United States v. Private E2 RONALD NGUYEN

UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Before
FLEMING, PENLAND, and COOPER
Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Private EZ RONALD L. NGUYEN
United States Army, Appellant

ARMY 20230319

Headquarters, Fort Bragg
Tyler J. Heimann and J. Harper Cook, Military Judges
Colonel Joseph B. Mackey, Staff Judge Advocate

For Appellant: Captain Stephen R. Millwood, JA; Daniel Conway, Esquire (on
brief); Captain Stephen R. ‘Millwood, JA; Scott R. Hockenberry, Esquire (on reply
brief).

For Appellee: Colonel Richard E. Gorini, JA; Major Chase C. Cleveland, JA;
Lieutenant Colonel Matthew T. Grady, JA (on brief).

12 March 2025

PENLAND, Judge:

A military judge, sitting as a general court-martial, convicted appellant,
contrary to his pleas, of two specifications of rape, one specification of aggravated
assault by strangulation, and one specification of assault consummated by battery, in
violation of Articles 120 and 128, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§
920, 928 [UCMJ]. The military judge sentenced appellant to a dishonorable
discharge and confinement for seven years.!

Reviewing the case under Article 66, UCMJ, we have carefully considered
appellant’s assigned errors and personally asserted matters. None merit relief,

' The military judge found appellant not guilty of two specifications of sexual
assault, one specification of assault consummated by battery, and one specification
of burglary, in violation of Articles 120, 128, and 129, UCMJ.
NGUYEN — ARMY 20230319

though two assigned errors and one personally asserted matter warrant brief
discussion.

Appellant assigns two errors arising from the military judge denying a defense
motion to admit evidence, under Military Rule of Evidence [Mil. R. Evid.] 412,
arising weeks after the victim reported appellant for rape. It is unnecessary to
describe this evidence, for the military judge did not err in prohibiting it under this
rule of exclusion; suffice to say defense counsel suggested the evidence as motive
for the victim to continue fabricating allegations against appellant at trial.

The military judge, however, based his denial of this defense motion on two
problematic lines of logic, among others that were well-grounded. First, he
reasoned the victim’s purported motive to fabricate was temporally limited to her
immediate outcry following the rape; therefore, the subsequent evidence proffered
under Mil. R. Evid. 412 could not indicate a motive to fabricate. Specifically, the
military judge found, “any theory of ‘motive to fabricate’ on that basis illogical.”
We do not share this assessment, as a person’s motive to fabricate is not necessarily
tethered to only a single event or circumstance and may evolve as a case progresses.
Cf. United States v. Allison, 49 M.J. 54, 57 (C.A.A.F. 1998). Second, in reaching
his decision, the military judge considered — again, in part — the government’s stated
intent not to offer or otherwise address the proffered Mil. R. Evid. 412 evidence.
This logic was also unavailing; the admissibility of defense evidence does not
depend on the government’s trial tactics, rather the relevance of said evidence and
the ability of defense counsel to lay an adequate foundation for its admissibility.
United States v. Hennis, 75 M.J. 796, 825 (C.A.A.F. 2016); see also South Carolina
v. Holmes, 547 U.S. 319 (2006).

Despite these logic errors, the military judge’s decision to exclude the
proffered evidence was well within the bounds of reasonable judicial discretion.
E.g., United States v. Robinson, 58 M.J. 429, 433 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (“the military
judge’s error was harmless, because the military judge reached the correct result,
albeit for [some of] the wrong reason[s].”). The defense fell far short of its burden
to show the excluded evidence was constitutionally required under Mil. R. Evid.
412(b)(3). Instead, it amounted to a textbook example of matters warranting
exclusion under Mil. R. Evid. 403 because its low probative evidentiary value — if
any - was substantially outweighed by the danger of confusing the issues by creating
a time-wasting trial within a trial. The defense underscored this in their motion, if
unwittingly, by asserting the purported need for a civil proceeding to address the
evidence.

Appellant personally asserted ineffective assistance of counsel, because his
trial defense team “fail[ed] to introduce appellant’s exculpatory statement” given to
a Criminal Investigation Division (CID) agent during an interview in May 2022.

The prosecution offered a very brief excerpt of this interview. We ordered affidavits
NGUYEN — ARMY 20230319

from both defense counsel, seeking their explanation for not offering the entire
interview under the rule of completeness.?_ Their responses reflect careful, well-
reasoned logic for not seeking admission of the entire interview and instead eliciting
only exculpatory information by cross-examining the CID agent. The defense
approach to this evidence — and the case overall — was well within the scope of
reasonable professional judgment and, it follows, not deficient.

CONCLUSION

On consideration of the entire record, the findings and sentence are
AFFIRMED.

Senior Judge FLEMING and Judge COOPER concur.

FOR THE COURT:

JAMES W. HERRING, JR. {
Clerk of Court

? Once a party introduces “all or part of a writing or recorded statement,” the rule of
completeness under Mil. R. Evid. 106 allows “an adverse party [to] require the
introduction ... of any other part — or any other writing or recorded statement — that
in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.”