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[[COURTLISTENER_SUBOPINION {"id":"11175684","type":"010combined","part":"opinion","author":null,"source_field":"html_with_citations"}]]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 24-2044
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
JEROMY PITTMANN,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Landya B. McCafferty, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Gelpí, Thompson, and Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
Bradley L. Henry, with whom Amanda Firgau, Paul H. Tzur, and
Blank Rome LLP were on brief, for appellant.
David M. Lieberman, Attorney, Appellate Section, U.S.
Department of Justice, with whom Jeremy R. Sanders, Assistant
Chief, Fraud Section, Criminal Division, Matt Kahn, Trial
Attorney, Fraud Section, Criminal Division, Theodore M. Kneller,
Trial Attorney, Fraud Section, Criminal Division, and Matthew R.
Galeotti, Supervisory Official, Criminal Division, were on brief,
for appellee.
October 22, 2025
KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Jeromy
Pittmann of multiple crimes related to his participation in a
scheme to provide, in exchange for money, letters of recommendation
for Afghans seeking visas to enter the United States. On appeal,
Pittmann challenges all four counts of conviction. We now affirm
on all counts. Our reasoning follows.
I.
A.
In 2003, Pittmann was sworn in as a U.S. Navy Reserve
officer. Over the next decade and a half, he served several
deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. During his deployments in
Afghanistan, he frequently relied on Afghan interpreters to
communicate with members of the Afghan Army. Many of these
interpreters were contractors provided to the U.S. armed forces by
an Afghan company called Sunny Universe, which was owned and
operated by Afghan businessman Ghulam Rabani.
After concluding his last deployment in Afghanistan,
Pittmann remained in touch with Rabani. In February 2018, amid
discussions about potential joint business opportunities, Rabani
emailed Pittmann to say that he had been contacted by people who
"needed a recommendation letter from an American supervisor,"
explaining that the letters were needed for Afghan applicants for
Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) to the United States and that
"[t]hey will pay for it."
- 2 -
SIVs, established by federal statute, are designated for
Afghan nationals who were "employed by or on behalf of the" United
States or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Afghan
Allies Protection Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–8, § 602,
123 Stat.
807
, 807. The program was designed to "provide[] an incentive for
Afghans to seek employment with the United States" during the
United States' mission in Afghanistan, which was difficult due to
threats of reprisals from the Taliban or ISIS.1 At the time of
Rabani's request, SIV applicants needed to provide a letter of
recommendation from an American supervisor during their period of
employment for or on behalf of the U.S. military in Afghanistan.
Such letters required a description of the applicant's work duties
and an explanation of how the applicant "provided faithful and
valuable service to the U.S. Government," as well as "any ongoing
serious threat[s] . . . [the applicant is] experiencing as a
consequence of [the applicant's] employment by or on behalf of the
U.S. Government." These letters had to include the recommender's
present "opinion on whether [the applicant] pose[d] a threat to
1 ISIS refers to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, a
transnational jihad movement also known as the Islamic State in
Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL. Islamic State in Iraq and Syria,
Encyc. Britannica (Oct. 10, 2025), https://www.britannica.com/
topic/Islamic-State-in-Iraq-and-the-Levant [https://perma.cc/
7TRL-GC96]. Relevant here, the branch of ISIS that is active in
Afghanistan and to which the parties refer is the Islamic
State-Khorasan Province, also referred to as ISKP, ISIS-K, or
simply ISIS.
Id.
- 3 -
the national security or safety of the United States." For an SIV
application to be approved, the recommender must have had personal
knowledge of the facts and attestations included in the letter.
Responding to Rabani's request to provide SIV letters of
recommendation, Pittmann emailed him asking, "Who is this for?"
Rabani responded, "It's for my cousins. I have five of them to
go. If you can do it, it will be good and they will pay for it."
Rabani then supplied one cousin's name, the U.S. military contracts
and project numbers he worked on, and "a recommendation letter
format for [Pittmann's] review." Rabani also noted, "You can put
the date from May 2015." Pittmann responded, "How much is he
paying?" Rabani replied, "How much you want?" Pittmann proposed
$2,500 per letter, and Rabani replied, "2,500 for a letter? Isn't
it a lot, [hahaha]." Rabani then suggested $500 per letter, for
a total of ten letters. Pittmann responded, "Okay. Send me the
info."
Three months later, Pittmann emailed Rabani to ask what
the applicants did for the U.S. military, stating, "I need to write
something about what they did and where. Same goes for all the
others. Otherwise, it doesn't look personal or professional."
Rabani replied that "[t]hey were all translators, communicating
and translating directly with U.S. Army and ISAF forces in
Afghanistan at NKAIK, Bagram Airfield and Cam[p] Commando. Check
the format I have sent a while ago. It's all written there."
- 4 -
Rabani later wrote, "Send me the soft copy. I will review it. If
anything changes required, I will let you know." Pittmann then
sent a draft letter. Rabani responded, "Yeah, it's good, but I
guess if you could please use the attached format will be better.
It's because this is the official format they accept the letter."
Rabani also provided several other suggestions.
After a few more rounds of edits, Pittmann sent the
letters via email to Rabani. About a month later, Rabani emailed
Pittmann to request three more letters. Pittmann responded, "Okay.
Send me the details. I will adjust the letters." Rabani sent
back the letters, stating, "These are three new employees. Just
hand-sign them, scan it, and send it back to me."
After these letters were finalized, Rabani emailed
Pittmann again: "I received the payment from guys[,] waiting for
your details so I can send you through Western Union." Pittmann
responded, "That's good news. Let me know how it goes." Pittmann
later wrote, "I need to write an invoice for the amount." Rabani
responded, noting, "The last three, Islamuddin, Yama, and Bizhan,
they will bring their payment as well. I have already adjusted
their letters, so you only keep their details with you. I made
your job easy, [hahaha]." Pittmann then asked, "which one of your
companies do you want me to put on the invoice so it looks
official," and Rabani responded, "Sunny Universe Construction
Company." Pittmann then sent the invoice for "consultant
- 5 -
services," dated July 18, 2018, via email. After some difficulty
transferring the money, on July 23, a $2,000 wire deposit arrived
in Pittmann's bank account.
Rabani later asked if Pittmann had received emails from
the National Visa Center requesting verification of the
recommendation letters, to which Pittmann responded, "I have a
bunch of them[.] Which names should I approve? I don't recognize
them all." After Rabani provided the names, Pittmann verified his
approval of the named applicants to the National Visa Center.
Almost all of the recommendation letters were
substantially identical, containing the following and varying only
the names and other personal details of the applicants:
To whom it may concern,
My name is Jeromy Pittmann and I am Engineer
Officer for NSOCC-A which is located in
Afghanistan until March 2015.
I am writing this letter to recommend
[Applicant] for consideration to the Special
Immigrant Visa (SIV) program. [Applicant] has
worked in support of United States army and
NATO forces since July 2012 for a trusted
local national company as a supervisor. I
personally, have been supervising [Applicant]
since 7 March 2014 up to 02 March 2015.
During this time he has had excellent
performance in all aspects of work and
provided faithful and valuable service to the
United States Forces in Afghanistan. I have
known him to be a diligent, polite and
hardworking individual.
Just by being a supervisor to directly
supporting United States army and NATO forces
- 6 -
his life is in jeopardy some of the extremist
and Taliban consider him a traitor despite his
hardship he always shows up for work. I do
not see [Applicant] as a threat to the United
States and in my opinion he would become a
productive member of American society if
allowed to emigrate. He is concerned for him
and his family's safety once the NATO and U.S.
pull out of Afghanistan. He has faced threats
as a result of the employment and therefore he
feels he will be a target of anti-government
forces, and will be specifically targeted due
to his work for the U.S.
In summary I highly recommend him for approval
of a special immigration VISA (SIV) and I
don't think he poses a threat to the national
security or the safety of the United States of
America.
The letters then listed the applicant's personal details
and job title, as well as Pittmann's contact information.
B.
On November 28, 2022, a grand jury in the District of
New Hampshire indicted Pittmann on four charges -- conspiracy to
commit bribery and false writing, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 371
(count I); bribery, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 201
(b)(2)(A)
(count II); false writing, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1001
(a)(3)
(count III); and conspiracy to commit concealment money
laundering, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1956
(h), (a)(1)(B)(i)
(count IV).
At trial, after the close of the government's case,
Pittmann moved for a judgment of acquittal on counts I and III, on
- 7 -
the basis that there was insufficient evidence to show that the
letters of recommendation contained false statements. See Fed. R.
Crim. P. 29(a). The district court denied Pittmann's Rule 29(a)
motion in a brief statement, explaining that it found, "after
viewing the evidence on counts I and III in the light most
favorable to the government's case, . . . that a rational
factfinder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the charged crimes."
On July 12, 2024, the jury found Pittmann guilty on all
counts. Fourteen days later, on July 26, 2024, Pittmann renewed
his motion for a judgment of acquittal, this time seeking acquittal
on all counts. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c). In his accompanying
memorandum of law, he argued there was insufficient evidence to
show his statements in the recommendation letters were
"objectively false" and that all counts of conviction required
falsity. He also argued that the State Department's requirements
for SIV recommendation letters were ambiguous such that his
responses were not false.
The district court held a hearing on Pittmann's
Rule 29(c) motion and verbally denied it. First, the court stated
that the government was only required to prove Pittmann made a
false statement for count III, the false-writing charge. Thus,
the court denied the motion "to the extent [] Pittmann [wa]s
arguing" that such a requirement applied to all four charges.
- 8 -
Next, the district court stated it was "not persuaded by []
Pittmann's argument that to prove he made a false statement[,] the
government was required to produce the testimony of the subjects
of these SIV letters that [] Pittmann authored"; instead, the court
found that there was sufficient evidence of falsity for the jury
to convict on count III. The court further found that the State
Department's questions were not ambiguous.2
On November 1, 2024, the district court entered judgment
and sentenced Pittmann to thirty months' imprisonment. Pittmann
timely appealed.
II.
A.
Pittmann first challenges his convictions on counts I
through III, arguing that the government was required to prove
falsity to convict on each count and that the evidence was
insufficient in that regard.
The falsity requirement on which Pittmann focuses is
derived from the false-writing statute, which subjects to criminal
penalties anyone who, "in any matter within the jurisdiction of
the [federal g]overnment, knowingly and willfully . . . makes or
uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry."
2 Pittmann does not press his ambiguity argument on appeal.
- 9 -
18 U.S.C. § 1001
(a), (a)(3). Under this statute, "the government
must prove that the defendant (1) made a material, false statement
(2) in a matter within the jurisdiction of the government
(3) knowing that the statement was false." United States v.
Vázquez-Soto,
939 F.3d 365, 371
(1st Cir. 2019). Pittmann contends
that the government did not carry its burden on the first element;
he argues there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the letters of recommendation he wrote
contained false statements.
Because Pittmann raised this concern in his timely
Rule 29(a) and (c) motions below, our review is de novo. United
States v. Buoi,
84 F.4th 31, 37
(1st Cir. 2023). "In reviewing a
sufficiency challenge, the relevant question is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found [that
Pittmann made false statements] beyond a reasonable doubt." United
States v. Falcón-Nieves,
79 F.4th 116, 123
(1st Cir. 2023)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). "We evaluate the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution and draw all
reasonable evidentiary and credibility inferences in favor of the
verdict." United States v. Rodríguez-Martinez,
778 F.3d 367, 371
(1st Cir. 2015). In doing so, we must reverse if "the
evidence . . . gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support
to theories of guilt and innocence." United States v.
- 10 -
Guerrero-Narváez,
29 F.4th 1, 9
(1st Cir. 2022) (quotation marks
and citation omitted).
At trial, the government had two independent theories of
falsity: first, that the letters were false because Pittmann never
supervised the applicants; second, that Pittmann's statements
about the applicants' character were false because at the time he
wrote them, Pittmann did not remember the applicants' character.
On appeal, Pittmann primarily takes issue with the former theory.
But we think there was more than sufficient evidence for the jury
to convict on the latter theory, such that we need not reach
Pittmann's arguments about the insufficiency of proof as to whether
he actually supervised the applicants.
The letters each attested to Pittmann's personal,
present knowledge of the applicant, stating: "I have known [the
applicant] to be a diligent, polite and hardworking individual."
Each letter exploited and reinforced that assertion of personal
knowledge by offering additional opinions about the applicant
without any suggestion that the writer was simply parroting the
opinions of others: the applicant "is" "efficient and attentive,"
"prompt," and not "a threat."
These statements were repeated essentially verbatim in
twenty-two letters of recommendation. And at trial, the government
presented emails from Pittmann in which he directly admitted to
not "recogniz[ing] them all" and asked Rabani "which names [he]
- 11 -
should . . . approve." Combined with evidence that Rabani
provided Pittmann with all of the names and information about each
applicant, this was enough for a jury to have reasonably concluded
that the applicants were not "known" to Pittmann and his opinions
concerning them were not the product of such knowledge. By
extension, this is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
conclude that the letters attesting to the applicants' character
were false. Even accepting the possibility that Pittmann did, at
one point, supervise the applicants in Afghanistan, a jury could
find that he could not truthfully vouch in such detail for their
character if he did not know who was who.
As a result, we hold that there was sufficient evidence
for a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
Pittmann's letters of recommendation contained false statements,
and we affirm Pittmann's conviction on count III on that basis.
Because those statements are the same ones that Pittmann claims
must be proven false under counts I and II, we need not reach his
argument that those counts also required proving falsity, since we
conclude that, even if they did, the evidence was sufficient to
show those statements were false. We therefore reject Pittmann's
argument for acquittal on counts I and II as well.
B.
Pittmann launches a separate challenge to his conviction
on count II under
18 U.S.C. § 201
, which makes it unlawful for any
- 12 -
public official to "corruptly . . . agree[] to receive or accept
anything of value . . . , in return for . . . being influenced in
the performance of any official act."
18 U.S.C. § 201
(b)(2),
(b)(2)(A). He argues that he was entitled to a lesser-included
offense instruction on illegal gratuities. See Fed. R. Crim.
P. 31(c), (c)(1) ("A defendant may be found guilty of . . . an
offense necessarily included in the offense charged."). But
Pittmann failed to request such an instruction below -- even after
the district court explicitly invited comment on the jury
instructions. And we have previously found arguments of
instructional error waived where, as here, the "court invited
edits" and counsel "unambiguously signified approval of the . . .
instructions as given." United States v. Simon,
12 F.4th 1, 61
(1st Cir. 2021). At best, Pittmann might have been entitled to
daunting plain-error review, yet he makes no effort on appeal to
address the elements of that review. See United States v. Pérez-
Greaux,
83 F.4th 1, 31
(1st Cir. 2023) (deeming an argument waived
for failure to brief the prongs of plain-error review). We
therefore find his belated request for a lesser-included offense
instruction waived.
C.
Lastly, Pittmann challenges his conviction on count IV
under
18 U.S.C. § 1956
(h) and (a)(1)(B)(i) for conspiracy to commit
concealment money laundering. Together, these two provisions of
- 13 -
§ 1956 criminalize anyone who "conspires to" "conduct[] or
attempt[] to conduct . . . a financial transaction" involving "the
proceeds of specified unlawful activity" while "knowing" both
"that the property involved . . . represents the proceeds of . . .
unlawful activity" and "that the transaction is designed in whole
or in part . . . to conceal or disguise the nature, the location,
the source, the ownership, or the control of" such "proceeds."
18
U.S.C. § 1956
(h), (a)(1)(B)(i).
Pittmann argues that this conviction must be overturned
because the financial transaction for which he was convicted of
conspiracy to commit concealment money laundering did not involve
"proceeds of specified unlawful activity."
Pittmann did not make this argument below, so we review
only for plain error.3 See Pérez-Greaux,
83 F.4th at 31
. To
prevail under that standard, Pittmann "must show that (1) an error
occurred (2) which was clear or obvious and which not only
(3) affected the defendant's substantial rights, but also
(4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of the proceedings."
Id.
(cleaned up). As we explain
3 Because we conclude that Pittmann's arguments fail
plain-error review, we need not reach the government's contention
that, with Pittmann having raised only specific
sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments below, we should review only
for "clear and gross injustice." See, e.g., Falcón-Nieves,
79
F.4th at 124
(quoting United States v. Ponzo,
853 F.3d 558, 580
(1st Cir. 2017)).
- 14 -
below, Pittmann does not show that any clear or obvious error
occurred.
First, Pittmann contends that he was improperly
convicted of conspiracy to commit concealment money laundering
because the indictment charged the same conduct as both bribery
and money laundering, thereby impermissibly merging those separate
crimes. This was improper, he argues, because the funds cannot
both become proceeds and be laundered as proceeds in the same
transaction. To make this argument, he claims that the transaction
charged as money laundering was the $2,000 payment from Rabani to
Pittmann, that this is the "same transaction underlying the
bribery," and thus that the indictment fails to allege "any
secondary, 'independent manipulation' to conceal the funds."
But the conduct charged as conspiracy to commit money
laundering in the indictment is not the payment from Rabani to
Pittmann -- it is the agreement to "creat[e] a false and fraudulent
invoice" disguising that payment as compensation for "legitimate
consulting work." Like Pittmann's counsel below, we read the
indictment to mean what it says: that it is this fraudulent
invoice -- not the payment itself -- that underlies the concealment
money laundering charge.4 The creation of that invoice was a
4 On appeal, Pittmann briefly addresses the false invoice by
arguing that it "does not convert the payment for the letters into
a money laundering transaction." But he does not argue that his
- 15 -
secondary, independent manipulation to conceal the nature and
origin of the bribery proceeds and therefore presents no merger
issue.
Nor does the actual payment from Rabani to Pittmann
necessarily underlie Pittmann's conviction for bribery of a public
official. To be found guilty of this offense, the public official
must "directly or indirectly, corruptly demand[], seek[],
receive[], accept[], or agree[] to receive or accept anything of
value . . . in return for . . . being influenced in the
performance of any official act."
18 U.S.C. § 201
(b)(2), (b)(2)(A)
(emphasis added). That crime was complete upon the reaching of an
agreement for a quid pro quo in February 2018, well before any
payment was issued or Pittmann took any steps to conceal that
payment. See United States v. Brewster,
408 U.S. 501, 526
(1972)
("The illegal conduct is . . . agreeing to take money for a promise
to act in a certain way." (emphasis added)); United States v.
generating a false invoice and sending it to Rabani -- the conduct
alleged as money laundering in the indictment -- was not in and of
itself a "financial transaction" under the meaning of the statute.
See
18 U.S.C. § 1956
(c)(4) (defining "financial transaction" for
purposes of the money-laundering statute as "a transaction . . .
involving the movement of funds . . . or . . . one or more monetary
instruments, or . . . a transaction involving the use of a
financial institution"). We therefore need not address any such
argument. See Igartúa v. United States,
626 F.3d 592, 603
(1st
Cir. 2010) (noting that "claims neither raised below nor on appeal"
are waived).
- 16 -
McDonough,
727 F.3d 143, 152
(1st Cir. 2013) (quoting this language
from Brewster).
It is true that "the laundering of funds cannot occur in
the same transaction through which those funds first became tainted
by crime." United States v. Richard,
234 F.3d 763, 769
(1st Cir.
2000) (quoting United States v. Butler,
211 F.3d 826, 830
(4th
Cir. 2000)). But the conduct alleged here as money
laundering -- the creation of a false invoice -- did not "first"
taint the funds in question with crime. They were tainted from
the moment a quid pro quo was agreed to -- and certainly before
Pittmann took the separate, independent step of generating a false
invoice to obscure the agreed-upon proceeds of that quid pro quo.
Thus, Pittmann "was not doubly punished for" his subsequent steps
to conceal the proceeds of bribery. United States v. Cardona,
88
F.4th 69, 80
(1st Cir. 2023).
Second, Pittmann argues that the false invoice he
generated to conceal the $2,000 payment was not yet a financial
transaction involving "proceeds" under § 1956(a) because he
created and sent the invoice several days before the payment
arrived. But we have previously rejected similar arguments,
explaining that a defendant who "attempt[s] to conceal the source
of the money before it actually c[o]me[s] into his possession" can
still be subject to criminal liability. United States v. Misla-
Aldarondo,
478 F.3d 52, 68
(1st Cir. 2007); cf. United States v.
- 17 -
Castellini,
392 F.3d 35, 48
(1st Cir. 2004) (noting that although
"'the predicate offense[] must produce proceeds before anyone can
launder those proceeds[]' . . . that does not require the two
crimes involved to be entirely separate in time" (quoting United
States v. Mankarious,
151 F.3d 694, 705
(7th Cir. 1998))).5 Thus,
in Misla-Aldarondo, we held that a defendant who "took steps . . .
to conceal" the receipt of extortion proceeds when such funds were
in his co-conspirator's possession, but not yet his own, was liable
for conspiracy to commit concealment money laundering.
478 F.3d
at 68
. Here, as there, "[t]he transaction that created the
proceeds -- the [quid pro quo agreement] -- is sufficiently
distinct from the side transaction[] done to hide the trail" -- the
sending of the false invoice -- thus rendering liability
appropriate. Id.; cf. Richard, 234 F.3d at 769–71 (applying the
same analysis under § 1957(a)).
In enacting § 1956 "it is clear" that "Congress wanted
to curtail" situations in which "money laundering of the proceeds
of an underlying illegal activity may make the underlying crime
more difficult to detect or to prove." Castellini,
392 F.3d at
5
In Castellini, this court also recognized that proceeds
"of an illegal activity may be created before the completion of an
underlying on-going crime."
392 F.3d at 48
. While "[s]ome types
of fraud, like bank and wire fraud, usually create proceeds only
on execution of the first scheme," others can create proceeds
earlier, such as mail fraud, which "can create proceeds before a
mailing takes place."
Id.
- 18 -
49. Here, a jury could reasonably infer that Pittmann crafted an
invoice for "consultant services" that would "look official" in
order to "conceal or disguise" the underlying crime of bribery.
See
18 U.S.C. § 1956
(h), (a)(1)(B)(i). "His conduct was at the
heart of what Congress sought to criminalize." Castellini,
392
F.3d at 49
.
We find there is no clear error here and therefore affirm
Pittmann's conviction under § 1956(h), (a)(1)(B)(i).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court
on all counts.
- 19 -Case Information
- Court
- 1st Cir.
- Decision Date
- October 22, 2025
- Status
- Precedential