sentencing. United States v. Amin, 85 F.4th 727, 734 (4th Cir. 2023). But they must
retain the “ultimate authority” to modify or enforce those conditions, just as they do for other
exercises of the judicial power. United States v. Campbell, 122 F.4th 624, 634–35 (6th Cir.
 No. 24-5784                         United States v. Lockridge                              Page 4


2024) (quotation omitted); United States v. Vaughn, 119 F.4th 1084, 1087–88 (6th Cir. 2024);
see also Weinberger v. United States, 268 F.3d 346, 360 (6th Cir. 2001).

       As is often the case with in-the-future conditions of supervised release, the district court
in this instance did not spell out precisely how these conditions would be implemented years in
the future. We construe that silence not as a sign of constitutional infirmity, but as a sign that the
court, the parties, and the probation officer will work through the appropriate condition at the
time it becomes relevant. See United States v. Shultz, 733 F.3d 616, 624 (6th Cir. 2013). Put
another way, when we could read an open-textured condition to violate Article III by placing
ultimate authority in the probation officer, or to respect Article III by retaining that authority for
the court, we adopt the reading that avoids, not exacerbates, a potential constitutional problem.
See id.; United States v. Ossa-Gallegos, 491 F.3d 537, 543 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc); see also
United States v. Mike, 632 F.3d 686, 696 (10th Cir. 2011).

       These principles frame our fresh review of Lockridge’s two challenges to the conditions
of his supervised release. See United States v. Carpenter, 702 F.3d 882, 884 (6th Cir. 2012).

       Inpatient treatment.      Lockridge first claims that the district court needed to choose
between inpatient and outpatient programs for his mental-health and substance-abuse treatment
at his sentencing. It did not.

       The parties agree that the district court could decide at sentencing whether Lockridge
must undergo treatment—here mental-health and substance-abuse treatment—during his term of
supervised release.    And the parties agree that the district court permissibly exercised its
discretion in saying some treatment was in order. What separates the parties is whether the
district court was required to specify the features of the treatment programs 210 months in
advance. By not finally deciding whether inpatient or outpatient treatment was required at
Lockridge’s sentencing, in other words, did the district court abdicate its authority to make that
decision?

       We have no reason to think that the district court relinquished its authority to select
Lockridge’s treatment programs to the probation officer by not making that choice at sentencing,
and every reason to think that the court merely delayed making that choice. Almost two decades
 No. 24-5784                         United States v. Lockridge                            Page 5


will pass before Lockridge begins supervised release, during which time he will attend 500 hours
of substance-abuse treatment in prison and undergo any number of personal changes that a
lengthy prison sentence will bring. No one, not the district court, not the probation officer, not
even Lockridge himself, can predict at this stage whether Lockridge will require inpatient
treatment when he begins supervised release.          That renders inpatient treatment at most a
possibility, not a reality. And that explains why the district court did not choose, indeed could
not and should not have chosen, between inpatient and outpatient programs when it sentenced
Lockridge last August. Cf. Shultz, 733 F.3d at 623 (declining to consider the propriety of a
condition because the condition might not apply by the time the defendant’s supervised release
begins); United States v. Lee, 502 F.3d 447, 450 (6th Cir. 2007) (same); United States v. Lantz,
443 F. App’x 135, 139 (6th Cir. 2011) (considering the propriety of a condition because that
condition will certainly apply when the defendant’s supervised release begins); see also, e.g.,
United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 46 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Rhodes, 552 F.3d 624,
628–29 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Thomas, 198 F.3d 1063, 1065 (8th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Bennett, 823 F.3d 1316, 1326–27 (10th Cir. 2016).

       On this record, it thus makes sense to read the sentence as reserving for the district court
discretion to choose treatment programs at a time closer to Lockridge’s supervised release. At
that point, years into the future, Lockridge’s probation officer can assess his treatment needs and
recommend inpatient or outpatient treatment to the district court, with enough time for Lockridge
to object, with the help of appointed counsel, before he sets foot in any program. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(2); Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c)(1); see also, e.g., Shultz, 733 F.3d at 623; Balon, 384 F.3d
at 47; Rhodes, 552 F.3d at 629; Thomas, 198 F.3d at 1065; Bennett, 823 F.3d at 1327. Then and
only then will the district court weigh Lockridge’s need for inpatient treatment, if such a need
exists, against Lockridge’s liberty interests before those interests are compromised. See 18
U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). The court, not the probation officer, thus will decide whether Lockridge
must be involuntarily committed or must attend inpatient treatment against his wishes. See id.
§ 4246; Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-3-617. All of this ensures that decisions regarding Lockridge’s
treatment rest where Article III requires: with the district court.
 No. 24-5784                         United States v. Lockridge                             Page 6


       Resisting this conclusion, Lockridge points to several circuits that purportedly require
district courts to specify whether treatment will be inpatient or outpatient. United States v.
Matta, 777 F.3d 116, 122–23 (2d Cir. 2015); United States v. Martinez, 987 F.3d 432, 435–36
(5th Cir. 2021); United States v. Esparza, 552 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam);
Mike, 632 F.3d at 695–96. But none of those cases conflicts with our disposition of this one.
Either the circuit court addressed such a short prison sentence that the district court could have
and should have made the treatment decision at the defendant’s sentencing. See Martinez, 987
F.3d at 436 (ten months). Or the circuit court was not presented with the argument that it could
construe the condition to give the district court the final say over the defendant’s treatment
program. See Matta, 777 F.3d at 122–23; Esparza, 552 U.S. at 1091; cf. Mike, 632 F.3d at 695–
96 (construing the condition as permitting the court to make the decision in the future and
finding it permissible).

       Frequency of drug testing. Lockridge’s second challenge fares no better: that the district
court needed to specify the number of drug tests required by his substance-abuse special
condition.

       The problem for Lockridge is that we have already held that district courts may
collaborate with probation officers on this feature of a sentence. The district court may allow the
probation officer to take the first pass at the number of drug tests required by a special condition,
so long as the court remains free to modify that choice on its own initiative or in response to a
claim by the defendant.     Vaughn, 119 F.4th at 1088–89; 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2); see also
Carpenter, 702 F.3d at 884–85. That is all that happened here.

       We affirm.