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[[COURTLISTENER_SUBOPINION {"id":"10840684","type":"100trialcourt","part":"other","author":null,"source_field":"html_with_citations"}]]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Steve Salvador Ybarra, Case No. 25-CV-894 (KMM/DJF)
Plaintiff,
v.
ORDER FOR DISMISSAL
Michelle Kathleen Ybarra, in her individual
capacity,
Defendant.
Steve Salvador Ybarra, Case No. 25-CV-938 (KMM/DJF)
Plaintiff,
v.
ORDER
David Lutz, Honorable Judge, in his official and
individual capacity; Michelle Ybarra; Legal
Assistance of Dakota County, LADC; and Lydia
Clemens, Guardian ad Litem,
Defendants.
Within a matter of days, Plaintiff Steve Salvador Ybarra filed two actions in this
District concerning his ongoing divorce and child custody proceedings in Minnesota state
court. See Ybarra v. Ybarra, Case No. 25-CV-0894 (KMM/DJF) (“Ybarra I”); Ybarra v. Lutz,
et al., 25-CV-0938 (KMM/DJF) (“Ybarra II”). Because his claims concern the same factual
matter, there is significant overlap between the two cases, thus warranting addressing
both in the same order.
In each case, Mr. Ybarra has both filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP”) and has paid the filing fee. See Ybarra I, IFP App. [ECF Nos. 2 & 3]; Ybarra II, IFP
App. [ECF Nos. 2 & 16]. These matters are therefore before the Court for preservice
review pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915
(e) and the Court’s inherent authority to dismiss
frivolous actions, see Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 409 296, 307-08 (1989).
Upon that review, Ybarra I and Ybarra II are dismissed without prejudice, and all pending
motions are therefore be denied as moot.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915
(e), an IFP application will be denied, and an action
will be dismissed notwithstanding the plaintiff’s financial eligibility for IFP status, when
an IFP application fails to state a cause of action on which relief may be granted. See
28
U.S.C. § 1915
(e)(2)(B)(ii); Atkinson v. Bohn,
91 F.3d 1127, 1128
(8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam);
Carter v. Schafer,
273 F. App’x 581, 582
(8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“[C]ontrary to
plaintiffs’ arguments on appeal, the provisions of
28 U.S.C. § 1915
(e) apply to all persons
proceeding IFP and are not limited to prisoner suits, and the provisions allow dismissal
without service.”).
In reviewing whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted,
this Court must accept as true all of the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Aten v. Scottsdale Ins. Co.,
511 F.3d 818,
820
(8th Cir. 2008). Although the factual allegations in the complaint need not be detailed,
they must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). The complaint must “state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.”
Id. at 570
. In assessing the sufficiency of the complaint, the court
may disregard legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. See Ashcroft v.
Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). Pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, but they
still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced. See Stone v. Harry,
364
F.3d 912, 914
(8th Cir. 2004). Further, “a complaint, containing as it does both factual
allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in
law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325
(1989).
II. BACKGROUND
The Ybarras are in the midst of a contentious divorce involving questions of child
custody. See Ybarra v. Ybarra, Case No. 19AV-FA-24-839 (Minn. Dist. Ct.). That case is
currently set for a motion hearing in state court later this month and a court trial in June
2025. See
id.
(Index #216). Ms. Ybarra is represented by Legal Aid of Dakota County
(“LADC”), a non-profit organization that provides legal services to financially eligible
individuals, and Mr. Ybarra proceeds pro se.
In Ybarra I, Mr. Ybarra sues Ms. Ybarra, claiming that Ms. Ybarra misrepresented
her income and assets to qualify for LADC services. He also claims that LADC, an
organization that receives federal funding, discriminated against him, a Mexican-
American, by failing to enforce its own financial eligibility requirements. And he says
that the assigned guardian ad litem (“GAL”) has exhibited bias against him during state
divorce proceedings. Mr. Ybarra expressly asserts four causes of action against
Ms. Ybarra for (1) fraud and perjury; (2) violating his due process and equal protection
rights under
42 U.S.C. § 1983
; (3) violating Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d; and (4) wire fraud in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1343
. Ybarra I, Am. Compl.
[ECF No. 7]. Mr. Ybarra has also filed a Motion for Expedited Discovery,
id.
[ECF No. 6],
an Emergency Motion for Custody,
id.
[ECF No. 10], and a Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order,
id.
[ECF No. 11].
In Ybarra II, Ybarra takes aim at the divorce and child custody proceedings
themselves, claiming that the state trial court judge—Judge Lutz—has failed to rule on
“urgent” motions, that Michelle Ybarra committed fraud and perjury by misrepresenting
her income to the LADC in order to obtain their free legal services, that the LADC has
represented her notwithstanding this fraud, and that Lydia Clemens, the assigned
guardian ad litem, has submitted false reports to the court. Ybarra II, [ECF No. 1].
Ybarra II asserts the same four causes of action as Ybarra I.
Id.
In that case, Mr. Ybarra has
also filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction to Stay the State Court Proceedings,
id.
[ECF No. 3], a Motion for Expedited Consideration,
id.
[ECF No. 4], a Motion for
Immediate Parenting Time Enforcement,
id.
[ECF No. 6], a Motion to Excuse Appearance,
id.
[ECF No. 7]; an Amended Motion,
id.
[ECF No. 8], a Motion to Compel Ruling,
id.
[ECF
No. 9], Motion to Disqualify, id [ECF No. 10], Notice of Motion and Motion for Attorneys’
Fees and Sanctions,
id.
[ECF No. 11]; Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Emergency Custody,
id.
[ECF No. 20], and Motion to Expedite,
id.
[ECF No. 21].
III. ANALYSIS
The Court considers Ybarra I and Ybarra II in turn, though some of the infirmities
below are shared by both cases.
A. Ybarra I
1. Younger Abstention Doctrine
As a threshold matter, the Younger abstention doctrine “requires that federal
courts ‘abstain from exercising their jurisdiction if (1) there is an ongoing state
proceeding, (2) that implicates important state interests, and (3) that provides an
adequate opportunity to raise any relevant federal questions.’” Arseneau v. Pudlowski,
110
F.4th 1114, 1117
(8th Cir. 2024) (quoting Tony Alamo Christian Ministries v. Selig,
664 F.3d
1245, 1249
(8th Cir. 2012)). In such cases, “principles of comity and federalism preclude
federal actions seeking injunctive or declaratory relief.” Tony Alamo Christian Ministries,
664 F.3d at 1249
.
Here, the three Younger abstention factors have been met: Mr. Ybarra’s state
divorce and child custody proceedings remain ongoing. See Ybarra v. Ybarra, Case No.
19AV-FA-24-839 (Minn. Dist. Ct.). Second, the issues at play here—namely, child custody
and divorce—fall into the realm of domestic relations, an area of state concern where
federal abstention is “particularly appropriate.” See Carlson v. Cnty. of Ramsey, Minn.,
Case No. 16-CV-765 (SRN/BRT),
2016 WL 3352196
, at *6 (D. Minn. June 15, 2016) (listing
cases); Rubbelke v. Zarembinski, Case No. 23-CV-0707 (PJS/ECW),
2023 WL 3094371
, at *2
(D. Minn. Apr. 26, 2023) (concluding that numerous federal courts in this District have
concluded that state family court proceedings give rise to Younger abstention) (listing
cases). Finally, the state court proceedings provide an adequate opportunity for Ybarra
to raise his federal issues. Carlson,
2016 WL 3352196
, at *6 (listing cases). Ybarra,
moreover, asserts no facts suggesting that some exception to Younger applies here. While
Ybarra plainly believes that he has been treated unfairly, he points to no specific facts to
suggest that “the proceeding is so fundamentally biased or unfair as to rise to the level of
Younger’s bad-faith exception and to warrant federal court interference.” P.G. v. Ramsey
Cnty.,
141 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1229
(D. Minn. 2001). To the extent, therefore, that Ybarra I
requests injunctive or declaratory relief, Younger requires the Court to abstain from
exercising jurisdiction over such claims.
2. Claims for Money Damages
That said, Ybarra I requests not only injunctive relief, but also money damages,
and Younger abstention does not clearly apply in such a circumstance. See Yamaha Motor
Corp U.S.A., v. Stroud,
179 F.3d 598, 603-04
(8th Cir. 1999)(observing that Younger
abstention does not prevent a court from exercising jurisdiction over claims for damages,
except in certain circumstances). But the Court has reviewed Mr. Ybarra’s damages
claims, and they are nevertheless dismissed as failing to state a claim, as explained below.
Claims Against Ms. Ybarra
Recall that Ybarra sues Ms. Ybarra in Ybarra I, asserting (1) fraud and perjury;
(2) violations of his due process and equal protection rights under
42 U.S.C. § 1983
;
(3) violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; and (4) wire fraud.
See Ybarra I, [ECF No. 7]. There are several problems with these claims.
First, to establish a plausible
42 U.S.C. § 1983
claim, the plaintiff must show that
“[he] ha[s] been deprived of a constitutional right by a person acting under color of state
law.” Sabri v. Whittier Alliance,
833 F.3d 995, 999-1000
(8th Cir. 2016) (citing Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co.,
457 U.S. 922, 924
(1982)). Ms. Ybarra is plainly a private party. “A
private party may be held liable under § 1983 only if it is a ‘willful participant in joint
activity with the State or its agents.’” Magee v. Trs. of the Hamline Univ., Minn.,
957 F. Supp.
2d 1047, 1057-58
(D. Minn. 2013) (quoting Gibson v. Regions Fin. Corp.,
557 F.3d 842, 846
(8th Cir. 2009)). “A plaintiff seeking to hold a private party liable under § 1983 must
allege, at the very least, that there was a mutual understanding, or a meeting of the minds,
between the private party and the state actor regarding the violation of plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.” Id. (cleaned up) (citing Miller v. Compton,
122 F.3d 1094
, 1098 (8th
Cir. 1997)). “Mere allusion to such a conspiracy is insufficient; the conspiracy, or meeting
of the minds, must be pleaded with specificity and factual support.” Id. at 1058 (citing
Holbird v. Armstrong-Wright,
949 F.2d 1019, 1020
(8th Cir. 1991)).
Even setting aside the question of whether Ybarra pled a constitutional violation,
Ybarra’s § 1983 claim against Ms. Ybarra lacks any factual support. Ybarra argues that
Ms. Ybarra’s financial misrepresentations to the LADC not only induced the LADC to
agree to represent her, but also influenced other parties, including the GAL and custody
evaluator, to issue reports favorable to her (and unfavorable to him). Such argument falls
far short of asserting specific and particularized facts showing that Ms. Ybarra, a private
party, reached an agreement with a state actor to violate Mr. Ybarra’s constitutional
rights. See Lawrence v. City of St. Paul,
740 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1050
(D. Minn. 2010) (“[A]
plaintiff alleging a conspiracy between a private party and a government actor must
allege facts that would permit a reasonable jury to find that the two reached an agreement
to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”).
Second, Ybarra’s Title VI claim against Ms. Ybarra likewise fails. Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act prohibits race discrimination in any program receiving federal funds.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Ybarra makes no plausible argument—and certainly fails to assert
any facts in support of that argument—that Ms. Ybarra, a private party, could reasonably
be construed as a program receiving federal funding.
Third, Ybarra asserts that Ms. Ybarra has committed perjury, fraud, and wire fraud
in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1343
(claims one and four). To the extent that Ybarra contends
that Ms. Ybarra has committed a crime, this Court has no authority to investigate or
prosecute such allegations. See United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 693
(1974) (“[T]he
Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to
prosecute a case. . . .”). Further, to the extent that Ybarra asserts a civil claim against
Ms. Ybarra for fraud, fraud is typically a state law claim, and he points to no source for a
federal civil fraud cause of action in this matter. See Williams v. Tweed,
520 N.W.2d 515,
517
(Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (describing “reckless misrepresentation, negligent
misrepresentation, and deceit” as falling under the “broad category of fraud”); Whitson
v. The Minn. Dep’t of Health, No. 19-cv-3165 (ECT/DTS),
2020 WL 5017823
, at *4 (D. Minn.
Aug. 25, 2020) (“Whitson identifies no federal basis for her fraud claim, and ordinarily
that is a state-law claim.”).
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Gunn v. Minton,
568 U.S. 251, 256
(2013). Although
28 U.S.C. § 1331
establishes federal court jurisdiction over federal-law
claims, this provision cannot supply original jurisdiction over state-law claims. The
Eighth Circuit has counselled against the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over state-
law claims where, as here, all federal claims are dismissed prior to trial. See Hervey v. Cnty.
of Koochiching,
527 F.3d 711, 726-27
(8th Cir. 2008) (explaining that dismissal without
prejudice of state-law claims following pre-trial dismissal of all federal claims is the best
course of action “[i]n most cases”).
For these reasons, Ybarra’s federal claims against Ms. Ybarra are dismissed for
failure to state a claim, and any state law claims will therefore be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Allegations Against the GAL and the LADC
One final matter requires some discussion: While Ms. Ybarra is the only identified
defendant to Ybarra I, the Complaint nevertheless alleges that the LADC’s representation
of Ms. Ybarra violates his constitutional right to equal protection, and that the GAL was
biased against him. Am. Compl. at 2, [ECF No. 7]. Recognizing that pro se pleadings are
to be liberally construed, this Court considers whether these allegations assert a plausible
claim for relief, concluding that they do not.
First, Ybarra asserts that the GAL “exhibited bias by treating [him] as an aggressor
while assuming [Ms. Ybarra], a white-passing woman, was a victim.” Am. Compl. at 2
[ECF No. 7].1 But Ybarra provides no facts in support of this allegation. This Court is
“not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual conclusion.” Iqbal,
1 The Court notes that Mr. Ybarra filed a Second Amended Complaint on March 20, 2025.
[ECF No. 9]. However, Mr. Ybarra had already amended his original complaint. He was
permitted that first amendment “as a matter of course.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). “In all
other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written
consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Mr. Ybarra did not receive leave of
court to file a Second Amended Complaint, and nothing in the record suggests he
obtained Ms. Ybarra’s consent to the amendment. Therefore, the Court disregards
Mr. Ybarra’s Second Amended Complaint. However, even had the amendment been
permitted, the proposed Second Amended Complaint does not fix the problems
identified here with the current operative pleading.
556 U.S. at 678
. Accordingly, this allegation is insufficient to establish a plausible claim
for relief. Moreover, the GAL is “entitled to absolute immunity for acts that occurred
within the course of their court-appointed duties, even if their conduct was wrongful and
illegal.” Arseneau,
110 F.4th at 1118
; see also
id.
(“Absolute immunity would afford only
illusory protection if it were lost the moment a state officer acted improperly.”) (cleaned
up). To the extent, therefore, that Ybarra asserts a claim against the GAL in Ybarra I, such
a claim is dismissed.
Finally, Ybarra claims that the LADC discriminated against him, a Mexican-
American male, by electing to represent Ms. Ybarra. Ybarra asserts a cause of action
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq., and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983
. Am. Compl. at 2-3
[ECF No. 7].
To prevail on a Title VI claim, the plaintiff “must show that his race, color, or
national origin motivated the defendant’s discriminatory conduct.” Rowles v. Curators of
Univ. of Mo.,
983 F.3d 345, 355
(8th Cir. 2020) (citing Thompson v. Bd. of Special Sch. Dist.
No. 1,
144 F.3d 574
, 581 (8th Cir. 1998)). To establish a section 1983 claim, “a plaintiff must
plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual
actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 676
. Ybarra asserts the LADC
violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Both
discrimination claims are analyzed under the same framework, requiring proof that
Ybarra was “treated differently from others similarly situated.” Creason v. City of
Washington,
435 F.3d 820, 823
(8th Cir. 2006); Rowles,
983 F.3d at 355
(explaining that to
establish prima facie discrimination case under Title VI requires showing that plaintiff
“was treated differently from similarly situated [persons] outside his protected class”).
Here, Ybarra claims the LADC exhibited “racial and gender bias by denying [him]
access to free legal aid while enabling [Ms. Ybarra’s] fraudulent representations.” Am.
Compl. at 3 [ECF No. 7]. Such allegations are wholly conclusory. Moreover, Ybarra
asserts no facts establishing that in declining to represent him, the LADC treated him any
differently than any other similarly situated person. Thus, to the extent Ybarra also
asserts claims against the GAL and LADC, those claims are similarly dismissed because
he fails to state a claim.
Conclusion
In sum, Ybarra I will be dismissed without prejudice—this Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over Ybarra’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to
Younger, and with respect to Ybarra’s claims for money damages, the federal causes of
action are dismissed for lacking an arguable basis in law or fact, and any state-law causes
of action are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Mr. Ybarra’s IFP
Application, [ECF No. 2], Motion for Expedited Discovery, [ECF No. 6], Emergency
Motion for Custody Transfer [ECF No. 10], and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
[ECF No. 11] are therefore denied as moot.
B. Ybarra II
Ybarra II identifies Judge David Lutz, Ms. Ybarra, LADC, and the GAL as
defendants, and asserts the same cases of action as Ybarra I. See Ybarra II, Compl. [ECF
No. 1]. Contrary to Ybarra I, however, Ybarra II exclusively requests injunctive and
declaratory relief in the form of an injunction “staying” his state family court proceedings
and prohibiting the defendants from further interfering with his “legal rights,” an order
granting him sole legal and physical custody of his children, and an order directing an
investigation into his allegations of financial fraud and civil rights violation. See Ybarra
II, Compl. [ECF No. 1].
Younger plainly precludes this Court from exercising jurisdiction over Ybarra’s
claims. As described above, Ybarra’s claims arise from an ongoing child custody and
divorce proceedings in state court. It is well established that Younger precludes federal
courts, such as this one, from exercising jurisdiction over such cases. See, e.g., Rubbelke,
2023 WL 3094371
, at *2. And Ybarra has not established that any exception to Younger
applies. Accordingly, Ybarra II will be dismissed without prejudice for lack of
jurisdiction. Ybarra’s IFP Application, [ECF No. 2], Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
[ECF No. 3], and Motion for Expedited Consideration, [ECF No. 4], Motion for Immediate
Parenting Time Enforcement, [ECF No. 6], Motion to Excuse Appearance, [ECF No. 7],
Amended Motion, [ECF No. 9], Motion to Disqualify, [ECF No. 10], Notice of Motion and
Motion for Attorney Fees, [ECF No. 11], Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, [ECF
No. 20], and Motion to Expedite Consideration, [ECF No. 21], are therefore denied as
moot.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. Ybarra v. Ybarra, Case No. 25-CV-894 (KMM/DJF) is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE—Ybarra’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under Younger and with respect to Ybarra’s claims for money
damages, the federal causes of action are dismissed for lacking an arguable basis in law
or fact and his state law causes of action are dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
a. Plaintiff Steve Salvador Ybarra’s Application to Proceed IFP in Ybarra I,
[ECF No. 2], is DENIED as MOOT.
b. Plaintiff Ybarra’s Motion for Expedited Discovery, [ECF No. 6], in Ybarra
I, is DENIED as MOOT.
c. Plaintiff Ybarra’s Emergency Motion for Custody Transfer, [ECF No.
10], in Ybarra I, is DENIED as MOOT.
d. Plaintiff Ybarra’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, [ECF No.
11], in Ybarra I, is DENIED as MOOT.
2. Ybarra v. Lutz, et al., Case No. 25-CV-938 (KMM/DJF) is DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
a. Plaintiff Steve Salvador Ybarra’s Application to Proceed IFP in Ybarra II,
[ECF No. 2], is DENIED as MOOT.
b. Plaintiff Ybarra’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, [ECF No. 3], and
Motion for Expedited Consideration, [ECF No. 4], are DENIED as
MOOT.
c. Plaintiff Ybarra’s Motion for Immediate Parenting Time Enforcement,
[ECF No. 6], is DENIED as MOOT.
d. Plaintiff Ybarra’s Motion to Excuse Appearance, [ECF No. 7], is
DENIED as MOOT.
e. Plaintiff Ybarra’s Amended Motion, [ECF No. 8], is DENIED as MOOT.
f. Plaintiff Ybarra’s Motion to Compel, [ECF No. 9], is DENIED as MOOT.
g. Plaintiff Ybarra’s Motion to Disqualify, [ECF No. 10], is DENIED as
MOOT.
h. Plaintiff Ybarra’s Notice of Motion and Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, [ECF
No. 11], is DENIED as MOOT.
i. Plaintiff Ybarra’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, [ECF No.
20], is DENIED as MOOT.
j. Plaintiff Ybarra’s Motion to Expedite Consideration, [ECF No. 21], is
similarly DENIED as MOOT.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Date: April 7, 2025 s/Katherine Menendez
Katherine Menendez
United States District JudgeCase Information
- Court
- D. Minnesota
- Decision Date
- April 7, 2025
- Status
- Precedential