United States v. Keith Euring, Sr.

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United States Court of Appeals
                           For the Eighth Circuit
                       ___________________________

                               No. 23-1212
                       ___________________________

                           United States of America

                                     Plaintiff - Appellee

                                       v.

                 Keith Deshon Euring, Sr., also known as Sweat

                                  Defendant - Appellant
                                ____________

                    Appeal from United States District Court
                   for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern
                                 ____________

                          Submitted: January 9, 2024
                            Filed: August 12, 2024
                                ____________

Before SMITH, Chief Judge, 1 GRUENDER and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
                               ____________

SMITH, Chief Judge.




      1
      Judge Smith completed his term as chief judge of the circuit on March 10,
2024. See
28 U.S.C. § 45
(a)(3)(A).
       Keith Euring, Sr., appeals his conviction for sex trafficking of a child, in
violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1591
(a)(1). He challenges certain of the district court’s2
evidentiary rulings as well as the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.

                                      I. Background
       In November 2018, 16-year-old S.G. was reported missing. The next day, she
showed up at her Iowa high school. The school resource officer, Matthew Poirier,
interviewed her and noticed that she seemed intoxicated. She told him that she had
spent the weekend in Chicago at “Sweat’s” father’s home and had made $2,000
packaging cocaine; she later said that she had made $6,000 to $7,000. S.G. told
Poirier that “Sweat” had given her money and offered to take her to Chicago so she
could provide for herself. She said she had refused to go to Chicago to have sexual
encounters. S.G. also denied having sex with “Sweat” and said that she would never
do so. Initially, she said that the previous weekend was her first trip to Chicago with
“Sweat,” but then she admitted that she had also been there the weekend before. She
described three dates she had been on during that first weekend and the amount of
money she had earned on each. S.G. first recounted earning a total of $1,500 and
then said she earned $1,700, of which $200 went to “Sweat.” But she denied
engaging in any sex acts during those dates. She reported that during the second trip
to Chicago, she used cocaine and either lost her memory or became unconscious.
She described being held captive by two Middle Eastern men, escaping through a
window, and taking two Uber rides to get home.

      Based on this interview, Poirier presented S.G. with a photo lineup. That
lineup did not include Euring’s picture, and S.G. did not make an identification. That
afternoon, after running a search on the phone number associated with “Sweat,”
police prepared a second photo lineup. This time, S.G. identified Euring’s photo as
a photo of “Sweat.”



      2
        The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, Chief Judge, United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa.
                                      -2-
       S.G.’s later statements to medical personnel and police contained additional
details, some of which were inconsistent with her original account to Poirier. For
example, her written statement said that she had given Euring $500 of the $1,700
she earned, rather than $200. Additionally, she wrote that Euring had paid her $600
for sex, despite previously denying that she had sex with him.

        Law enforcement officers continued investigating. They searched S.G.’s
phone and obtained records from her service provider. They learned that, in October
2018, someone had created a profile for S.G. on a dating site, and S.G. had thereafter
communicated with men she connected with through the site. Her phone contained
recordings of a male voice stating some of the contents of her profile. S.G. later
identified the voice as Euring’s and said that she thought she made the recordings to
remember what he said. S.G.’s profile stated that she “offer[ed] massages and happy
endings.”3 R. Doc. 121, at 49. Hotel and car rental records also supported law
enforcement’s theory that Euring had taken S.G. to Chicago. The investigation
established that S.G.’s earlier statements about escaping a captive situation were
false. In fact, S.G. had ended the second weekend in Chicago by spending a few days
with a Dr. Muhammad Ali, someone she had previously met, and it was Dr. Ali, not
Uber drivers, who had brought her back to Iowa.

       The government sought an indictment against Euring. Before the grand jury,
the government called Dr. Ali and some of S.G.’s clients to testify. The government
offered immunity to some witnesses, but not to Dr. Ali. The grand jury indicted
Euring for sex trafficking of a child (Count One), transportation of a minor with
intent that the minor engage in criminal sexual activity (Count Two), use of interstate
commerce to facilitate prostitution (Count Three), and distribution of marijuana to a
person under age 21 (Count Four).




      3
      One client later testified that he understood this phrase to mean a massage
with masturbation.
                                         -3-
        At trial, the government called four men who had been S.G.’s clients. One
testified that he had paid S.G., she had massaged him, and she had masturbated him.
Another client testified that he believed he had engaged in oral sex with S.G. in
exchange for money. The government also introduced into evidence cell phone
location data suggesting that S.G. and Euring had traveled to Chicago together on
the two weekends in question. Phone records showed that they had been in the same
area and had communicated while she was with clients.

       S.G. testified that Euring suggested that she make money by going on dates
in Chicago and told her that she could make more money by performing sexual acts.
She said that Euring created an advertisement for her on a dating website and helped
her set up a profile. She also testified that Euring made two weekend trips to Chicago
with her, booked a hotel room, communicated with clients, took her to and from
appointments with clients, and split her earnings 50–50. She testified that she
engaged in sex with clients in exchange for money. She also said that she engaged
in oral sex with a client.

      On cross-examination, the defense confronted S.G. with multiple inconsistent
statements she had previously made. In four instances, she asked defense counsel if
she could explain her prior statement, without first admitting that she had made the
statement. The defense never allowed her to explain her prior statements. S.G. did
admit to making one of those four prior statements. In two additional instances, she
asked to be allowed to explain a prior statement she made while testifying. The
defense again refused. But on redirect, the government gave her the opportunity to
explain some of her prior testimony as well as some of her prior inconsistent
statements.

       The government moved to prevent the defense from introducing extrinsic
evidence of S.G.’s prior inconsistent statements. The court ruled that it would admit
extrinsic evidence of S.G.’s prior statements to impeach her denials or recollection
failures unless she had also asked to explain herself and been denied the opportunity
to do so. For any series of questions in which S.G. had asked to explain herself, the
                                         -4-
court would not allow extrinsic evidence of inconsistent statements. The defense
called Poirier as a witness and asked him about some of S.G.’s prior inconsistent
statements. At closing argument, the court allowed the defense to argue for a
negative inference from S.G.’s memory lapses, thus treating them as admissions that
she had made the statements she could no longer remember.

        Prior to trial, the defense had failed to find Dr. Ali, and it appeared that he
may have left the country. At trial, the defense sought to introduce the transcript of
Dr. Ali’s grand-jury testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1). The
defense argued that Dr. Ali was unavailable and that the government had the same
motive to develop his testimony before the grand jury as at trial. The government
objected, arguing that it did not have a similar motive because at the time of Dr.
Ali’s grand-jury testimony S.G. had not yet told investigators anything about Dr.
Ali. 4 The government also argued that Dr. Ali’s grand-jury testimony was almost
entirely untrue.

       The district court found that the government did not have a similar motive to
examine Dr. Ali because the grand jury met during an early stage of the
investigation. Furthermore, because the grand-jury testimony contained no “indicia
of reliability,” the court determined that the government would have intensely cross-
examined Dr. Ali at trial. R. Doc. 148, at 9 (Sealed). Thus, the court did not admit
the transcript.

       At the close of the evidence, Euring moved for a judgment of acquittal. The
district court denied the motion. The jury found Euring guilty on Count One, sex
trafficking of a child, and Count Four, distribution of marijuana to a person under




      4
       On the eve of trial, S.G. reported that Dr. Ali forced her to use cocaine, tied
her hands, and refused to let her leave.

                                         -5-
age 21. It acquitted him on Count Two and could not reach a verdict on Count Three.
Euring appeals.5

                                   II. Discussion
       Euring raises three issues on appeal. First, he argues that the district court
should have admitted the transcript of Dr. Ali’s grand-jury testimony. Second, he
argues that the court should have permitted him to introduce extrinsic evidence of
S.G.’s inconsistent statements even when he denied S.G. the opportunity to explain
her statements. Third, Euring argues that the evidence was insufficient because it did
not show that he “knew or recklessly disregarded that S.G. would engage in a
commercial sex act.” Appellant’s Br. at 27.

                              A. Evidentiary Rulings
       We review a district court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence—and its
underlying factual findings—for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Dunn,
76
F.4th 1062
, 1066 (8th Cir. 2023); United States v. Smith,
383 F.3d 700, 706
(8th Cir.
2004). But we review de novo the court’s construction of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Smith,
383 F.3d at 706
.

                          1. Dr. Ali’s Grand-Jury Testimony
       Euring argues that the court should have admitted Dr. Ali’s grand-jury
testimony under Rule 804(b)(1). He contends that Dr. Ali’s testimony was crucial to
the defense because Dr. Ali’s relationship with S.G. predated the alleged trafficking;
Dr. Ali did not meet S.G. through the dating profile that Euring allegedly helped to
create, but rather through a different dating website; and S.G. spent three days at Dr.
Ali’s home during one of the trips when Euring allegedly trafficked her. And Euring
argues that Dr. Ali’s grand-jury testimony should have been admitted because Dr.




      5
        Euring conceded his guilt on Count Four, and he does not ask us to reverse
this conviction.
                                       -6-
Ali was unavailable at trial and the government had a similar motive to cross-
examine him before the grand jury, as Euring was the target of that proceeding.

      The prior testimony of an unavailable witness is admissible if it

      (A) was given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition,
      whether given during the current proceeding or a different one; and

      (B) is now offered against a party who had . . . an opportunity and
      similar motive to develop it by direct, cross-, or redirect examination.

Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1); see also United States v. Salerno,
505 U.S. 317
, 321–24
(1992) (holding that the “similar motive” requirement applies when a criminal
defendant seeks to introduce the prior grand-jury testimony of an unavailable
witness). We assume, as did the district court, that Dr. Ali was unavailable within
the meaning of Rule 804(a), and we likewise assume that the government had a prior
opportunity to develop Dr. Ali’s testimony. We consider only whether the
government had a similar motive to develop Dr. Ali’s testimony. This “is inherently
a factual inquiry.” Salerno,
505 U.S. at 326
(Blackmun, J., concurring); see also
United States v. DiNapoli,
8 F.3d 909, 914
(2d Cir. 1993) (en banc) (“[T]he inquiry
as to similar motive must be fact specific . . . .”).

      Our circuit has compared motives case-by-case.6 But we have not previously
prescribed an analytical rubric for determining the presence of a similar motive for
the admission of prior testimony of an unavailable witness.

      6
        See United States v. Preciado,
336 F.3d 739
, 746 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding
that the government’s motive to develop one criminal defendant’s testimony at his
plea hearing was not similar to the government’s motive to develop testimony at a
different defendant’s trial); Azalea Fleet, Inc. v. Dreyfus Supply & Mach. Corp.,
782
F.2d 1455, 1461
(8th Cir. 1986) (holding that two different defendants in two
different civil actions arising from the same incident had a similar motive to develop
a witness’s testimony as to liability); Hannah v. City of Overland,
795 F.2d 1385
,
1390–91 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that a prosecutor’s motive in questioning two
deponents as part of a criminal proceeding was not similar to the motive of the
                                           -7-
       The Ninth Circuit considers similar motive “at a high level of generality.”
United States v. McFall,
558 F.3d 951, 962
(9th Cir. 2009). It focuses on “the
government’s fundamental objective.”
Id. at 963
. In McFall, the Ninth Circuit held
that a grand-jury transcript should have been admitted because “the government’s
fundamental objective in questioning [the witness] before the grand jury was to draw
out testimony that would support its theory that [the defendant] conspired with [the
witness] to commit extortion—the same motive it possessed at trial.” Id.7

       By contrast, the Second Circuit considers whether the government “had at a
prior proceeding an interest of substantially similar intensity to prove (or disprove)
the same side of a substantially similar issue.” DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 914–15. In
DiNapoli, the Second Circuit noted that “the low burden of proof at the grand jury
stage” and the “public interest in not disclosing prematurely the existence of
surveillance techniques” could serve to distinguish the government’s motive to
develop grand-jury testimony from its motive at trial. Id. at 913. The court, however,
declined to say that the government’s motive will generally be dissimilar. Id. at 914.




defendants in a plaintiff’s civil action for wrongful arrest), abrogated on other
grounds by Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.,
490 U.S. 504
(1989); DeLuryea v.
Winthrop Lab’ys,
697 F.2d 222
, 226–27 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that a prior
deposition of the plaintiff’s doctor in a workers’ compensation case should have
been admitted against the plaintiff in her suit against a drug manufacturer).
      7
         See also United States v. Foster,
128 F.3d 949
, 955–56 (6th Cir. 1997)
(holding that grand-jury testimony should have been admitted when the government
had the opportunity “to strenuously question [the unavailable witness] during his
grand jury testimony” and the “testimony could have had a significant impact on the
jury’s verdict”); United States v. Miller,
904 F.2d 65, 68
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (“[T]he
government had the same motive and opportunity to question [the witness] when it
brought him before the grand jury as it [did] at trial. Before the grand jury and at
trial, [the witness’s] testimony was to be directed to the same issue—the guilt or
innocence of [the defendants].” (citations omitted)).

                                         -8-
Instead, it described the question as factual.
Id.
The court also stated that the cross-
examination undertaken and forgone was relevant, but not conclusive. Id. at 915.8

       We hold that a party seeking the admission of prior testimony must show that
the other party’s motive at the time of the prior testimony was substantially similar
in both scope and intensity to the motive at the time of trial. But the court need not
“compar[e] [the two] motives at a fine-grained level of particularity.” McFall,
558
F.3d at 962
. The question of similarity is inherently factual, Salerno,
505 U.S. at 326
(Blackmun, J., concurring), and thus not conducive to general rules, see DiNapoli,
8
F.3d at 914
. A court may consider, among other factors, the purpose of the prior
proceeding, see DeLuryea, 697 F.2d at 226–27; the nature of the prior proceeding,
see DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 912–13; any differences in the burdens of proof, see
id. at
913
; the information known to the examining party at the time of the prior testimony;
the motive of the examining party to avoid disclosing such information, see id.; the
scope of examination undertaken and forgone, see
id.
at 914–15;9 and whether the
prior testimony contradicts the evidence introduced at trial.




      8
        See also United States v. Huskey,
90 F.4th 651
, 670 (4th Cir. 2024) (holding
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding grand-jury testimony
but noting that this is a fact-specific inquiry); United States v. Omar,
104 F.3d 519
,
523–24 (1st Cir. 1997) (suggesting that the government will rarely have a similar
motive to develop grand-jury testimony, looking for a motive to develop “the
specific portion of the testimony at issue,” and holding that grand-jury testimony
was properly excluded under Rule 804(b)(1)).
      9
        Cross-examination is relevant only insofar as it demonstrates motive; a
failure to cross-examine does not necessarily show a dissimilarity of motive or
foreclose the admission of prior testimony. See DeLuryea, 697 F.2d at 227 (“[The
plaintiff’s] counsel’s decision to limit cross-examination in the workers’
compensation hearing does not bar use of the former testimony even though [the
plaintiff] might later have desired fuller cross-examination. Opportunity and
motivation to cross-examine are the important factors, not the actual extent of cross-
examination.”).
                                        -9-
       In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
the government’s motive to cross-examine Dr. Ali before the grand jury was
dissimilar to its motive at the time of trial. In a broad sense, the government may
have had the same purpose in questioning Dr. Ali before the grand jury as it would
have had at trial—to incriminate Euring. But an identity of overarching purpose is
not conclusive on the question of motive. Although the government had some
information about Dr. Ali’s activities at the time of his testimony, the government
proffered that S.G. had not yet told investigators about Dr. Ali when he testified. In
fact, two years elapsed before S.G. told the government that Dr. Ali had forced her
to use cocaine, tied her hands, and refused to let her leave. And Dr. Ali testified prior
to some of S.G.’s clients. Thus, at the time of Dr. Ali’s grand-jury testimony, the
government did not yet have access to all the information that it later had at trial.

       Additionally, Dr. Ali’s testimony differed from evidence adduced at trial. Dr.
Ali presented himself as someone who was trying to help S.G. and who had no
knowledge that S.G. was using drugs. But S.G. testified that she had used cocaine
with him, she had felt unsafe in his home, and he had threatened her. Although the
government challenged Dr. Ali’s grand-jury testimony on some points, it was not
primarily concerned with impeaching him. The district court noted the inconsistency
between Dr. Ali’s testimony and the evidence, stating that there were no “indicia of
reliability” in his testimony and that, at trial, the government likely would have been
“gathering information and cross-examining him pretty hard.” R. Doc. 148, at 9
(Sealed). The court did not abuse its discretion in finding that this inconsistency
affected the government’s motive at trial.

      The government’s incomplete information at the time of Dr. Ali’s testimony
limited the scope of the government’s questioning, suggesting that the government’s
motives before the grand jury and at trial were not substantially similar. And the
inconsistency between Dr. Ali’s testimony and the evidence at trial, as well as the
government’s higher burden of proof at trial, suggests that the government would
have been motivated to question him with greater intensity at trial. The district court


                                          -10-
did not abuse its discretion in finding that the government’s motive was dissimilar
and refusing to admit the grand-jury transcript.10

                  2. Extrinsic Evidence of Inconsistent Statements
      Euring next argues that the district court should have permitted him to
introduce extrinsic evidence of S.G.’s prior inconsistent statements. He does so even
though he denied S.G. the opportunity to explain the statements.

       “Extrinsic evidence of a witness’s prior inconsistent statement is admissible
only if the witness is given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement and an
adverse party is given an opportunity to examine the witness about it, or if justice so
requires.” Fed. R. Evid. 613(b). Euring argues that this rule requires only that the
impeaching party give the witness the opportunity to deny the statement or the
opportunity to explain it, but not both. Because Euring gave S.G. the opportunity to
deny the statements, he argues that he should have been permitted to introduce
extrinsic evidence.

       We read Rule 613(b) differently. If the impeaching party were not required to
give the witness the opportunity to explain the statement, then the word “explain”
would be superfluous. The impeaching party would only be required to ask the
witness if he or she had made the prior statement, because then the witness would
have had the opportunity to deny the statement, and a denial needs no further
explanation. We understand the rule, rather, to give the witness the option of
explaining or denying the statement.

      10
         Euring argues that the grand-jury transcript was crucial to his defense
because it shows that S.G. met Dr. Ali through a dating site before the alleged
trafficking. But Euring sought to introduce the entire transcript, with certain
inadmissible portions redacted. He did not seek to introduce only the portion of Dr.
Ali’s testimony detailing how Dr. Ali met S.G. Because Euring has not raised the
issue, we decline to consider whether the government had a similar motive to
develop this specific portion of the testimony, nor do we consider whether a court
may focus on the motive for developing a discrete topic when conducting its analysis
under Rule 804(b)(1).
                                         -11-
       Our precedents are consistent with this reading. Extrinsic evidence may be
admitted when a party “squarely confront[s]” a witness with a prior inconsistent
statement and the witness denies the statement. United States v. Durham,
470 F.3d
727
, 731–32 (8th Cir. 2006). A court does not abuse its discretion by declining to
admit extrinsic evidence when the impeaching party never asked the witness about
the prior statement. United States v. Schnapp,
322 F.3d 564
, 571–72 (8th Cir. 2003).
Furthermore, we have approved the use of extrinsic evidence when a witness was
uncooperative, noting that “this rule only states that a witness be afforded the
opportunity to explain; Rule 613(b) does not require a witness to actually explain or
deny the prior inconsistent statements.” United States v. Kelly,
436 F.3d 992, 996
(8th Cir. 2006).

       Rule 613(b) gives the witness the option of denying the prior statement or
explaining it. In doing so, the rule denies the impeaching party the prerogative to
choose whether to allow an explanation if the party intends to offer extrinsic
evidence of the statement. When a witness does not squarely deny a statement and
asks for an opportunity to explain the statement, the impeaching party must give the
witness an opportunity to explain or else risk rendering extrinsic evidence of the
statement inadmissible.11 Here, S.G. specifically asked to explain herself, and the


      11
        It is only a risk of inadmissibility. Even when a party does not first confront
a witness with an inconsistent statement, the court has discretion to allow extrinsic
evidence if the witness is available to be recalled to explain or deny the statement,
or even if the witness is unavailable if the interest of justice so requires. Schnapp,
322 F.3d at 571–72. Furthermore, the rule “does not require the proponent of the
inconsistent statement to direct the witness’s attention to the inconsistency and
afford an opportunity for explanation. All that is required is that the witness have an
opportunity to explain.” United States v. Peltier,
800 F.2d 772
, 777 n.8 (8th Cir.
1986) (emphases added). In Peltier, we noted that the district court should have
permitted the defense to argue the inferences to be drawn from two inconsistent
reports when the government gave the reports’ author “an opportunity to explain the
inconsistency” on redirect.
Id.
Here, on redirect, the government gave S.G. the
opportunity to explain some of her inconsistent statements. But Euring does not
                                           -12-
defense denied her the opportunity. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
limiting the admission of extrinsic evidence to only those instances in which S.G.
did not ask to explain herself.12

                            B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
       Euring also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction
for sex trafficking of a child. He contends that the government failed to prove that
he “knew or recklessly disregarded that S.G. would engage in a commercial sex act.”
Appellant’s Br. at 27.

       “We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing evidence in the
light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, resolving conflicts in the government’s
favor, and accepting all reasonable inferences that support the verdict.” United States
v. Paul,
885 F.3d 1099, 1101
(8th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). We
will reverse only when “no reasonable jury could find all the crime’s elements
beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id. at 1102
(cleaned up).

      Euring was convicted of violating
18 U.S.C. § 1591
(a), which provides:

      (a) Whoever knowingly—

             (1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or within the
             special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,
             recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains,
             advertises, maintains, patronizes, or solicits by any means a
             person; or




argue that these statements should be treated differently, so we decline to consider
the question.
      12
       We note that Euring actually asked Poirier—without objection—about one
statement that S.G. had wanted to explain.
                                       -13-
             (2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from
             participation in a venture which has engaged in an act described
             in violation of paragraph (1),

      knowing, or, except where the act constituting the violation of
      paragraph (1) is advertising, in reckless disregard of the fact, that means
      of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion described in subsection (e)(2),
      or any combination of such means will be used to cause the person to
      engage in a commercial sex act, or that the person has not attained the
      age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act,
      shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).

When, as here, a defendant is charged with trafficking a child, the statute requires
the government to prove that the defendant knew, or recklessly disregarded, that the
child would “engage in a commercial sex act.”
Id.
We have held that the government
need not prove that the victim actually engaged in a commercial sex act. Paul,
885
F.3d at 1103
. Under the statute, the commercial sex act is in the future, relative to
the criminal activity of recruiting, harboring, or transporting.
Id.
In Paul, we
affirmed a conviction when the victim never engaged in a commercial sex act
because the evidence showed that the defendant had the requisite knowledge at the
time he harbored the victim.
Id.
Thus, the government was not required to prove that S.G. engaged in a
commercial sex act. Instead, the government was required to prove that Euring knew
or recklessly disregarded that she would do so. The government met this burden by
introducing evidence that Euring suggested that S.G. make money by going on dates
in Chicago, told S.G. that she could make more money by performing sex acts,
created an account on a dating website and helped S.G. set up a profile that at one
point offered “happy ending” massages, went with S.G. to Chicago on two weekends
so that she could meet with clients, rented a hotel room in Chicago, communicated
with clients, took S.G. to and from appointments with clients, and took some of the
proceeds from S.G.’s appointments. This proof satisfies evidentiary sufficiency.



                                         -14-
       And even if the government were required to prove that S.G. actually engaged
in a commercial sex act, the evidence would be sufficient. S.G. testified that she
engaged in sex in exchange for money. One client testified that he paid S.G. and that
she masturbated him. Another, after first giving an equivocal answer, testified that
he believed oral sex occurred and that he believed he paid S.G. for that activity. Oral
sex and masturbation are sex acts within the meaning of § 1591(a). See United States
v. Jungers,
702 F.3d 1066
, 1075–76 (8th Cir. 2013) (oral sex); United States v.
Taylor,
44 F.4th 779
, 788 (8th Cir. 2022) (masturbation).

       S.G.’s story has certainly changed over time. But relevant portions of her
testimony were corroborated in part by phone records and the testimony of clients.
Furthermore, the jury determines credibility. See United States v. Scofield,
433 F.3d
580, 585
(8th Cir. 2006) (“[The defendant] attacks the credibility and coherence of
[the informant’s] testimony but such disputes are issues for the jury to decide.”).
Thus, the evidence sufficiently supports Euring’s conviction.

                                  III. Conclusion
       The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the grand-jury
transcript and in limiting Euring’s use of extrinsic impeachment evidence. And
sufficient evidence supports Euring’s conviction. Therefore, we affirm.
                       ______________________________




                                         -15-