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Full Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JOSEPH LEE WILLIAMS, 2:22-CV-10693-TGB-EAS
Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
vs. CORPUS (ECF NO. 1);
MICHELLE FLOYD, DENYING CERTIFICATE OF
APPEALABILITY;
Respondent.
AND GRANTING LEAVE TO
APPEAL IN FORMA
PAUPERIS
Petitioner Joseph Lee Williams, an inmate confined at the Central
Michigan Correctional Facility in St. Louis, Michigan, has filed a petition
for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his pro se
application, Petitioner challenges his conviction for first-degree home
invasion; domestic violence, second offense; two counts of resisting or
obstructing a police officer; assault by strangulation; and being a fourth
felony habitual offender.
For the reasons that follow, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is
DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner was convicted following a jury trial in the Macomb
County Court. The Michigan Court of Appeals opinion affirming
Petitionerâs conviction summarized the facts of the case as follows:
These cases arise out of two domestic disputes that occurred
between defendant and the victim, who was defendantâs
girlfriend and the mother of his child. On September 28, 2017,
defendant became angry with the victim, believing she was
having an affair. Inside their apartment, defendant choked
the victim and punched her in the stomach multiple times.
Defendant fled when a neighbor called police after the victim
ran out of the apartment screaming for help.
On November 18, 2017, the victim called police after she
received threatening text messages and pictures from
defendant. Police were called back later that same evening
after the victim told police dispatch that defendant kicked
down her front door and entered her apartment without her
permission. Inside the apartment, defendant found the victim
in her bathroom, took her cellular telephone, disconnected the
call with police dispatch, and hit her in the face with his fist.
Officers responded to the apartment and observed defendant
confronting the victim with a knife. Officers removed the
victim from the apartment and ordered defendant to drop the
knife. Defendant refused to comply, and barricaded himself in
an upstairs bathroom. Officers kicked the bathroom door off
of its hinges and took defendant into custody after a struggle
on the bathroom floor.
The victim appeared under subpoena for the first day of
defendantâs trial, but she was not called to testify. Although
she was instructed to return the following day, she did not
appear for any of the remaining trial dates. After officers were
unable to locate the victim, the trial court allowed her
preliminary examination testimony to be read into the record.
The jury convicted defendant of first degree home invasion,
domestic violence, two counts of resisting or obstructing a
police officer, and assault by strangulation.
People v. Williams, No. 350166, 2020 WL 7413953, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App.
Dec. 17, 2020).
The Michigan Supreme Court denied Petitionerâs request for leave
to appeal the Michigan Court of Appeals decision. People v. Williams, 965
N.W.2d 512 (Mich. 2021), reconsideration denied, 969 N.W.2d 16 (Mich.
2022).
Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus on the following grounds:
(1) Petitionerâs Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were
violated when the State failed to serve Petitioner a copy of its
answer to his application for leave to appeal to the Michigan
Supreme Court in violation of Michigan Court Rule 7.305(D);
(2) The state court erred in denying his direct appeal;
(3) Petitionerâs Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights
were violated because Petitioner could not cross examine the
victim, who was deemed unavailable at trial;
(4) The victimâs absence from trial prevented Petitioner from
presenting a meaningful defense in violation of Petitionerâs
compulsory process rights; and
(5) The trial court erred in its scoring of state sentencing
guideline variables when calculating Petitionerâs sentence.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A habeas petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is subject to the
heightened standard of review set forth in the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (âAEDPAâ). To obtain relief, habeas
petitioners challenging âa matter âadjudicated on the merits in State
courtâ [must] show that the relevant state-court âdecisionâ (1) âwas
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law,â or (2) âwas based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.ââ Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1191 (2018) (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).
The focus of this standard âis not whether a federal court believes
the state courtâs determination was incorrect but whether that
determination was unreasonableâa substantially higher threshold.â
Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007). In other words, âAEDPA
thus imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court
rulings and demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the
doubt.â Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
âA state courtâs determination that a claim lacks merit precludes
federal habeas relief so long as âfairminded jurists could disagreeâ on the
correctness of the state courtâs decision.â Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.
86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664
(2004)). Furthermore, a state courtâs factual determinations are
presumed correct on federal habeas review, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), and
the federal courtâs review is âlimited to the record that was before the
state court.â Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Stateâs Failure to Serve Petitioner a Copy of Its Answer
to Petitionerâs Application for Leave to Appeal to the
Michigan Supreme Court
Petitioner first claims that his due process rights were violated
when the State failed to serve him a copy of its answer to his application
for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court as required by
Michigan Court Rule 7.305(D).1 Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this
claim.
First, the Stateâs attorney attached a proof of service to the Stateâs
answer, indicating that a copy of the answer had been sent to Petitioner.
ECF No. 10-17, PageID.1490. Although Petitioner filed a motion to strike
the answer on the ground that he did not receive a copy of it, the Michigan
Supreme Court denied Petitionerâs motion when it denied leave to appeal.
Id. at PageID.1418. In his motion for reconsideration filed with the
Michigan Supreme Court, Petitioner again claimed that he never
received a copy of the answer, but his motion for reconsideration was
denied. Id. at PageID.1414, PageID.1416.
Petitioner has failed to offer clear and convincing evidence that he
never received a copy of the Stateâs answer. But even if Petitioner did not
receive a copy of the answer, he would not be entitled to habeas relief.
1 In his briefing, Petitioner incorrectly cites Michigan Court Rule 7.302,
which relates generally to electronic filing in the Michigan Court of
Appeals and does not contain a subsection D as referenced by Petitioner.
The Court agrees with Respondent that this reference should be
construed as Michigan Court Rule 7.305(D).
In general, there is no federal constitutional right to appeal a state
court criminal conviction. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 270 n.5
(2000) (noting that â[t]he Constitution does not . . . require States to
create appellate reviewâ in criminal cases); Cleaver v. Bordenkircher, 634
F. 2d 1010, 1011 (6th Cir. 1980) (â[The petitioner] has no federal
constitutional right to appeal his state court conviction.â). The right of
appeal in criminal cases, âis purely a creature of statute,â and âin order
to exercise that statutory right, one must come within the terms of the
applicable statute.â Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977).
Here, Petitioner challenges the procedural due process afforded to
him in his application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court.
But his grounds for habeas relief are exceptionally weak because his
application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court involved
discretionary review of his conviction. See M.C.R. 7.303(B)(1). Indeed, no
constitutional right to discretionary review exists. See Washpun v.
United States, 109 F. Appâx 733, 735 (6th Cir. 2004). Because no United
States Supreme Court decisions hold that there is a federal constitutional
right guaranteeing criminal defendants the ability to file a discretionary
appeal, any defects in the manner in which the Michigan Supreme Court
denied Petitionerâs application for leave to appeal cannot permit habeas
relief. See Alley v. Bell, 307 F.3d 380, 386â87 (6th Cir. 2002) (â[E]rror
committed during state post-conviction proceedings cannot provide a
basis for federal habeas relief.â). Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief
on his first claim.
B. Review of Denial of Relief by the Michigan Court of Appeals
Petitioner next alleges âthat the state court erred in [its] denial of
his appealâ and requests that this Court âhave a âlook throughâ pursuant
to Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. [1188] (2018) when reviewing this
petition.â ECF No. 1, PageID.6.
The Court cannot consider this claim as a viable ground for habeas
relief, but construes it as a request for the Court to deviate from the
standard of review under AEDPA. The Supreme Courtâs decision in
Wilson, however, does not allow habeas courts to review the entire lower
court record and search for potential issues as Petitioner suggests. In
Wilson, the Supreme Court held that federal habeas courts must âlook
throughâ the state court record only to determine the last reasoned state
court decision. 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018) (âWe hold that the federal
court should âlook throughâ the unexplained decision to the last related
state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should then
presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.â).
The last reasoned decision in this case was the Michigan Court of
Appeals decision affirming Petitionerâs conviction. Per Wilson, the Court
must assume that the Michigan Supreme Court adopted the Michigan
Court of Appealsâ reasoning when it denied leave to appeal in a standard,
unexplained order. Accordingly, this Court relies on the Michigan Court
of Appeals decision when reviewing the constitutionality of Petitionerâs
conviction, but adheres to the highly deferential standard set out by
§ 2254.
C. Petitionerâs Confrontation Clause Claim
Petitioner next claims that his Sixth Amendment right to confront
the Stateâs witnesses against him was violated when the trial court judge
permitted the victimâs testimony from the preliminary examination to be
read to the jury after declaring the victim unavailable.
The victim was served a subpoena for trial on June 5, 2019 at 7:40
a.m. ECF No. 10-10, PageID.491. The victim appeared in court for the
first day of trial and stayed for the entire day awaiting her testimony. Id.
at PageID.494. When the first day ended without her testifying, the
victim was instructed to return the next day because she was still under
subpoena. Id. The prosecutor faxed a copy of the victimâs subpoena to her
employer because she was scheduled to work a late shift that evening. Id.
at PageID.486, PageID.494.
On the morning of the second day of trial, the victim did not appear
as anticipated. A detective who had been coordinating with the victim
and originally served her âcalled her several timesâ and left one
voicemail, but after that, âher voicemail was full.â Id. at PageID.495. The
detective estimated that he tried to call her unsuccessfully âclose to ten
times.â Id. at PageID.499. A patrol car was then sent to the victimâs
house, but there was no answer and no sign that she was home. Id. at
PageID.495, PageID.499. The detective also contacted the victimâs
employer, but was informed that the victim did not show up for work the
previous evening and was not presently at work. Id. at PageID.500â01.
The judge ruled that the victim was unavailable, and that the prosecutor
had exercised due diligence to locate her. Id. at PageID.506â07. The
prosecutor was then permitted to read the victimâs testimony from two
preliminary examinations into the record in lieu of her live testimony. Id.
at PageID.507â08.
â[T]here has traditionally been an exception to the confrontation
requirement where a witness is unavailable and has given testimony at
previous judicial proceedings against the same defendant which was
subject to cross-examination by that defendant.â Barber v. Page, 390 U.S.
719, 722 (1968). But this exception does not apply âunless the
prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain [the
purportedly unavailable witnessâs] presence at trial.â Id. at 724â25.
Therefore, when prosecutors seek to admit a non-testifying
witnessâs preliminary examination testimony, the Confrontation Clause
requires satisfying two elements. First, the prosecution must establish
that the declarant is âunavailableâ by showing that âthe government has
made a good faith effort to obtain her presence at the trial proceedings.â
Hamilton v. Morgan, 474 F.3d 854, 858 (6th Cir. 2007). Second, to admit
prior testimonial statements of an unavailable witness, the defendant
must have âhad a prior opportunity to cross-examineâ the witness.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004).
â[G]ood faith efforts are context-specific,â requiring the government
to go to âreasonable lengths . . . to locate, contact, and arrange to
reasonably transport the witness.â Hamilton, 474 F.3d at 859. The
Supreme Court has noted that âwhen a witness disappears before trial,
it is always possible to think of additional steps that the prosecution
might have taken to secure the witnessâ presence, but the Sixth
Amendment does not require the prosecution to exhaust every avenue of
inquiry, no matter how unpromising.â Hardy v. Cross, 565 U.S. 65, 71â
72 (2011) (citation omitted). Significantly, âthe deferential standard of
review set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not permit a federal court to
overturn a state courtâs decision on the question of unavailability merely
because the federal court identifies additional steps that might have been
taken.â Id. at 72.
On the record before it, the Court concludes that the prosecution
and law enforcement made good faith efforts to locate the victim and
secure her presence at trial. See Pillette v. Berghuis, 408 F. Appâx 873,
882 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding good faith efforts satisfied by going to the
unavailable witnessâs address listed on her driverâs license, inquiring
with other witnesses who knew her, researching recent police records,
and calling the witnessâs father). Although the trial court, prosecutor, or
police could have taken additional steps to secure the victimâs presence,
AEDPAâs deferential standard of review requires this Court to accept the
Michigan Court of Appealsâ reasonable rejection of Petitionerâs claim.
Petitioner also had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the
victim at the preliminary examination hearing, in spite of his argument
to the contrary. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief in the absence
of any Supreme Court precedent to support his argument that his
opportunity to cross-examine the victim at the preliminary examination
hearing was inadequate to satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation
Clause. See Williams v. Bauman, 759 F.3d 630, 635â36 (6th Cir. 2014).
The Sixth Circuit has noted that âthere is some question whether a
preliminary hearing necessarily offers an adequate prior opportunity for
cross-examination for Confrontation Clause purposes.â Al-Timimi v.
Jackson, 379 F. Appâx 435, 437 (6th Cir. 2010); see also Vasquez v. Jones,
496 F.3d 564, 577 (6th Cir. 2007). But in Barber, the Supreme Court
explained that âthere may be some justification for holding that the
opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at a preliminary hearing
satisfies the demand of the confrontation clause where the witness is
shown to be actually unavailable.â 390 U.S. at 725â26. For example, in
Al-Timini, the Sixth Circuit observed that the Supreme Court upheld the
admission of preliminary examination testimony of unavailable
witnesses where the defendant had full opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses at the preliminary examination. 379 F. Appâx at 438â39.
At the preliminary hearing in this case, Petitioner was represented
by counsel, who was given a full opportunity to cross-examine the victim,
without any restriction by the examining magistrate. Petitionerâs counsel
took advantage of this opportunity to the extent that he saw fit. Williams,
2020 WL 7413953, at *2â3. As the Michigan Court of Appeals found,
Petitionerâs âmotive to cross-examine the victimâ to âdemonstrate he did
not commit the crimes chargedâ at the preliminary examination was the
same as it would have been at trial. Id. at *3. Accordingly, the trial courtâs
decision to admit the victimâs testimony from the preliminary
examination when she failed to appear in court was not contrary to or an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Bauman, 759
F.3d at 635â36; Al-Timini, 379 F. Appâx at 439.
Lastly, the mere fact that Petitioner had a different attorney at the
preliminary examination than he did at trial does not negate a finding
that Petitioner had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the victim.
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 72 (1980). Petitioner is not entitled to
habeas relief on his Confrontation Clause claim.
D. Petitionerâs Compulsory Process Claim.
Petitioner next claims that his right to present a defense and to
compulsory process was violated when the prosecutor failed to
successfully bring the victim to court to testify in person.
âThe Sixth Amendment guarantees to a defendant the right to
confront witnesses against him and to have compulsory process for
witnesses in his favor.â United States v. Moore, 954 F.2d 379, 381 (6th
Cir. 1992). But the Sixth Amendment does not ârequire the government
to call every witness competent to testify.â Id.; see also Whittaker v.
Lafler, 639 F. Supp. 2d 818, 825 (E.D. Mich. 2009). Instead, the Supreme
Court has held that a defendantâs right to compulsory process is violated
only where he can âmake some plausible showing of how [the witnessesâ]
testimony would have been both material and favorable to his defense.â
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982).
Petitioner presents no evidence that the victim would have offered
exculpatory evidence had she testified or that he planned to call her as a
witness in his defense. In outlining the facts of the underlying case, the
Michigan Court of Appeals decision makes clear that the victimâs live
testimony would have been anything but favorable to Petitioner, as her
allegations of Petitionerâs violence against her formed the basis for the
crimes charged. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on
his compulsory process claim.
E. Petitionerâs Michigan Sentencing Guidelines Claim.
Lastly, Petitioner claims that the trial court incorrectly scored
several offense variables under the Michigan Sentencing Guidelines.
Petitionerâs claim that the state trial court incorrectly scored or
calculated his guidelines range under the Michigan Sentencing
Guidelines is not a cognizable claim for federal habeas review because it
is essentially a state law claim. See Tironi v. Birkett, 252 F. Appâx 724,
725 (6th Cir. 2007); Howard v. White, 76 F. Appâx 52, 53 (6th Cir. 2003).
Simply put, âerrors in the application of state sentencing guidelines . . .
cannot independently support habeas relief.â Kissner v. Palmer, 826 F.3d
898, 904 (6th Cir. 2016). Petitionerâs claim that the state trial court
improperly departed above the correct sentencing guidelines range does
not entitle him to habeas relief because Petitioner has not demonstrated
that this departure violated Petitionerâs federal due process rights.
Austin v. Jackson, 213 F. 3d 298, 301 (6th Cir. 2000). Therefore,
Petitioner cannot obtain habeas relief on his state sentencing guidelines
claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus.
The Court also DENIES issuance of a certificate of appealability
(âCOAâ). To obtain a COA, a petitioner must make âa substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right.â 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To
demonstrate this denial, the petitioner is required to show that
reasonable jurists could debate whether, or agree that, the petition
should have been resolved in a different manner, or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483â84 (2000). When a district court
rejects a habeas petitionerâs constitutional claims on the merits, the
petitioner must demonstrate âthat reasonable jurists would find the
district courtâs assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or
wrong.â Id. at 484.
The Court concludes that jurists of reason would not find the
Courtâs disposition of the petition debatable. Accordingly, the Court
DENIES issuance of a certificate of appealability.
Although jurists of reason would not debate this Courtâs resolution
of Petitionerâs claims, the issues are not frivolous; therefore, an appeal
could be taken in good faith and Petitioner may proceed in forma
pauperis on appeal. See Foster v. Ludwick, 208 F. Supp. 2d 750, 764â65
(E.D. Mich. 2002).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 28, 2023 s/Terrence G. Berg
TERRENCE G. BERG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Case Information
- Court
- E.D. Mich.
- Decision Date
- March 28, 2023
- Status
- Precedential