Young v. Vintage Stock Inc

1 2 FILED IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 3 Mar 14, 2024 4 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 9 TAMMY YOUNG, No. 2:23-CV-00296-SAB 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER DENYING 12 VINTAGE STOCK INC, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 13 Defendant. DISMISS 14 15 Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 15. The 16 motion was heard without oral argument. Plaintiff is represented by Conner Spani. 17 Defendant is represented by Jessica Jensen. 18 Plaintiff is bringing a putative class action under the federal Telephone 19 Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) and the Washington Commercial Electronic 20 Mail Act, (CEMA). Plaintiff alleges that she received at least seven spam texts 21 from Defendant, notwithstanding that she registered her cell phone number on the 22 National Do Not Call Registry. She asserts that she never provided her number to 23 Defendant, never had a relationship with Defendant, and never gave permission for 24 Defendant to send any type of telemarketing. 25 Defendant denies these allegations and instead asserts that Plaintiff visited 26 its Coeur d’Alene, Idaho store and signed up to receive the text messages. 27 Defendant now moves to dismiss this action for want of personal 28 jurisdiction. In the alternative, Defendant asks the Court to dismiss the class 1 allegations because the purported class is overbroad and involves highly 2 individualized inquiries unsuitable for class-wide resolution. 3 Motion Standard 4 A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) 5 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), a party may seek to 6 dismiss an action for lack of personal jurisdiction. Once a party seeks dismissal 7 under Rule 12(b)(2), the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that the exercise 8 of personal jurisdiction is proper. Menken v. Emm, 503 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 9 2007). Where the motion is based on written materials rather than an evidentiary 10 hearing, “the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional 11 facts.” Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990). Although the 12 plaintiff cannot “simply rest on the bare allegations of its complaint,” 13 uncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be taken as true. AT&T v. 14 Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996). Factual disputes 15 are resolved in the plaintiff's favor. Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 16 1554 (9th Cir. 2006). 17 B. Personal Jurisdiction 18 The Court exercises personal jurisdiction over defendants if (1) it is 19 permitted by the state’s long-arm statute and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction does 20 not violate federal due process. Id. at 1154. Washington’s long-arm statute extends 21 the Court’s personal jurisdiction to the broadest reach permitted by the United 22 States Constitution. See Wash. Rev. Code § 4.28.185. Because Washington’s long- 23 arm statute is coextensive with federal due process requirements, the jurisdictional 24 analysis is the same. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 25 800–01 (9th Cir. 2004). 26 A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant if 27 the defendant has “at least ‘minimum contacts’ with the relevant forum such that 28 the exercise of jurisdiction ‘does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 1 substantial justice.’” Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 2 (1945)). 3 Specific personal jurisdiction exists when the following requirements are 4 met: 5 (1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct their activities or 6 consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof . . . 7 (2) The claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s 8 forum-related activities; and 9 (3) The exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial 10 justice, i.e. it must be reasonable. 11 Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002). 12 Purposeful direction is analyzed under a three-part test: whether the 13 defendant (1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, 14 (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum 15 state. Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs, Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1228 (9th Cir. 16 2011). The test may be satisfied even if the defendant has no physical contact with 17 the forum state. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. 18 Analysis 19 Defendant argues the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over it. 20 Defendant Vintage Stock, Inc. is a limited liability company with its principal 21 place of business in Joplin, Missouri. Plaintiff is a resident of Spokane County in 22 Spokane, Washington. 23 Because the claims brought under the TCPA sound in tort, the question is 24 whether Defendant purposefully directed its activities toward Washington. 25 Defendants. See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. Here, the parties disagree 26 whether Plaintiff went to Defendant’s store and signed up to receive text messages 27 from Defendant. Plaintiff denies that she did this, and instead asserts that the 28 information in Defendant’s records have been fabricated. At this stage of the 1 proceedings, the Court must resolve all factual disputes in Plaintiff’s favor. Pebble 2 Beach Co., 453 F.3d at 1154. Thus, for purposes of dealing with Defendant’s 3 motion, the Court presumes Plaintiff did not visit the Coeur d’Alene store and did 4 not sign up to receive text messages from Defendant. 5 The allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint are sufficient to establish that 6 Defendant purposefully directed its activities toward Washington. Although the 7 Court agrees it is no longer feasible to assume that an area code for a cell phone 8 number indicates that a person is residing in the state associated with the area code, 9 Defendant’s own records show the text messages were sent to a phone number that 10 was associated with an address in Washington state. Based on this, the Court finds 11 that Defendant purposely directed its activities to a Washington state resident. 12 Whether Plaintiff signed up for the text messages is a question of fact that goes to 13 liability but does not affect the personal jurisdiction analysis. Rather, Defendant’s 14 own evidence shows that it had notice it was sending a text to a Washington 15 resident. Additionally, Defendant has not shown that the exercise of personal 16 jurisdiction over it would be unreasonable. 17 The Court declines to dismiss the class allegations in Plaintiff’s Amended 18 Complaint as requested by Defendant. It is premature for the Court to attempt to 19 evaluate the possible affirmative defenses Defendant may have to one or more 20 class members’ claims. The Court will revisit Defendant’s arguments after 21 discovery and the Court’s consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for Class 22 Certification. 23 // 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 15, is DENIED. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive is hereby directed to file this Order and provide copies to counsel. 5 DATED this 14th day of March 2024. eO... 9 ° bya Sect Stanley A. Bastian Chief United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT?’S MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 5