United States v. Jose Mireles, Jr.

                              In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                For the Seventh Circuit
                    ____________________
No. 22-1505
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                  Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                 v.

JOSÉ ANTONIO MIRELES, JR.,
                                              Defendant-Appellant.
                    ____________________

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the
            Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
       No. 1:15-CR-485(9) — Virginia M. Kendall, Chief Judge.
                    ____________________

  ARGUED MARCH 29, 2024 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 12, 2024
               ____________________

   Before ROVNER, ST. EVE, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
    PRYOR, Circuit Judge. José Mireles participated in a drug
distribution conspiracy that flooded Chicago with hundreds
of kilograms of cocaine and heroin. Mireles’s role was to re-
trieve drug shipments and deliver them to his boss’s custom-
ers in exchange for duffle bags of cash. Mireles then helped
launder those proceeds back to Los Angeles, where he and the
drug network’s ringleader lived.
2                                                 No. 22-1505

    Eventually, the Drug Enforcement Agency shut down the
network in a sting that involved the simultaneous arrests of
multiple coconspirators, including Mireles. While en route to
the Los Angeles federal courthouse to be arraigned, Mireles
escaped from DEA custody. He was apprehended again
about 18 months later—this time for good—and proceeded to
trial. Mireles was ultimately convicted and sentenced to 342
months’ imprisonment.
    Mireles now challenges his conviction by asserting that
the court erred in admitting certain evidence. He also takes
aim at his sentence, contending that the court procedurally
erred and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. We
affirm Mireles’s conviction; the district judge ably handled
this sprawling case and did not err in admitting the chal-
lenged evidence. Nevertheless, we order a limited remand for
resentencing because we cannot discern the factual basis for
one of the sentencing enhancements that Mireles received.
                    I.   BACKGROUND

   We take the following account from the testimony and ev-
idence introduced at trial.
    A. Factual Background
      1. The Roque Distribution Network
   Mireles worked as a trusted member of Edgar Roque’s co-
caine distribution network, which employed up to 50 people.
Through his network, Roque distributed more than 1,500 kil-
ograms of cocaine and 100 kilograms of heroin in Chicago. See
United States v. Sanchez, 989 F.3d 523, 532–34 (7th Cir. 2021)
(describing Roque’s drug distribution network and affirming
his original sentence). After his conviction and sentencing,
No. 22-1505                                                  3

Roque testified against Mireles in hopes of receiving a re-
duced sentence. Much of the evidence at Mireles’s trial came
from Roque’s testimony. We start by describing Roque’s over-
arching drug scheme to situate Mireles’s place within it.
    Roque started as a small-time dealer out of his dad’s auto-
body shop in Los Angeles in 2008. But two developments
proved extraordinarily lucrative. First, Roque developed a re-
lationship with the Sinaloa cartel, which provided Roque with
cocaine on credit. Second, Roque was able to bribe an Amtrak
Station manager in Los Angeles. In exchange for $500 per
shipment, the manager would ensure that Roque’s packages
were shipped via Amtrak’s train-based package delivery ser-
vice, Amtrak Express, without going through the normal
package screening procedures. These two developments were
significant because the selling price of cocaine was signifi-
cantly higher in Chicago than it was in Los Angeles and the
cartel was willing to provide as many drugs as Roque could
sell.
    Roque’s scheme was surprisingly simple. To send cocaine
from Los Angeles to Chicago, Roque would ship a package
using Amtrak Express. He would pack the cocaine in boxes
topped off with scrap auto parts, send the box from the
Amtrak station in Los Angeles and have someone pick it up
at Chicago’s Union Station. Roque often had his workers fly
from Los Angeles to Chicago to retrieve, stash, and distribute
the drugs. From 2009 until 2015, Roque averaged about one
shipment per week, with each shipment containing 10 to 40
kilograms of cocaine. In about 2012, he began occasionally
supplementing his shipments with 10 kilograms of heroin.
   These drugs sold for enormous sums—at a price of $33,000
per kilogram of cocaine and $40,000 per kilogram of heroin, a
4                                                   No. 22-1505

single shipment could be worth more than $1 million. All the
proceeds, of course, had to be laundered back to Los Angeles.
Roque used various strategies to do so. He hired women to
carry cash in luggage through the airport. He also filled cartel-
connected semitrucks with pallets of cash and operated about
100 different bank accounts, which he managed by keeping
detailed ledgers. He would have his workers, friends, and
family open bank accounts, into which his workers would
then deposit just under $10,000 in cash, which would then be
withdrawn in Los Angeles. Anyone could deposit money into
these accounts, but only the account holder could withdraw
it. Once the drug proceeds were laundered back to Los Ange-
les, Roque would repay the cartel and take his cut.
   By Roque’s own estimate, he distributed 2,000 to 3,000 kil-
ograms of cocaine, plus about 200 kilograms of heroin, which
netted $60 to $70 million in proceeds.
       2. Mireles Joins the Enterprise
    In October 2013, one of Roque’s Chicago stash houses was
raided by law enforcement. Suspecting that his workers were
compromised, Roque looked to recruit new, trusted employ-
ees.
   Mireles was one such recruit. Roque and Mireles were
high school acquaintances and had kept in touch over the
years. Mireles knew that Roque was involved in dealing
drugs but was not part of Roque’s network.
    Shortly after the October 2013 raid, Roque asked Mireles
to accompany him to Chicago to help “pick up some gifts.”
Mireles agreed. Soon after, they traveled to Chicago together
“for a week or two” and stayed in a downtown hotel. Once
they arrived, one of Roque’s workers met them at the hotel
No. 22-1505                                                              5

with a “gift.” Roque and Mireles then delivered it to one of
Roque’s customers, Donald Williams. Afterward, Roque and
Mireles went out to lunch and Roque asked Mireles if he
would retrieve these “gifts” on his own. Roque told Mireles
that the boxes contained marijuana; both laughed incredu-
lously.
   Mireles agreed to retrieve one of Roque’s gifts, so Roque
arranged for one of his workers in Los Angeles to send a ship-
ment of cocaine. The package arrived two days later in Chi-
cago, and Mireles retrieved it from Union Station. Mireles
then picked up Roque from their hotel and they again gave
the drugs to Williams.
   On the way back to the hotel, Mireles agreed to continue
working for Roque. In exchange for Mireles’s services, Roque
agreed to pay Mireles $200 per kilogram that he retrieved and
another $200 per kilogram that he delivered to Roque’s cus-
tomers. Because the box that they had just delivered to Wil-
liams contained 15 kilograms of cocaine, Roque agreed to pay
Mireles $6,000 for retrieving and delivering that cocaine.
Mireles agreed, and, with the arrangement secured, Roque
and Mireles returned to Los Angeles.
        3. Mireles’s Trips to Chicago
   Mireles made about 10 more trips from Los Angeles to
Chicago to retrieve, stash, and distribute drugs. Mireles was
regularly involved in retrieving packages at Chicago’s Union
Station, some of which were delivered in his name. 1 When

1 Amtrak provides “waybills,” essentially labels that double as receipts,

for the packages it delivers. Because the person responsible for retrieving
the package had to provide photo identification, the recipient had to pro-
vide their real name. The sender typically used an alias.
6                                                            No. 22-1505

Mireles traveled alone to Chicago, Roque managed things
from afar by texting and calling Mireles. Other times, Roque
and Mireles would travel to Chicago together. For example,
in February 2014, Roque and Mireles returned to Chicago for
a month or two. During this trip, Roque received 20 to 30 drug
shipments. Mireles picked up several of these packages from
Union Station. He would then transport the drugs back to one
of Roque’s stash houses, unload the shipment, and assist in
preparing it for delivery. Then when Roque’s customers were
ready, Roque would often have Mireles deliver the drugs,
typically on credit, to Roque’s customers.
    When Roque’s Chicago-based customers were ready to
pay, Mireles would pick up the cash, often packed in duffle
bags. Mireles’s largest cash pick up during the February 2014
trip to Chicago was $1.8 million. He then helped send the cash
back to Los Angeles. Up to 50 times during this trip alone,
Mireles deposited between $9,000 and $9,500 into the various
bank accounts that Roque controlled.
        4. The Trip to Mexico
    In October 2014, one of Roque’s semitruck drivers was
stopped by law enforcement. The truck—which held $1.3 mil-
lion in cash that belonged to the Sinaloa cartel—was seized.
Roque reported the seizure to Jorge Cazeras, Roque’s high-
ranking contact with the cartel. Cazeras instructed Roque to
come to Mexico and bring the driver, who went by Batecas,
for questioning. 2


2 It seems that this was the typical procedure when the cartel suffered sig-

nificant losses. If they could verify that the money had been seized by law
enforcement, and no one was at fault, that was deemed a cost of doing
business. The alternative was grim.
No. 22-1505                                                 7

    Roque agreed and decided to bring Mireles too. Mireles
had nothing to do with the seized cash, but Roque decided to
bring Mireles anyway. Roque would often bring his workers
with him to Mexico to impress upon them the danger of dou-
ble-crossing him.
    Roque, Mireles, and Batecas drove from Los Angeles to a
gas station in Mexicali, Mexico. Cazeras, several other cartel
members, and three vehicles were waiting. Roque, Mireles,
and Batecas all got in one of the cars while Cazeras rode in
another. Over the next hour, one of Cazeras’s henchmen
grilled Batecas about the lost cash and admonished him to tell
the truth to Cazeras when they arrived.
    After about an hour, the caravan arrived at a small ranch
at the end of a dusty dirt road. Cazeras brought Roque, Mire-
les, and Batecas around the side of the house where they en-
countered ten men, armed with assault rifles. Cazeras ques-
tioned Batecas about the lost money. Batecas explained that it
was lost during a routine traffic stop, but Cazeras was uncon-
vinced. Before long, Cazeras and his men beat a confession
out of Batecas, who admitted that he had taken an unap-
proved cash-hauling job for another drug dealer, which was
against cartel rules.
    Roque convinced Cazeras not to “butcher” Batecas on the
spot as it would be bad for business. Cazeras agreed, and then
took Roque and Mireles out for lunch. When Roque and Mire-
les were permitted to leave three days later, Batecas remained
as a hostage held for ransom.
      5. Mireles Returns to Chicago
   By November 6, 2014, Mireles was back in Chicago doing
Roque’s bidding. On that trip, one of Roque’s other workers,
8                                                 No. 22-1505

Angelica Cervantes, picked up 10 kilograms of heroin from
Union Station. Cervantes thought that she was being followed
by law enforcement and relayed word to Roque. Roque called
Mireles and sent him to investigate. Within half-an-hour,
Mireles found her vehicle and confirmed that she was being
followed by undercover law enforcement. Mireles tried to cre-
ate a diversion, but Cervantes was caught anyway.
      6. The Conspiracy Crashes
    In June 2015, Roque flew to Chicago to set up a new stash
house. He picked a place in Streamwood, Illinois, and told
one of his workers to stash 30 kilograms of cocaine at the
house. Over a series of text messages, Roque directed Mireles
to come to Chicago and help with an incoming drug ship-
ment. Roque also requested that Mireles find a “Glock 19,
Generation 4” handgun. Mireles agreed but was unsuccessful
in locating the firearm.
    On June 22, 2015, Mireles flew to Chicago and took a taxi
to the Streamwood stash house. Mireles observed one of
Roque’s workers take 20 kilograms of cocaine from the stash
house for delivery to a customer. When the worker got back
to the stash house, he said that he thought he was being fol-
lowed.
    June 23 was pivotal. Roque and Mireles left the Stream-
wood address to replace their burner phones. Before they left,
they stashed the remaining cocaine in the vents. They also hid
about $90,000 in cash under the T.V. stand. Shortly after they
left, though, law enforcement pulled them over and took
them to the police station. Meanwhile, other officers obtained
the consent of one of Roque’s workers to search the Stream-
wood stash house and found the stashed cash. After some
No. 22-1505                                                  9

interrogation, the officers released Roque and Mireles. The
two went to a hotel to regroup.
    Shaken, Roque and Mireles reconnected with a pair of
Roque’s workers. One of them began asking suspicious ques-
tions, which Roque took to mean that his entire network was
compromised. So, Roque and Mireles made their way back to
Los Angeles. Roque then fled to Mexico for several months;
Mireles appears to have stayed in Los Angeles. As far as the
record reveals, this was the end of Roque’s cocaine empire
and Mireles’s role within it.
      7. Mireles’s Arrest, Escape, and Re-Arrest
    In 2016, law enforcement obtained arrest warrants for
Roque, Mireles, and about a dozen others. DEA Special Agent
Nina Goteva and other law enforcement members were as-
signed to arrest Roque and Mireles in Los Angeles. On Octo-
ber 26, 2016, the officers—dressed in plain clothes with tacti-
cal vests marked “Police” on the back—arrested Roque with-
out incident around 6:00am. They then drove in unmarked
rental cars to Mireles’s residence. Around 6:30am, the officers
knocked on Mireles’s door, announced themselves, and ex-
plained to Mireles that they had a warrant for his arrest
(though they did not show it to him). The officers then placed
Mireles under arrest and put him inside one of the rental cars
for transportation to the courthouse for processing.
   As they sat in traffic, Agent Goteva, who was in a different
car than the one transporting Mireles, observed the door of
Mireles’s vehicle swing open. Mireles stumbled out of the
back seat with his hands cuffed in front of him and began flee-
ing. Agent Goteva called out over the radio that Mireles was
escaping and then began pursuing Mireles on foot.
10                                                 No. 22-1505

    Mireles ran across the median, through four southbound
lanes of highway traffic, and down a steep embankment.
Agent Goteva and another officer chased Mireles into a neigh-
borhood where several construction workers were working.
Agent Goteva momentarily lost sight of Mireles, but then
heard screeching tires. She saw a white pickup truck speeding
toward her with Mireles behind the wheel. Mireles drove
straight toward her. Agent Goteva opened fire, but Mireles
swerved off and made his getaway.
   Mireles was ultimately apprehended about a year-and-a-
half later by the U.S. Marshals. The Marshals were asked to
locate Mireles in February 2018. On May 17, 2018, they staked
out Mireles’s residence in Los Angeles—the same one where
Agent Goteva first arrested Mireles—to see if he was still liv-
ing there. The Marshals had surveilled his residence “maybe
twice” before. Mireles was there, sleeping in his bed. This
time, Mireles was arrested without incident.
     B. Procedural Background
    For his role in the Roque drug distribution network, Mire-
les was charged by superseding indictment with Conspiracy
to Possess with Intent to Distribute and Distribute Cocaine
and Heroin. See 21 U.S.C. § 846; 18 U.S.C. § 2. All of Mireles’s
codefendants pled guilty, but Mireles elected to proceed to
trial.
        1. Pretrial Motions
   Ahead of trial, the government moved in limine to admit
two pieces of prior-bad-acts evidence under Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b). First, the government moved to introduce
evidence that Mireles did not file tax returns while he was in-
volved in the conspiracy. The government asserted that this
No. 22-1505                                                             11

evidence showed that Mireles did not have a legitimate
source of income despite having significant sums of money
flowing through his bank accounts. Second, the government
moved to introduce evidence of Mireles’s pre-trial escape to
prove his consciousness of guilt.
    Mireles objected to both pieces of evidence. As for the tax-
return evidence, Mireles asserted that this evidence was con-
jectural because many people fail to file tax returns. Concern-
ing the evidence of his escape, Mireles argued that this evi-
dence was unfairly prejudicial and lacked probative value, ar-
guing that he believed he was again being kidnapped by the
cartel. He argued his prior experience with Batecas and his
inability to see the agents’ marked vests made this belief rea-
sonable.
    The court ruled that both pieces of evidence were admis-
sible. In the court’s view, the tax-return evidence was admis-
sible to show “consciousness of potential guilt” that this was
money that Mireles knew he could not put on a tax return.
The court concluded that any prejudice could be dealt with
through cross examination. In regard to the flight evidence,
the court also found that it was admissible to show conscious-
ness of guilt but barred any reference to the fact that Agent
Goteva shot at Mireles as he was fleeing.
   The government also made a Santiago proffer 3 to admit the
June 2015 text message conversation between Mireles and

3 In United States v. Santiago, we approved a pretrial procedure whereby a

district judge can decide to admit coconspirator testimony based on the
government’s proffer that it has sufficient evidence to prove the existence
of a conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence at trial. 582 F.2d 1128,
1130–31 (7th Cir. 1978) (overruled on other grounds by Bourjaily v. United
12                                                            No. 22-1505

Roque concerning the purchase of a firearm. The government
argued that these out-of-court statements helped establish
Mireles’s active participation in the drug conspiracy and not
that of a simple bystander. Mireles responded that “we don’t
have an objection to what [the government] propose[s] to use
regarding coconspirator statements if” the court makes “the
initial finding that they are, in fact, coconspirators.” The dis-
trict court responded that it would “accept the proffer that
shows that a conspiracy existed, that the defendants identi-
fied within this proffer were members of that conspiracy, and
that the statements identified in the proffer were in further-
ance” of the conspiracy. The court confirmed that Mireles
could object “if something doesn’t fit within any one of those
parameters.” But Mireles never made or renewed any such
objection at trial.
        2. Trial
   Prior to Mireles’s trial, Roque had pled guilty and been
sentenced to 420 months’ imprisonment for his role in the
conspiracy. See Sanchez, 989 F.3d at 533–34. Hoping to receive
a reduced sentence, Roque testified for the government at
Mireles’s trial.
    To rebut Roque’s credibility problems, the government re-
lied on other members who participated in the drug scheme
and corroborating evidence. For example, the government
called Donald Williams, who testified about Mireles’s


States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987)). “This procedure helps streamline trials by per-
mitting the government to introduce co-conspirator testimony at any
point during the trial rather than waiting until after it has provided suffi-
cient independent proof of conspiracy.” United States v. Bey, 725 F.3d 643,
647 (7th Cir. 2013).
No. 22-1505                                                   13

personal involvement in packaging and delivering drugs as
well as picking up cash payments. The government also pro-
vided substantial documentary evidence, including Amtrak
receipts, flight records, phone records, bank records, text mes-
sages, and recorded calls of Mireles. The government also re-
lied on numerous law enforcement officers who testified at
the trial and corroborated these records. In short, this evi-
dence supported Roque’s account of Mireles’s travels, pack-
age retrievals, money laundering, and knowing participation
in a drug conspiracy.
    At the close of trial, the jury rendered a unanimous verdict
of guilty.
       3. Sentencing
    After Mireles’s conviction, the United States Probation Of-
fice prepared a Presentence Investigation Report. The PSR
concluded that Mireles’s base offense level was 36, driven pri-
marily by the drug quantity attributable to Mireles from the
conspiracy. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (2018). To the base offense
level, the PSR added a two-level enhancement related to Mire-
les’s escape: one for obstructing justice, id. § 3C1.1, and the
other for recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or bod-
ily injury, id. § 3C1.2. With a criminal history category of II,
Mireles’s total offense level of 40 yielded an advisory guide-
lines range of 324 to 405 months’ imprisonment.
    At sentencing, Mireles objected to the PSR’s drug quantity
calculation and the sentencing enhancements. As for the
amount of drugs attributable to him from the conspiracy,
Mireles argued that he could only be held responsible for the
drugs that he personally retrieved from Union Station. In re-
sponse, the government proposed a more conservative figure
14                                                 No. 22-1505

of 140 kilograms of cocaine and 10 kilograms of heroin, which
was the minimum amount received while Mireles was in Chi-
cago. This figure did not, however, alter Mireles’s base of-
fense level calculated by the probation office. The district
court concluded that the government’s more conservative fig-
ure was the appropriate measure of Mireles’s responsibility.
   The parties next debated simultaneously the propriety of
applying both the obstruction-of-justice enhancement and the
reckless-endangerment enhancement based on Mireles’s es-
cape. Mireles maintained that he thought he was being kid-
napped by the cartel, and not being arrested by law enforce-
ment, so he did not knowingly obstruct justice. The govern-
ment maintained that Mireles’s argument was “ridiculous”
because the agents wore police vests, handcuffed Mireles, and
drove north toward downtown, not south toward Mexico.
Mireles retorted that if he was trying to obstruct justice, as
found in the PSR, he would have gone into hiding, not home.
    After hearing argument, the court applied both enhance-
ments. The court found that Mireles “was aware of the indict-
ment such that when the agents came to arrest him, he knew
that he was being arrested” for his role in the drug conspiracy.
The court also noted that Mireles had driven “towards Agent
Goteva to harm her or take her out.” This “was a threat to her
such that she had to discharge her firearm.” Accordingly, the
court imposed “both levels for the specific offense character-
istics of obstruction, one for the action against the agent, and
one for his evading the administration of justice … for avoid-
ing that indictment.” Applying these enhancements, the dis-
trict court calculated the same ranges as the PSR and found
Mireles’s offense level yielded an advisory guideline range of
324 to 405 months’ imprisonment. After considering the
No. 22-1505                                                   15

parties’ arguments about an appropriate sentence based on
the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the court imposed a within-
guidelines sentence of 342 months’ imprisonment.
   Mireles timely appealed.
                      II.    ANALYSIS
   A. Mireles’s Evidentiary Challenges
    Mireles first challenges the district court’s admission of
three pieces of evidence, including: (1) evidence that he failed
to file tax returns during the conspiracy, (2) evidence that he
fled law enforcement, and (3) evidence of his phone call with
Roque in which he agreed to procure handguns. We address
these challenges in turn.
    A district court’s evidentiary rulings, including its deci-
sion of whether to admit evidence of other bad acts, is re-
viewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Edwards, 26
F.4th 449, 453 (7th Cir. 2022). “Under this standard, we will
defer to the district court unless no reasonable person could
adopt its view.” United States v. Schmitt, 770 F.3d 524, 532 (7th
Cir. 2014). Even if we find the district court improperly ad-
mitted certain evidence, we will only reverse if the error was
harmful, meaning that “the ‘average juror would find the
prosecution’s case significantly less persuasive without the
improper evidence.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Garcia-Avila,
737 F.3d 484, 490 (7th Cir. 2013)).
   Unpreserved challenges are treated differently. When the
government moves to introduce certain evidence and the de-
fendant deliberately does not object, any challenge to the ad-
mission of that evidence is waived. See United States v.
Lundberg, 990 F.3d 1087, 1094 (7th Cir. 2021); Henry v. Hulett,
969 F.3d 769, 786 (7th Cir. 2020). On the other hand, if the
16                                                    No. 22-1505

defendant fails to object by accident or out of neglect, our re-
view is for plain error. Lundberg, 990 F.3d at 1094.
       1. Admission of Mireles’s Failure to File Tax Returns
    Over Mireles’s objection, the district court admitted evi-
dence at trial that Mireles did not file tax returns in 2013, 2014,
or 2015—i.e., while he was participating in the conspiracy. In
the court’s view, this evidence, when combined with evidence
that Mireles’s bank accounts had about $100,000 flowing
through them during the conspiracy, was admissible to
demonstrate Mireles’s knowledge that he was participating in
a drug conspiracy and the funds were the ill-gotten gains of
the drug sales. On appeal, Mireles maintains that this evi-
dence was improperly admitted pursuant to Rule 404(b) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence.
    For the most part, “[r]elevant evidence is admissible,”
whereas “[i]rrelevant evidence is not.” FED. R. EVID. 402; see
United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 853 (7th Cir. 2014) (en
banc) (detailing at length the admissibility of other-act evi-
dence). But not all relevant evidence is admissible. Schmitt,
770 F.3d at 532–33. Federal Rule of Evidence “404(b)(1) bars
evidence of uncharged misdeeds to prove that the defendant
had a propensity for committing crime.” United States v.
Brewer, 915 F.3d 408, 415 (7th Cir. 2019). Yet, Rule 404(b)(2)
permits the introduction of such evidence if it is being used
for other purposes, including “motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or
lack of accident.” FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
   The key question when tasked with deciding whether
Rule 404(b) applies is how the evidence of the defendant’s
other bad acts is being used. This is done by the district court
No. 22-1505                                                     17

establishing through a “propensity-free chain of reasoning”
that the other-act evidence is relevant to a specific issue in the
case, and that the probative value of this evidence is not sub-
stantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Schmitt, 770
F.3d at 532–33 (citing Gomez, 763 F.3d at 852, 856).
    In Gomez, we provided district courts with a “roadmap”
for how to deal with Rule 404(b) evidence. United States v.
Brewer, 915 F.3d 408, 415 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Gomez, 763 F.3d
at 860). After a Rule 404(b) objection, the government must
show that the other-act evidence is “relevant to a legitimate
purpose” that does not depend on “the forbidden inference
that the person has a certain character and acted in accordance
with that character on the occasion charged in the case.” Id.
(quoting Gomez, 763 F.3d at 860). If the government can prove
a legitimate, non-propensity use for this evidence, then the
district court must “assess whether the probative value of the
other-act evidence is substantially outweighed by the risk of
unfair prejudice” under Rule 403. United States v. Mabie, 862
F.3d 624, 633 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Because of the
inherent risk of unfair prejudice arising from evidence of
prior bad acts, the district court may exclude the other-acts
evidence if the risk is too great. Id.; see also Gomez, 763 F.3d at
857 (“Other-act evidence raises special concerns about unfair
prejudice because it almost always carries some risk that the
jury will draw the forbidden propensity inference.”).
    Following the path we outlined in Gomez, the district court
properly admitted evidence of Mireles’s failure to file tax re-
turns during the time of the drug conspiracy. After Mireles
raised his Rule 404(b) objection to the government’s request
to introduce evidence of Mireles’s substantial income during
the taxable years of 2013, 2014, and 2015 and his failure to file
18                                                  No. 22-1505

income tax returns for these years, the government argued
that this other-act evidence was relevant to prove Mireles’s
knowing participation in the drug conspiracy, which, was an
issue at trial. The “propensity-free” chain of reasoning show-
ing that this evidence was relevant to Mireles’s knowing par-
ticipation stems from the fact Mireles had approximately
$100,000 flowing through his personal bank accounts—funds
that he withdrew but did not necessarily deposit. Despite
having these significant funds, Mireles did not file taxes dur-
ing the period of his participation in the conspiracy. This sug-
gests that Mireles knew that the funds in his accounts were
the ill-gotten gains of a drug conspiracy. See United States v.
Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1500 (7th Cir. 1990) (“In the Rule
404(b) context, [the defendant’s] failure to file income tax re-
turns evinced his knowledge and intent concerning his illicit
narcotics trafficking activities.”).
    Importantly, Mireles’s failure to file tax returns was rele-
vant to a contested issue at trial: Mireles’s knowing involve-
ment in the drug conspiracy. See Gomez, 763 F.3d at 857 (“The
general guiding principle is that the degree to which the non-
propensity issue actually is disputed in the case will affect the
probative value of the other-act evidence.”). Mireles’s central
defense at trial was that he was just a gullible friend who had
been duped by Roque, a criminal mastermind. By placing his
knowing participation at issue, Mireles increased the proba-
tive value of otherwise tangential other-act evidence, and the
government was entitled to introduce evidence to rebut the
argument. E.g., United States v. Gulley, 722 F.3d 901, 907 (7th
Cir. 2013) (noting that the government is “entitled to put forth
evidence to rebut” the defense’s theory of the case).
No. 22-1505                                                   19

    Mireles’s argument to the contrary is difficult to follow,
but he appears to contend that the district court erred because
a lack of tax returns is only relevant to a non-propensity in-
ference if there was also evidence that he had unexplained
wealth. He says that there was no evidence that he personally
deposited the funds or that they “accrued” to him. Nor, says
Mireles, was there any evidence that he engaged in lavish
spending.
    Mireles’s complaint that the tax returns were unaccompa-
nied by evidence of unexplained wealth is difficult to square
with the record. The evidence at trial established that Mireles
opened two bank accounts that received combined deposits
totaling approximately $100,000. Though anyone could make
the deposits, only Mireles could withdraw the funds from the
account. Given the uncontested evidence that Mireles did not
have any apparent source of income during the conspiracy,
his receiving and withdrawing north of six figures constitutes
“unexplained wealth.” See United States v. Cardena, 842 F.3d
959, 983 (7th Cir. 2016) (describing when evidence of unex-
plained wealth is relevant in a drug conspiracy case). The rel-
evance of the tax returns does not hinge on whether Mireles
deposited the funds himself or whether the funds “accrued”
to him. For “[i]t it well settled that in narcotics prosecutions,
a defendant’s possession … of large sums of money” and his
“failure to file tax returns[] are relevant to establish that the
defendant lacked a legitimate source of income” and, more
likely, was involved in drug dealing. Briscoe, 896 F.2d at 1500.
   Considering all of this, the district court concluded that
the probative value of the tax return evidence was not sub-
stantially outweighed by a risk of unfair prejudice. See Gomez,
763 F.3d at 860 (“[T]he district court must in every case assess
20                                                            No. 22-1505

whether the probative value of the other-act evidence is sub-
stantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.”). Mire-
les makes no argument that the district court improperly
weighed this evidence’s probative value against the risk of
unfair prejudice under Rule 403. Therefore, Mireles has
waived this argument. United States v. Butler, 58 F.4th 364,
367–68 (7th Cir. 2023). In the interest of completeness, how-
ever, we note that the district court properly admitted the ev-
idence and reduced any risk of unfair prejudice by offering a
limiting instruction. 4
         2. Admission of Flight Evidence
   The district court also admitted evidence that Mireles fled
from law enforcement and escaped his first arrest. Mireles


4 The court instructed the jury as follows:

     You have heard testimony and evidence that the defendant com-
     mitted acts other than the ones charged in the indictment. Specif-
     ically, you have heard that the defendant failed to file tax returns
     in 2013, 2014, and 2015 … . Before using this evidence, you must
     decide whether it is more likely than not that the defendant did
     these acts that … are not charged in the indictment. And if you
     decide that the defendant failed to file tax returns in 2013, 2014,
     and 2015, then you may consider this evidence to help you decide
     whether the defendant had a legitimate source for the funds iden-
     tified in his Bank of America and Chase bank accounts and, if not,
     whether the reason he failed to report this income was due to his
     knowing participation in the charged narcotics conspiracy. … You
     may not consider this evidence for any other purpose.
This is exactly the sort of customized limiting instruction that we have in-
structed courts to give upon request to “help to reduce the risk of unfair
prejudice.” Gomez, 763 F.3d at 860. We presume a limiting instruction
along these lines is effective, United States v. Moore, 641 F.3d 812, 824–25
(7th Cir. 2011), and, again, Mireles makes no argument to the contrary.
No. 22-1505                                                      21

maintains that this evidence was improperly introduced and
unfairly prejudicial. We review the district court’s decision to
admit evidence of flight for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Skoczen, 405 F.3d 537, 548 (7th Cir. 2005). Flight evi-
dence can be used to show guilt or consciousness of guilt. Id.
Here, the evidence was used by the government to prove
Mireles’s consciousness of guilt.
    The test that governs the admissibility of circumstantial
flight evidence is outlined in Skoczen, where we explained
“[t]he probative value of flight as circumstantial evidence of
guilt depends upon the degree of confidence with which four
inferences can be drawn: (1) from the defendant’s behavior to
flight; (2) from flight to consciousness of guilt; (3) from con-
sciousness of guilt to consciousness of guilt concerning the
crime charged; and (4) from consciousness of guilt concerning
the crime charged to actual guilt of the crime charged.” Id.
(citing United States v. Levine, 5 F.3d 1100, 1107 (7th Cir. 1993)).
Only the second and third inferences are at issue here.
    Mireles contends that the manner and timing of his arrest
undercut these inferences. He first argues that he reasonably
believed he was being kidnapped by the cartel again because
the officers wore plain clothes and drove rental cars, did not
have badges displayed, and did not show him an indictment
or arrest warrant. Thus, Mireles says, the strongest inference
is that he fled out of fear, not because of his guilty conscience.
   We disagree. The degree of confidence with which the jury
could draw the inference of a guilty conscience is substantial.
The trial evidence demonstrated that the arresting officers
wore jackets or vests clearly marked “Police,” announced
themselves at the door, explained that they had an arrest war-
rant, handcuffed Mireles, and then began driving north
22                                                             No. 22-1505

toward the courthouse in Los Angeles, not south toward the
border between the United States and Mexico. In light of this
substantial evidence that Mireles knew he was being ar-
rested—not kidnapped—the trial court properly admitted the
evidence of Mireles’s flight. United States v. Kord, 836 F.2d 368,
372 (7th Cir. 1988). Although there may be competing infer-
ences to be drawn from the evidence, the “jury was entitled to
consider the inferences” to be drawn from the evidence and
determine how much weight to place on Mireles’s flight. Id.;
see also United States v. Clark, 45 F.3d 1247, 1251 (8th Cir. 1995)
(“The existence of other possible reasons for flight does not
render the inference [of consciousness of guilt] impermissible
or irrational.”). Additionally, the district court properly gave
a limiting instruction, which we presume to be effective in
limiting any prejudice arising from this other-acts evidence. 5
See Gomez, 763 F.3d at 860; United States v. Moore, 641 F.3d 812,
824 (7th Cir. 2011).
   Mireles also makes a barebones argument that the timing
of his arrest makes the inference that he fled because of a
guilty conscience improper. He points out that his arrest

5 Specifically, the district court instructed the jury that:

     You have heard testimony and evidence that the defendant com-
     mitted acts other than the ones charged in the indictment. Specif-
     ically, you have heard that … he escaped and fled from custody
     following his arrest on October 25th of 2016. Before using this ev-
     idence, you must decide whether it is more likely than not that the
     defendant did these acts that … are not charged in the indictment.
     And if you decide that the defendant escaped and fled from cus-
     tody following the arrest, then you may consider this evidence to
     help you decide whether the defendant knew he was guilty of
     committing narcotics trafficking crimes. You may not consider the
     evidence for any other purpose.
No. 22-1505                                                  23

occurred more than a year after he exited the conspiracy. We
recognize that we have “indicated that the chronology of
events, and in particular the passage of time between the com-
mission of a crime or the defendant being accused of a crime
and his purported flight, is a material consideration in our as-
sessment” of the probative worth of flight evidence. United
States v. Russell, 662 F.3d 831, 851 (7th Cir. 2011). The year-
long gap between Mireles’s participation in the conspiracy
and his arrest, however, does not help him here. Mireles knew
he was under arrest; officers notified him of the reason for the
arrest; and while in route to the courthouse to face these
charges, Mireles fled. Moreover, Mireles fails to explain what
about that time gap made the inference that he fled because
of his guilty conscience improper. We decline to make any
such argument on his behalf.
       3. The Firearm-Related Evidence
    Mireles also challenges the introduction of his conversa-
tion with Roque about obtaining a “Glock 19, Generation 4”
handgun, plus a demonstrative photograph of the sort of
handgun that Mireles and Roque discussed. Conceding that
he did not object to this evidence at trial, Mireles now con-
tends that the district court committed plain error in admit-
ting it.
    The problem, however, is that Mireles did not just fail to
object to this evidence—he affirmatively assented to its intro-
duction. Counsel for Mireles, during a pretrial conference,
represented to the district court that he did “not have an ob-
jection” to the government’s proposed use of this conversa-
tion with Roque. Further, during the trial, counsel used this
conversation to draw the jury’s attention to the fact that Mire-
les never actually obtained any firearms.
24                                                    No. 22-1505

    This is a textbook example of waiver—a defendant cannot
profess to have no objection to certain evidence, strategically
emphasize a favorable view of that evidence, and then turn
around and claim error on appeal. E.g., Lundberg, 990 F.3d at
1094; United States v. Schalk, 515 F.3d 768, 774 (7th Cir. 2008);
United States v. Redditt, 381 F.3d 597, 602 (7th Cir. 2004). As the
argument is waived, we will not review it. Lundberg, 990 F.3d
at 1094.
     Mireles also maintains that the government used a
demonstrative photograph of a Glock handgun to highlight
to the jury what type of firearm Mireles and Roque were dis-
cussing. At trial, Mireles’s counsel did not object to the ex-
hibit, so our review would be, at best, for plain error. United
States v. Gaytan, 649 F.3d 573, 580–81 (7th Cir. 2011). Even if
we understand his challenge to the demonstrative exhibit to
be separate from his challenge to the substantive evidence re-
garding the communication about the firearm, to meet the
first step of plain error review, Mireles must demonstrate that
the trial court erred. See United States v. Natale, 719 F.3d 719,
729 (7th Cir. 2013). The demonstrative exhibit was used “to
illustrate [the government expert’s] testimony,” which is “a
classic and proper use of a demonstrative exhibit.” Baugh ex
rel. Baugh v. Cuprum S.A. de C.V., 730 F.3d 701, 708 (7th Cir.
2013). We see no abuse of discretion in permitting the use of
a photograph to illustrate properly admitted substantive evi-
dence—the demonstrative exhibit merely depicted the sort of
handgun that Mireles casually agreed to seek to acquire for
Roque and was not sent to the jury room. Natale, 719 F.3d at
743–44 (finding no abuse of discretion in permitting a demon-
strative exhibit where the defendant did not contest the intro-
duction of the underlying substantive evidence).
No. 22-1505                                                     25

    Last, we note that even if Mireles had been correct that the
court should not have admitted these three pieces of evidence,
we would only reverse if “the ‘average juror would find the
prosecution’s case significantly less persuasive without the
improper evidence.’” Schmitt, 770 F.3d at 532 (quoting United
States v. Garcia-Avila, 737 F.3d 484, 490 (7th Cir. 2013)). The
evidence of Mireles’s guilt was overwhelming at trial; any er-
ror in admitting these three minor pieces of evidence would
have been harmless. Skoczen, 405 F.3d at 549.
   B. Mireles’s Sentencing Challenges
   We turn now to Mireles’s sentencing arguments. On ap-
peal, Mireles maintains that the district court committed two
procedural errors in calculating his guidelines range and im-
posed a substantively unreasonable sentence. Because we re-
solve procedural issues before substantive reasonableness
challenges, we will look first at Mireles’s two procedural chal-
lenges to his sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007) (noting that courts resolve procedural issues before
substantive reasonableness challenges).
       1. Drug Quantity
    Mireles argues the district court procedurally erred by at-
tributing too many drugs to him. We start here because the
drug quantity calculation drove Mireles’s base offense level.
We review a district court’s drug quantity calculation for clear
error. United States v. Freeman, 815 F.3d 347, 353 (7th Cir. 2016).
The quantity of drugs attributable to a defendant at sentenc-
ing must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. In
a drug conspiracy, a defendant is responsible “not only for
drug quantities directly attributable to him but also for
amounts involved in transactions by coconspirators that were
26                                                   No. 22-1505

reasonably foreseeable to him.” Id. (quoting United States v.
Turner, 604 F.3d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 2010)).
    “Since drug networks and dealers rarely keep transparent
and reliable accounts, determining drug quantities under the
Guidelines is not an exact science, and district courts may
make reasonable estimates based on the evidence.” United
States v. Jones, 56 F.4th 455, 506 (7th Cir. 2022) (internal cita-
tions omitted). In estimating the drug quantity, the district
court is allowed to use “testimony about the frequency of
dealing and the amount dealt over a specified period of time.”
Freeman, 815 F.3d at 354 (quoting United States v. Hernandez,
544 F.3d 743, 746 (7th Cir. 2008)). This information, however,
must bear “sufficient indicia of reliability to support its prob-
able accuracy.” Freeman, 815 F.3d at 354 (quoting
    United States v. Hankton, 432 F.3d 779, 789 (7th Cir. 2005)).
The district court concluded that Mireles was accountable for
at least 140 kilograms of cocaine and 10 kilograms of heroin.
The court reached this tally by relying on the evidence of the
minimum quantity of drugs that was shipped to Chicago
while Mireles was personally present in the city. According to
Mireles’s flight records and the Amtrak Express records, the
conspiracy shipped 15 packages to Chicago while Mireles was
there. Roque testified that each one of those packages con-
tained between 10 and 40 kilograms of cocaine. The trial evi-
dence also demonstrated that another coconspirator, Angelica
Cervantes, retrieved 10 kilograms of heroin from Union Sta-
tion while Mireles was in Chicago. Mireles even tried, though
unsuccessfully, to create a diversion so that Cervantes would
not be stopped by law enforcement. Using this reliable evi-
dence, the district court determined that 14 of the 15 packages
contained at least 10 kilograms of cocaine each, and that the
No. 22-1505                                                   27

fifteenth package contained the 10 kilograms of heroin that
Cervantes retrieved.
    The district court permissibly adopted the most conserva-
tive figure the evidence supported. Freeman, 815 F.3d at 354.
That tally created a “reasonable estimate[] of drug quantity
based on evidence in the record,” United States v. Austin, 806
F.3d 425, 431 (7th Cir. 2015), and therefore was not clearly er-
roneous, Freeman, 815 F.3d at 353.
    Mireles contends, however, that he can only be held ac-
countable for the five packages that he personally retrieved
from Union Station. Thus, Mireles contends the best estimate
of his drug quantity calculation is 50 kilograms of cocaine, not
140. Mireles argues that the drugs delivered to Chicago,
picked up by a different co-defendant, and managed by oth-
ers in the drug conspiracy were not reasonably foreseeable to
Mireles and should not have been included in the court’s rel-
evant conduct analysis when calculating Mireles’s drug quan-
tity calculation.
    Mireles’s argument misapprehends how conspiracy liabil-
ity works. As a general rule, the reasonably foreseeable crimes
of one conspirator are attributable to all coconspirators. Pink-
erton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647–48 (1946). This rule of
coconspirator liability also applies at sentencing, U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.3(a)(2), and “each conspirator is responsible for both the
drug quantities directly attributable to him and amounts in-
volved in reasonably foreseeable dealings by co-conspira-
tors.” Austin, 806 F.3d at 431. Thus, Mireles’s sentencing ex-
posure is not driven solely by the drugs he personally han-
dled; he is also accountable for the reasonably foreseeable acts
of his coconspirators, including the drugs they retrieved. Free-
man, 815 F.3d at 353.
28                                                  No. 22-1505

    The district court did not err, clearly or otherwise, in con-
cluding that Mireles was accountable for 140 kilograms of co-
caine and 10 kilograms of heroin. The evidence established
Mireles’s knowing participation in a tentacular drug conspir-
acy that shipped kilogram-quantities of cocaine and other
drugs on a near-weekly basis. Mireles knew he was but one
cog in the machine of that enterprise. Mireles personally re-
trieved at least five packages from Union Station, provided
cover to Cervantes when she retrieved another package, and
he was present for the unboxing and distribution of drugs re-
trieved by others. While in Chicago, Mireles lived in stash
houses, stacked cocaine on tables, and exchanged kilograms
of the drugs—whether he retrieved them from Union Station
or not—for duffle bags of cash. He also knew what his cocon-
spirators were doing, and thus those transactions were also
foreseeable to Mireles. Upon review of the record, we con-
clude that the district court did not err in its drug quantity
calculation for Mireles.
       2. The Sentencing Enhancements
   Mireles also challenges two Sentencing Guideline en-
hancements the district court imposed based on Mireles’s es-
cape from law enforcement. On appeal, Mireles argues that
he was punished twice based on the same conduct.
          a. Obstruction and Related Enhancements
    To Mireles’s base offense level, the district court added
two 2-level enhancements based on Mireles’s escape from ar-
rest by law enforcement. The first penalized Mireles for ob-
structing justice. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The second penalized Mire-
les for recklessly endangering others during his flight from
law enforcement. Id. § 3C1.2. We review a challenge to the
No. 22-1505                                                     29

application of a Guidelines enhancement de novo, though we
review the court’s underlying factual findings for clear error.
United States v. Barker, 80 F.4th 827, 834 (7th Cir. 2023). Before
moving to the analysis, we will describe each enhancement
because the overlap between the two is important.
   Under § 3C1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines,
a defendant’s offense level is increased by 2 levels if:
   (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or
   attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of
   justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or
   sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and
   (2) the obstructive conduct related to (A) the defend-
   ant's offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or
   (B) a closely related offense … .
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The application notes to § 3C1.1 list several
examples of conduct that is not covered by this enhancement
including “avoiding or fleeing from arrest.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1
cmt. n. 5(D). But, in interpreting that provision, we have clar-
ified that “some efforts to evade authorities through flight”
can warrant this enhancement. United States v. Cisneros, 846
F.3d 972, 975 (7th Cir. 2017). The ultimate question is whether
the “defendant’s conduct evidences a willful intent to ob-
struct justice.” Id. “Accordingly, we have distinguished be-
tween ‘panicked, instinctive flight,’ generally in the immedi-
ate aftermath of the crime,” which does not warrant the en-
hancement, “and ‘calculated evasion’ constituting a deliber-
ate attempt to frustrate or impede an ongoing criminal inves-
tigation,” which does. Id. (quoting United States v. Schwanke,
694 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases)); see also
United States v. Nduribe, 703 F.3d 1049, 1053 (7th Cir. 2013).
30                                                   No. 22-1505

    The Guidelines also prescribe, pursuant to § 3C1.2, a two-
level increase to the defendant’s offense level if “the defend-
ant recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious
bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a
law enforcement officer.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. In addition, for
this enhancement to apply, the defendant must have known
he was fleeing from law enforcement. United States v. Hibbett,
97 F.4th 477, 481 (7th Cir. 2024).
    One more point. The Sentencing Guidelines often permit
double counting—the practice of basing multiple enhance-
ments on the same underlying conduct. United States v. Viz-
carra, 668 F.3d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 2012). But there are excep-
tions. Id. (“[I]n the context of guidelines sentencing, double
counting is generally permissible unless the text of the guide-
lines expressly prohibits it.”). Relevant here, the district court
cannot impose enhancements under § 3C1.1 and § 3C1.2
“solely on the basis of the same conduct.” § 3C1.2 n.1.
          b. Applying the Obstruction Enhancements
    At sentencing, the parties and the court appear to have
dealt with these two enhancements, § 3C1.1 and § 3C1.2, in
tandem. When the district court was calculating the appropri-
ate guidelines range, Mireles objected to both enhancements
and the government responded in kind. The district court rec-
ognized that there were two enhancements at issue and
sought clarification for why that was the case. The govern-
ment then responded that, in addition to “the reckless opera-
tion of the vehicle,” Mireles was “a fugitive.” The parties’ dis-
cussion then focused on whether Mireles knew at the time of
the arrest that he had been charged by indictment. After con-
cluding that Mireles likely knew that he was under indict-
ment, the district court ruled as follows: “So I’m going to give
No. 22-1505                                                     31

both -- both levels for the specific offense characteristics of ob-
struction, one for the action against the agent, and one for his
evading the administration of justice … for avoiding that in-
dictment.”
    On appeal, Mireles contends that the court should not
have imposed either enhancement. He did not obstruct jus-
tice, he argues, because he escaped only from arrest, not cus-
tody. Compare U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 app. ns.4(E) & 5(D). He also
contends he did not recklessly endanger anyone because a ci-
vilian witness’s testimony established that he drove away “at
moderate speed,” which “contradicted the findings of the dis-
trict court.” He also contends that imposing both enhance-
ments violates § 3C1.2 n.1, which prohibits double counting
under §§ 3C1.1 & 3C1.2.
    Mireles’s argument about the reckless endangerment en-
hancement is a nonstarter. The district court expressly cred-
ited Agent Goteva’s testimony that Mireles—after running
across at least five lanes of highway traffic, down an embank-
ment, and then stealing a pickup truck—drove straight at her,
prompting her to open fire to protect herself and others. That
finding, which Mireles does not challenge as clearly errone-
ous, United States v. Lard, 327 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 2003), is
essentially dispositive.
    Our inquiry is whether the district court clearly erred in
concluding that Mireles recklessly created a substantial risk
of harm, United States v. Brown, 716 F.3d 988, 995–96 (7th Cir.
2013). The district court credited Agent Goteva’s account of
Mireles’s escape rather than that of a civilian witness who de-
scribed Mireles’s escape in milder terms. But, with exceptions
not relevant to this appeal, the district court’s credibility de-
termination “can virtually never be clear error.” Anderson v.
32                                                   No. 22-1505

City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985). Accordingly, the
court’s imposition of this enhancement is appropriate based
on the nature of Mireles’s escape. See United States v. Smith,
210 F.3d 760, 762 (7th Cir. 2000). The officers, other drivers,
the construction workers, and other passersby were all placed
at a substantial risk of serious harm based on Mireles’s reck-
less escape. See Brown, 716 F.3d at 995–96.
    The district court’s decision to impose the obstruction of
justice enhancement is more enigmatic. Largely because of the
way the sentencing hearing unfolded, we are left unsure of
the factual basis for the obstruction of justice enhancement.
See United States v. Clayborne, 105 F.4th 965, 969 (7th Cir. 2024)
(noting that the record must be “sufficient to permit the re-
viewing court ‘to discern the considerations which motivated
the district court’s sentencing decision.’”). The parties’ discus-
sion of the obstruction enhancement, and the district court’s
engagement with that discussion, frequently overlaps with
the discussion about the manner of Mireles’s escape. The tran-
script seems to suggest that the district court may have im-
posed the enhancement because Mireles, knowing he was un-
der indictment, did not turn himself in. But merely failing to
surrender voluntarily does not warrant an obstruction of jus-
tice enhancement. Nduribe, 703 F.3d at 1051.
    The district court also suggested, however, that Mireles
was actively avoiding the indictment. This sort of obstruction-
ist behavior could support the enhancement if there was evi-
dence in the record that Mireles’s actions were “likely to make
the investigation or prosecution significantly more costly or
less effective than it would otherwise have been.” Id. at 1053.
The problem is that, from our vantage point and based on this
record, we see no evidence that Mireles did anything after he
No. 22-1505                                                     33

escaped to make his prosecution “significantly more costly or
less effective.” Id. That’s important because application note
5(D) says that “avoiding or fleeing from arrest” is “ordinar-
ily” not obstruction of justice. See id. at 1051–53 (considering
U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 app. n.5(D)). The question, in essence, is
whether the defendant engaged in “calculated evasion” in a
“deliberate attempt to frustrate or impede an ongoing crimi-
nal investigation.” Cisneros, 846 F.3d at 975.
    There is a gap in the record about whether, after Mireles
made his escape, he engaged in “calculated evasion.” Id. We
see no evidence in the record that Mireles altered his appear-
ance, fled the area, or assumed a new identity, among other
possibilities for concluding he was intentionally evading
prosecution. E.g., id.; Nduribe, 703 F.3d at 1052; Gonzalez, 608
F.3d at 1007; Porter, 145 F.3d at 902. More importantly, if that
evidence exists, the district court did not point to it. Clayborne,
105 F.4th at 969. As the record stands, all we know is that after
two attempts to locate Mireles, he was found at home, asleep
in his bed. More to the point, we must be able to review the
district court’s reasoning for imposing a sentencing enhance-
ment. See United States v. Garcia-Oliveros, 639 F.3d 380, 382 (7th
Cir. 2011). Here the transcript is unfortunately too muddled
because of the way this issue was presented to the district
court for us to discern the court’s basis for the enhancement
beyond Mireles’s failure to turn himself in, which is not
enough. Nduribe, 703 F.3d at 1051.
    Even so, we recognize that this was not the primary thrust
of the parties’ arguments at sentencing as they focused pri-
marily on whether Mireles knew he was under indictment.
Accordingly, on remand, “[i]f the government possesses ad-
ditional evidence to support [this] enhancement, then … the
34                                                             No. 22-1505

district court has discretion to grant it an opportunity to sup-
plement the record with that evidence.” United States v. Hyatt,
28 F.4th 776, 785 (7th Cir. 2022). It may be that, in the end, both
enhancements are appropriate because different conduct sup-
ports each. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 app. n.1. At this stage, how-
ever, we order a limited remand to reassess the propriety of
applying the obstruction of justice enhancement to Mireles’s
sentence, and, if necessary, to recalculate Mireles’s guidelines
range and resentence him under the correct range. See United
States v. Adams, 746 F.3d 734, 744–45 (7th Cir. 2014) (explain-
ing that the purpose of a limited remand is to focus the par-
ties’ attention on the scope of the remand). 6
                        III.     CONCLUSION
   For these reasons, we AFFIRM Mireles’s conviction,
VACATE his sentence, and REMAND for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.




6 We do not reach Mireles’s substantive reasonableness argument because

we find that, on this record, the factual basis for the obstruction of justice
enhancement is unclear. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (not-
ing that courts resolve procedural issues before substantive reasonable-
ness challenges).