Walker v. Studlack

       IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                           
    FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA                          

ANTOINE WALKER,                    :    Civil No. 1:17-CV-2371            
                              :                                      
            Plaintiff,        :                                      
                              :                                      
   v.                         :    (Magistrate Judge Carlson)        
                              :                                      
C.O. STUDLACK,                     :                                      
                              :                                      
          Defendant.          :                                      



         MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                

I.   Factual Background                                                   

This case is a prisoner civil rights lawsuit brought by Antoine Walker against 
the defendant, Correctional Officer Ralph Studlack. In his complaint, Walker alleges 
that Studlack violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment when he indulged in the use of excessive force against Walker during a 
September 26, 2017 encounter between this inmate and correctional officer at SCI 
Coal Township. In the wake of this encounter, Walker was charged with assault, and 
entered a plea of nolo contendere to this charge. As a result of this no contest plea, 
Walker now stands convicted of aggravated assault because of this incident. 
However, even as Walker was a defendant in this state criminal case, he also 
was  a  plaintiff  in  federal  court  pursuing  this  excessive  force  claim  against 

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Correctional Officer Studlack. This Eighth Amendment claim is now scheduled for 
trial in February of 2022, and in anticipation of this trial, the parties have filed 

competing motions in limine seeking a pretrial ruling regarding how the court will 
address Walker’s state court nolo contendere plea and conviction on assault charges 
arising out of this episode in this related civil lawsuit. (Docs. 117, 125). 

For his part, Walker urges us to exclude any substantive evidence relating to 
this nolo contendere plea from the trial of this case and also invites us to prohibit the 
defendant from attempting to impeach him with the fact of this prior conviction. 
(Doc. 117). According to Walker, complete exclusion of this evidence either as 

substantive  proof  or  for  impeachment  purposes  is  necessary  to  avoid  undue 
prejudice to the plaintiff.                                               
Defendant Studlack, in turn, seems to concede that he may not introduce this 

no contest plea conviction as substantive evidence at trial, but argues that he should 
still be permitted to impeach Walker with the fact of this prior conviction. On this 
score, Studlack argues that a total prohibition on impeachment in this manner would 
deny the defense the opportunity to fully explore crucial matters of credibility at 

trial.                                                                    
With the parties’ contrasting position framed in this fashion, as discussed 
below, these motions in limine will be granted, in part, denied, in part, and deferred 


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in part as follows: The defense will not be permitted to introduce this no contest plea 
conviction as substantive evidence at trial. However, we will deny any request to 

totally preclude the defense from using this conviction for impeachment purposes. 
Instead,  we  will  defer  a  ruling  on  the  use  of  the  conviction  for  impeachment 
purposes until trial, when we can make an evaluation of the probative value and 

prejudicial effect of any such impeachment on a fully developed factual record.  
II.  Discussion                                                           
A. General Principles Guiding Motion in Limine Practice              
The Court is vested with broad inherent authority to manage its cases, which 

carries with it the discretion and authority to rule on motions in limine prior to trial.  
See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984); In re Japanese Elec. Prods. 
Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 260 (3d Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds sub nom., 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (the court 
exercises its discretion to rule in limine on evidentiary issues “in appropriate cases”).  
Courts may exercise this discretion in order to ensure that juries are not exposed to 
unfairly prejudicial, confusing or irrelevant evidence.  United States v. Romano, 

849 F.2d 812, 815 (3d Cir. 1988).  Courts may also do so in order to “narrow the 
evidentiary  issues  for  trial  and  to  eliminate  unnecessary  trial  interruptions.”  
Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1069 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation 


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omitted). However, courts should be careful before doing so.              
Legally, there are several different bases for motions in limine. First, such 

motions may be filed when it is alleged that evidence is going to be offered is 
irrelevant and inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. In addition, some 
motions in limine acknowledge the potential relevance and admissibility of certain 

evidence, but seek the exclusion of the evidence because its prejudicial impact 
substantially outweighs any probative value the proof might have.         
In considering motions in limine, which call upon the Court to engage in 
preliminary evidentiary rulings, we begin by recognizing that these “evidentiary 

rulings [on motions in limine] are subject to the trial judge's discretion and are 
therefore reviewed only for abuse of discretion . . . Additionally, application of the 
balancing test under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 will not be disturbed unless it is 

‘arbitrary and irrational.’” Abrams v. Lightolier Inc. 50 F.3d 1204, 1213 (3d Cir. 
1995) (citations omitted); see Bernardsville Bd. of Educ. v. J.H., 42 F.3d 149, 161 
(3d Cir. 1994) (reviewing in limine rulings for abuse of discretion). Yet, while these 
decisions regarding the exclusion of evidence rest in the sound discretion of the 

district court, and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion, the 
exercise of that discretion is guided by certain basic principles.        
One of the key guiding principles is reflected in the philosophy which shapes 


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the rules of evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence can aptly be characterized as 
evidentiary rules of inclusion, which are designed to broadly permit fact-finders to 

consider  pertinent  factual  information  while  searching  for  the  truth.  The 
inclusionary quality of the rules is embodied in three cardinal concepts. The first of 
these concepts is Rule 401's definition of relevant evidence. Rule 401 defines what is 

relevant in an expansive fashion, stating:                                
“Relevant evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make the   
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the   
evidence.                                                            

Fed. R. Evid. 401.                                                        

Adopting this view of relevance, it has been held that “[u]nder [Rule] 401, 
evidence is relevant if it has ‘any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence.’ [Therefore] ‘[i]t follows that evidence is irrelevant 
only when it has no tendency to prove the fact. Thus the rule, while giving judges 
great freedom to admit evidence, diminishes substantially their authority to exclude 
evidence as irrelevant.’” Frank v. County of Hudson, 924 F.Supp. 620, 626 (D.N.J. 
1996)  (citing  Spain  v.  Gallegos,  26  F.3d  439,  452  (3d  Cir.1994))  (quotations 
omitted).                                                                 


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This quality of inclusion embraced by the Federal Rules of Evidence is further 
buttressed  by  Rule  402,  which  generally  defines  the  admissibility  of  relevant 

evidence in sweeping terms, providing that:                               
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by 
the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these  
rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to 
statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 

Fed. R. Evid. 402.                                                        
Thus,  Rule  402  expressly  provides  that  all  “[r]elevant  evidence  will  be 
admissible unless the rules of evidence provide to the contrary.” United States v. 
Sriyuth,  98  F.3d  739,  745  (3d  Cir.1996)  (citations  omitted).  These  principles 
favoring inclusion of evidence are, however, tempered by specific rules which deem 
certain  classes  of  evidence  inadmissible.  For  example,  when  considering  the 
admissibility of nolo contendere pleas, Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
clearly provides as follows:                                              
(a) Prohibited  Uses. In  a  civil  or  criminal  case,  evidence  of  the 
following is not admissible against the defendant who made the plea or 
participated in the plea discussions:                                
. . . .                                                              
(2) a nolo contendere plea;                                          

Fed. R. Evid. 410.                                                        

In  addition  beyond  these  threshold  considerations  of  relevance  and 

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admissibility, Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides for the exclusion 
of some potentially irrelevant but highly prejudicial evidence, stating that: 

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 

Fed. R. Evid. 403.                                                        

By permitting the exclusion of relevant evidence only when its probative 
value  is  “substantially  outweighed”  by  other  prejudicial  factors,  Rule  403 
underscores the principle that, while evidentiary rulings rest in the sound discretion 
of the court, that discretion should consistently be exercised in a fashion which 
favors  the  admission  of  relevant  proof  unless  the  relevance  of  that  proof  is 
substantially outweighed by some other factors which caution against admission. 
Finally, while we possess the discretion to make such pretrial evidentiary 
rulings, we are reminded that we should often exercise caution in this field. In this 
regard, we recognize that:                                                
Parties  frequently  invite  courts  to  make  pre-trial  rulings  on  issues 
of prejudice,  relevance  and     admissibility  through             
motions in limine. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third  
Circuit has cautioned us, however, that “pretrial [rulings regarding 
evidentiary] exclusions should rarely be granted.... Excluding evidence 
as  being  more prejudicial than  probative  at  the  pretrial  stage  is  an 
extreme measure that is rarely necessary, because no harm is done by 
admitting it at that stage.” In re Paoli R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 
859 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 453 (3d 

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Cir. 1994) (noting that the Third Circuit's “cautious approach to Rule 
403 exclusions at the pretrial stage....”). Moreover, the Third Circuit 
has characterized Rule 403, the rule permitting exclusion of evidence, 
as a “trial-oriented rule” and has warned that “[p]recipitous Rule 403 
determinations, before the challenging party has had an opportunity to 
develop the record, are ... unfair and improper.” In re Paoli R. Yard 
PCB Litig., 916 F.2d at 859.                                         

Keiser v. Borough of Carlisle, No. 1:15-CV-450, 2017 WL 4053686, at *2 (M.D. 
Pa. Sept. 13, 2017).                                                      
Judged against these benchmarks we turn to a consideration of the parties’ 
competing motions in limine.                                              
B. The  Defendants  May  Not  Introduce  Proof  of  Walker’s  Assault 
  Conviction as Substantive Evidence, But We Will Defer Ruling Upon  
  Whether that Conviction May Be Used to Impeach the Plaintiff       

Two related legal issues are framed by these motions in limine: First, may the 
defense  in  this  excessive  force  case  introduce  Walker’s  aggravated  assault  no 
contest plea conviction as substantive evidence; and, second, if this nolo contendere 
plea is not admissible as substantive evidence may this conviction still be used to 
impeach the plaintiff if he testifies at trial?                           
As to the first of these two questions, the issue of the substantive use of the 
conviction at trial, the answer is clear. By its terms, Rule 410 prohibits such use of a 
nolo contendere plea as substantive evidence, stating in clear and precise terms that, 
“[i]n a civil or criminal case, evidence of the following is not admissible against the 

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defendant who made the plea or participated in the plea discussions: . . . a nolo 
contendere plea.” Fed. R. Evid. 410(a)(2).                                

Indeed, in the context of a prisoner’s constitutional excessive force claims, the 
Court of Appeals has expressly held that the prisoner-plaintiff’s nolo contendere 
plea conviction to assault charges arising out of any alleged excessive force incident 

is not admissible as substantive evidence. Sharif v. Picone, 740 F.3d 263, 270 (3d 
Cir. 2014). In reaching this result, the Court of Appeals in Sharif emphasized the 
clear command of Rule 410, and also noted its own prior precedents, which have 
made it clear that there is no inherent legal contradiction between a prisoner’s nolo 

contendere plea to assault charges arising out of an affray with the authorities and a 
claim that excessive force was used against that prisoner in the course of this affray. 
Id. at 270 (citing Nelson v. Jashurek, 109 F.3d 142, 145–46 (3d Cir.1997) (“[T]here 

undoubtedly  could  be  substantial  force  which  is  objectively  reasonable  and 
substantial force which is excessive and unreasonable.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir.1999) (plaintiff's § 1983 
claim predicated on excessive force during his arrest is not barred by his nolo 

contendere plea to the offense for which he was arrested). Accordingly, given the 
plain language of Rule 410 and the teachings of the appellate court in Sharif, the 



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defendant will not be permitted to introduce Walker’s nolo contendere plea to 
assault charges as substantive evidence in this trial of this excessive force claim. 

Indeed, we note that the defense concedes as much in their filings, stating that 
they do not intend to make substantive use of this conviction at trial, but arguing that 
the defense should nonetheless be permitted to impeach Walker with the fact of this 

conviction in the event that he testifies as trial.                       
In Sharif the Court of Appeals also provided us with some guidance regarding 
the precise issue confronting us here; namely, how we should assess whether to 
permit the use of a prisoner-plaintiff’s no contest plea assault conviction to impeach 

the prisoner at an excessive force claim trial arising out of the same set of facts 
which led to the assault prosecution. As the appellate court aptly observed: 
Rule 609 governs when prior convictions can be admitted to attack a  
witness's character for truthfulness. Rule 609 reads in pertinent part: 

     (a) In General. The following rules apply to attacking a        
     witness's  character  for  truthfulness  by  evidence  of  a    
     criminal conviction: (1) for a crime that ... was punishable    
     by death or by imprisonment for more than one year, the         
     evidence: (A) must be admitted, subject to Rule 403, in a       
     civil case or in a criminal case in which the witness is not a  
     defendant.                                                      

Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).                           

Since Rule 609 is subject to Rule 403, courts must consider whether the 
probative value of a prior conviction is substantially outweighed by the 
prejudicial effect of admitting the conviction. See Fed.R.Evid. 403. In 

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doing so, we have directed that four factors should be weighed against 
the potential for prejudice in admitting a conviction: (1) the nature of 
the  conviction;  (2)  the  time  elapsed  since  the  conviction;  (3)  the 
importance  of  the  witness's  testimony  to  the  case;  and  (4)  the 
importance  of  credibility  to  the  claim  at  hand. United  States  v. 
Greenidge, 495 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Gov't of the Virgin 
Islands v. Bedford, 671 F.2d 758, 761 n. 4 (3d Cir.1982)).           

Sharif, 740 F.3d at 272.                                                  

Applying these Greenidge factors, the Court of Appeals held that, in this 
factual setting, the first of these factors—the nature of the conviction—weighed 
heavily in favor of exclusion of this conviction for impeachment purposes. The 
Court  noted  that,  while  prior  violent  crime  convictions  are  not  automatically 
excluded as grounds for impeachment, the use of such convictions for impeachment 
purposes:                                                                 
[D]oes require a district court to be diligent in considering the nature of 
the  conviction  and  its  relationship  to  the  issues  at  trial,  and  in 
explaining  its  reasons  for  admission  under  Rule  403.  This  is 
particularly true in a case where the nature of the conviction is so 
closely related to the issue at trial. Not only was the trial about violent 
conduct, [the plaintiff’s] 2009 aggravated assault conviction was for 
the very incident at the center of his civil claim. It was not simply 
similar to the issue at hand, it was the issue at hand.              

Id. at 273.                                                               

The  appellate  court  further  found  that  the  second  Greenidge  factor,  the 
timeliness of the conviction, was essentially neutral and added little weight to the 

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evidentiary assessment that the court must make. However, as to the final two 
Greenidge considerations, the Court of Appeals explained that:            

The  final  two Greenidge factors,  the  importance  of  the  witness's 
testimony  and  the  importance  of  credibility  to  the  claim  at  hand, 
overlap. [The plaintiff’s] testimony was very important as he was his 
only witness, and for that very reason, his credibility was also crucial to 
his claim. . . . In assessing all of these factors we cannot help but 
conclude that the probative value of [the plaintiff’s] assault conviction 
was minimal. Even though his credibility was the key factor in the case, 
this . . . assault conviction added little on top of the [other convictions] 
the jury were already made aware of.                                 

Balancing  the  limited  probative  value  against  the  potential  for 
prejudice, we conclude that the . . . assault conviction should not have 
been admitted. The primary concern regarding prejudice is that the jury 
may believe that the defendant has a propensity towards acting in    
conformity with a prior bad act. See Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 
936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ( “[T]here is inevitable pressure on lay jurors 
to  believe  that  if  he  did  it  before  he  probably  did  it  this  time.”). 
Accordingly, we ask whether the admission of this conviction “ha[d]  
the potential to so prejudice the jury that its weighing of all the factual 
issues  in  the  entire  case  may  be  impaired.” Tabron  v.  Grace, 898 
F.Supp. 293, 296 (M.D. Pa. 1995). The fact that the . . . conviction 
stems from the same incident at issue here makes this type of prejudice 
a particular danger, and given its limited probative value, the balance 
clearly favors not admitting the conviction pursuant to Rule 403.    

In some situations, a limiting instruction, such as that given by the 
District Court, can minimize the prejudice. Here, however, we cannot 
imagine the jury being able to compartmentalize the most recent assault 
conviction—already having evidence of the other [convictions]—as     
relevant only to [the plaintiff’s] character for truthfulness. Such mental 
gymnastics may well be beyond the ability of the common man, and     
may  be  more  confusing  than  helpful  to  the  jury  in  light  of  the 
circumstances, . . . . Jurors would be left wondering what the assault 
that relates to this § 1983 action has to do with honesty.           

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Id. at 273–74.                                                            

While the reasoning in Sharif is strongly suggestive of the path we should 
follow in the instant case when addressing the use of Walker’s assault conviction for 
impeachment purposes, acting out of an abundance of caution, we will decline the 
plaintiff’s invitation to wholly exclude any form of impeachment through this prior 
conviction in advance of trial. Instead, as to this issue we will defer any ruling until 
trial, thus enabling us to determine the proper scope of impeachment, the extent to 

which Walker is impeached by other convictions, the efficacy of any cautionary 
instructions,  and  apply  the  multi-factorial  analysis  called  for  by  Sharif  and 
Greenidge on the basis of a fully developed factual record.               

An appropriate order follows.                                        











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       IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                           
    FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA                          

ANTOINE WALKER,                    :    Civil No. 1:17-CV-2371            
                              :                                      
            Plaintiff,        :                                      
                              :                                      
   v.                         :    (Magistrate Judge Carlson)        
                              :                                      
C.O. STUDLACK,                     :                                      
                              :                                      
          Defendant.          :                                      

                        ORDER                                        
For the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, IT IS 
ORDERED that the parties’ motions in limine relating to the plaintiff’s no contest 
plea  assault  conviction  in this case (Docs. 117, 125), are GRANTED, in part, 
DENIED, in part, and DEFERRED in part as follows: The defense will not be 
permitted to introduce this no contest plea conviction as substantive evidence at trial. 
However, we will deny any request to totally preclude the defense from using this 
conviction for impeachment purposes at this time. Instead, we will defer a ruling on 
the use of the conviction for impeachment purposes until trial, when we can make an 
evaluation of the probative value and prejudicial effect of any such impeachment on 
a fully developed factual record.                                         
                         /s/ Martin C. Carlson                       
                         Martin C. Carlson                           
                         United States Magistrate Judge              

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Dated:  January 26, 2022.                                                 
























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