William Ridley v. State

[[COURTLISTENER_SUBOPINION {"id":"11194565","type":"010combined","part":"opinion","author":null,"source_field":"html_with_citations"}]]
FOURTH DIVISION
                               RICKMAN, C. J.,
                         DILLARD, P. J., and PIPKIN, J.

                    NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
                    physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
                    days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
                               https://www.gaappeals.us/rules



                                                                      June 28, 2023




In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
 A23A0333. RIDLEY v. THE STATE.

      RICKMAN, Chief Judge.

      In this interlocutory appeal, William Ridley challenges the trial court’s order

granting the State’s motion in limine to exclude any evidence related to criminal

charges lodged against the lead investigator in the case. Ridley contends that the trial

court abused its discretion by excluding any reference to the investigator’s arrest, the

charges asserted against him, and the subsequent termination of his employment. For

the reasons that follow, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case to the

trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

      In October 2017, the Paulding County Sheriff’s Office investigated reports that

Ridley had engaged in acts that would constitute aggravated child molestation and

child molestation with two victims. Steve Sorrells, a detective in the Crimes Against
Children Unit of the Paulding County Sheriff’s Office, was the lead investigator.

Sorrells interviewed the victims and their parents, attended the victims’ forensic

interviews, obtained a recorded statement from Ridley, applied for and obtained an

arrest warrant for Ridley and search warrants for evidence in the case, and testified

before the grand jury, which returned indictments against Ridley in October 2018.1

      In November 2019, Sorrells was arrested on two charges of child molestation

and possibly other offenses. He was subsequently terminated from the Sheriff’s

Office. The record does not include many details about the case against Sorrells,

revealing only that, according to the Paulding County District Attorney’s Office, the

events took place while Sorrells was employed by the Sheriff’s Office, the Georgia

Bureau of Investigation conducted the investigation, the Paulding County District

Attorney’s office is not handling the case, and no deal has been reached for his

cooperation as a witness in Ridley’s case. In September 2022, after Ridley’s appeal

was docketed in this Court, Sorrells was indicted by a Paulding County grand jury.

      In anticipation of Sorrells’ testimony in this case, the State filed a motion in

limine to prohibit Ridley from mentioning the child molestation charges against


      1
      Although Ridley was indicted separately for each victim, the indictments were
combined for trial.

                                          2
Sorrells, his arrest, or his subsequent termination from the Sheriff’s Office. In its

motion, the State argued that such evidence would be inadmissible under OCGA §

24-6-608 (specific instances of bad conduct may not be proved by extrinsic evidence,

but may be inquired into on cross-examination if probative of truthfulness or

untruthfulness), OCGA § 24-4-402 (irrelevant evidence is not admissible), and

OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,

or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence.”).

      Following a hearing, the trial court granted the State’s motion in limine.2 In its

order, the trial court initially recognized that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth

Amendment guarantees the right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him

and stated that although the potential bias of a witness is always relevant, trial judges

retain the right to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination. The trial court then

concluded that the evidence at issue was inadmissible character evidence precluded

by Rule 608. In addition, the trial court concluded that the evidence was more

prejudicial than probative and therefore properly excluded under Rule 403. After

      2
          We note that the trial court’s order was drafted by the State.

                                            3
obtaining a certificate of immediate review from the trial court, Ridley filed an

application for interlocutory appeal in this Court, which we granted. This appeal

followed.

      We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion in limine for abuse of discretion.

Hutzel v. State,
359 Ga. App. 493
, 498 (4) (
859 SE2d 495
) (2021). “A party’s motion

in limine to exclude evidence as inadmissible should be granted only if there is no

circumstance under which the evidence is likely to be admissible at trial.

Accordingly, the grant of a motion in limine excluding evidence is a judicial power

which must be exercised with great care.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Id. at

499
(4).

      Ridley contends that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding any

reference to Sorrells’ arrest, the charges asserted against him, and the subsequent

termination of his employment. He argues that the trial court abridged his Sixth

Amendment right to confront witnesses against him and that the risk of unfair

prejudice to the State from admitting evidence of Sorrells’ pending charges does not

substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.3


      3
        Ridley does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion that the evidence would
not be admissible under Rule 608.

                                          4
       “The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States

Constitution guarantees to the defendant the right to inquire about a witness’s

pending criminal charges in an effort to show that the witness has possible biases,

prejudices, or ulterior motives that may influence his testimony.” (Citation and

punctuation omitted.) Carston v. State,
310 Ga. 797, 800
(2) (
854 SE2d 684
) (2021);

accord Kennebrew v. State,
267 Ga. 400, 402-403
(3) (
480 SE2d 1
) (1996).4 Whether

the witness is testifying pursuant to a deal with the State is not crucial to the right to

conduct such cross-examination. Hines v. State,
249 Ga. 257, 260
(2) (
290 SE2d 911
)

(1982); accord Byrd v. State,
262 Ga. 426, 427
(2) (
420 SE2d 748
) (1992); see also

Cheley v. State,
299 Ga. 88, 94
(4) (
786 SE2d 642
) (2016) (Where a prosecution

witness is facing charges but has not entered a deal with the State, “the defendant has

broad scope in exposing the potential for bias in the witness’s testimony[.]”) (citation

and punctuation omitted).

       What counts is whether the witness may be shading his testimony in an
       effort to please the prosecution. A desire to cooperate may be formed


       4
         “Bias is a term used in the ‘common law of evidence’ to describe the
relationship between a party and a witness which might lead the witness to slant,
unconsciously or otherwise, his testimony in favor of or against a party. Bias may be
induced by a witness’ like, dislike, or fear of a party, or by the witness’ self-interest.”
United States v. Abel,
469 U. S. 45, 52
(
105 SCt 465
, 83 LE2d 450) (1984).

                                            5
      beneath the conscious level, in a manner not apparent even to the
      witness, but such a subtle desire to assist the state nevertheless may
      cloud perception.


(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hines,
249 Ga. at 260
(2). In addition, a

defendant’s Confrontation Clause right to inquire about a witness’s pending criminal

charges is not automatically negated by the fact that the pending charges are being

prosecuted by a different district attorney’s office in the state. See Hines,
249 Ga. at

258, 260
(2) (upholding defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine a key

state’s witness concerning pending criminal charges against the witness where the

witness was being held in jail in an adjoining county because of his arrest on charges

in that county).

      The Confrontation Clause does not, however, prohibit the imposition of any

limits on cross-examination into potential bias.5 Trial judges




      5
        For example, in Watkins v. State,
276 Ga. 578, 581
(3) (
581 SE2d 23
) (2003),
the Supreme Court of Georgia recognized that the right of cross-examination integral
to the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation does not mandate “unlimited
questioning by the defense,” and concluded that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it allowed defense counsel to question a prosecution witness about
her pending charges but ruled that counsel could not ask the witness about the
specific nature of the charges pending against her.

                                           6
       retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to
       impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns
       about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the
       issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only
       marginally relevant.


(Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Vogleson,
275 Ga. 637, 639
(1) (
571

SE2d 752
) (2002). These limitations are consistent with Georgia’s Rule 403, which

permits trial judges to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading

the jury.6

       “The major function of Rule 403 is to exclude matter of scant or cumulative

probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.”

       6
          Although the applicability of Rule 403 is not directly challenged here, we
note that in Holmes v. South Carolina,
547 U. S. 319
(
126 SCt 1727
,
164 LEd2d 503
)
(2006), the United State Supreme Court recognized the connection between these
limitations on cross-examination and Federal Rule 403 and explained that although
the Constitution “prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve
no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted
to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence
if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.”
Id. at 326-327
(II). In
addition, the Supreme Court of Georgia, relying on the Holmes decision, found no
constitutional impediment to applying Rule 403 to evidence of prior false allegations
by a complaining witness in a sexual offense prosecution in State v. Burns,
306 Ga.
117, 125-126
(3) (
829 SE2d 367
) (2019).

                                           7
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hood v. State,
299 Ga. 95, 103
(4) (
786 SE2d

648
) (2016). Thus, the trial court’s discretion to exclude evidence under Rule 403 “is

an extraordinary remedy which should be used only sparingly.” (Citation and

punctuation omitted.) Olds v. State,
299 Ga. 65, 70
(2) (
786 SE2d 633
) (2016).

       Here, the trial court found only that evidence of Sorrells’ pending charges was

more prejudicial than probative and never analyzed whether such prejudice

substantially outweighed any probative value. Accordingly, the trial court erred when

it performed its Rule 403 analysis. See State v. Jackson,
351 Ga. App. 675
, 677 (
832

SE2d 654
) (2019) (abuse of discretion standard does not permit application of wrong

legal standard). We therefore vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case for the

trial court to reconsider the motion in limine under the correct legal standard. See

State v. Harris, ___ Ga. ___ (3) (Case No. S23A0090, decided May 16, 2023); State

v. Anderson,
365 Ga. App. 75
, 80 (
877 SE2d 639
) (2022); Jackson, 351 Ga. App. at

677.

       Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. Dillard, P. J., and

Pipkin, J., concur.




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