United States v. Stone

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Case: 24-10115 Document: 144-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/05/2025

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
____________ United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit

No. 24-10115
FILED
August 5, 2025
____________
Lyle W. Cayce
United States of America, Clerk

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

William Roy Stone, Jr.; Joseph Eventino DeLeon,

Defendants—Appellants.
______________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:21-CR-236-1
______________________________

Before Wiener, Willett, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
Jacques L. Wiener, Circuit Judge: *
Following a thirteen-day trial, a jury convicted defendants-appellants
William Roy Stone, Jr. and Joseph Eventino DeLeon in connection with an
elaborate scheme they orchestrated to defraud a young woman out of her in-
heritance. Stone appeals only the application of the sophisticated means sen-
tencing enhancement. DeLeon challenges his conviction on sufficiency

_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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No. 24-10115

grounds, the denial of his motion for a new trial, and the application of two
sentencing enhancements. We affirm.
I.
Background
Bill Stone worked as an FBI Special Agent for twenty years, retiring
on October 31, 2015. Before working with the FBI, he had been an Irving,
Texas police officer. Joe DeLeon was a restaurant owner in Fort Worth,
where he resided for the majority of his life. DeLeon was also a longtime vol-
unteer with the Fort Worth Police Department, was involved with the de-
partment’s Citizen’s Academy, and volunteered his translation services to
various law enforcement agencies. Stone and DeLeon first met in 2003
through DeLeon’s volunteer work.
C.T. was a woman in her early twenties who had been struggling with
substance abuse for ten years, causing her to be estranged from her family
and at times to lose custody of her young children. Around 2005, C.T.’s ex,
a former police officer, introduced her to DeLeon at his restaurant. When
they first met, DeLeon represented to C.T. that he worked for the police and
that he was an FBI interpreter. At one of these early meetings, DeLeon
showed C.T. a “government-issued ID” that appeared to be “some sort of
law enforcement ID.” C.T. testified that in their meetings, DeLeon “would
always refer to different places that he was going to assist in cases” and he
“seemed pretty busy doing the Fort Worth Police Department stuff” along-
side his restaurant business. He always wore a firearm on his waistband.
Shortly after meeting DeLeon, sometime between 2005 and 2006,
DeLeon suggested that C.T. meet his friend Bill Stone. DeLeon was aware of
C.T.’s drug problems as well as her family issues and custody challenges.
C.T., nervous to meet an FBI agent, did not attend the first scheduled meet-
ing, but DeLeon continued to push it until she agreed. There, Stone told C.T.

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that her car was seen near known drug houses that he was monitoring. She
found this credible because she “was using drugs and it’s probably likely that
[her] car was seen in front of a drug house.” She told Stone that she was
“trying to maintain sobriety” and that she was experiencing family issues as
a result of her drug use. She did not reach out to Stone following this meeting
but kept in touch with DeLeon. She continued to struggle with addiction and
then lost custody of her children.
In 2007, the Irving Police Department arrested C.T. on a drug charge.
Upon searching her car, the police found a notebook in which C.T. had writ-
ten Stone’s contact information. She was released the next day after the po-
lice convinced her to act as an informant, and the arresting officer suggested
she call Stone because he was a former Irving police officer. She did so and
Stone told her “that he would take care of it.” She was never charged, and
she testified that DeLeon and Stone told her that it was because Stone had
intervened on her behalf. Between 2007 and 2014, C.T. continued to struggle
with addiction and had several encounters with law enforcement, none of
which amounted to much. Throughout that time, C.T. was intermittently in
touch with DeLeon for general support.
Then, in 2014, she was arrested and charged with felony drug posses-
sion in Hood County, Texas. Afraid of going to prison and losing any hope of
regaining custody of her children, C.T. opted to go into rehab. She was in
touch with DeLeon more frequently then, talking about her kids and family,
the arrest and legal situation, and how her progress was going at the treatment
facility. DeLeon told her that he was keeping Stone apprised of her progress.
C.T. successfully completed her rehab program in early 2015 and
pleaded guilty to the drug charge. She was sentenced to six years of probation,
during which she was required to maintain sobriety, not commit further
crimes, and abide by other conditions. C.T. turned her life around: She

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reconnected with her family, enrolled and excelled in college, and was made
the sole executrix of her grandmother’s will. When that happened, C.T. told
DeLeon and Stone that she “might need [DeLeon’s] help . . . because [she]
didn’t know how to do probate or anything like that.” Her grandmother
passed away later that year, in November 2015. Unbeknownst to C.T., her
grandmother’s estate was worth approximately $3 million. By that time,
Stone had already retired from the FBI.
The Scheme
C.T. informed DeLeon and Stone about her grandmother’s death,
and—although she organized the funeral—she did not invite DeLeon or
Stone to attend. DeLeon showed up anyway, carrying a firearm as usual. He
told C.T. that Stone instructed him to “keep eyes” on her for her protection
and that Stone was in town to help C.T. on a case. It troubled her that DeLeon
was there for that purpose, and she testified it made her “extremely uncom-
fortable.”
Following the funeral, DeLeon went to C.T.’s house to talk about why
Stone was “in town helping [her]” and Stone came over shortly after. Stone
continued to represent that he was an FBI agent, and he told her that he had
flagged her name in “the system” so that he “was alerted anytime [her] name
was brought up.” He also said that some older drug cases were resurfacing.
When she asked to see evidence, Stone told her that she would have to go
before a judge who would then revoke her probation. Stone also said that if
she told her family, they would use it against her in the probate proceedings.
He also told her that the only person she could tell anything to was DeLeon,
and that he (Stone) could listen to her phone calls and read her text messages.
Stone then told DeLeon to go to the probate hearing with C.T., and it
was there that they learned the value of her inheritance. Starting about a week
after the probate hearing, Stone initiated more meetings with C.T. He

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claimed that he was in Austin to help C.T. with a pending drug charge
there—even though she was unaware of what charge it could be because she
had not gone to Austin—and that they should all meet to discuss it. Stone
told C.T. that she was facing fifty years in prison and that she was “one lucky
kid” that he was there to help her. He claimed to have seen a video of her
conducting a drug deal, but when she asked to see the video, he told her she
would have to go to court and then she would go to jail. He also said that she
should not call an attorney because “there’s no amount of money that [she]
could pay an attorney to get for [her] what [Stone] could do for [her].” In-
stead, Stone said he worked out a deal with the judge to secure her “secret
probation.” Evidence at trial revealed that, at this time, Stone and DeLeon
changed C.T.’s name in their phones to “Project #2” and began referring to
her as such during the scheme.
Stone told C.T. that DeLeon had agreed to be her probation officer for
her secret probation. Stone imposed stringent conditions on C.T. in connec-
tion with that probation. 1 Stone and DeLeon worked together to ensure that
C.T. complied with those conditions. Stone created a cast of fictitious char-
acters to support that ruse, including “Judge Anderson” in Austin who had
worked out this secret probation plan for C.T.; a team of FBI “analysts”
with names like Avery and Ainsley who Stone said worked in the “North Ko-
rea Unit” but who were helping him with C.T.’s case on the side, “sharpen-
ing their skills;” an FBI psychiatrist named Dr. Bryan, or “Dr. B,” who
treated C.T. over the phone; and a fictional state trooper named “Jerry” who
Stone said would drive past C.T.’s house and report his findings to Stone.
_____________________
1
These conditions required C.T. to fill out her entire day’s activities, every day,
on 3x5 index cards and send them to DeLeon, spend a certain amount of time with DeLeon
each day, complete community service hours, enroll in school fulltime and earn good
grades, send Stone a list of her financial assets, obtain permission (from Stone) before
traveling, and obtain Stone’s permission before dating anybody.

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C.T. never once saw or heard these characters, but interacted with them over
the phone through Stone in ways that strain credulity. For example, C.T. tes-
tified that she would be on the phone with Stone, and that Stone had a sepa-
rate satellite phone that allowed the analysts (or Dr. B) to listen in on their
call and respond in real time, but only to Stone who would then relay their
responses back to C.T.
DeLeon furthered and reinforced these antics. When C.T. asked him
why she never heard Stone’s phone ring when he took calls from those char-
acters, DeLeon told her that Stone had a device in his pocket that vibrated so
he would know when to answer the phone. DeLeon once called C.T. in the
middle of the night to tell her that Stone was trying to handle a Child Protec-
tive Services (CPS) matter for her and that she “needed to get up and get
[her] house ready for a home visit.” She complied, but CPS never came. She
testified that she was told that Stone and DeLeon had handled it for her.
Stone told C.T. that a condition of her secret probation was to get her tattoos
permanently removed, an expensive and painful process with which she com-
plied, and DeLeon helped enforce this condition. DeLeon carried a gun every
time he came to her house, told her it was “standard operating procedure”
to delete all texts with Stone, continued to insinuate that he was actively help-
ing law enforcement with serious cases like homicides and SWAT activities,
and frequently made it seem like he was up all night working on her case for
her.
Almost immediately after putting C.T. on “secret probation,” Stone
and DeLeon began to scheme to get her inheritance money for themselves.
First, it was $5,000 cash installments for Stone’s purported “travel ex-
penses,” which she gave Stone at least two or three times a month in the
beginning. DeLeon also sought money, complaining often that he was going
broke because he spent so much time with C.T. instead of at his restaurant.
In January of 2016, one month into the secret probation, she gave DeLeon a

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check for $15,000 for “working as [her] probation officer.” She gave him
$5,000 cash when he complained about the payroll at the restaurant, and
bought him a new laptop and a new phone so they could “continue [their]
communication per required from the court.” Also in early 2016, Stone made
her sign her power of attorney over to DeLeon.
Before long, Stone and DeLeon sought more than money. In February
of 2016, Stone told C.T. to give DeLeon a truck because DeLeon “was acting
kind of childish and acting as though he was going to quit on us.” Against her
own wishes, C.T. gave DeLeon her family’s Ford F-150 truck, but DeLeon
insisted they create a fake paper trail to make it look like she sold the truck to
him. DeLeon wrote a check for the truck, and instructed C.T. to write a check
back to him for the same amount. C.T. testified that the whole thing “felt
extremely uncomfortable” to her and that she “didn’t feel like he deserved
to be given a truck.” DeLeon quickly sold the truck for about $37,000 and
kept the money. C.T. gave DeLeon over $50,000 related to his services as
her probation officer in the first two months of the secret probation.
Also in February, Stone told C.T. to give him a vehicle—the Lexus
SUV she was using as her primary car. She was told this was “a form of pay-
ment so there wasn’t any monetary exchange for his efforts in helping [her].”
She testified that she was told that any paper trail could impact her Hood
County probation, and that DeLeon told her she was “the luckiest girl in the
world” to have his and Stone’s help. After she gave Stone the Lexus, he
traded it in for a Mercedes and had C.T. pick up the tab on the difference
between the trade-in value and full cost.
In March, Stone and DeLeon told C.T. she owed restitution in con-
nection with the secret probation, and if she did not pay she could incur new
criminal charges and violate her (real) probation. Stone told her she owed
$250,000 in restitution, which she paid to Stone by cashier’s check. In

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August, Stone told C.T. he needed her to buy him another vehicle, which she
did—a truck for about $24,000. In September, Stone said he was moving to
Texas to work for the FBI remotely, but could not buy a house because his
money was tied up in retirement trusts, so she gave him $154,500 for a down
payment. When Stone asked her to help with the remodel of this house, she
paid the remodeling company $25,000.
All told, her “secret probation” lasted four years. C.T. finished col-
lege in 2017 and completed her Hood County probation in 2018 earlier than
scheduled, and Stone told her this was because Judge Anderson had written
a letter to Hood County on her behalf. In December of 2017, DeLeon retired
and sold his restaurant business because of his health issues. Those health
issues also forced him to cease acting as her probation officer. But Stone had
a solution. He told C.T. that Judge Anderson gave him permission to be her
probation officer instead. Stone then initiated a romantic relationship with
C.T. In the summer of 2019, C.T. and Stone took a trip to Florida, but they
got into a fight there. C.T. asked Stone if they could break up and if she could
have a different probation officer, but Stone rebuffed her.
When they returned to Texas, Stone told C.T. that he saw a video of
her talking to waiters in Florida who were on a terrorist list, so he would need
to intercede with Judge Anderson again. Stone then used a spoofing program
to call C.T., mimicking the real 512 phone number from the Austin district
court to make it look like he was calling from the judge’s chambers. Following
that call, Stone tightened the conditions of C.T.’s secret probation. Stone
also enlisted a friend to leave a voicemail, pretending to be a Drug Enforce-
ment Agency (DEA) agent, saying that C.T.’s name came up in more drug
investigations and that the agent was alerting Stone because he controlled
C.T.’s “law enforcement umbrella.”

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Shortly after those fake calls, Stone proposed to C.T. and she “reluc-
tantly said yes.” Stone then said that he had asked Judge Anderson to end
her secret probation because they were engaged and in love, and—although
he told her the judge said the probation can end—she testified that it did not
end that day. C.T. did not want to marry Stone and—after a few more days—
she “did not feel good wearing the ring knowing that’s not what [she]
wanted,” so she called off the engagement. Stone did not react well, harass-
ing her sixteen-year-old son, her brother, and her mother, telling them that
C.T. was regressing in her progress. Around that time, Stone claimed that
Dr. B had fallen off his Peloton and died, and he sent C.T. a picture of the
purported funeral. However, C.T. saw that they were live photos and, when
she clicked them, she discovered that Stone had just taken pictures of other
pictures. So began C.T.’s doubts.
The Investigation
C.T. started to question whether the secret probation was real—she
told a friend’s mom because that mother worked with the judge who gave her
the Hood County probation. When the friend’s mom told C.T. that she was
released early because of good behavior, not because a Judge Anderson inter-
vened for her, C.T. called a Texas Ranger, Danny Briley, who began to inves-
tigate. 2 She was hurt and angry at both Stone and DeLeon for the “terror and
sadness and fear” and all the time they made her spend with them instead of
with her children. She testified that she never would have given either of
them any money, vehicles, property, or time had she known the truth.

_____________________
2
C.T. testified that the impetus for all of this was that she wanted to travel to New
Mexico to go to a family wedding, but Stone was being evasive about giving her permission
to travel.

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During the subsequent investigation, law enforcement interviewed
DeLeon several times. He continued to stay in touch with Stone, despite be-
ing told not to tip Stone off, and lied repeatedly to law enforcement about the
nature of the scheme and his role in it. 3 He lied to Ranger Briley when he said
Stone gave C.T. probation papers to sign, drawing a diagram of where they
were standing in her home when she signed, but that never occurred. He told
law enforcement that he believed Stone was still an FBI agent when text mes-
sages show he knew that Stone had retired earlier. DeLeon insisted he never
received any payment from C.T. despite having received cash and the
$15,000 check. He also told law enforcement that he purchased the F-150
truck and that he had a check to prove it, omitting that he made C.T. write
the check back to him at the same time. When DeLeon ultimately told law
enforcement about the $15,000 check, he lied about when he had received it
and, when pressed, he told Ranger Briley that “she’s wealthy and that she
does not need it anyway.”
The Trial & Sentencing
Stone and DeLeon were charged with conspiracy to commit wire
fraud, and Stone was charged with six counts of wire fraud, one count of
money laundering, and one count of falsely impersonating a federal officer.
At trial, C.T. testified extensively, and the jury also heard from Ranger Briley
and ten other witnesses for the prosecution. The government offered vol-
umes of evidence in the form of thousands of text messages, recorded phone
calls, and various other exhibits. At the close of the government’s case, both

_____________________
3
The investigators pored over text messages between DeLeon and Stone, including
messages of them joking about the $3 million, and found a secret set of calendars hidden in
Stone’s trash can liner documenting his and DeLeon’s efforts and conversations about
C.T.—including late in the scheme after DeLeon had stopped acting as her probation
officer.

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defendants moved for acquittal, reasoning that if DeLeon did not know the
secret probation was fake, then he (and they) could not have conspired to-
gether. However, the court denied the motions. 4 Neither Stone nor DeLeon
renewed these motions at the close of their cases.
DeLeon’s defense was consistently that (1) he did not know the pro-
bation was fake, (2) he blindly trusted Stone because he respects law enforce-
ment so much, and (3) absent knowledge about the probation’s fiction, he
could not have the requisite intent to conspire. At trial, DeLeon called several
former Fort Worth police officers who knew him from his volunteering to
testify to his character for honesty. Each testified that DeLeon: (1) knew vol-
unteers cannot accept payment, especially from a defendant or supervisee;
(2) “knew more than your average citizen” about law enforcement; (3) had
“40 or 50” friends in law enforcement at all levels of leadership that he could
turn to if he had questions; (4) was entrusted by Fort Worth Police Depart-
ment with leadership positions given his knowledge and capabilities; (5) knew
that if something did not “look right” DeLeon would know to report it; (6)
in all his years DeLeon never accepted payment from the police or anyone
else for his volunteer work; and (7) would know not to lie to a Texas Ranger.
The prosecution cross examined these witnesses, asking about specific bad
acts by DeLeon, and DeLeon objected only once.
The trial lasted thirteen days. During deliberations, the jury sent a
question to the judge, asking: “Do defendants of this case for Count 1 have
to have the same verdict in order for it to be a conspiracy?” The court invited

_____________________
4
The prosecution’s position throughout the case has been that the unlawful
purpose of the conspiracy was to defraud C.T. out of her money and property, and that the
fake probation was but one means to that end. Because a co-conspirator need not be aware
of every aspect of the conspiracy to be convicted, the prosecution did not find the
defendants’ argument to hold water, and the court agreed.

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the parties’ position on a response, and—although Stone’s attorney wanted
to point the jury to a particular part of the charge—DeLeon’s attorney agreed
with the government’s position: “[I]t seems like the most appropriate thing
to do is just say you have all the law applicable in this case in the jury charge,
and I direct you back to the jury charge. Some words to that effect.” The
court responded to the jury according to DeLeon’s and the government’s
wishes.
The jury convicted both men on the conspiracy count and convicted
Stone on all other counts except one of the six wire fraud charges. At Stone’s
sentencing hearing, the government urged the court to apply the sophisti-
cated means enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C). 5 That en-
hancement applies to “especially complex or especially intricate offense con-
duct pertaining to the execution or concealment of an offense.” § 2B1.1 cmt.
n.9(B). The court agreed with the government and applied the enhancement.
Stone was sentenced to 87 months incarceration. At DeLeon’s sentencing,
the court applied two enhancements: (1) the sophisticated means enhance-
ment, and (2) the abuse of trust enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. The
court sentenced DeLeon to 70 months incarceration.
Stone only appeals the application of the sophisticated means en-
hancement. DeLeon brings several issues on appeal: (1) the denial of his mo-
tion for a new trial on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecu-
tion’s allegedly improper closing remarks, and the jury note response; (2)
improper cross examination of character witnesses that he claims under-
mined his presumption of innocence; (3) the sufficiency of the evidence to

_____________________
5
The court applied various other enhancements to both defendants but, in this
opinion, we discuss only the ones on appeal.

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support his conviction; and (4) the application of the sophisticated-means
and abuse-of-trust enhancements.
II.
We begin with DeLeon’s motion for a new trial. We next turn to his
insufficiency challenge. We then address DeLeon’s objections to the cross-
examination of his character witnesses. We conclude with the sentencing
enhancements applied to both defendants.
A.
We review a denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Wall,
389 F.3d 457, 465
(5th Cir. 2004). “This standard is
necessarily deferential to the trial court because the appellate court has only
read the record and, unlike the trial court, did not see the impact of witnesses
on the jury or observe the demeanor of witnesses.”
Id.
(citing United States
v. O’Keefe,
128 F.3d 885, 893
(5th Cir. 1997)). In our review, “to some extent
[we] must begin with the error or grounds upon which the district court based
its decision” and we “examine the court’s decision as measured against the
relevant standard.” Id. at 466; see also United States v. Logan,
861 F.2d 859,
864
(5th Cir. 1988) (holding that the Strickland v. Washington standard
applies to new trial motions based on ineffective assistance of counsel) (citing
Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668
(1984)).
DeLeon challenges the denial of his motion for a new trial on three
grounds: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) improper prosecutorial jury
closing arguments; and (3) the court’s response to the jury question. We
address each in due course.

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DeLeon insists that one of his two trial attorneys provided ineffective
assistance because that attorney misunderstood a ruling on a motion in limine
and therefore did not call DeLeon’s then-girlfriend, Margarita, as a witness. 6
To make a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, DeLeon must
show that (1) his attorney’s performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient
performance prejudiced him. Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687
. DeLeon must also
show “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness” under “prevailing professional norms.”
Id. at 688
. We
“must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”
Id. at 689
. Decisions about
which witnesses to call and how to question them “are tactical
determinations” and “[e]rrors, even egregious ones, in this respect do not
provide a basis for postconviction relief.” United States v. Rubin,
433 F.2d
442
, 445 (5th Cir. 1970).
Allegedly, Margarita would have testified that Stone told DeLeon that
Margarita was to be deported imminently unless DeLeon complied with
Stone’s directives, showing that Stone employed similar tactics against

_____________________
6
Just one of DeLeon’s two attorneys attended one of several pretrial hearings and,
at that hearing, the court explained it would not allow the government’s 404(b) witnesses
to testify about conduct irrelevant to the fraud perpetrated on C.T. Margarita’s testimony
would have described how Stone furthered a scheme unrelated to C.T. that involved
Margarita’s immigration status, and DeLeon contends that this testimony would make him
appear to be another one of Stone’s victims instead of a perpetrator. But the court ruled
that witnesses can testify as to “the allegations contained in this indictment,” not as to
“any other alleged bad acts, crimes, or wrongs” unless counsel raises it outside the jury’s
presence first. Attached to his new trial motion, DeLeon’s attorney—who was absent from
that hearing—filed an affidavit attesting that he misunderstood this ruling as barring all
404(b) witnesses, not just those the government sought to call, and that Margarita would
have corroborated DeLeon’s victimhood. There were several other witnesses in this bucket
besides Margarita, even though all of them would have testified to matters unrelated to
C.T., and the affidavit focuses on Margarita.

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DeLeon and reinforcing his position that he was a victim just like C.T. But
failing to call Margarita was not a deficient performance under Strickland. See
Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689
(“[T]he defendant must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be
considered sound trial strategy.’” (quoting Michel v. Louisiana,
350 U.S. 91,
101
(1955)); Rubin, 433 F.2d at 445. Moreover, “admissions of inadequate
performance by trial lawyers are not decisive in ineffective assistance claims”
because “[i]neffectiveness is a question for the courts, not counsel.” Walls
v. Bowersox,
151 F.3d 827, 836
(8th Cir. 1998); Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S.
86, 109
(2011) (“After an adverse verdict at trial even the most experienced
counsel may find it difficult to resist asking whether a different strategy may
have been better, and, in the course of that reflection, to magnify their own
responsibility for an unfavorable outcome.”).
Even if DeLeon could show deficient performance—which he
cannot—he certainly cannot show the requisite prejudice to prevail under
Strickland. See
466 U.S. at 694
. “The defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
Id.
The
district court reasoned that Margarita’s testimony would have not only been
irrelevant to the fraud perpetrated on C.T., but that it also would have been
cumulative because DeLeon consistently offered evidence that he was duped
by Stone. The jury did not believe him. Therefore, the court did not abuse its
discretion in denying his motion on that basis.
DeLeon next contends that the court should have granted him a new
trial because, at closing, the prosecution told the jury it need not prove that

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DeLeon knew that the probation was fake. 7 We “consider the magnitude of
the prejudicial effect of the challenged statements, the efficacy of any
cautionary instructions, and the strength of the evidence of the defendant’s
guilt.” United States v. Holmes,
406 F.3d 337, 356
(5th Cir. 2005) (quoting
United States v. Bernard,
299 F.3d 467, 488
(5th Cir. 2002)). “The
determinative question is whether the prosecutor’s remarks cast serious
doubt on the correctness of the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Iredia,
866
F.2d 114, 117
(5th Cir. 1989). If we find that the remarks were improper, we
must then consider whether they prejudiced DeLeon’s substantial rights.
Holmes,
406 F.3d at 357
. A prosecution’s misstatement of law does not
prejudice the defendant when the court accurately instructs the jury on the
law, explains to the jury that counsel’s statements are not evidence, and there
is sufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict. United States v. Fierro,
38
F.3d 761
, 771–72 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Loeffel,
172 F. App’x 612,
618
(5th Cir. 2006).
We do not find the statement improper, but—assuming arguendo that
we did—“[w]e do not view the prosecutor’s comments in isolation, but
rather in the context of the entire trial.” Fierro,
38 F.3d at 771
. Here, the court
provided the jury with the correct statement of the law, instructed the jury
that counsel’s statements are not evidence, and DeLeon and Stone both
repeatedly argued that DeLeon did not know the probation was real—
contentions that the government rebutted with evidence throughout the trial.

_____________________
7
At closing, the prosecution told the jury that it did not need to find DeLeon knew
the probation was fake in order to find him guilty of conspiracy. Defense counsel called for
a sidebar, the jury was excused, and DeLeon argued that this misstates the law. The
prosecution maintained that a co-conspirator need not know all of the details of the
conspiracy to be convicted, and that the probation was one such detail, while the overall
agreement was to take C.T.’s money and property. The court agreed with the prosecution,
stating: “I have given [the jury] the law. You-all are arguing what the facts are.”

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No. 24-10115

The court did not abuse its discretion in denying DeLeon’s motion on this
basis.
Last, DeLeon insists that he is entitled to a new trial because of the
court’s response to the jury note. Because the court sent the response that
DeLeon specifically requested, we review this matter under the invited-error
doctrine and reverse only if DeLeon proves manifest injustice. United States
v. Salazar,
751 F.3d 326, 332
(5th Cir. 2014) (“A defendant may not complain
on appeal of errors that he himself invited or provoked the district court to
commit.” (alterations accepted) (citing United States v. Wells,
519 U.S. 482
,
487–88 (1997))). DeLeon alleges that he suffered manifest injustice because
the nature of the conspiracy charge is inherently confusing to laypeople, and
even confuses lawyers. But manifest injustice requires more. United States v.
Taylor,
973 F.3d 414
, 418 (5th Cir. 2020) (“Manifest injustice occurs when
the district court’s ‘error was so patent as to have seriously jeopardized the
rights of the appellant.’” (quoting United States v. Lemaire,
712 F.2d 944, 949
(5th Cir. 1983)).
The court did not abuse its discretion in denying DeLeon’s motion
for a new trial on any of the grounds he urges.
B.
We review unpreserved insufficiency challenges for plain error. Puck-
ett v. United States,
556 U.S. 129, 135
(2009). A defendant must show a clear
or obvious error that affected his substantial rights, meaning that it affected
the outcome of the case.
Id.
If a defendant makes such a showing, we may
only correct the error if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.”
Id.
(alterations accepted) (quoting
United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 736
(1993)). We “will reverse only if
there is a ‘manifest miscarriage of justice.’” United States v. Delgado,
672 F.3d

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No. 24-10115

320, 331 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Pierre, 958 F2d 1304, 1310
(5th Cir. 1992) (en banc)).
DeLeon complains that the evidence was insufficient to support a
conspiracy conviction because he did not know the probation was fake, and
therefore the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
had the requisite intent to further an unlawful purpose. DeLeon did not
preserve this challenge because he did not renew his Rule 29 motion after the
close of all evidence. In any event, he misconstrues the nature of the
conspiracy by focusing on the means—the fake probation—while ignoring
the object of the conspiracy, viz., to cheat C.T. out of her money and
property.
On the record before us, we see no clear error. As we have recounted,
the jury heard extensive testimony and saw volumes of physical evidence,
including text messages, recorded phone calls, secret calendars, and financial
records. This evidence was sufficient to show that DeLeon knowingly agreed
with Stone to cheat C.T. out of her money and property and that he: (1)
frequently emphasized his law enforcement ties and carried a firearm to
support the inference that he was law enforcement; (2) attended the probate
hearing where he learned of the $3 million, and one week later unveiled the
secret probation scheme with Stone; (3) worked with Stone to enforce the
secret probation; (4) complained about needing money and cars so C.T.
would pay him; (5) created a fake paper trail to conceal the truck transaction;
(6) was in frequent contact with Stone about the scheme and about C.T.’s
money; and (7) lied repeatedly to law enforcement. The jury also heard
DeLeon’s own character witnesses testify that he knew more about law
enforcement than the average person, had plenty of friends in law
enforcement he could turn to if he had concerns or questions, and knew that
accepting payment from a defendant was improper.

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DeLeon fails to establish an error that is clear or obvious and that
affected the outcome of the case, let alone one that constitutes a manifest
miscarriage of justice. See Puckett,
556 U.S. at 135
; Delgado,
672 F.3d at 331
.
C.
We review “a district court’s decision to permit a certain line of cross-
examination for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Smith-Bowman,
76 F.3d
634, 636
(5th Cir. 1996). If there is no objection at trial, however, we review
for plain error. United States v. Burns,
526 F.3d 852, 858
(5th Cir. 2008).
DeLeon challenges five statements on appeal but at trial objected to only
one. 8
If a criminal defendant puts forth evidence of his good character at
trial, the prosecution may cross examine the defendant’s character witness
or witnesses, and “the court may allow an inquiry into relevant specific
instances of the person’s conduct.” Fed. R. Evid. 405(a). To do so, the
prosecution “must have a good faith factual basis to believe that the
_____________________
8
Those five questions are:
“So then it probably would come as a surprise to you that [DeLeon] volunteered
for a position and within 60 days received a Ford truck as compensation. Would that be
surprising to you?”
“And would it surprise you to know that [DeLeon] was untruthful to the victim in
this case?”
“Okay. So you’re not telling the jury in any way that your opinion has any weight
on what the evidence and what the facts show in this case?” This is the only statement to
which DeLeon’s counsel objected, asserting it invaded the province of the jury. It was
overruled.
“You’d agree with me that an honest person wouldn’t pretend to be someone’s
federal probation officer knowing they had no authority to do so; would you agree with
that?”
“And you’d agree with me that an honest person wouldn’t pretend to be a
probation officer knowing they didn’t have the authority to do so?”

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No. 24-10115

defendant committed the bad act” and “the incidents must be relevant to the
defendant’s character traits that are testified to by the character witness,” in
this case, DeLeon’s honesty. United States v. Dilliard,
354 F. App’x 852, 860
(5th Cir. 2009) (first citing Michelson v. United States,
335 U.S. 469
, 481 n.18
(1948), then citing United States v. Nixon,
777 F.2d 958, 970
(5th Cir, 1985)).
We have held, however, that the prosecution may not ask such a witness to
assume the defendant’s guilt. United States v. Candelaria-Gonzalez,
547 F.2d
291, 294
(5th Cir. 1977) (“Government counsel asked if Ledesma’s
reputation would be affected if he were convicted of the alleged crime.”).
Here, the questions did not ask the character witnesses to assume
DeLeon’s guilt—they asked about specific instances of misconduct, such as
that his acceptance of the truck was while volunteering, that he was
untruthful to C.T., and that he pretended to be a probation officer. This is a
far cry from asking the witness to assume DeLeon gets convicted of the
instant offense. See
id.
In any event, just because there must be some basis in
fact “does not mean that the basis in fact must be proved as a fact before a
good faith inquiry can be made.” Nixon,
777 F.2d at 970
. We find no plain
error in the court’s permitting those four questions.
As for the one question to which DeLeon objected, we see no abuse of
discretion. The prosecution asked William Mitchell, a retired Fort Worth
police officer: “So you’re not telling the jury in any way that your opinion has
any weight on what the evidence and what the facts show in this case?”
DeLeon objected on grounds that this question invades the jury’s province.
We simply cannot say the court abused its discretion in overruling that
objection and permitting the prosecution to ask the witness a question that
clarifies the nature of his character testimony. Moreover, we strain to find
that this question even falls within 405(a), as it does not inquire into any bad
act.

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None of the cross examination statements require reversal.
D.
A determination that an offense involved sophisticated means is a
factual finding that we review for clear error. 9 See United States v. Valdez,
726
F.3d 684, 695
(5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Patel,
789 F. App’x 981
, 984
(5th Cir. 2019). We also review the application of the abuse-of-trust
enhancement for clear error. United States v. Ollison,
555 F.3d 152
, 164–65
(5th Cir. 2005). “There is no clear error if the district court’s finding is
plausible in light of the record as a whole.” United States v. Cisneros-
Gutierrez,
517 F.3d 751, 764
(5th Cir. 2008) (quotation and citation omitted).
We begin with the sophisticated means enhancement pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C), which both defendants challenge. The
application notes explain that this enhancement applies to “especially
complex or especially intricate offense conduct pertaining to the execution or
concealment of an offense.” § 2B1.1 cmt. n.9(B). “We have affirmed the
application of the sophisticated means enhancement in cases involving some
method that made it more difficult for the offense to be detected, even if that
method was not by itself particularly sophisticated.” Valdez,
726 F.3d at 695
;
see also United States v. Clements,
73 F.3d 1330, 1340
(5th Cir. 1996)
(upholding the enhancement when a defendant moved funds from his
account to an account in his wife’s name); United States v. Conner,
537 F.3d
480, 492
(5th Cir. 2008) (upholding the enhancement when a defendant used
fake identities and fake business names). But we found it inapplicable when a

_____________________
9
Stone contends that the relevant facts are undisputed and that we should review
this enhancement’s application de novo. He is incorrect. United States v. Miller,
906 F.3d
373
, 376–77 (5th Cir. 2018) (reviewing for clear error “the factual determinations that
[defendant] abused a position of trust and used sophisticated means.” (emphasis added)).
DeLeon concedes that clear error is the appropriate standard of review.

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No. 24-10115

defendant took money from his own “operating account, which was in his
name, and moved it into his investment accounts, which were also in his
name.” Valdez,
726 F.3d at 695
(describing the conduct as “open and
transparent direct deposit and movement of funds”).
Both Stone and DeLeon contend that they did not use sophisticated
means because all of the transactions were in their own names and were easily
traceable by looking at C.T.’s financial transactions alongside their own.
DeLeon further contends that the Guidelines require that the court look at
the individual defendant’s conduct, not the scheme. On clear error review,
their arguments fail.
In United States v. Miller, we upheld this enhancement even though
we observed that “some aspects of Miller’s scheme were not sophisticated”
because we “view[ed] the scheme in its entirety.”
906 F.3d 373, 380
(5th Cir.
2018). We noted that the defendant “employed multiple methods that made
it more difficult to detect her bank fraud,” including misrepresenting her
boyfriend as a vendor, creating false bookkeeping entries for fake
transactions, and forging signatures.
Id.
In United States v. Connor, we upheld
the enhancement even though the conduct “was not the most sophisticated
fraud.”
537 F.3d at 492
. In that case, the defendants used fake IDs and fake
business accounts to obtain goods and resell them on Ebay, moving from state
to state and pre-selling merchandise.
Id.
“Taken together, these aspects of the
fraud indicate that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the
crime involved sophisticated means.”
Id.
(emphasis added).
We acknowledged that the cash withdrawals and checks that C.T.
gave to Stone and DeLeon were straightforward to trace once law
enforcement began its investigation. But the enhancement applies to “the
execution or concealment” of the offense, and the scheme must be
considered in its entirety. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.9(B); Miller,
906 F.3d at 380
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No. 24-10115

(emphasis added). The district court did not clearly err in determining that
the enhancement was proper as to both defendants.
Stone undeniably engaged in tactics that made the offense more
difficult to detect: he created a fake federal judge and other fake law
enforcement officials to reduce the chance that C.T. would divulge the
scheme to friends, family, or her attorney; he frequently requested cash to
reduce paper trails, falsely stated on the title transfer application that he
purchased C.T.’s Lexus from her when he did not; and he created a fake set
of calendars that omitted all mention of the scheme, while the real calendars
were hidden in his trash can liners.
DeLeon also engaged in actions that made the scheme more difficult
to detect. He made C.T. give him power of attorney, insisted on creating a
fake paper trail for the truck transaction, justified Stone’s lies and conduct to
assuage C.T., and lied multiple times to law enforcement. The district
court’s application of the enhancement to each defendant was “plausible in
light of the record as a whole” and in consideration of the scheme in its
entirety. See Cisneros-Gutierrez,
517 F.3d at 764
; United States v. Rubio,
225
F. App’x 290, 291
(5th Cir. 2007) (viewing the scheme in its entirety “even
if some [] aspects of [her] offense were not sophisticated”); United States v.
Tape,
73 F. App’x 83
, 83 (5th Cir. 2003) (rejecting defendant’s argument that
the enhancement was improper as applied to him because he “did not
personally engage in any sophisticated actions within the scheme”).
Finally, DeLeon challenges the two-level enhancement for abuse of a
position of trust under § 3B1.3, maintaining that he was not and never has
been law enforcement and therefore did not hold such a position. We apply a
two-part inquiry to determine whether this enhancement is proper: “(1)
whether the defendant occupies a position of trust and (2) whether the
defendant abused [his] position in a manner that significantly facilitated the

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No. 24-10115

commission or concealment of the offense.” United States v. Miller,
607 F.3d
144, 148
(5th Cir. 2010) (quotation and citation omitted). The enhancement
is appropriate when “the defendant provides sufficient indicia to the victim
that the defendant legitimately holds a position of private or public trust
when, in fact, the defendant does not,” such as by falsely holding oneself out
as being a licensed physician or legitimate investment broker. § 3B1.3 cmt.
n.3; see, e.g., United States v. Domingue,
713 F. App’x 413, 413
(5th Cir. 2018)
(per curiam) (affirming the enhancement when defendant “falsely portrayed
himself to detainees in [ICE] facilities, and their relatives and friends, as an
immigration consultant whose company performed immigration-related
services”); United States v. McConathy,
619 F. App’x 359, 361
(5th Cir. 2015)
(per curiam) (affirming the enhancement when defendant “misrepresented
himself to the victim as a licensed oil and gas operator and that the investor
would not have invested but for the misrepresentation”).
The district court adopted DeLeon’s presentence report (PSR),
which stated that he “provided sufficient indicia to the victim, C.T., that he
legitimately held a position of public or private trust; namely, that of a law
enforcement officer and, later, as someone trusted by a federal judge to
monitor C.T.’s compliance with the ‘secret probation’—such as a federal
probation officer.” DeLeon showed C.T. a law enforcement ID, always
carried a firearm, told her he was present to protect her on Stone’s orders,
and frequently discussed serious law enforcement matters that he claimed to
be assisting on, like hostage and homicide cases. The PSR concluded that
DeLeon abused that position of trust and thereby significantly facilitated the
commission of the offense by, inter alia, enforcing the conditions of the secret
probation, personally monitoring C.T.’s movements and activities, and
reinforcing Stone’s threats of prison and the loss of custody of her children.
C.T. testified that she never would have complied with any of the conditions
or given DeLeon any money or property if she did not believe those

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No. 24-10115

misrepresentations. See McConathy,
619 F. App’x at 361
(“[T]he investor
would not have invested but for the misrepresentations.”). The court did not
clearly err in applying this enhancement to DeLeon.
III.
The district court did not err in denying DeLeon’s motion for a new
trial, permitting certain lines of cross-examination into DeLeon’s character
witnesses, or allowing the prosecution’s closing statement. Neither did it err
in applying the sentencing enhancements to either defendant.

AFFIRMED.

United States v. Stone

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